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Enlightenment discourse advanced an idiosyncratic cognitive framework and epistemology that 
rationalized the overturning of usury laws. Under capitalism, money innately changed as banks 
gained the institutional right to create credit and lend it into existence at interest. The implicit 
ideologies of this discourse instantiated a reframing of traditional conceptions about money and 
interest worldwide. In contradistinction, Islam prohibits riba, a term approximated as 
usury/interest, presenting ethical problems to banking practice. This conflict has yielded Islamic 
banking and finance (IBF), bolstered by a small cadre of Shariah scholars, even though it 
continues to fail in its stated social justice imperatives. IBF evidently charges what is 
commensurate to interest while declaring it does not, promoting its products as ‘Shariah 
compliant’ – a term producing different meanings to different interpreters. This study adopts an 
Islamic maqasid methodology and analyzes discourses in reframing how such an industry 
emerged, how its practice departed from its claims, how it sustains itself, and asks why Muslims 
have not moved beyond it towards alternatives that procure greater possibilities for social and 
environmental justice. It reexamines discourses connected to the historical and contextual 
reframing of money, usury, interest and riba, and isolates the associated semantic obfuscations 
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LIST OF DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
‘Adl = justice 
Aqeeda = creedal belief 
‘Aql = the intellect 
Credo = credit: derived from Latin, belief, to believe in 
Ex-nihilo = out of nothing 
Gharar = excessive speculation or risk taking in investment 
Hadith = a report, but used in reference to a Prophetic tradition 
Halal = permissible or lawful in Islamic law 
Ibadah = an act of worship 
IBF = Islamic Banking and Finance 
Iconolatry = unusual reverence for a signifier or an icon 
IFI = Islamic Financial Institution 
Ijtihad = independent juristic reasoning in Islamic law 
Iman = belief 
Islah = repair, used in reference to restoring a Prophetic practice 
Jahiliyya = pre Islamic era of ignorance 
Khubara = a learned coterie of scholarship 
Maqasid = plural of maqsid, an ultimate telos or purpose 
Riba = a composite Arabic term comprising various economic immorality i.e. usury and interest 
Ribh = profit, legal and ethical profit 
Maslahah = a neutral term that can take on positive or negative correlations depending on 
context but oft taken to mean ‘social benefit’ in an Islamic context 
Mujtahideen = plural mujtahid, an independent legal jurist 
Sunnah = a Prophetic practice 
Qist = justice, denotes putting things back in their proper places 
Tafsir = Quranic exegesis or interpretation of scripture 
Ulama al waqi’ = scholars of contemporary sciences 
Ulama al nusus = scholars of religious texts 














This work focuses on two terms in modern discourse that mean different things to 
different interpreters: money and riba (often translated as interest/usury). It utilizes an ethical 
(maqasid) framework informed by the normative (scholastic) Islamic tradition in order to 
examine discrepancies between faith and practice associated to these terms, as they are 
detectable in discourse, by identifying how power affects the discussion. In introducing the crux 
of the problem, an anecdote seems most appropriate. 
Home purchasing is the lower to middle-class’s biggest investment prerogative and life-
long aspiration, and many claim that buying a home is cheaper than renting, which thereby 
makes it a prevalent objective (Topham, 2012). Accepting this claim, an unsuspecting lay 
Muslim with aspirations of making his first major investment in a home, enters an institution 
advertising its services as ‘Islamic’.1 However, the patron’s initial excitement begins to wane as 
he looks through the proposed financing terms, which seem to mirror the conventional bank’s 
proposal. The semantics of the two contracts seem similar enough; however, the pricing of the 
‘Islamic’ financial institution’s (IFI) contract is noticeably higher (Meera, 2009).2 How can it be 
that this ‘Islamic’ bank, advertising its services as ‘interest-free’, charges more for overall 
financing than the conventional bank charging compound interest? For this proletarian, who 
                                                 
1 Popular culture promotes mortgages over renting, alleging it to be £200,000 cheaper over the span of a lifetime. 
One issue with extracting financial advice from popular culture is that it is usually inserted into public’s psyche by 
marketing campaigns and corporate sponsors of the banking apparatus, as is the case with this notion of mortgaging 
over renting, which is promoted by Barclays bank researchers in this article.  
2 IFIs are known to place stringent demands of more secured collateral only to give back diminished insurance 
entitlements in addition to costing more. Meera writes that the Islamic bank contract “always carries a higher 
financing balance compared to the conventional loan of similar APR” on page 4. 
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neither has the time nor the inclination to delve deep into the historical factors behind the options 
being presented to him, the decision to use the traditional bank may create a feeling of guilt, for 
the local Imam has endorsed one option as ‘Islamic’ and the other as ‘prohibited’.  
This is only one aspect of a much larger discourse; and on the other side of the desk, the 
banker, who may or may not be a Muslim, also faces a quandary. The banker’s career training in 
economics was undertaken at a university that instantiated in him an undoubtedly laissez fair 
view towards both interest and profit maximization and so the precepts of his training likely 
conflict with his moral convictions and the banks’ marketed axioms of being an ‘Islamic’, 
‘interest free’ and or ‘ethical’ lending institution. Ultimately, the most important aspect of 
economic survival in today’s capitalist markets is to beat the competition; thus, under the 
constraints of the current monetary system and its legislative authority, Muslim financiers argue 
that they too must think and behave like capitalists if they are to survive. Hence, many of them 
have been reticent to vocalize their tacit acknowledgement that serious moral predicaments in 
their practice exist.  
We may benefit from looking at this conundrum syllogistically. 
 
Major premise: Islam prohibits riba. 
 
Minor premise: Banking is (a business quintessentially based on) riba (lending debt into 




Conclusion: Banking is not Islamic i.e. attempting to merge conventional banking 
practices and imperatives into an Islamic legal and ethical framework presents an 
intrinsic clash of values.  
 
The universals understood in this Aristotelian deductive syllogism seem to be at odds 
with the tangible outcome even though the premise (protasis) in both instances is sound, because 
the conclusion (sumperasma) that results of necessity is defied by the existence of banks that call 
themselves ‘Islamic’ (Aristotle, 1989). 3 This seems reason enough to investigate the formation 
of this interesting quagmire. This thesis looks at how such a peculiar arrangement has come 
about and tries to explain today’s status quo, where banks wield enormous power over the lives 
of sovereign people, to an audience that comprises not primarily of economists, but rather of 
those who are simply interested in solving practical issues of morality in society. For that reason, 
the targeted audience for this work is not exclusively an academic one, although academics may 
be interested in what is proposed. Rather, the intended audience comprises people that are driven 
by questions related to ethics, social justice and wealth inequality. This would include the 
proletarian previously described, who has unanswered questions about why his options seem to 
be between two equally unequitable choices. However, it goes into depth in a way that classical 
economics treatises cannot due to the conventions of the field.  
The Islamic tradition emphasizes and engenders the qualities of compassion, justice and 
integrity and therefore many people from the Islamic tradition are interested in issues of wealth 
inequality. However, there are many overlapping areas of mutual interest being deliberated upon 
                                                 
3 As a bedrock of deductive reasoning Aristotelian and Stoic syllogisms were defined by Aristotle as “a discourse in 
which certain (specific) things have been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of 
necessity because these things are so” in his Prior Analytics – where he limits his assertions to three categorical 




and proposed within this discussion, which is about exchange parameters that affect us all – not 
only the person looking for a home mortgage. However, both banking and Islam as independent 
discourses underpinned by their own epistemic communities, have their own value systems, each 
of which contain deleterious effects. Hence, in merging these two distinct epistemic systems into 
an institutional formation, one of the value systems will cede to augmentation. In this case, the 
power-influenced augmentation is aptly traced by analyzing the relationship between discourse, 
knowledge and ideology and by analyzing the historical discourses and cognitive framings that 
have shaped these issues and terms. 
Today’s reality is that banks are for-profit enterprises that are legally entitled to 
manufacture money as an interest bearing debt instrument i.e. creating debt to lend it at interest. 
Hence, whether the terminology employed is ‘interest’ as conventional banks label it, or ‘profit 
rate’ as ‘Islamic’ financial institutions term it, the banks’ functionalities are the same (as 
financial intermediaries) although the contract semantics differ (Meera, 2013). Therefore, the 
contemporary utilization of the term ‘Islamic’ does not necessarily translate into ‘ethical’ 
practice, although discourse framers intending to communicate to Muslim audiences 
intentionally use these two terms interchangeably. Therefore, operating within this ambiguity 
there is apparent obfuscation in need of examination regarding the cognitive framing and 
semantic representation of terms and discourse communities dealing with this phenomenon. 
Hence, the discourses articulated by the dominant narrative connected to banking need 
examination; and a similar examination is needed regarding the adoption of mainstream 
nomenclature and its amalgamation within discourses about Islamic terminologies. 
To draw an analogy, if we consider a situation where the pervasiveness of taking 
performance-enhancing drugs becomes the norm to the point where it is in fact detrimental for an 
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athlete to compete without performance enhancers, what should he do? How can he realistically 
compete when what is considered cheating within certain communities becomes the norm in 
others? In that situation, does winning become problematic?4 Should he still compete in an arena 
that does not consider his ethical boundaries? The Islamic response to this is nuanced, but there 
are certain lines that cannot be crossed.  
However, banking, unlike sports, is not an arena of optional participation. Banking is a 
reality that everyone must face in the capitalist world. The wider Muslim discourse community, 
like many others, is still trying to negotiate and navigate the rules and parameters that were set 
up for a ‘game’ that was instituted and developed without its direct participation, involvement or 
consultation in regards to its ethical parameters. Such development occurred within a Western 
discourse community during the Enlightenment era that did not consider Islamic sensibilities as 
its cognitive framing made a departure from traditional values on key issues and terms like 
money and usury. The development of the present global monetary system has its own complex, 
idiosyncratic history. However, Muslims are lacking a unified solution to the greater monetary 
issues presented by this framing because Muslim societies are suffering from, among numerous 
other crises, a crisis in imaginative philosophizing, and ultimately, in applied ethics, and this has 
been pointed out by several contemporary thinkers and Muslim ethicists (Ramadan, 2008).  
The crisis of ethics is a result of numerous factors, primary of which is the presence of 
long-standing Western cultural imperialism. This influence has been examined by scholars of 
post-colonialism and graphed by communication scholars. It is defined aptly by Schiller (1976) 
as: “The sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and 
how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping 
                                                 
4 Another example, maybe more relevant to the average person is the issue of downloading pirated material. 
Downloading copyrighted material has always been illegal, but then why is it so accepted today in society when a 
person downloads a movie or song that he or she has not paid for? 
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social institutions to correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating 
centre of the system” (pp. 9-10).5 Operating as only one aspect of such hegemony, (economic), 
the paradigm of capitalism triumphed in modernity, stifling out all other traditional ideologies 
and conceptions of exchange. As a result, we can understand the context from which ‘Islamic’ 
banking and finance (IBF) was developed in the 1970s. It did so as the most observably 
concerted Muslim reaction to capitalism, emerging while some Muslims succumbed 
ideologically to the secular capitalist paradigm in large numbers. During which time, numerous 
others were enticed by what was perceived as its antithesis in Marxism, which seemed to offer a 
shrewd and perspicacious criticism and alternative to the injustices in capitalism. However, the 
adoption of the nomenclature from the binaries of this dialectic has not boded well for most 
Muslim societies. Moreover, as IBF describes itself in text and talk as an identifiably ‘Islamic’ 
business operation, it, and the historical factors that can explain its emergence, become the 
primary focuses of this research. The intent of which is to explain how Islamic thought and 
discourse could not only embrace an industry like commercial banking that is built on charging 
interest for intermediation, but how this continues to be morally justified, rationalized and 
exonerated all while claims persist from within its practice that dispute that there is a functional 
problem.  
There seems to be a clear departure between faith and normative ethical practice, which 
subsequently is connected to sociopolitical power relations. When history is re-contextualized in 
a manner that looks for a better macro explanation for this, the ‘Islamization’ of banking comes 
to represent only one aspect of a greater capitulation to an entire power paradigm that has 
obfuscated traditional understandings of entire semantic fields including that which comprises 
money and riba as terms. In turn, this reframing has altered Islamic thought’s traditional 
                                                 
5 The terms cultural hegemony and cultural imperialism are used synonymously. 
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understanding of the prohibition of general market injustices by relegating the terminologies of 
its scholastic discourse to an issue of semantics – easily undermined by legalistic maneuvers – as 
currently practiced in IBF.  
IBF has been around for several decades, yet industry insiders and external observers are 
coming to the realization that something has gone seriously afoul in the establishment of it as an 
alleged ‘alternative’. The question looms, why has IBF not distributed greater economic justice? 
That is what research continues to show (Kamla & Rammal, 2013). Why has IBF not 
significantly uplifted the poverty in the Muslim world, in which over half subsist on less than $2 
per day (Obaidullah & Khan, 2008)?6 Moreover, if IFIs are such better alternatives, then why 
have the majority of Muslims not embraced them? Studies on this are still scant, but The 
Economist (2012) claims that only about 12% of Muslims worldwide utilize IFIs. Moreover, one 
Gallup World Poll (2012) conducted across five MENA region countries in 2012 revealed that 
48% of the respondents had heard about ‘Islamic’ banking, but that only 2% of them were 
currently using such services.  
Beck et al. (2009) estimate that 2.7 billion adults have yet to open a bank account, and 
some of this can be attributed to the trepidation people in traditional societies have about aspects 
of banking that conflict with their religious sensibilities and traditional practices, whereas some 
of it is attributable to a lack of opportunity and development. These figures do not provide 
enough substantive data to test any hypotheses and more research about Muslim perceptions of 
banking must be conducted beyond what is investigated here. In addition, Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
(2013) agree to this assertion in their inconclusive ethnographic study. However, here, a logical 
                                                 
6 These researchers from the Islamic Development Bank estimate that this poverty level is in the five most populated 
Muslim-majority countries: Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt and Nigeria. In the age of resource-rich 
Muslim-majority regions, and during an era of never before seen technological possibilities, where the cultivation of 
food and the manufacturing of essential products can be assisted by automated machines and green alternatives, how 
then can people – who claim to live by divine moral standards – still allow such destitution amidst so much excess?  
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conclusion can be reached that Muslims have not largely embraced the operations of IFIs. And 
so, why is that? Some argue that IFIs are a failure because there is an Islamic crisis of faith 
preventing Muslims from using them (Bhatti, 2010). Thus, it may benefit to look at a few 
numbers.  
Paying a credit price above the sales price of an item (finance installments) has become 
normalized in today’s world. For instance, paying more than double for the sales price of a 
home, over a long period (a mortgage), is today, a societal norm. An average mortgage of $200k 
paid over 30 years at 5% interest ends up paying back approximately $461,511.57 to the bank, 
and of this amount $176,011.57 (or 38%) of the total payments go towards interest. This is a 
significant amount of money to pay for financing. However, what is considered ‘significant’ is 
actually relative, depending on the context of one’s cognitive frame. To some 5% is considered a 
‘good’ rate. Hence, instead of $555 per month, which would be the price without interest, one 
pays $1281 – more than double. In modernity, this operation seems normal.7  
Why is it acceptable to charge, for what is essentially time? The answer is not 
straightforward, but it can be found by examining a long history of cognitive framing that has 
happened through discourse affecting the knowledge (justified beliefs) of certain communities. 
Regarding this process of paying for fees on borrowed money, Muslims aware of the precepts of 
their religion fear that such a transaction is an aspect of riba. Yet it seems that there is also an 
observable crisis in faith and understanding of this issue because 25% of the Muslims polled 
admitted that if given two choices they would opt for whichever option was cheaper, regardless 
of whether or not Islamic law or ethics sanctioned it. This diversion between faith and practice is 
usually explainable by identifying the appeals of the claimants, who largely argue on utilitarian 
                                                 
7 Calculations are generated using a standard amortization schedule available at mortgagecalculator.org, based on a 
5% mortgage, with $0 down on a new purchase, which may or may not factor in components of the agreement like 
taxes and tax write-offs. 
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and or materialist grounds. Under mounting pressure to these social norms, some Muslim 
scholars have capitulated to such sentiments and have responded by producing endorsements of 
conventional mortgages. An oft-discussed and controversial example of this is a Dr. Yousef 
Qaradawi fatwa from a 1999 meeting with European Council for Fatwa and Research, which 
tried (unsuccessfully) to give an Islamic justification for purchasing homes with traditional 
mortgages (Research, 1999).8 This fatwa was widely refuted, but in the midst of all of this, 
Islamic scholars who endorse such notions have often themselves become paid members and 
advisors of bank boards, a conflict of interest and potentially another symptom of power shaping 
discourse and knowledge (Al-Sawi, 2001).9 
However, despite this reframing, the consensus in scholastic Islamic scholarship has 
strictly maintained that conventional mortgages are unacceptable because of their structural 
connection to riba; and because of faith commitments, many Muslims are willing to forego the 
ownership of property if the only means of obtaining it is through measures unacceptable in 
Islamic terms. However, this religious conviction provides an opportunity for an exploitative 
market that intends to make money in offering ‘alternatives’ to mortgages. We can see that of 
those polled, 45% said they would be willing to pay more than the conventional loan price for a 
truly Islamic alternative (Demirguc-Kunt, et al., 2013). Epistemic community resistances to 
concepts, although significant, are open to various interpretations. However, this now leads to 
                                                 
8 Taken from the fatwa translation, the following succinctly displays the utilitarian argument, “Prohibiting usury is a 
matter that concerns the host non-Muslim countries, and which Muslim communities can do nothing about [it] (sic). 
It has many things to do with the socio-economic philosophies of the host countries. However, in these countries 
what is required of the Muslim is to establish the shari'a's rulings in matters that concern him in person such as the 
rules that govern acts of worship, food, drinks and clothes, marriage, divorce, inheritance and so on. If Muslims 
choose not to deal with these invalid contracts, including contracts involving usury in non-Muslim countries, this 
would weaken them financially. Islam is, however, supposed to strengthen Muslims not weaken them, increase 
rather than diminish them, benefit and not to harm them” (p. 1). 
9 Al-Sawi’s 86-page refutation was produced to pinpoint the inaccuracies in the Qaradawi fatwa, chief amongst 
which was the identification of Western lands as ‘abodes of war’ wherein Muslims are not responsible for the 
economic rulings of Shariah and that all necessities become permissible under extreme conditions (darura). 
However, any land where a Muslim is allowed to follow the precepts of his religion is a land of peace, and therefore 
the very basis of the mortgage fatwa was faulty.  
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the crux of the matter: why are we even having this discussion? The mortgages offered by IFIs 
cost even more than conventional bank mortgages; therefore, interest fees are clearly being 
levied, but they are simply not being called ‘interest’. Therefore, if IFIs are charging amounts 
commensurate to, or more than traditional banks, but they maintain that they are not charging 
interest, what is really going on?  
The aforementioned illustrations simply elucidate some of various issues being raised 
about the ethical nature of commercial banking in general, but within a context that is tied to a 
community that wants its ethics and business transactions to be informed by Islam. For the 
individual buying a house, this is a big issue; but why should society care if this person can or 
cannot get an interest-free loan? The answer takes much historical contextualization to reframe. 
In essence, this issue is connected to a greater apocalypse that human beings and the natural 
world are all facing, which is intimately tied to the notion that the entire monetary system has 
failed to serve its purpose of assisting and benefiting societies. Its failure continues to have 
measurable social, political and environmental ramifications (Brown, 2012).  
The crux of the problem seems to be that discourses of power are redefining terms and 
parameters, which thereby affect perceptions and meanings, allowing the legal justification of 
unethical practices that simultaneously prevent the emergence and development of ethical 
alternatives. Mortgages, derivatives and hedge funds are part of a global system built on debt and 
interest. Global debt in 2008 was $152 trillion; and within the decade subsequent to the 2008 
crisis it has grown to $186 trillion, which is 212% of global GDP, a system that literally ‘piles 
new debts on top of old’ (The McKinsey Global Institute, 2013). In this exchange paradigm, 
money is itself an instrument of debt attached to interest. The very nature of money has been 
grotesquely altered as an idea because of the way it comes into existence today, by banks 
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creating debt. In brief, money is debt and there is not enough of it ever in existence to pay back 
what is owed, which ultimately means the system is perpetually dependent on unnatural growth. 
All of this is a huge catalyst in driving systems to the brink of irreversible damage; and the state 
of the environment and impending extinction of numerous species speak to this fact (Al-
Jayoussi, 2012).  
One study claims, “In a business-as-usual scenario, our demands on planet Earth could 
mount to the productivity of 27 planets Earth by 2050” (Mora & Sale, 2011, p. 261). This is in 
no way a problem exclusively facing Muslims. The debt and interest system is a global issue. 
The connection that is not being made, however, is that in recreating destructive systems, 
Muslims are adding to the problem whereas their ethics should be driving them to be catalysts 
for progress. An IBF scholar, Prof. Habib Ahmed acknowledged in a presentation (2014) that the 
IBF sector creates “legal contracts to expand debt in Muslim societies,” conceding that in IBF 
“you may have an act which is legal” that “can be unethical” (Ahmed, 2015).10 
The contention made in this research is that if we use an ethical lens to redefine the 
semantic field that comprises money, usury, interest, and riba by considering overlooked 
historical and contextual knowledge, money then clearly becomes delineated as a part of the 
commons. Therefore, monopolizing it and charging for its ‘use’ is identifiably an ideologically 
motivated framing, which in practice translates into an ethical violation of human (property) 
rights. However, the converse to this argument, which presently prevails, is a cognitive framing 
of money that is very ideological, as a type of commodity to be hoarded and controlled by a 
process entirely inequitable in its arrangement, which therefore sanctions the ‘renting’ of money 
as any other tangible commodity; traditionally this was called usury. Hence, adopting and 
                                                 
10 This quote is taken from a presentation posted on YouTube on March 6, 2014 titled Defining Ethics in Islamic 
Finance | Professor Habib Ahmed, Durham University, in which the professor discusses some of the issues 
regarding current practices in IBF.  
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supporting the ideological assumptions that underpin banking is, thus, in a re-contextualized 
understanding, a form of iconolatry – the adoration of an image (from Greek eikōn/image) that 
places money as the ultimate item of adulation – an item that is able to take on a personality of 
its own that makes human affairs subservient to it. In Theology of Money, Goodchild (2009) 
suggests that this ideation of money is similar to treating it as a god. However, for reasons 
largely attributable to greed and power, this knowledge has been obfuscated and largely detached 
from the mainstream narrative. The same can be said for the sub-discourses framing this issue 
within Muslim polities.  
Identifying that this is how we should frame this issue and analyzing how it took place 
within Muslim discourse communities in this context is largely uncharted territory because 
economics discussions are usually centered on policy decisions, and not particularly entrenched 
in ethics. The ethical problems with this arrangement are being addressed in monetary reformist, 
environmentalist and ethical sustainability circles; however, they are simply not gaining traction 
in ‘Islamic’ ones. For instance, Petifor (2013) highlights notions in support of the contention that 
money, if removed from ideological influence, ought to be defined as a ‘social construct’ and a 
‘public good’. She argues that it can never be claimed that there is simply ‘no money’ for public 
needs, major threats and fighting poverty. This may sound utopian, yet more context is needed; 
‘the commons’ are the naturally existing resources available to all members of society, like air, 
water and habitable land. A free society has certain rights, one of which is the right to exchange 
items freely. In order to do that, society uses money, which should never be artificially kept 
scarce or hard to come by (Greco, 2009). The pragmatics contextualizing our understanding of 
‘currency’ denote a concept that implies circulation as a current does in a body of water. A 
sophisticated economy’s life force is dependent on currency circulating the way blood does in a 
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body. The smoother and faster it flows, the better. Therefore, what credit is at its essence is our 
future obligations to one another, the fulfillment of promises made towards one another. 
 Pragmatics, which looks at how context affects meaning, would help to contextualize 
how the term credit is used today as our obligations, our commitments, or our IOUs. Each 
individual getting up and going to work every day, creating value, creates these obligations. 
People and their potential to provide value to each other are the source of wealth; this is true in 
both cosmologies that acknowledge the divine source of all things, and those that do not. 
Metaphysics would simply require going a step further and recognizing the divine agency behind 
allowing people to create such wealth. Nevertheless, people must maintain the right to exchange 
goods or services with one another. However, to facilitate such transactions in advanced societies 
an instrument of record keeping is needed. This is credit. Credit comes from credo, meaning a 
‘belief’ that someone is going to pay back what he or she has promised. In order to keep count of 
‘who owes what to whom’ a system of bookkeeping is needed.  
Graeber (2011) cites numerous examples in his assertion that anthropology has shown for 
over a century that this is indeed how almost all traditional societies created and managed 
money, through bookkeeping and maintaining systems to issue, manage and regulate it in 
communal credit-clearing houses. Their formations varied, but these systems all essentially 
shared similar features of assessing credit and creditworthiness, risk, skill, and allowing 
communities to govern and audit these systems. These communal credit-clearing houses operated 
in the Agrarian Age (3500 BCE- 800 BCE), the Axial Age (800 BCE- 200 CE), and for many 
communities they endured through the Middle Ages up until the capitalist age. A distinct feature 
of communities issuing credit it such a manner is that it incurs little to no opportunity cost 
because it is free for someone to offer up his or her commitment (promissory note). What this 
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tells us is that most of the charge connoted by the term ‘interest’ is unnecessary in a system 
where credit is money. Likewise, by a credit-clearing house inexpensively insuring against a 
borrower’s pledge, such a commitment can be immediately transferred to other members in a 
system – a necessary feature of credit – to be used as communal credit i.e. money. Hence, very 
inexpensive communal credit issuing and bookkeeping is what contemporary society needs its 
monetary institutions to do (Greco, 2009).  
However, instead of people having the right to access their own credit, based on 
localized, democratic institutions assessing their risk profiles and etcetera, a long historical 
process led to Western governments enacting legal tender laws underpinned by a distinct 
ideology that together has usurped this fundamental right and granted it to banks. Banks 
therefore enjoy a monopoly on credit creation and allocation. What is more detrimental is that 
banks are for-profit institutions that charge mathematically compounding ‘use fees’ for the 
commoners to swap their credit with each other – hence credit is made artificially scarce – and 
the compounding fees are such that natural production cannot keep pace (Kennedy, 1991). That 
production cannot keep up with compound interest is not a matter of opinion, but simply a matter 
of mathematics and the boundaries of physical production because debt plus interest is always 
more than any given debt (P+I > P). However, instead of treating money as part of the commons, 
money has become defined as a commodity that has a ‘time value’.  
Money in the Middle Ages in some communities, especially European ones, started to 
distinctly gravitate away from being credit-based to being eventually replaced by circulating gold 
and silver, which became the default exchange practice in many societies leading up to the 
modern era. However, money today is no longer some cow, malleable metal or tangible item of 
utility: it is simply a promise. These two different histories essentially formulate into two 
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different signifiers of the same semantic term: money. Moreover, what the field of economics 
has done, is to embrace notions of money that are essentially informed by semiotic renderings of 
money as a commodity while in actual practice, banks create money as debt i.e. credit. Thus, 
herein lies an operation that must be critically examined in terms of semantics. What exactly are 
we referring to today when we say the word money? Banking as an operation benefits from 
premeditated ambiguity of this semantic field, i.e. obfuscation. Therefore, so too do IFIs. 
This chosen arrangement for the genesis of all credit in the global system has ethical 
issues: i.e. the concept that the possession of money today is absolutely worth more than money 
tomorrow and that one should be able to charge for the definite opportunity loss that would occur 
from lending it. What opportunity is lost? If money is invested, it has the potentialities of both 
increase and decrease. However, a fixed return nixes all of that and eliminates potential risk by 
ensuring a payment purely for the use of credit – credit that is today simply created on ledgers 
and computer screens at virtually no cost. This seems bizarre, and as Galbraith said, “The study 
of money, above all other fields in economics, is one in which complexity is used to disguise 
truth or to evade truth, not to reveal it. The process by which banks create money is so simple the 
mind is repelled. With something so important, a deeper mystery seems only decent” (2001, p. 
1). This is possibly an oversimplification, but it encapsulates nonetheless, the widespread schema 
of interpretation that justifies interest charges in our contemporary monetary system. However, 
in truth, there is no deep secret to creating money. We are the money. When we promise to work 
and pay it back, it becomes real. It is that simple. 
The financial system is a set of rules and social institutions that decide how and why 
someone has the right to own and manage wealth generated in the economy; it decides the terms 
of distribution, and within those limitations rests the concept of property rights (Galbraith, 2001).  
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In such a system, money is just a tool to distribute ownership; it is the carrier of economic power 
used to allow agents to acquire different services and goods, a quality called liquidity (Smith, 
2013). In order for money to operate in a sophisticated economy, it must assert the right of 
ownership. Whenever people are assured that they can obtain other goods and services with an 
instrument, such an instrument instantaneously qualifies as money. When money loses this 
quality, it ceases to be money. So ‘just’ money, though not simple to define unless historically 
reframed, does have some stark characteristics. It is ‘neutral’ (meaning it does not unfairly 
benefit its creator), and it serves the purpose of the credit commons – meaning it is not made 
artificially scarce – and in order to remain stable it cannot have a compounding fee attached to its 
usage that imbalances its supply to the benefit of a minority at the expense of the majority.  
Now in the midst of a crisis of ethics, the most identifiably ‘Muslim’ concerted response 
to this has been to mimic the operations of commercial banking, by charging for the same 
operations and relabeling them with Arabicized names. However, the trajectory of this 
development has been very different from the trajectory by which usury became accepted in the 
West and renamed as interest. An ethical consideration of this starkly different history seems to 
have been overlooked in the development of IBF and its discursive literature. Today, IFIs 
similarly charge fees that are commensurate to or greater than bank fees, simply for keeping the 
public’s books and ledgers for them (Beinhocker, 2007). Instead of focusing on the fact that this 
is unnecessary, and unethical in various ways, the discourse instead revolves around the 
semantics of how the stratagems utilized by IFIs are ‘legal’ and ‘Shariah-compliant’; and 
therefore, the industry alleges that its operations must be an improvement on old-fashioned usury 
in its unsophisticated form. It is further argued that there is a qualitative value that IFIs provide 
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to the Muslim community by avoiding the direct financing of products that are considered 
prohibited in Islamic law like pork, alcohol and pornography.  
Undoubtedly, there is some ethical value in trying not to channel money towards illicit 
industries. And one being critical of IBF would have to acquiesce that this is a qualitative 
difference between IBF and conventional banking that should be noted. On the other hand, this is 
a strange conundrum: banks that avoid financing liquor and pork while operating under religious 
pretenses only to hide interest charges through semantic obfuscation. Additionally, these are 
banks that consistently feature abysmally in social corporate responsibility studies (SRI). For 
instance, a report by Hayat (2013) recently assessed IBF as a ‘profit-seeking first’ banking 
industry. Nevertheless, the industry continues to proceed on its trajectory with impunity. Because 
there is no existing authority that can hold institutions accountable for advertising their services 
as ‘Islamic’ – which is a signifier of different things to different interpreters – but as a marketing 
tool, it is terminology that is powerfully employed in order to frame a conception of religious 
adherence to the prohibition of riba. However, these institutions are clearly charging interest of 
some sort (implied interest rates); although the claim is that, these calculable financing charges 
are not interest, and not riba. Yet the majority position of scholastic Islam is that any increase on 
a loan whatsoever is riba, which is against Islamic law for moral, social and economic reasons 
(explored in Ch. 4). In Islam, trade and business are very much promoted. However, money does 
not beget money and so money is not charged for money. This parallels many other religions and 
their rulings on usury (Reed & Bekar, 2003). But resulting from pressures created by the 
normalization of interest in the global economy, the topic of usury has been reopened for 
reinterpretation, and discourse communities that are identifiably Muslim are now seriously 
questioning what is being presented by banks, both ‘Islamic’ and conventional.  
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Because the traditional semantic fields defining the terms usury, interest, and money, are 
no longer applicable to today’s non-traditional and ‘modern’ world, numerous new 
understandings are being cogitated of what Islam actually prohibits in re-contextualized terms. 
This is why the issue becomes an ethical inquiry into comparing principles to practices by 
examining the effects of cognitive framing, semantics and contextual (pragmatic) meaning 
within discourse communities. Although it is true that “discourse analysis is a term which has no 
stable definition” (Hogan, 2013, p. 2), it is a vital tool nonetheless. As critical discourse analysis 
takes a normative stance, and clearly points out, power is ubiquitous and hegemony always 
benefits from the preservation of maintaining certain status quos in discourse and debate (Van 
Dijk, 1993). As a result, some Muslim writers, clearly influenced by this discourse, have adopted 
positions arguing that interest is no longer a sin because the global banking industry has been 
modernized and regulated in a way that prevents systemic injustice (Masud, 1996). Because of 
the points of divergence on the semantics of what constitutes usury, interest, and riba, several 
different interpretations of justice are competing for implementation.  
This uncertain vision and lack of uniformity cannot function as a long-term solution for 
Muslims living in the West, or for polities comprised of Muslim majorities. Furthermore, the 
current economic plight of the world’s poor, the most affected by this macro financial scheme, is 
having ever-increasing repercussions on global society and the environment. Evidenced by the 
uprisings sweeping through various parts of the world, many societies now feel like a new social 
contract is necessary. According to emerging research on the factors that led up to the Arab 
uprisings which began with Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, the dire economic situation, particularly 
for young males and the unemployment numbers in the MENA region were considerably the 
prime instigators (Tikuisis & Minkov, 2015). Quantitative and qualitative analyses continue to 
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contextualize the uprisings by examining the 2008 U.S. economic crisis and the resultant 
measures taken to adjust the United States’ monetary base (by bailing out banks). Such moves 
translated into commodity price explosions and social instability for poorer MENA nations that 
could no longer afford to import the foodstuffs priced in dollars that were needed to maintain 
social stability (Farha, 2015).  
Meanwhile, IBF and the role it fails to play in any social change, is drawing criticism 
from former practitioners, policymakers and insiders who have become dissidents. For instance, 
there is El-Gamal (2006), and El-Diwany (2010), whose works are examples of scathing reviews 
of IBF operations written by experienced, ex-IBF insiders. However, the recommendations made 
by the authors of these two works cannot be reconciled on what the proper direction forward 
towards something more ethical and sustainable should be because the authors can neither 
reconcile on the semantic signifier of money, nor can they agree on what constitutes riba; thus, a 
uniting vision remains elusive. This dearth of a unified solution allows the maintenance of the 
status quo, while energy is simultaneously diverted away from moving beyond these institutional 
frameworks to radically different ethical alternatives.  
There are many ideas being promoted under the general scope of monetary reform that 
range from the very sensible, to the purely ideological, to the outright erroneous. This ubiquitous 
situation is the same within discourse in Muslim polities. There are groups, primarily in 
Southeast Asia, that have been lobbying for a full reimplementation of precious metals as money 
for over a decade (Maurer, 2002).11 This argument for a return to money with ‘intrinsic’ value 
gained some traction because there has been a growing understanding that an alternative needs to 
                                                 
11 Maurer goes into the arguments of different groups but it is much more complicated than his narrative. For 
instance, the Murabitun World Movement, a Sunni Muslim group, has amongst many other similar groups 
adamantly called for a return to using physical precious metals in the marketplace as money for over a decade. 
Interestingly, Dr. Abdulqadir Al-Sufi, formerly known as Ian Dallas, issued a statement calling to cease and desist 
all dinar propagation in 2014. 
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be addressed. However, steering sentiments towards alternatives that do not address the core 
issues has also likely helped to derail serious discussions about monetary ethics and justice. This 
is especially the case in Malaysia where ex-Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mohamed Mahathir, on 
several occasions, called for the use of gold dinars in trade, which was interpreted as an 
endorsement for returning to a bimetal economy by dinar advocates (Bhal, 2007).  
However, whether it is recognized or not, this nostalgic yearn to using gold dinars and 
silver dirhams in global trade plays into a narrative entirely acquiescent to the biddings of power. 
It is an understandable, yet simplistic yearn for a return to a glorious past in the midst of an 
abysmal present. Yet, central banks and multinational mining companies have little to object to 
regarding a return to using their products (metals) as money instead of credit, as they would 
stand to gain heavily in its implementation. Mammoth-sized multinational corporations have 
markets cornered in most of the mining areas throughout the third world and it makes little sense 
that the solution to a complicated economic problem would lie in something so anachronistic – 
and similarly – so beholden to the power structure. It in fact becomes a circular argument, again, 
in support of iconolatry: ‘let us use gold coins and the market will work itself out’. Gold, 
however, cannot distribute justice. Humans have always been tasked with that. When 
governments are in a liquidity crisis, and in need of money to feed their starving populations, are 
they to go digging in the dirt for gold? It still would not alleviate the problem of interest. 
In taking a clear normative stance on the issue, when it comes down to it, interest really 
appears to be the most crucially unaddressed problem in terms of economic and social inequality. 
This is because it is so identifiably at the center of income disparity, but remains tritely ignored 
and unquestioned because the word ‘usury’ conjures up unsettling religious baggage that a 
modern secular world flouts and sequesters to an area removed from serious mainstream 
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discourse. Those who are able to best articulate the money creation process in conventional 
banking belong to different discourse communities than those who best articulate signifiers like 
riba in Islamic scholarship. What the signifier riba has traditionally represented can be 
interpreted into a plethora of modern operations if contextualized properly. One such operation is 
the banking process of creating debt plus interest as a money supply (Greco, 2009). However, 
traction is unremarkable in framing this within the Muslim discourse community that addresses 
Islamic financing issues. Moreover, one would question why this issue is not paid more attention 
to when quantitative analyses directly tie the issues of deforestation, poverty, starvation and 
climate change to the effects of this type of money creation (fractional-reserve banking) (El-
Diwany, 2010).  
Again, only an ethical analysis will cause the reconsideration of this on a systematic level 
because most of what is done in banking is conducted within the confines of the law, which in 
capitalist nation-states, is the only dynamic authority presiding over human agency. Although, 
aside from interest, there is an equally important tertiary issue, which is the lack of economic 
justice being administrated by the functionality of banks in general, including IFIs (Kamla & 
Rammal, 2013). IFIs operate under the guise of religious and moral axioms. Therefore, their 
inability to facilitate any generally measurable instances of greater wealth distribution in society 
after four decades – even if we dismiss their participation in hiding interest charges through 
linguistic denotative ambiguities – has been a telltale sign of the ethical quality of their modus 
operandi, which, no different than Western-styled banks, seems to be pure profit-seeking. The 
‘Islamic’ products are in fact often more expensive for customers because of the fees IFIs collect 
to pay an elite class of shareholders, which are in addition to the fees collected to retain Sharia 
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scholars to oversee their operations that El-Gamal (2006) calls ‘Shariah-arbitrage’ (paying for 
fatwas and oversight committees). 
Observant Muslims desire financing options that are ethical, which they ideally envisage 
as truly interest-free financing arrangements, where one only pays the sale price of an item and 
nothing more. What is presented instead to Muslims are options that use the jargon of ‘Shariah-
compliant’ and ‘riba-free’ that still cost the same, if not more than other financing options. 
Currently, 0% financing options for big purchases such as homes do not exist in any institutions 
that claim to be ‘Islamic’. Therefore, it may seem that the problem is systematic because despite 
the arrangement of the current economic system, 0% financing has existed in other spheres of 
exchange for decades. Take the unique example of JAK Members Bank (JAK Medlemsbank), an 
authentic interest-free institution in Sweden that gives interest-free home loans to its 38,000 plus 
members, while operating under the following principles:  
 Charging interest is inimical to a stable economy 
 Interest causes unemployment, inflation, and environmental destruction 
 Interest moves money from the poor to the rich 
 Interest favors projects which yield high profits in the short term (short-term thinking) 
(Burton, 2008). 
 
Admittedly, JAK is not highly profitable; it only survives on co-op like yearly dues as it 
facilitates interest free financing for its members from its pool of savings. But that is exactly the 
point, that without ideological commitments to charging interest, credit facilitation facilities can 
be distribution centers for society’s access to their own credit, rather than monopolies on wealth 
or highly profitable businesses. In recognizing the intrinsic difference here, JAK does not utilize 
the axiom of ‘interest-free’ (or riba free) to charge more than the price of the item being 
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financed, whether it is a car or a home. Since it is possible, then, the question looms, why are 
Muslims unable to move beyond ‘Islamic’ banks and establish more of these types of ethical 
exchange facilities? 
Some may find this question itself to be insignificant. Others may question why it should 
matter if IFIs are swindling an insignificant amount of observant Muslims. However, the IBF 
industry now annually registers in the trillions of dollars, making it significant (Financial Times 
estimates 1.8 trillion) (Barnes, 2013). In addition, the answers to these questions are connected to 
a growing trend in research that seeks to question our conceptions about money, which means 
considering the possibility that we may need to replace the entire capitalist banking system that 
governs world trade. Because of the observably flawed system of exchange we presently use, 
these questions are also being raised from the inside of institutions that have vested ideological 
commitments to the continuance of the status quo as such. Thus, as expected, due to stakes, some 
take the opportunity for re-evaluation to opine solutions that reform certain aspects of the system 
while consciously ignoring others. For example, an IMF paper by Benes and Kumhof (2012) that 
questions money creation powers without addressing the question of interest.12  
Stiglitz (2002), among others, points out why institutions like the IMF are controversial 
and not impartial.13 This should be expected as Foucault has explicated in Truth and Power 
(1979), that “truth” becomes a “system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
                                                 
12 Another popular platform is Positive Money in the UK, headed by monetary reformers who argue that it is 
unethical and unfair that commercial banks have been granted the right to literally create money from debt. 
However, they similarly intentionally avoid tackling the issue of charging interest on that debt.  
13 The Chicago plan white paper alludes to Fisher’s 100% reserve argument that requires banks to lend out what they 
actually have in reserves rather than creating loans against money they do not have, but simply leverage. In 
monetary reform, this is actually seen as a distraction because it only addresses money creation and not interest, 
which is identifiably the bigger issue. Stiglitz discusses the ten points of the Washington Consensus and the 
neoliberalization that was pursued after the fall of the USSR. Stiglitz points out that the conditionality placed on the 
ten points compromised the political and economic sovereignty of the nations it was implemented on among other 
criticisms. Hence, the IMF is controversial, and its funding of studies ultimately leads to people reacting timidly and 
apprehensively in poorer nations that have constantly been victims of financial exploitation. 
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distribution, circulation, and operation of statements” that has a circular relation with systems of 
power (p. 1). This leads us back to the question that is at the root of this discussion: is interest 
that bad? Is it something that actually needs to be entirely reevaluated as a norm? If this indeed is 
the case, it entails questioning the ideologies and the quintessential values underpinning the 
entire monetary sphere of exchange and the historical evolution of the legal systems 
underpinning it. However, just a cursory glance at some available statistics is overwhelmingly 
convincing that interest does need such reexamination.  
A false assumption prevails today that avoiding debt avoids paying interest. Yet, scholars 
working in this under-researched area have cited empirical data revealing that the poorest 80% in 
society generally pay more interest than they ever receive, to the top 10%, a pure wealth transfer 
of approximately $10 trillion per year to the richest 10% in societies across the world (Creutz, 
2010). Margrit Kennedy (d. 2013), a German architect, scientist, and environmentalist whose 
work was driven by a research question that asked which factors were responsible for humans 
destroying their own natural environments, similarly quantified data from her native Germany 
demonstrating that interest was a leading mechanism behind understanding this phenomenon. 
Her research suggests that interest causes inflation (Kennedy, 1995).14 She adds that even those 
of us who do not pay interest directly, do in fact pay lots of it indirectly. Embedded in every 
price tag is an implicit interest-fee, passed on to the end purchaser. Kennedy claimed that on 
average, 40-45% of the cost of every single item we purchase goes to paying interest, an 
astounding figure that often reaches 50% for government projects and 77% for rents. These are 
interest fees passed on at every level of production to the final consumer. In other words, “within 
                                                 
14 Kennedy took German statistics from 1982 that revealed that 2.5 million households paid out 1.8 billion DM in 
net interest whereas the richest 2.5 million households received 34.2 billion DM in net interest. Furthermore, she 
demonstrated how income, Gross National Product and salaries of the average German income earner rose 
approximately 400% between 1968 and 1989 whereas the interest payments of the government during that same 
time rose by approximately 1,360%. The implication is that interest is inflationary. 
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our monetary system we allow the operation of a hidden redistribution mechanism which 
constantly shuffles money from those who have less money than they need to those who have 
more money than they need” (pp. 1-2). 
An additional study done by a Jubilee (debt relief) advocacy group estimates that “the 
current $4tn of external debts owed by developing countries costs them more than $1.5bn a day 
in repayments – and $34m of that comes from the very poorest countries” (Mead, 2012, p. 1). 
Such debt servicing is mostly comprised of interest payments, leading to the unfortunate scenario 
where over 3 billion people, nearly half the world, live on less than $2.50 per day (Shaw, 2013). 
Rowbotham (2001) argues that ‘third world’ debt is immoral, invalid and un-repayable. He 
contends it is so because, contrasted with the natural growth patterns found in nature, compound 
interest grows on debts in a geometrically exponential growth pattern typical of an abnormality 
in the physical realm, like cancer, or decomposition, and that natural ecosystems and human 
societies simply cannot compete with such a phenomenon.  
Another study befittingly titled The Network of Global Corporate Control quantifies 
figures revealing a capitalist network that exercises measurable, grossly disproportionate control 
over the world’s economy. The researchers devised a model analyzing the Orbis database’s 37 
million listed companies and investors worldwide, and from that data extracted the 43,060 
transnational companies, along with the share ownerships linking them (Vitali, et al., 2011).15 
What has emerged from the research is evidence that from the 43,060 transnational companies, 
1318 exist with interlocking ownership, and these 1318 companies exercise controlling shares 
and rights of the other 43,060 companies. This signifies that 1318 companies directly control 
over 60% of the world’s economy.  
                                                 
15 The term transnational corporation (TNC) is used according to the taxonomy established by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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As this power conglomeration reaches the top, it exerts even more identifiable influence. 
An even smaller group of 737 companies, controls over 80% of the entire world’s income and, at 
the very top, 147 corporations, a super-network, directly control 40% of the world’s income. The 
top 49 of those 147 companies are all banks.16 This means that banks, which are not producers of 
any tangible goods, exhibit direct control over most of the economy. Interest is a key facilitator 
in this scenario. Furthermore, it is not hyperbole to state that under modern capitalism in its 
normative function that commercial banks monopolize the entire system – which is one – and 
that shareholders who are not beholden to the demands made in the political processes of 
sovereign nations, in turn, own the banks. Defining what the researchers claim to be control the 
researchers point out the problematic notion of such power:  
 
…by control we mean how much economic value of companies a shareholder is 
able to influence. Moreover, we did not limit our focus on the control of a 
shareholder of a single firm. Instead, we look at the control each shareholder has 
over its whole portfolio of directly and indirectly owned firms. As a result, the 
shareholders with a high level of control are those potentially able to impose their 
decision on many high-value firms. The higher a shareholder’s control is, the 
higher its power to influence the final decision. In this sense, our notion of control 
can be related to Weber’s definition of “power”, i.e. the probability of an 
individual to be able to impose their will despite the opposition of the others 
(Vitali, et al., 2011, p. 31). 
 
The potential of such power is reflected in discourse, which then shapes knowledge in 
society. Another study by the charity Oxfam has reported that the 85 richest people on the planet 
own the wealth of approximately half of the world’s population, a situation that clearly threatens 
egalitarianism and social stability. Meanwhile since the 1970s, tax rates for 29 of the richest 30 
countries have fallen to appease the rich (Fuentes-Nieva, 2014). Another study conducted by the 
                                                 
16 The top 50 are all banks, with the exception of one Chinese petrochemical manufacturer listed at number 50: CN 
6511 T&T, registered number 39.78.  
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World Wealth Organization (2013) shows that the combined wealth of the world’s millionaires 
increased by 10% to $46.2 trillion in 2012 alone. This figure is three times larger than the entire 
economic output of the United States economy. The study took into account 98% of the world’s 
global earnings by collecting data from 71 of the world’s countries.17 Additionally, research 
discloses there to be approximately only 12 million millionaires in the world (Pennington, 2013). 
This is approximately .0017% of the world’s population according to population census 
estimates (World Bank, 2013). One final statistic is that “The wealth of the one percent richest 
people in the world amounts to $110 trillion” (Fuentes-Nieva, p. 2).  
All of this alarming data gives more of an understanding as to why the ancient world and 
the great religions all made such strong stances against usury. Although interest on debt cannot 
explain away the entire world’s economic injustices, it is seriously under-considered and 
therefore understudied as a catalyst, and this seems to be a failure in ethics and of the ability of 
religious traditions to influence modern normative economic practices through discourse. All of 
the aforementioned studies reveal the peculiar nature of capitalism as a system that facilitates 
some serious economic injustices.  
Moreover, interest aside, the banking industry is continuously involved in other scandals, 
which is also understandable once context is considered, regarding the impunity that banks 
legally operate with in society. One major instance was the LIBOR scandal that surfaced in 2012 
implicating the most powerful banks and their involvement in manipulation, which in turn just 
paid off some inconsequential fines that amounted to significantly less than the profits they 
                                                 
17 The World Wealth Report was prepared in conglomeration by the Royal Bank of Canada Wealth Management 
and Capgemini, a French technology and finance firm. 
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garnered in swindling investors (USA Today, 2012).18 An even bigger scandal emerged in 2015 
regarding HSBC and criminal tax avoidance (Obrien & Dixon, 2015). These scandals continue to 
happen despite the existing legal penalties. This discussion also brings into question the way in 
which the modern concept of a corporation shields responsibility from individuals directly 
responsible for corporate crimes. Banks, after all, are corporations, and limited-liability 
corporations are central to the capitalist paradigm. To understand a paradigm, as Foucault and 
others have explained, is to understand how power works and permeates, more aptly termed 
“Biopower” as “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations 
of bodies and the control of populations” (1976, p. 140).  
Pinpointing usury as a mechanism chief in the subversion of power has not been 
undetected by all observers. In fact, historically the discussion about usury has been very lively. 
One special characteristic of the arts is the way they timelessly manifest social theories 
penetrating the minds of society, to be then expressed through text and talk, including poetry and 
other mediums as measures of dissent against paradigms. Ezra Pound (1885-1972) incorporates 
his dissent of usury:  
 
Usury kills the child in the womb 
And breaks short the young man’s courting 
Usury brings age into youth; it lies between the 
bride and bridegroom 
Usury is against Nature’s increase (Pound, 1997). 
 
What expressions from the past like this show us is that interdisciplinary inquiries, for 
instance, into the arts or ethics, can possibly yield introspective answers that fields like 
                                                 
18 The LIBOR underwrites approximately $350 trillion of derivate assets. Thus, the extent of the manipulation is 
unknown; however, the banks have paid billions of dollars in penalties although the actual individuals responsible 
have evaded prosecution.  
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economics and business cannot. This is especially true with arts like poetry because poets speak 
in universals. This is a reminder that with the contemporary complexities of a globalized world, a 
single lens rarely captures reality. The previously discussed siphoning of wealth has essentially 
permeated every facet of society, so it is not surprising that it has also affected the thinking of 
religious people. Islamic teachings do not condone artificially securing profits through interest. 
However, it is still taking place while the discourse in Muslim polities remains very conflicted 
about what to do with an interest-based system, and not enough has been done to address it. 
Moreover, although nothing is structurally different about its outcome, IBF is still touted by its 
proponents as a way to offer ‘alternative’ means of financing to Muslims who want to fully 
subscribe to their religion in contemporary times (Kamla & Rammal, 2013). What a telltale sign 
it is then that the top banks in the world, and Western governments like the UK, flock to the 
prospects of implementing ‘Islamic’ banking (Vizcaino, 2013). The word is out that it is 
extremely lucrative. Hence, some legitimately ask; if this is the way Muslims want to be 
integrated into the system, then why not let some government or sector profit?  
As postcolonial studies have narrated, however, early in the 20th century nascent Muslim-
majority states inherited the banking models bequeathed to them by European imperialists that 
had established banks throughout the Islamic world during the colonial era (Wilson, 1995). Tripp 
(2006) has been one of the few to cover the various responses that Muslim discourses had to the 
economic hegemony of the West in the 20th century. In his (2006) Islam and the Moral 
Economy, he examines why Muslims were so enticed by Marxism, only to then embrace 
capitalism as despotic regimes in the MENA region capitulated to the arrangements of 
multinationals and Western hegemons. However, in general, there is a dearth of studies taking 
these individual paths further and examining factors behind why certain pathways were chosen 
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over others, comparing their rhetoric and discourses. For instance, why was IBF the path chosen 
over other various options?  Moreover, why does it continue to enjoy support from religious 
figures as it continues to fail in achieving its axioms about ethicality and social responsibility?  
This study examines the phenomenon of how the most visibly ‘Islamic’ reaction to 
capitalism essentially props up a system that in many ways thwarts the possibility of 
socioeconomic justice, and how this remains largely unrecognized in the Muslim sub-discourses 
about money and economics, which generally continue to rationalize and justify the continued 
trajectory of IBF. It further argues that only critical lenses of ethical evaluation can decipher the 
semantic ambiguities, obfuscations, and cognitive framings that allow such an operation to 
continue. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
(a) Banks, as institutions, are legally obliged to create credit and exact interest on it as 
businesses based on financial intermediation. (b) In Islam, the prohibition of riba puts checks on 
such operations. (c) Therefore, banking, by definition as a for-profit business, poses significant 
ethical problems to contemporary Islamic practice.  
The proliferation of IBF, which has secured legalistic approval from a small cadre of 
Muslim scholars, developed out of a field initially known as the Islamic Moral Economy (IME), 
which was an attempt to negotiate Islamic framework in a modern economy. One small yet 
significant component of IME was supposed to be the financial institutions that carried out its 
moral imperatives. However, due to various factors and obstacles the banks (IFIs) were launched 
first, without governmental support, and in an environment during the 1970s that was very 
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hostile to the proposals of IME scholars. Banking practices developed, while the theoretical 
development of IME never took off, leaving IFIs to operate alone in an unprotected sphere 
dominated by conventional banks. In order to compete, normative practices were developed on 
utilitarian grounds permitting any operation deemed ‘Shariah-compliant’.  
However, the conflicts of interest in operating for-profit banks under ‘Islamic’ banners 
became manifest when it was quickly discovered that everything ‘legal’ was not fundamentally 
right or ethical. Therefore, it must be considered, that if complex factors have steered IFIs into 
adopting a perfunctory definition of riba due to the obfuscation of certain terms and realities, 
then it is plausible that the continued existence of IBF remains an obstacle to the realization of 




In Western history, the concept of usury has been the topic of much discussion, and most 
of the contributors to its early discourse were rooted in the Christian tradition. This traditional 
understanding was then supplanted by a changing conceptualization of the practice, and 
eventually, the West exonerated the practice setting Western finance on a very non-traditional 
developmental trajectory. The Islamic prohibition of riba attempts to ban a phenomenon that is 
very similar to what the West has articulated as usury, now deemed archaic, although this 
phenomenon has also sailed under the name ‘compound interest’. Although the terms 
usury/interest and riba do share some overlapping characteristics, the prohibitions in the 
Christian and Islamic traditions are not entirely the same. However, contemporarily the Islamic 
prohibition has been conflated with the Western understanding of usury, the archaic rendering, 
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which has created a semantic loophole in Islamic law for banks to exploit in ways unprecedented 
in Islamic history.  
In taking a normative position, such violations can only be detected with a new 
reimagined vision of applied Islamic ethics. By utilizing a new methodological vision this 
research investigates the possible misappropriation of Islamic law and ethics regarding IBF’s 
uncritical adoption of essential ideological premises from capitalism, which are sets of a priori 
truths that cause ethical conflicts with the Islamic tradition’s notions of just money, the 
prohibition of riba, monopoly and other axiomatic principles related to justice. Continuing to 
prop up such a project misallocates energy and simultaneously prevents the development of 
ethical alternatives as measured by outcomes. This hypothesis is discussed further in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
 
1.4 Political Context of the Study 
 
Given the circumstances of today’s over-militarized milieu, a zeitgeist plagued with the 
recurring ‘Islam versus the West’ tensions which seek to emphasize societal and theological 
differences, one might wonder what benefit an analysis of Islamic discourses and machinations 
offers to widening the scope of knowledge. As Arnold J. Toynbee presciently examines in his 
1946 series of essays, during crises civilizations have the tendency to repress what is actually 
most needed, a “self-reflection” and “assessment” rather than deflecting blame towards “the 
Other” (Toynbee, 1948, pp. 172-6).19 Toynbee’s meta-historical analysis is that civilizational 
                                                 
19 Ironically, and very relative to this study, the era his aforementioned projection is written in describes how 
communists and capitalists were seeking to shift blame on each another in a dialectical discourse taking place during 
the middle of the 20th century. Toynbee notes that when civilizations fall under great stress they find “bug-bears,” 
people to blame their tribulations on, and that, “Whenever things go awry in circumstances that seem ever more 
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rises and falls, though cyclical, do not necessarily have to take place, but that Islamic 
civilizations in modernity are facing the crisis of being enveloped by Western civilization.  
Toynbee portentously asserts that Islam would once again become problematic for the 
West as an ideological, and or political entity. Moreover, he claimed that in that event one of two 
things was likely to occur: ‘Herodianism’ or ‘Zealotism.’ These reactions were first applied to 
characterize how Jewish society dealt with the impact of Hellenism at the dawn of Christian 
civilization. Along these lines one choice for societies has historically been to opt for 
‘Herodianism,’ which is mimicry, by which conquered peoples emulate the dominant culture that 
has subdued them, seeking out the apparent superiority of ‘the Other’ that has enabled the 
envelopment of the prior’s culture. Alternatively, the other choice has been to opt for ‘Zealotism’ 
and yearn nostalgically for some utopian and glorious return to an antiquated ideological 
superstructure. Toynbee presciently suggested that the most probable places for the occurrence 
of such a recurrent pattern of reactionary events was in Najd (Saudi Arabia), Afghanistan and or 
Yemen (pp. 172-6). 
Now, while Toynbee has his own particular approach to history that has not been entirely 
accepted by all historians, we can opine here that one thing Toynbee does insist on, that must be 
considered, is that for civilizations to continue thriving they absolutely need religion. Moreover, 
whatever religion that is, it needs continuity within its own discourse community in order to be 
effective. In comparison, IBF and its ideological underpinnings were developed largely in the 
Arabian Peninsula and the Asian Subcontinent by physically conquered and ideologically 
colonized civilizations, during times of post-colonial duress. Therefore, the importance of 
readdressing commentaries from classical and scholastic Islamic scholarship becomes 
                                                                                                                                                             
intractable, we tend to accuse the enemy of having sewn tears in our field and thereby implicitly excuse ourselves 
for the faults of our own husbandry” (p. 176). 
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abundantly befitting. Is it plausible that both possibilities predicted by Toynbee have 
simultaneously occurred? The Western political approach to Middle Eastern foreign policy, and 
particularly the neoconservative doctrine, does indeed pursue a revitalized conflict with Islam.20 
Additionally, there is a presence of both mimicry of the Western system in the Muslim world in 
several aspects, as well as an over-reactionary movement of Islamic nostalgia crudely lumped 
together in the Western milieu under the crude label of ‘political Islamism’.   
In addition, to continue within the context laid out by Toynbee’s thought, IBF may 
conceivably be a combination of both prognoses, an attempt to find the secret of Western success 
that attained an impressive temporal and global dominance over the last several centuries as well 
as a nostalgic return to terms and contracts deemed ‘Islamic’. This phenomenon appears to be at 
least partially attributable to nomenclature that was injected into the Muslim discourse with 
absolutely no continuity. Banking was a phenomenon adopted overnight in the Muslim world. 
Whereas the resurgence of zealotry in the form of extremism and ultra-conservatism that 
manifests itself sometimes into ultra-separatist pietism, but at other times into resistance 
movements, often violent, is ever-present and overly sensationalized by the media to become a 
fixture of 21st century tragic reality. IBF support does come, at least in part, from the latter 
phenomenon. Although it is not the emphasis of this study to pinpoint all of the ideological 
connections of IBF, it should be considered that there are political ramifications for developing 
IBF as an alternative means to advance certain agendas. In fact, some research has linked 
                                                 
20 This assertion has been heavily debated, and would likely be phrased differently by neoconservative thinkers. See 
“The Doha Debates” where Tim Sebastian debated this issue with a panel of Islamic scholars and secular thinkers 
from Thursday April 28 2005. Retrieved March 13, 2014 from thedohadebates.com. After the debate, the panel and 
audience remained split 50/50 on the issue. 
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ideological connections between Islamic revivalist movements and the simultaneous 
development of IBF, such as a (2009) paper by Ayoob and Koebalban.21  
The macroeconomic banking paradigm, inclusive of IFIs, operates as a tool susceptible to 
political manipulation. Many researchers who have documented the links of this wider network 
would say that these operations take place with the full cognizance and even complicit assistance 
of some Western intelligence agencies (Gibbs, 2002). It is problematic trying to assert that a 
grand collusion exists, but it is generally accepted in theories of power that certain individuals 
wish to continue profiting from a specific labyrinth of financial arrangements in place between 
petro-monarchies and the West. Of course, there are those voices that insist that any such 
consideration is “nonsense” (Roy, 2004, p. 291). Nevertheless, the notional possibility of this 
political influence cannot be ignored in a serious study. It should be considered that some have 
even argued that IBF is merely a ploy to lure money from the Gulf States into Western coffers 
(Calderwood, 2007). Regardless, using banks in such a manner is incompatible with Islamic 
distributive justice and ethics. However, what these hypotheses could potentially explain is why 
real transcendent economic justice has not been achieved through the IBF vehicle, and why 
Islamic scholarship has not been able to move beyond ‘Islamic’ banks to institutions that actually 
embody Islamic ethical values. 
                                                 
21 The 18th century ideological movement spearheaded by Ibn Abdul-Wahhab (1703-92), known by many as 
Wahhabbism, which sought to revive a ‘pure’ Islam and eradicate ‘deviant’ beliefs from the Arabian Peninsula, may 
have an ideological relation to IBF. Wahhabism is the predominant sectarian strand of Islam operating in the 
Arabian Peninsula, and state ideology of Saudi and Qatar, which are influential in establishing IBF hubs in the GCC 
region. Wahhabism is also used synonymously with the term Salafism although it is a crude overgeneralization.  
Furthermore this assessment is met with resistance by Saudis who view the term Wahhabi as a pejorative, and 
recognize the notion of their faction as a sectarian movement as a canard. Nevertheless, the relationship between the 
ideology of the Saudi state and the jihadist movements is debated. Moreover, the ideological influence of the Saudis, 
Qataris and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries operating in the Arabian Peninsula has been oft-linked 
to militant groups with extremely low visibility. This aspect, that there may be some subversive ulterior motives, at 
least deserves some consideration.  
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In times of such crises, the perennial plague is a dearth of erudition in possession of the 
ability to conduct the ideological disengagement of terms and hostilities systematically and 
tranquilly. This research has been undertaken within the economic environment in the decade 
following the lingering ‘Great Recession’ of 2007-9. Some areas recovered from the downturn 
but many industrialized nations did not. For many, a depressed economy has become the new 
normal. In many ways, capitalism is still mimicking the symptoms of a virus subduing its host, 
indicators tantamount to the end of all historical periods of magnanimous alteration of social and 
economic cycles. Anthropologists would call this an end of a paradigm. Hence, within such a 
context the ability and willingness to reexamine all ideologies should be on the table – even 




The rationale driving this research is that analyzing discourse can only study the way 
injustice is reproduced through power; whereas ethics are necessary in providing solutions. To 
delve into the discourse contemporarily taking place within Muslim polities, the controversial 
subject of ‘reform’ tends to highlight a chronology of propositions regarding different 
methodologies used in interpreting religious scriptures and documents anachronistic in content. 
Regarding ‘reform’ in Islam and the building pressure on Muslims to address it, a seminal 
conference took place at the Oxford Union in 2010 aptly titled “Rethinking Islamic Reform” that 
centered on the understanding in scholastic Islamic history of the general impermissibility of 
reforming Islam, and how this notion presents challenges to Muslims today. The two speakers 
represented very different spheres of thought.  
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The first of the two speakers was Sheikh Hamza Yusuf, a leading proponent for the 
revivification of classical Islamic learning approaches (Korb, 2013).22 While rejecting 
naturalism, Yusuf argued that the vast Islamic tradition has, within its own textual account, the 
cure for its modern ills if qualified Muslims were to study their own rich tradition through a 
rededication to traditional approaches. He noted that Islam cannot be reformed in the manner that 
many different groups are calling for (feminists, liberals, modernists, etc.), because the word 
‘reform’ has its own idiosyncratic connection to an Enlightenment understanding in Europe 
towards Christianity and the Protestant Reformation. Furthermore, because “Reformation can be 
a complete restructuring of something, whereas in the Islamic tradition the idea is that the house 
is fundamentally of sound foundation, but it often needs renovating” (Yusuf, 2010, p. 1). 
However, Yusuf’s keenest insights were regarding what is most relevant to this study, in which 
he made the explicit connection to one of the negative outcomes of the Protestant Reformation 
that still affects us today through its impact on our cognitive framing of interest. 
 
[The Protestant Reformation led to] the banking state of Switzerland and this is often the 
danger of reformations because there is a wonderful statue of Calvin in Geneva because 
the bankers love the fact that the Protestants allowed for usury. Whereas the Catholics 
opposed usury and now we're living in a world that is economically disintegrating before 
our eyes because of this hegemonic banking madness that is out of hand (Yusuf, 2010). 
 
Yusuf further opined that the Islamic tradition has traditionally been cosmic, and that to 
be faithful to it means seeking for answers within its sources and positive historical commentary. 
However, not beyond the bounds of two classical terms – repair (islah) and renewal (tajdeed) – 
                                                 
22 Yusuf along with Zaid Shakir and Hatim Bazian and others, have founded the first Muslim liberal arts school of 
higher education in the United States, Zaytuna College, in Berkeley, California with the intent on providing students 
with the necessary tools with which they can use in approaching religion. Yusuf advocates that such tools be utilized 




islah meaning to rectify something after it is corrupted, and tajdeed taken to mean a type of 
renewal. The contextual implication derives from an understanding of one particular Prophetic 
tradition that the Shariah (or the Sunnah) can be corrupted, and that its application can be 
deviated from its originally intended prescription (Yusuf, 2010).23 He stressed that all 
foundational documents need to be revisited regarding their textual meanings in order to keep the 
door closed to perfidiously explosive interpretations, which lead to ideologies that threaten 
stability. Yusuf, the student of many of the Muslim world’s most erudite sages, articulated the 
classical tradition’s position judiciously, “The Islamic tradition has within itself all of the needs 
to renovate the house, but it's going to take an immense amount of intellectual energy. It's going 
to take very highly qualified people, which necessitates institutions that can train and produce the 
types of people that are needed to engage in this activity” (Yusuf, 2010, p. 1).24  
Yusuf’s sentiments were juxtaposed with the ‘political-activist approach’ of Professor 
Tariq Ramadan that places a strong emphasis on applied ethics and a reevaluation of approaches 
to fundamentals that utilizes technocratic experience of experts across all spheres and disciplines 
                                                 
23 Yusuf quoted the hadith of the strangers (ghuruba) and the reply to the question asked to the Prophet about who 
were the strangers, to which he replied “Al-latheena yuslihuna shariati ba'da ma afsadaha an-nas” which means 
that people can restore (yuslih) the Shariah after it has been corrupted (afsada). What I have found in the Arabic 
books of hadith is a similar tradition with slightly different wording in the narration from Abu Huraira in Sahih 
Muslim regarding Islam beginning as a stranger. It says “allatheena yuslihuna ma afsad min sunnati” and that can be 
considered a close rendering because to corrupt the Sunnah would be similar to corrupting the Shariah. Sh. Abdullah 
Bin Bayyah distinguished his preference for also not using the word reform, opting instead for the French loan word 
‘renovation’ which translates to something closer to tajdeed or renewal. Yusuf connected it by saying, “sometimes 
the faucets aren't working anymore, the water's not flowing, people aren't getting fresh air because the window can't 
be opened; so you need people to come in and renovate the house, and this is the idea”. Yusuf’s argument 
highlighted that convergent calls for Islamic reform make claims for a ‘living’ Quran, as well as a ‘liberal’ and a 
‘literal’ Quran, all of which have their dangers, but the resurging robust push galvanizing support for literalism in 
creedal interpretations (aqeeda athariya) may be the most precarious of them. The term athari denotes a literalist 
approach to scripture, which is a modern phenomenon heavily overrepresented in the mainstream discussion of 
Islam due to a copious influx of Saudi petrodollars subsidizing its maintenance. Furthermore, in regards to tajdeed, 
as the foundational document has surpassed the bicentennial mark in the United States, which is the basis of the 
legal system in the country, a certain amount of ambiguity in the founding fathers’ writings presents the dilemma of 
interpretation. Such ambiguity leaves the door open for perfidiously explosive interpretations, those of Trotskyites 
or Straussian Neoconservatives for example, to align ideological ambitions up with a politicized reading of the texts. 
Such prospects are increasingly dangerous as certain ideologies threaten political stability and global security.  
24 Yusuf studied under the tutelage of many sages, but is perhaps most well known for being a disciple of the 
Mauritanian Sheikhs Murabit al Hajj and Abdullah bin Bayyah. 
39 
 
– not only those trained in the Islamic sciences – in re-envisioning the purposes and intents of 
Islamic law and ethics in contemporary times. At the conference, Ramadan introduced a book on 
ethics that culminated from a decade of his contemplation on the contemporary ethical crisis in 
Islam. The book titled Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (2008) sets some 
guidelines for a more comprehensive utilization of ethics within a higher objectives (maqasid) 
theory perspective, and a reexamination of the reasons why ‘adaptive’ methods have not been 
fruitful for Muslims during their sustained contemporary crisis in ethics. Ramadan corroborated 
the classical accord, that the Islamic corpus cannot be reformed, but that the minds and the 
approaches to the religion must be. 
Yusuf’s approach is the soundest for those equipped with the requisite tools. However, 
Ramadan’s approach is more accessible for a methodology adopted as a framework and 
expanded upon in a doctoral thesis describing ‘this is what has happened’ scenarios, which 
consider discourses outside of Islamic legalistic framework. This is primarily because 
undertaking a doctoral thesis essentially culminates in producing a piece of research that requires 
substantially little to no comprehensive mastery. Therefore, its provisionary requirements are 
incommensurate to the amount of rigor and training required for independent juristic reasoning 
(ijtihad) in all areas of substantive Islamic law – the requirements of which have been 
acknowledged by consensus for centuries and articulated by jurists like Al-Ghazali (d. 1111) and 
others. Hallaq (1984) has translated and commented on the depths of such requisite knowledge.25  
                                                 
25 On page 7, the discussion covers how scholastic Islam has traditionally been preserved by a class of learnedness 
that was required to have mastery of several spheres of knowledge. The perquisites of which usually entailed the 
memorization of the Quran, possibly in several variant recitations in addition to rote memorization of additional 
entire corpuses of data (hadith collections, treatises on branches of law) and a strong grasp of logic, rhetoric and 
several other secular fields. The tradition’s history is not short of biographical works entailing the routines and 
habits of such scholars, and the non-hagiographic narrations of extraordinary breakthroughs and talents 
(photographic memories, penetrating insights, high levels of spiritual and metaphysical awareness). Al Ghazali 
enumerates the requirements in his classical work al-Mustasfa: “1. Know the 500 verses needed in law; committing 
them to memory is not a prerequisite. 2. Know the way to relevant hadith literature; he needs only to maintain a 
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Therefore, it is arguably neither deferential nor realistic to propose an entirely new 
substantive contribution to scholastic Islamic thought in any meaningful way within a doctoral 
thesis if that thought is supposed to challenge textual understanding of the existing textual corpus 
amongst authoritative coteries of textual scholars. Furthermore, Yusuf’s closing remarks made it 
clear that the crisis of authority in Islamic scholarship, in the minds of such scholars, is attributed 
to what he called the “Sheikh Google” syndrome of “Weekend Muftis”. Meaning that the 
negative outcomes (and externalities) of unqualified individuals making proclamations within 
Islamic thought continues to have real devastating effects on the Muslim community (Yusuf, 
2010). 
However, what can be offered as a substantive proposal, and in that sense something 
considered a ‘distinct’ analysis, is the hypothetical application of an already cogently articulated 
methodology to a sphere previously uncharted. It can therefore be proposed in a manner that 
argues that only now are we able to properly contextualize a phenomenon unprecedented in 
Islamic history (like banking) by contextually backdating its discussion several hundred years 
and utilizing previously inaccessible lenses of analysis. Thus, what can be suggested with such 
new information, is that the inheritors of the scholastic tradition need to reimagine some of the 
modalities they utilize in assessing the telos of classical rulings and prohibitions in contemporary 
times. In this instance, it would pertain to the signifier of riba, and how its prohibition should be 
                                                                                                                                                             
reliable copy of Abu Dawud's or Bayhaqi's collections rather than memorize their contents. 3. Know the substance 
of furu' works and the points subject to ijma, so that he does not deviate from the established laws. If he cannot meet 
this requirement, he must ensure that the legal opinion he has arrived at does not contradict any opinion of a 
renowned jurist. 4. Know the methods by which legal evidence is derived from the texts. 5. Know the Arabic 
language; complete mastery of its principles is not a prerequisite. 6. Know the rules governing the doctrine of 
abrogation. However, the jurist need not be thoroughly familiar with the details of this doctrine; it suffices to show 
that the verse or the hadith in question had not been repealed. 7. Investigate the authenticity of hadith. If the hadith 
has been accepted by Muslims as reliable, it may not be questioned. If a transmitter was known for probity, all 
hadiths related through him are to be accepted. Full knowledge of the science of al-ta’dil wal tajrih (hadith 
criticism) is not required”. It is further noted that Abu Husain al-Basri (d. 1044) was the first to enumerate such a list 
of conditions in his al mu-tamad fi usul al fiqh. 
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contextually understood in contemporary situations. Therefore, applying some of Ramadan’s 
articulations of the higher objectives (maqasid) to a sphere that he has not investigated with the 
same lens, is a conscious decision to raise new questions and produce new findings in a 
reimagined context. Ramadan’s approach is apposite because it ventures out of the traditional 
parameters in discussing the mutable and immutable aspects of Islam within the context of 
renewal (tajdeed). It thereby simultaneously remains authentic while proposing a change in the 
methodological modalities of how technocratic experts across all disciplines exchange 
information with textual scholars; the common interest remains in evolving the understanding of 
the discourse community that articulates these mandates by expanding perceptions and 
approaches towards various temporal realities and fields so that socioeconomic justice can be 
realized.26  
 
1.6 Methodology, Limitations and Delimitations 
 
In this era, two of the most influential voices within the wider Islamic discourse in the 
English language are Yusuf and Ramadan. They both make insightful normative statements 
about the unethical nature of the ideologies underpinning modern economic thought and practice, 
and the associated negative externalities produced thereby. However, neither has focused on this 
area in any considerable depth, and both tend to speak in overviews regarding the semantics of 
economic exchange. For instance, Yusuf was invited to speak at the 2015 World Economic 
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, but in a capacity that did not provide a platform for him to 
                                                 
26 Yusuf clearly contends that the most problematic areas are issues of “ahkam al-sultaniyya” which are the 
governmental categories and the penal code and encompass things like alcohol, sexual morality and inheritance 
laws. However, he asserts that a utopian enforcement of such laws is just that, utopian, and that the system was 
prophesized to only last 30 years.  
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articulate a robust economic vision. Moreover, Ramadan pointed out (at a 2009 lecture in 
Vancouver, B.C.) that the IBF model generally fails in its facile worldview and lack of 
profundity. He mentioned its rusticity saying, “I’m sorry to tell you if your answer to the 
economic global crisis today is that ‘we have the solution, no riba no speculation,’ that’s fine 
thank you, but this is a simplistic answer to a complex problem” (Ramadan, 2009).  
Similarly, Ramadan’s (2009) Radical Reform contains several important areas of 
discussion, and in only 384 pages, it covers a theoretical and practical proposed reevaluation of 
several problematic spheres for Muslims in modernity including women and gender relations, the 
arts, education, ecology, ethics and in a very brief manner, economics. However, Ramadan’s 
writings only touch on the need for these areas to be re-examined, which leaves this task to be 
taken up by others. Pertinent to this study, Ramadan identifies a problem that is the essence of 
the problem statement herein:  
 
The economic sciences have grown more complex just as their object of study 
has, and it is impossible to outline ‘an applied Islamic ethics in economics’ 
without relying on contemporary expertise and research, unless one reduces 
economic activity to the use of a few tools without going to the trouble of 
thinking through the philosophy and objectives of human behavior in that field. 
Unfortunately this is what can be observed, and the dysfunction comes from the 
answers offered by successive fuqaha (scholars), in light of the elements made 
available to them by their (mainly Muslim) economist advisors: a partial (and 
often biased) accounting of the complex workings of the contemporary economy, 
an obsession with tools and norms leading to ends that are dangerously 
overlooked, and finally-according to most practitioners-structural, marginal, and 
often cosmetic answers to questions about the global economic order (pp.117-
118).  
 
The obsession with ‘tools and norms’ leading to ‘dangerous ends’ is the main focus in 
this research, an emphasis on avoiding what is rendered riba in name, when its essence 
(injustice) is clearly part and parcel to normative banking practices, which then translate into 
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visibly observable ‘dangerous ends’. Thus, clearly a reevaluation needs to be driven by ethics 
that considers the impact of products labeled ‘Islamic’. Furthermore, the expertise and research 
consulted in any in-depth analysis cannot be limited to purely scientific or economic data. 
Ramadan has established the Research Center for Islamic Legislation and Ethics in Qatar with 
the expressed intent of supporting research that focuses on Islamic ethics in relation to these 
various problematic spheres. However, a conference held in 2014 titled “How Ethical is the 
Current Islamic Banking System?” was significantly telling about where the limits of this 
discussion still lie.  
At the conference, Professor Mohammed Fadel cogitated on the fact that IFI’s are for-
profit institutions that by definition must make money from money, arguing that in this context, 
critiques of them should not be too harsh. Additionally, Dr. Abdulazeed Abozaid added some 
criticism of certain mechanisms within IBF. A pioneer of the field, Dr. Umer Chapra mentioned 
some of his grievances as well. However, the most that was proposed was an idea that has been 
floated by Asutay (2012) and others, that the creation of some other types of institutions may be 
needed in order to help balance the unethical externalities of IFIs. Furthermore, until now 
Ramadan’s proposal of expanding the modalities used for an analysis of economic exchange has 
not been taken to the limits in any significant way because it is clear that throughout all of the 
disagreement, the critically important voices are unable to ‘move beyond Islamic banking’ to 
more ethical exchange paradigms. 
The assumed responsibility herein, then, is to utilize the maqasid as the lens with which 
all other information is viewed and normatively evaluated, so that it becomes clear that there are 
more ethical paths to traverse than IBF. This epistemological framework facilitates reimagining 
the modalities utilized in creating spheres of exchange by reconsidering historical framing, and 
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all of the newly available discourse-related and context-providing knowledge. The approach 
herein is not going to use economics, econometrics or mathematic theorems in any quantitative 
sense to chart out this territory. The immediate necessity is to establish that at the heart of the 
epistemology underpinning the modern economic system are certain beliefs with a peculiar and 
idiosyncratic history. And to further point out that the ‘philosophy’ and ‘objectives’ of human 
behavior in economics have not been considered in light of all new available knowledge 
emerging in interdisciplinary research.  
If it is acknowledged that this reevaluation has not been approached yet properly, it 
becomes clear why nothing radically different has emerged within a governing paradigm, if 
thought is limited by the parameters set forth by that very governing paradigm. What is 
necessary is an introspection that articulates deep introspection on the workings of the system, at 
least in one new, vital aspect, in how the connotation of riba as a signifier of meaning has 
departed from its historical denotation, and what the effects of this are. If problems are getting 
deeper, one then needs an even deeper understanding of the substantive causes of the problems in 
order to offer appropriate responses. If contemporary assessments are inaccurate, or reached with 
cursory understandings of the causative issues, one would only expect superficial and facile 
responses. 
My aim is to develop a wide-ranging ideological context; this includes consulting both 
the historical (antiquated) and contemporary moral opinions on economic justice and how it is 
meted out today by neoliberal capitalism. I particularly focus on the convergent moral outlooks 
on interest, their historical conflation, and on delineating how the contemporary macroeconomic 
paradigm became interest-based, which phenomenally witnessed an entire reversal in social 
consciousness. In addition, I try to establish a context for analyzing and contrasting the moral 
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taxonomy of the Western neoliberal economic system with the Islamic explication of economic 
morality. After such evaluation, within a normative discussion on seeking the higher ethical 
objectives (maqasid), I analyze the ostensibly unethical aspects of IBF in addition to exploring 
how and why they became fundamental and inherent practices in IBF. The ultimate aim is to 
argue that within an Islamic normative ethical framework, the application and way forward for 
such ideals is to move beyond using the cognitive frames that the discourse regarding exchange 
has been using.  
Therefore, it must be prefaced that because of taking normative stances and pre-
commitments to seeking out more ethicality and social justice in economic exchange, such 
implicit biases will steer the evaluations and readings of historical narratives and economic 
analyses in a way that challenges them in their inconsistencies. This also affects the manner in 
which I select to cite authoritative scholars. If scholars promote ends that can fit within the wide 
range of solutions, then their works would be preferred over other scholars who opine for 
methods that cannot fit within a just vision for change. Some types of ideologies are versatile, 
whereas others are simply intolerable. In fact, every man-made attempt at legislating morality is 
inherently flawed because humans are imperfect. This is readily observed by taking just a 
cursory look at the past and present ideologies of autocracy, oligopoly, democracy, technocracy 
and all of the associated branches of isms. For instance, the 20th century was likely the bloodiest 
in human history, but its conflicts were largely areligious secular clashes of ideology. Similarly, 
human excesses under the guise of religion have also claimed untold numbers. All ideological 
structures, then, have the potential of serving the interests of the few because of humanity’s 
inherent qualities, which are susceptible to political influence, corruption and tribal affinities. 
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However, in specific regards to the economy, the ultimate goal herein is to seek out an 
arrangement that is faithful to Islam’s moral essence, one that fulfills the higher objectives. 
Therefore, the etiology of ‘modern’ definitions of money and interest/usury (riba) need to be 
reexamined in light of all available knowledge in connection to how they are connected to power 
and framing, and how they are semantically conflated with Islamic terminologies that share 
considerable likenesses to terms articulated in the Western corpus of thought and religious 
commentary. Within the framework of Islamic ethics, questions are asked and then answers are 
sought with an interdisciplinary lens. By utilizing an eclectic combination of lenses, we are able 
to make sense of complicated histories and narratives. There is no traditional focus group in the 
sense that the tradition of ascertaining people’s perceptions, beliefs and attitudes towards specific 
products or concepts cannot alone produce answers to the driving research questions on ethics 
and power. The focus is instead on the historical justifications for certain concepts. The notions 
of duty, obligation and right or wrong are examined among ideologically bound communities by 
analyzing their narratives. The analysis herein also utilizes the contextual tool of historical 
research, which in the social sciences generally allows us to answer questions of meta-history 
such as, ‘where have we come from?’ and ‘where are we going’?  
Usury was once prohibited in the West. Then it became interest. Now interest is okay. 
Why is that? This narrative has its own trajectory that is dissimilar to the historical discussion of 
riba in the Islamic tradition. According to early discussions on this issue, riba was once all bank 
interest, but now bank interest is not riba if the IFI contract is careful in framing its terminology. 
Why is that? This is a macro study of a large system and a large period of history. Hence, it 
cannot delve in to the contours of every economic function. However, it can focus on the concept 
of interest and how it affects understandings of money, manifests, exploits and recurrently results 
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in visibly negative outcomes. Furthermore, it can examine how Muslims have understood this on 
different, arguably deficient, levels in the modern period, and the relationship this has to 
impeding social (economic) justice. I focus on the unit interest occupies, money. I also focus on 
the business practice built on interest, which is banking. In addition, I focus on the larger 
institutional system framework and the ideological and legislative support for it, which is 
neoliberal capitalism. 
Since the stated focus remains on extracting the pertinent points from a diverse 
assortment of literature, there are additional limitations to the study. Most of the information 
about banking is either attained from discourse (text and talk) or theoretical commentary (via 
disclosures made in a number of annual reports), and therefore no mathematical modeling is 
analyzed or quantified herein, which some may view as a major limitation.  
Lastly, IBF scholars write much of the history of their own field. Thus, there is a clear 
slant in much of its literature, in which the departure its practice made from its promoted axioms 
is often downplayed. In contrast, the biases herein are explicit and therefore the present 
contradictions in practice need to be connected to their underlying political and social reasons. I 
attempt to do this in Chapter 5. Not a lot exists in terms of interdisciplinary investigations into 
Islamic responses to capitalism, especially ethical evaluations of IBF and therefore this is an 
attempt to add to the existing literature on this topic. In keeping with my methodology, all 






Addressing this issue is important because inequality is the genesis of many other 
conflicts. As with most research, mine started with questions that seemed to be unanswered or 
answered unsatisfactorily. How can an entire well-compensated field of economists be unable to 
guide human civilization toward a more equitable model of distribution? Moreover, how is it, 
that with all of the available modern technology and tools at our disposal, the world’s wealth is 
still so controlled by such a small number of people, while the majority remains excluded? What 
sustains that? What role does interest play in that? What are the alternatives? A wide-scale 
rejection of the rapacious version of modern capitalism led to various developments. One 
happened to be ‘Islamic’. Hence, it must be asked, is IBF an earnest attempt to provide an ethical 
alternative to riba-financing, or is it a ruse set up to attract Muslim liquidity? If it is the latter, 
why can the Islamic discourse not move beyond this failed experiment? Why has the media not 
already put such an enormous amount of pressure on it that it is forced to change? 
I felt that in order to avoid the same pitfalls economists seem to succumb to when they 
set the scopes of their inquiry, I had to widen mine beyond purely economic modalities. Because 
it is evident that the a priori truths that are held in the epistemology of Western economics are 
very much (ideological) subjective social theories influenced by the growing positivist body of 
modern and post-modern reductionist scientific literature. Even though 20th century pioneers of 
‘Islamic Moral Economics’ (IME) tried to be unique and equitable, the field was built upon 
accepting very similar presuppositions and it borrowed much of the same indubitable taxonomy 
and nomenclature. IBF formulates logic based on a mélange of propositional and prescriptive 
knowledge that has become an interdisciplinary paradigm in itself, taught in prestigious 
universities as a distinct discipline called ‘Islamic’ finance, typically in colleges of business.27 I 
                                                 
27 At this time, Islamic banking and finance is taught in UK business schools at Durham, Aston, Bangor, Salford and 
Cass Business School, as well as internationally in the GCC region and southwest Asia (primarily Malaysia). 
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see this is as part of the problem. The imaginative modalities have already been truncated by the 
father science, the wider discourse. The emphasis of such research is on the propositional instead 
of the transcendent. In contrast, this research is approached from interdisciplinary perspectives 
traditionally deliberated on in colleges of arts and science as well as theological academies 
wherein the motivations are often to solve problems with the human experience.  
 
1.8 Scope  
 
A question that sequentially led to more tightly narrowing the scope was, is it possible 
that some false premises about the prescriptive knowledge of Islam have been misappropriated at 
the expense of a modern profit-seeking endeavor?  If so, how was this cognitive framing done? 
Islamic jurisprudence is quite robust, detailed, and specific about prohibitions and the insistence 
on ensuring justice, especially regarding the prohibition of riba. Therefore, it seemed that 
obfuscation, if it existed, was likely to be detected in examining the pragmatics of discourse and 
the obfuscation of semantics. If this is where a divergence between ‘legal’ and ethical has taken 
place, it helps contextualize the phenomenon. The scope of this research is a critical examination 
of the history and interrelationship of two concepts: money and riba, (which approximated into 
English is translated as both usury and interest). If an identifiable trajectory exists, that can 
illuminate this conundrum, it is the history of the Muslim understanding of these terms and 
where these semantic articulations meet Western conceptualizations of these same terms and 
cognates. Tracing this history includes an examination of how the non-Muslim world (the West) 
made a significant departure from its traditional understanding of usury and money, which 
developed into globalized banking practices that later challenged scholastic Islam’s legal 
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positions on exchange, thereby creating numerous difficulties for Muslims. The scope is limited 
to covering the most identifiable manifestation of this clash through a critical analysis of the IBF 
apparatus and its development within a context that sees it as a sub-discourse happening within a 
wider neoliberal discourse. The scope covers the changing concept of usury/interest back to its 
historical emergence, that context, and the influences that facilitated its permeation into modern 
culture. Where this clash most visibly plays out contemporarily is in this arena. The focus is 
regarding the framing of meanings and normative practices that IBF has adopted from the 
neoliberal capitalist paradigm.  
 
1.9 Sources  
 
This is an interdisciplinary work. Constructing the knowledge necessary for 
contextualizing this topic is best done through qualitative data analysis of texts that encapsulate 
the debates between scholastic Islamic scholarship and the negotiated limits of Islamic law as it 
converges with Western society and globalization. Therefore, I analyze relevant commentary on 
the topics of money and usury from social theorists and prominent Western commentators like 
William Shakespeare, Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, Thomas 
Malthus and David Hume among others who have shaped the Western discourse on money and 
interest in ways both subtle and evident. The imprint of such thinkers is still quite palpable on the 
ever-changing discourse within economics and its adopted views on reality, and humankind’s 
place within that worldview. I do not cover the entire development of economic thought, but I 
rely on sources that show how these prominent thinkers influenced societal views towards usury 
through cognitive framing. Sometimes it is the case, as scholars of literature contend that 
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thinkers simply express views that are increasingly commonplace in their milieus. However, 
other times, what is interjected into text and talk actually frames cognitive spheres. 
Irrespectively, linking the issue of usury as it appears and morphs throughout Western literature 
creates a mind map of the Western economic tradition, not entirely explanatory as an exposition 
of the history of economics, but a pragmatic and context-producing examination of a concept and 
its role in framing connoted notions on exchange. Additional references used are Western and 
Islamic works in English, Arabic, Persian, Turkish, French and German on history, 
anthropology, banking, communications, ethics, globalization, linguistics, philosophy, philology, 
politics, sustainability, and other relevant areas. 
In examining Islamic discourse I also use, as primary documents, the Quran, Hadith 
collections and classical legal positions regarding Islamic views of moral exchange, and the 
higher objectives. As the methodology entails, I must also look at alternative sources of 
knowledge about money, credit and exchange. In addition to utilizing academic texts, I cite 
numerous periodicals, conference lectures, web articles, populist commentaries, and interview 




This study has three (3) grand objectives, which are: 
 
1. To re-contextualize the history of changing perceptions in the West towards usury and 




2. To explain how embracing interest has affected the cognitive framing of how we 
discuss the ethics and morality of socioeconomic issues (like banking). 
 
3. To triangulate reasons why the Muslim adoption of the cognitive frames redefining 
money and interest (riba) led to the development of IBF, a framework that prevents communities 
























This chapter backdates the discourse on usury in the West. It historically analyzes the 
concept of usury as a signifier and its historical relationship, and effect, on money as a concept, 
specifically after money takes the form of credit created and lent into existence by banks at 
interest. The most influential normative statements in the evolving dialogue on usury in Europe, 
and the emergent consensus on vindicating it as a crime and delineating it as a necessary tool in 
political economy, is a significant departure away from the classical Islamic worldview wherein 
riba – often seen as usury’s cognate – is a universal, rather than a relative proposition. The 
chapter seeks to analyze how a semantic rendering of money as commodity is conflated with 
money as bank credit, and how in the process, usury gradually becomes interest, the necessary 
driver of economic stimulation. This is the aim because the system developed around these 
notions becomes capitalism and banks become the institutions that facilitate capitalism’s 
authority, and what happens as a sub-discourse within banking, in Muslim polities, remains the 
emphasis of this study.  
 
Part 1: Injustices Associated with Usury 
 




The history and development of capitalism is an etiology intertwined with the history of 
warfare and subjugation that ineludibly entails the development of a system that Smith (2000) 
calls ‘plunder by trade’ replacing ‘plunder by raid’.28 Analyzing it with scrupulousness innately 
comprises a discourse analysis that may seem to border on a philippic in the analysis of its 
institutionalization because some of its presentation requires positing a normative position 
against discursive injustices. Human history is replete with tales of men trying to domineer and 
subdue each other in the pursuit of power, the outward form of warfare. In contrast to warfare, 
plundering via trade takes its form in sundry ways, some of which are more sophisticated than 
others, but this chapter’s emphasis is on the manner in which plunder has manifested in the 
institutionalization of certain exchange practices in connection with the ‘legitimization of usury’. 
There has existed a recurrent pushback against the legal protections granted to all market 
participants in human spheres of exchange, and such protections were traditionally inspired by 
religious ethics. Those seeking to plunder within such spheres have perennially called for 
tolerance towards their preferences, in regards to exchange, this has taken the form of lobbying 
for ‘free markets’ wherein market participants are unrestricted in their capacities to exploit 
through all ‘legal’ means. Part 1 analyzes the history of the abuse most prominent in that 
narrative, the development of a culture that, through framing and changing discourse, exonerates 
and rationalizes the practice of usury.  
 
2.1.1 Pertinent Background Information Related to Usury 
 
                                                 
28 Smith writes, “There are two primary causes for both poverty and war. 1. Plunder by trade. 2. Property rights law, 
as applied to nature’s resources and technologies, denying others their rightful share of what nature offers to us all 
for free”. Smith attributes to nature what Islamic cosmology would attribute to God (the musabbib), but the two 




Western civilization, as an observable congeries of ideas took some two and a half 
millennia to develop. Most of academia asserts that the foundations of Western civilization 
began in Greece (Hamilton, 1954), although that narrative is challenged (Ben-Jochannan, 1988). 
Many of the traditions, however, came from the East. The prohibition of usury is one such 
concept. Researchers now acknowledge the archaeological and philological evidence supporting 
the idea that the prohibition of usury is traceable to approximately 2500 BCE (Hudson, 2000).  
The concept of usury has disparagingly affected the concept of money; therefore, the two 
concepts are inextricably linked. In the first millennium BCE there is evidence from Babylon, the 
Indian subcontinent, Roman law, and later, Old Testament Law that all predate the Christian, 
Islamic and modern secular articulations of money and usury (Hudson, 2000).29 To understand 
why usury has been such a perennial problem one must examine the conditions that led to its 
widespread practice.  
Usury is defined in two different ways. One is now deemed archaic and the other passes 
as ‘modern’. Prior to the spread of capitalism, we observe that usury meant “any money taken for 
its use”, or financing costs over 0% (J.F.B., 1865, p. 321). This meant that any money paid over 
and above the amount of a loan was usurious. There were several reasons for this. Prior to 
examining them, however, the traditional definition of usury, inscribed in a 19th century journal 
of law interestingly says that when money is “paid for the use of money according to the law [it] 
is denominated [as] interest; if more be taken it is usury” (p. 321). Consequently, by the 19th 
century differentiating between usury and interest was an issue of legal semantics. One rejects 
the legal possibility; the other allows it to exist but attempts to monitor its severity, which is 
                                                 
29 The three primary civilizations where Hudson’s research uncovers the history of interest-bearing debts is in 
Bronze Age Sumer, Classical Greece and Rome. 
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rather relative. Once society allows a certain percentage, drawing concrete legislative parameters 
that attempt to limit it becomes a relativistic task.  
 
2.1.2 Usury Appears in Babylon 
 
Usury abided for millennia with an accepted common definition as any increase on the 
repayment of a loan, or the rental price of money (Persky, 2007). The rediscovery of Cuneiform 
tablets in Ancient Lagash, Sumeria has been the focus of several economic historians in relation 
to tracing this history. Michael Hudson finds that in the old world divine royal saviors ruled and 
that once agrarian societies had submitted to such hierarchal systems, usury appeared quickly 
thereafter (1993). Naturally, agrarian societies developed the need for loans. The first usurious 
loans were lent on seeds and produce, and “Since one grain of seed could generate a plant with 
over 100 new grain seeds, after the harvest farmers could easily repay the grain with ‘interest’ in 
grain” (Zarlenga, 2010, p. 1).  
Thus, the forces of human labor in combination with nature were understood for their 
regenerative capacities. When loans were made against cattle, for instance, the usury was repaid 
by paying the lender back in cattle plus the offspring the cattle had borne. Thus, loans took on a 
connotation of being something that was feasibly paid back with an increase. The Babylonian 
word for interest that emerged was mas, which literally meant to give birth. Hudson (2000) 
contends that the actual interest rates were decided out of simplicity rather than any insightful 
mathematical formula.30  
 
                                                 
30 Hudson writes “…the smallest unit fraction in each of the above fractional systems: 1/60th in Mesopotamia, 
1/10th in Greece, and 1/12th in Rome. The birth or calf/kid metaphor for interest thus referred to ‘baby fractions’, 
not literally baby animals”. 
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2.1.3 Government Interventionism: Jubilee 
 
Issues did variably occur because when people suffered a difficult year in agricultural 
production, for whatever various reasons, they were rendered unable to pay back their loans. In 
such circumstances, those people would fall into debt, which inevitably meant bondage. This 
occurrence began to take place frequently enough for the Sumerian kings to intervene and begin 
playing more centralized roles in economic affairs. The kings would attempt to upset the 
structural flaws in the economy created as a result of usurious loans by monetizing the exchange 
rates in the market (Hudson, 1993). These attempts to absorb the debt also did not work. 
Therefore, people worked under compulsory labor, and kings were tasked with determining how 
much of each commodity to store each year.  It is the first time in documented history that 
governments permitted usury, although governments intervened in markets in attempts to contain 
its effect. The substantive evidence of this lies in the Hammurabi code (2130-2088 BCE). The 
lesson learned was that usury led to imbalance and injustice that required market intervention.  
Then, the entire market dynamics changed. When the concept of mas was transferred to 
interest accumulating loans on barren commodities, specifically on precious metals, catastrophic 
problems erupted. The critical perceptual error made was that the Sumerians “…treated 
inorganic materials as if they were living organisms with the means of reproduction” (Zarlenga, 
2010, p. 2 ). Thus, it was discovered that anything lent on usury which was inherently lacking the 
power of regeneration would lead to even greater problems of repayment. Any such loan’s 
surplus payment was to be siphoned from another source within the economy, something that 
truly served as a good or service (note: actual wealth). Evidence shows that rates of 20% and 
more were made against silver and barley, prompting more governmental intervention (Mierop, 
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2005). Therefore, on the authority of the Mesopotamian kings, every seven years the government 
“cancelled debts, freed debt-servants, and restored land to cultivators who had lost it under 
economic duress” (Hudson, 1993, p. 6).  
The people who had become slaves would be freed every seven years in what was called 
the Jubilee. The underlying motivation for the institution was twofold. It released the economic 
pressures caused by too many citizens becoming indentured and destitute, a mechanism resulting 
in concentrated amounts of wealth falling into a few hands, which relieved pressure on the 
monarch because power concentration as such was a political challenge. Additionally, the people 
of greater Mesopotamia, called Habirus, feared the wrath of their deity in retribution for failing 
to deal equitably with one another. Therefore, Babylon became an organic example of how the 
new year, clean slate concept was decreed every seven years. The OT (Levit. 25.10) mentions 
that the Grand Jubilee celebrations took place every 50 years (Holy Bible, 2004). 
It was soon discovered that usury was indeed a powerful weapon, and if put into the 
wrong hands, it had the potential to overtake entire economies by riddling them with debt. 
Hudson remarks, “What was radically disturbing in archaic times was the idea of unrestrained 
wealth-seeking. It took thousands of years for the idea of progress to become inverted, to 
connote irreversible freedom for the wealthy to deprive the peasantry of their lands and personal 
liberty” (1993, p. 44). Koyama (2008) hypothesizes that the prohibition of usury was 
continuously adopted as a political strategy that allowed rulers, the Church, and a minority class 
of merchant bankers to impose monopolies on rent collection. Koyama’s hypothesis develops the 
earlier claim of Roover (1974) that the medieval usury prohibition can be understood as a result 
of regulatory capture.31 Thus, those who could exploit did so, and usury procured monopolies.  
                                                 
31 Adding to that, some merchants were in more opportune positions to benefit than others by their ability to evade 




2.1.4 Usury and the Israelites: The Hapiru as Hebrews 
 
The phenomenon of prohibiting usury was not only isolated to Babylon and its periphery; 
however, this area remains the most documented (Gopal, 1935).32 After the captivity period 
(586-539 BCE) usury begins to appear manifestly among the Israelites (Zarlenga, 2010).33 The 
Pentateuch amalgamated the Babylonian usury laws, which made an emphasis on redeeming 
men and land. It became necessary for social prophets among their community to address the 
usury issue, delineate its prohibition, and impose the Jubilee as a safety net.34  
Meek (1936) first proposed that the Babylonian people called Hapirus, or Habirus later 
became the Hebrews. Campbell (1960) construes that “The terms ‘Apiru, Habiru and Hebrew’ 
relate to those who have renounced a relationship to an existing society, who have by a 
deliberate action withdrawn from some organization or rejected some authority, and who have 
become through this action freebooters, slaves, employees or mercenaries” which is a hypothesis 
                                                                                                                                                             
inflicted, competitors were unable to keep up with higher costs imposed by the usurious environment. The term for 
this economic weapon is called ‘cost predation’ where the imposition of statutes creates infra-marginal rents for 
specific lenders. Following this train of thought and historical reconstruction of economics, it would seem that the 
usurers welcomed the prohibition because of the confidence they had in their ability to avoid the legal ramifications 
of it, thus, they gained monopolies on lending. 
32 Gopal explains that the society used cast copper coins as well as silver coins as money throughout their 
international trade routes, which extended all the way to Greece with whom they had established economic treaties. 
For instance, the Mauryan Empire of the Indian subcontinent (325-185 BCE) is another illustration of the 
prohibition. In the Vedic Law of the Early Period in India, usury was condemned as a mortal sin and regulated by 
the government. 
33 There is a period after the collapse of the Bronze Age (1200 BCE) where syncretic systems suffered and mayhem 
reigned for roughly five centuries. Within that period, there is an intellectual decline due to the high levels of 
warfare, recurrent droughts and famine, and these economic factors led to much forced migration. It was after this 
period that usury emerged as a weapon, fostered by the lack of just law enforcement for several centuries. 
34 Scholars debate where the laws came from and exactly when they were amalgamated into Mosaic Law but it is 
accepted that they are related to the efforts of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezrah, and Josiah (641-609 BCE). 
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that “presents real possibilities” (p. 11). Greenburg (1955) challenged this history, yet it abides 
as an important hypothesis that the Hebrews brought usurious practices westward.35 
 
2.1.5 The Holiness Code in the Bible 
 
Biblical scholars have labeled Leviticus chapters 17-26 the Holiness Code. Some scholars 
believe it to have originated in the seventh century BCE (Cougan, 2009). The OT says, “Land 
must not be sold in perpetuity, for the land belongs to Me and you are only strangers and guests. 
You will allow a right of redemption on all your landed property… and restore it to its customary 
cultivators every fifty years” (Lev. 25.23-28). This echoes the spirit of the Babylonian Jubilee. 
The destitute, unfortunate people who had slipped into bondage were to be set free during Jubilee 
years because they belonged ultimately to the Lord, not to any person (Lev. 25.54). In the Book 
of Deuteronomy (31.10), there is a directive to have the laws read aloud publicly every seven 
years (shemitta).36  
                                                 
35 The Habiru are first discovered in the Amarna letters, they are described as a source of social turmoil and at the 
heart of rebellion within many Canaanite city-states. The evidence argued for Hapirus being the Hebrews’ 
antecedents is an etymological hypothesis combined with the study of migration and economic habits. Hebrew’s 
root meaning, ‘ibri, is “to go over, or across” signifying people who traveled across long distances. It would signify 
that such people were nomadic and patriarchal, migrating from place to place. However, to see the side of the debate 
that does not accept the connection in its entirety from the time Hebrew was discovered to be an appellation of 
Habiru, see Greenburg’s work as cited above; it contains a complete bibliography of the debate up until the time of 
its print. 
36 The Hebrew terminology employed to represent the Jubilee debt cancellation concept was shemitta. This 
egalitarian aspect to the code tried to ensure that literate as well as illiterate people were granted the opportunity to 
hear the enforcement of the law. It was an attempt to mitigate the potentiality of miscommunication as well as 
continued bondage past the seven-year threshold. It is interesting that today the credit reports in Western nations 
retain debts on them for a period of seven years, a remnant of this old practice. Furthermore, there is something 
transcendent about the number seven related to debt; for instance, a piece of paper cannot be folded more than seven 
times at its center; or a piano chord cannot extend beyond seven notes. The passages command the Hebrews to deal 
justly with society, especially in matters of exchange. The commands were taken seriously because they were 
considered divine law once they became a part of the Old Testament; this was a key element behind their gaining 
social acceptance. The spirit of the law focused on ethics, rather, it focused on function over form. Ceremonial 
purity was secondary to morality in that sense. As an undeniable weapon, governments and religious doctrines were 
forced to take stances on usury. For centuries, Muslims and Catholics prohibited it for its inimicality. Promoting the 
notion that ethical trade is based on mutual consent, Muslims remained as interlocutors and trendsetters in the 
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The spirit of such a law underscored the importance of righteousness and justice in all 
social exchanges, but especially in trade. Seeking usury from a person was viewed as an 
immorality within the Biblical discourse. This is demonstrated by the virtues embodied by 
Ezekiel in the OT (Ezek. 18.8), “He grants loans without interest, stays away from injustice, is 
honest and fair when judging others...” (Holy Bible, Ezek. 18.8). According to Rabbi Cohen’s 
Everyman’s Talmud (1995) usurers were not allowed to bear witness, neither were they allowed 
to give legal testimony. Their word was deemed tainted and they were societally rejected. The 
Halakhah law prohibited any financing charges on loan transactions because “someone who pays 
the higher price is actually paying an additional fee for credit. This is Ribbis” (Reisman, 1995, p. 
112).37 Furthermore, the notion that the rich and poor were created equally, in the image of God  
substantiated the fact that charging any interest was usury, which was also denoted as neshekh 
(Lev 25:35-37). The literal meaning was ‘snakebite’ (Jewish Encyclopedia, n.d.).38  
 
2.1.6 Employing Usury as a Technique in Warfare 
 
Islam shares the stance taken early on by other civilizations regarding the immorality of 
usury. Amongst the Israelites a contract of risk sharing replaced usurious lending, called heter 
iska. However, a hermeneutic duality would emerge that departs from the common ethical 
ground shared with the Islamic tradition, which declared the Gentile ineligible for the protection 
                                                                                                                                                             
ethical parameters of global trade during the Middle Ages until Islamic and Catholic influence in Europe and its 
periphery waned thereby creating a vacuum that was later replaced by the amoral system of banking. As a result, the 
predominating Jewish, Protestant and secular embrace of interest procured an environment in Europe where 
predatory industrial capitalism could emerge and thrive. 
37 He further adds on p.112 “The prohibition of Ribbis is not limited to situations where cash changes hands. It also 
applies to purchases made on credit. In this case the customer has the status of a borrower and is prohibited from 
paying interest on the credit he owes the seller”. 
38 According to the Jewish Encyclopedia, nacash in Hebrew signifies a serpent; therefore, its linguistic derivation 
neshekh means to strike with a serpent’s sting to the debtor. The language provides vivid imagery and this moral 
teaching was consistent with the greater ethical teaching of the Hebrew tradition. 
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against usury proscribed within the OT. Thus, it became kosher to lend to all gentiles as a 
stratagem, similar to how the Canaanites were lent to as a warfare technique (Gordon, 2013).39 
Not only was this method highly controversial, but it also seemed to falsely represent the spirit of 
the law, which had been established for social harmony, not as a weapon. In addition, Mosaic 
Law demands the Israelite community not to obfuscate, “You must not molest the stranger or 
oppress him, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt” (Exod. 22.21). It goes on, “If you lend 
money to any of my people, to any poor man among you, you must not play the usurer with him; 
you must not demand interest from him” (Exod. 22.25).  
Injudiciously, the normative practice amongst usurers emerged defining all Gentiles as 
‘foreigners’ and or ‘sojourners’ even though there were directives to treat foreigners with equity; 
“The same law will run for the native and the foreign resident among you” (Exod. 12.49). 
However, an exegetical reading of Deuteronomy 23.19 emerged stating, “You may demand 
interest on a loan of a foreigner, but you must not demand interest from your brother. . .” 
Additional commentary in support of this hermeneutic is found in the Talmud (Bava Metzia, 
n.d.).40 This diktat was an isolated ruling; Jews still had to abide by general, non-market related 
injunctions in dealing with Gentiles (Nelson, 1969). Mews and Abraham remark “While this 
concession is often interpreted as a double-standard, it can also be understood as enabling Jewish 
moneylenders to gain legitimate compensation in their dealings with an outside world, in which 
charging interest was a normal procedure” (2007, p. 3). 
                                                 
39 According to some opinions, this is even an obligation. A reading of the OT’s verses dealing with usury reveals 
some interesting results. Although there is no ambiguity in the text regarding the immorality of usury, a loophole 
exists if interpreted in a fashion that allows usury to be used as a weapon of warfare. It was under these auspices that 
usury was introduced as such a technique. 
40 The Talmud’s book Bava Metzia (70b-71a) commented on by Moses Maimonides’s Laws of Loans Chapter 5 law 
#2 says it is only permissible to loan on usury to ‘sojourners’ in order to provide a basic living standard, and that it is 
impermissible to charge a ‘high’ rate. Usurious loans were given to the Canaanites, which were mathematically 
impossible to repay as compounding interest acted as a stronger force than natural labor or ingenuity could check. 
The Canaanites were bled through loan repayment, eventually leading to their weakening and demise. 
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The prohibition of usury had been marginalized to make room for exceptions, these 
exceptions became the norms, and the rules became contradictory to their original conditions. 
The first departure from law and ethics regarding usury is witnessed in this context. Of course, 
not all rabbinical authorities were in agreement (Klein, 1994).41 Nevertheless, in essence, the 
politico-religious stratagem that some Israelites embraced in dealings with Gentiles was a wealth 
extraction technique; the only stipulated exception was that Israelites were not allowed to charge 
any interest amongst each other (Nelson, 1969). As a result of the practice that developed on this 
understanding Muller (2010) purports that “So closely was the reviled practice of usury 
identified with the Jews that St. Bernard of Clairvaux, the leader of the Cistercian Order, in the 
middle of the twelfth century referred to the taking of usury as Jewing” (p. 24). 
 
2.1.7 Usury in the Classics and the Medieval World 
 
In Ancient Greece, Aristotle delineates just money in his Nicomachean Ethics, asserting 
that money is purely an instrument used to measure the value of goods against each other (1952). 
In his Politics, he addresses the issue of usury; he denounces all methods of acquisitive (retail) 
exchange contrary to pure economic exchange or that concerned with the running of a 
household. The Ancient Greek term he refers to is campsoria, which within this context denotes 
usurious money changing, “Usury he considers to be the worst kind of exchange because money, 
intended to be used for exchange of goods, here becomes an end in itself” (Mews & Abraham, 
2007, p. 3).  
                                                 
41 There was an instrument developed in the Jewish tradition called ‘heter iska’ that tried to turn the borrower lender 
relationship into a profit and loss scenario similar to Islamic products of profit and loss sharing. Unfortunately, this 
practice has not been widely embraced.  
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Aristotle’s discourse demonstrated that money was sterile as an ethical truth. 
Additionally, he articulated the moral argument for why money must be something that is 
carefully managed by society, and preferably by elected representatives, in order to prevent 
unethical practices of charging for the usage of money. However, Aristotle’s writings did not 
penetrate the West until the 13th century, playing an inconsequential role in early trajectories of 
Western economic thought.  
 
2.1.8 Christian Mores Battle Against Usury 
 
One of the observable reasons for the prohibition of usury is because it visibly guarantees 
returns for the rich at the expense of the poor, which widens disparity. Usury exploits the poor by 
loaning amounts to them that grow in geometric progressions that nothing can match because of 
the limits of the physical world. Furthermore, usury taxes the money supply. In one respect, it 
becomes an issue, not of morals, but of mathematical restraints. In terms of stating its 
immorality, Christianity and Islam were in agreement. However a departure in terms utilized in 
the West from those used in the Islamic world starts to emerge, which later expands as 
connotations further depart from denotations. Due to the resilience of usurers and the lack of 
organized interest-free capital funding in European economies, the arguments in support of 
legalizing usury consistently put the Church’s moral teachings to the test. Christianity’s struggle 
with the usury prohibition shows a trajectory of long-standing resistance to usury, which wanes 
over a long period. 
Of the many avenues pursued in attempts at weakening the prohibition, the first was to 
render the issue to a matter of semantics. In Latin, the noun usura denotes the use of anything, as 
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in using borrowed capital; the price paid became the use of money. The Oxford Dictionary on 
Historical Principles (1992) reports this vaguely, as other dictionaries do, as an archaic 
understanding of usury (Boyes, 1982).42 One inadequacy of the Christian argument was that its 
reliance primarily depended on a rational articulation of Christian ethics by scholars, rather than 
on scripture.43 Islamologists further argue that the Christian argument was heavily dependent on 
borrowings from Islam and cite numerous similarities (Ahmad, 1995).44 Helmholz (1986) quotes 
the medieval stance of the Church: 
 
Since almost in every place the crime of usury has become so prevalent that many 
people give up all other business and become usurers, as if it were lawful, 
regarding not its prohibition in both Testaments, we ordain that manifest usurers 
shall not be admitted to communion, nor, if they die in their sins, be admitted to 
Christian burial, and that no priest shall accept their alms (pp. 364-365). 
 
Birnie (1952) documents how the church criminalized the offense at times. However, as 
strong as the stance was verbally, the lack of ethical economic infrastructure led to problems 
because people did not have access to interest-free credit. The Church’s worldview emphasized 
                                                 
42 The Latin usuria lacks the same negative connotation of the perspicuously termed ‘biting usury’ from the Hebrew 
term neshekh in the OT. It is more similar to the replacement of neshekh with marbut in selected parts of Ezekiel, 
denoting any credit towards the lender, which loses some of the pejorative of ‘biting.’ 
43 The concessions previously consented on by Rabbinical authorities were rejected by the Church because the 
scriptural OT evidence did not allow such exclusionary measures. On the other hand, there were no blatantly 
specific prohibitions of usury in the Bible. The existence of such a clear mandate would have added a doctrinal and 
legalistic aspect to the rational understanding. However, its absence was significant. The Christian doctrine taught to 
love God and to love one’s neighbor, whether he was a sojourner, Israelite or Gentile (John 2.4). Early on 
Christendom’s theological disagreements led to the ceding of some tenets, but the usury prohibition was not initially 
one of them. The issue was later firmly upheld at the Council of Nicaea (325 CE). The dispute was fervently debated 
and its articulation expounded as a rational and moral argument. 
44 There is considerable evidence that Islam played a role in shaping the moral economic atmosphere of global trade 
and Christian reinforcement of usury. Ahmad cites parallels between the Church position and Ibn Khaldun’s (d. 
1406) Prolegomena and opines that Charlemagne’s prosecution against usury was influenced by the Muslims, who 
had instituted the prohibition of usury a century prior to him and with whom he had been in contact with. He 
mentions, “It is also significant that the Christians of that era opposed usury not as unjust, but as uncharitable. Every 
criticism of usury in the Qur'an is in the context of a discussion of charity”. In addition, the first official prohibition 
was in the 4th century CE, but it was limited to the clergy. The edict was later extended to all laymen by the 5th 
century CE. Birnie (1958) notes that when things shifted in Europe was when Charlemagne (d. 814) was crowned as 
the Holy Roman Emperor and temporal protector of the church in the West. He made usury a criminal offense.  
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the importance of the afterlife very strongly and rarely did it focus on formulating ethical 
parameters for business dealings. The Church taught that society was incorrigibly corrupt and 
that all insatiability was sinful avarice, rendering temporal existence subsidiary to spirituality, 
which likely played a role in the absence of a robust economic jurisprudence. In the absence of 
necessary lending institutions, there existed a substantial void in the lives of people in need of 
guidance and opportunity in the financial sphere, especially those seeking working capital 
(Viner, 1978). As law prohibited charging fixed rates of interest, and capital was scarce, the 
practice of lending for a fee was forced underground, and it thrived, and this led to “…crippling 
rates of interest” and in this crisis “Canonists and theologians sought to distinguish what 
constituted unlawful usury from the legitimate compensation incurred by the lender” (Mews & 
Abraham, 2007, pp. 3-4). 
 
2.1.9 The Scholastics Discuss Usury and Just Compensation 
 
Scholasticism (1100-1500) is a method of critical thought known for its coalescence of 
morals, philosophy and Christian theology in its production of dialectical reasoning. Its scholars 
wrangled over the moral arguments against usury articulated by classical philosophers. On the 
issue of money, Aristotle had asserted that “it exists not by nature but by law…there must then 
be a unit, and that fixed by agreement” (Aristotle, 1952, p. 1133). Plato corroborated, and 
therefore regarded usury as a means by which the rich gained a vantage point of exploitation 
over the poor (Noonan, 1965).45 The most distinguished of the Scholastics was St. Thomas 
                                                 
45 Noonan discusses the connotations of the two terms as antonyms, furthering the argument that tokos is unnatural. 
To the Sumerians mas meant both calves and interest because both gave birth. A similar loan word was used in 
Ancient Egypt. Similarly, Aristotle had argued that money lent was not to increase upon repayment because it was 
sterile. Aristotle described usury with the term tokos, which meant a bringing forth, or a birth. It shares a likeness in 
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Aquinas (d. 1274). In his Summa Theoligica, question 78 (The Sin of Usury) specifically 
addresses usury in a discussion spanning several sections. First, it provides all of the arguments 
in favor of usury, some of which erroneously attribute their usury to following a precedent set by 
Jesus.46 To them Aquinas replies, “I answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, 
because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary 
to justice” (Aquinas, 2013, p. 1512). In this way, he portrayed usury as a form of bondage (as 
discussed in Ch. 2 section 1). Aquinas railed against the people who distorted the image of 
money by claiming its rental was akin to renting an asset.47 Furthermore, he addressed the Jewish 
moneylending practices contemporary to him, “The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their 
brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand that to take usury from any 
man is evil simply, because we ought to treat every man as our neighbor and brother, especially 
in the state of the Gospel, whereto all are called” (Aquinas, 2013, p. 1512). 
Scholars concede that Aquinas’s position is reliant on the concepts of ‘just exchange’ as 
articulated by Al Ghazali (1058-1111); and, Aquinas indeed acknowledged this indebtedness 
(Smith, 1944).48 These shared sentiments on just exchange were a common ground between the 
two faiths, which shared much in their discourses on justice. The Franciscan Scottish theologian 
Duns Scotus (d. 1308) was also aware of Al Ghazali’s treatises, and historians of philosophy 
                                                                                                                                                             
describing a phenomenon the Babylonian mas and original Latin term faenus endeavored to delineate. All of which 
made no distinction between increase and usury. 
46 Though there was not much ambiguity regarding the spirit of the entire corpus of Christian doctrine, a few 
anecdotes in the NT would later serve as contentious areas, which some thought were justification for interest. One 
example is “The Parable of Ten Minas” where Jesus seems to scold a person for not investing the monarch’s funds 
in an interest-bearing account (Luk. 19.23). 
47 For the rental of something tangible that has its usufruct destroyed by its usage, such as food, the usage is 
destroyed upon the food’s consumption. Therefore, commodities, like his example of food, cannot be rented; thus, 
whoever comes into possession of the commodity has the right to use its usufruct. One should not have to pay twice, 
once for buying the food and a second time for using the food. The reckoning of such he deems unjust. Furthermore, 
Aquinas relies upon Aristotle, who he calls “The Philosopher” and he cites on how it is unnatural to accept payment 
for the use of money lent, reaffirming that money is for the usage of society and inherently sterile. 
48 Al-Ghazali was influential on many European scholars. Aquinas studied at the University of Naples where “the 
influence of Arab literature and culture was predominant at the time” according Smith on p.220. 
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argue over how much influence that had on Scotus’ works in his advancements of the concept of 
‘just compensation’ (Speer & Wegener, 2006).49 Other prominent Scholastics like Alexander 
Lombard and Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) wrote on the subject with similar sentiments, often by 
alluding to Jesus’s renowned episode of violently forcing the moneylenders from the temple in 
Matt. 21.12, often interpreted as an anti-usury statement (Koyama, 2008).  
Aquinas’s arguments influenced how usury was increasingly discussed as a “social 
justice issue” as the context of his milieu’s discourse centered on what was considered usury and 
what was considered profit (Langholm, 1998, p. 67). Kaye (2005) argues that Aquinas 
transformed the earlier, more primitive discussion by emphasizing the inequity of a borrower and 
lender relationship wherein the wealthy lender exacts payments from a poorer person against his 
will. Thus, in this understanding the Scholastics allowed two types of investment that they 
deemed ‘just’ compensation to lenders, census and commendas.50 Both operated under equitable 
risk sharing principles.51  
However, the sophistication of unscrupulous methods was progressing rapidly. Many 
moneylenders were happily filling the void of an agreed upon public finance system. El-Diwany 
                                                 
49 Franciscans were followers of St. Francis of Assisi, and claimed Scotus was their answer to the Scholastics’ 
Aquinas. The first of the order, friars, followed a lifestyle of total poverty. On pages 620-622, Podkonski mentions 
that Al Ghazali’s fifth argument in his Metaphysics refers to the example in his Ash’arite argument of atomism that 
“The shadow of a rod of a sundial necessarily moves according to the movement of the sun. Therefore, if the Sun 
moves by one atom, the shadow will move proportionally, i.e., by less than one atom”. He compares this to Scotus’ 
mention of the same anecdote, “If the shadow does not move when the Sun moves, then one line would have two 
limits on one end. The first in the place where the Sun was before, the second in the place where the Sun moved 
afterwards – which is impossible”. 
50 Furthermore, contextualizing Aquinas’ milieu wherein the idea prevailed that usury did not exist on cases of price 
uncertainty about future goods, which centered specifically on what was considered profit and what was considered 
usury. Alanus Anglicus had argued around 1236 that usury did not exist in cases on price uncertainty about future 
goods, and what resulted from 1246-1253 in the legal system of Pope Innocent IV. 
51 This is plausibly adopted from a consensus reached in an interfaith dialogue with the Islamic civilization and its 
periphery’s wider business practices. It is very interesting that Muslims developed these loans called hawala in the 
medieval period but that much of the contemporary literature citing their existence alludes to terrorism and money 
laundering, which really obfuscates an academic search into what they stood for in essence. The census and 
comenda loans made moral considerations for just repayment, limited the amount that could be ultimately repaid and 
mitigated risks of exploitation through moral legislation by mimicking the concurrent Islamic loans that forced 
lenders and investors to share equitably in risks and profits (profit and loss PLS). Charging minimal administrative 
fees for drawing up a contract was allowed, whereas exacting usury was not. 
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(2010) adds, “During these times, the willingness of Jews to advance money under usury saved 
many a Christian exchequer from financial embarrassment” (p. 24). Nevertheless, the amassed 
wealth of the moneylenders caused resentment and shifted public sentiments in Europe. 
Reverend Patrick Cleary (1972) notes “The people clamoured for their expulsion, and at length 
in 1290 Edward, yielding to their importunities, ordered all Jews to quit the kingdom with their 
goods and chattels under penalty of death” (p. 72). 
 
2.1.10 The Islamic Concept of Rizq Loses Influence in Europe 
 
Jewish, secular and Christian aristocrats were finding unimaginable wealth in the avarice 
of lending.52 Medievalist historians have triangulated several reasons for the chipping away of 
the usury prohibition during the ‘commercial revolution’ of the 12th and 13th centuries (Baldwin, 
1970). Because the vitality of Scholastic arguments hinged on social justice, protecting the poor 
was imperative, but an emerging rationalization in Europe gave way to the idea that legitimate 
compensation to investors was indispensable in order to maintain equity among financial 
relationships. In Islamic nomenclature, this was connected to the concept of rizq. However, the 
concept’s denotation would be unhinged as lenders became conflated with investors.  
The Quranic concept of rizq (29.7) meaning ‘to seek one’s reward or bounty from God’, 
which views God as the one that bestows wealth (ar-razzaaq), first appeared translated into Latin 
as resicum (or risicum) in 1156 (Noonan, 1957).53 The concept denoted that a return on 
                                                 
52 Avarice is contradicted by the Pauline theme that it serves as the root of all evils (1 Tim. 6:10). Consequently, 
although Christian societies essentially adopted ‘Islamic’ understandings on usury, they never instituted the 
alternative, which is the enforcement of equal-risk and profit and loss sharing contracts (discussed in Chapter 4). 
53 The word risk appeared in a financial document in Genoa undertaken by an agent named Jordan who assumed the 
risk of investing someone else’s capital. Noonan maps the chronological sequence of events covering the Church’s 
attempt to deal with the semantics of usury. In the 13th century Pope Innocent IV (1250-1261 CE) upheld the ban, 
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investments must not be guaranteed, as usurious loans were; thus, rizq meant that God may or 
may not confer, and that investors had a legitimate right to seek compensation if, and only if, a 
venture’s risks and profits were equitably shared. However, it has been pointed out that a major 
cognitive reframing of rizq took place whereby the meaning of ‘risk’, at least to some Europeans, 
was secularized to mean ‘chance’ or ‘danger’ and it increasingly became something to be 
avoided in the quest for ‘risk-free’ returns (Kedar, 1969). This semantic obfuscation is 
significant.54 Things denoted as ‘risky’ made investors ‘risk averse’ whereby danger was linked 
with rizq, a major shift in discourse, which several arguments emerged to substantiate. 
 
2.1.11 The Rationale in Arguing for Usury: Time Value of Money  
 
As discourse about lending became ‘risk-averse’, elite commentators began to frame 
usury upon rational justifications. If no religiously inspired ethical regulation exists to counter 
immoral and or ideological assumptions, the rationale for charging usury can be very 
compelling. It is, after all, very attractive in a utilitarian sense to make a return on one’s money 
without exerting any effort, or taking any risks. The idea that fundamentally underpins this 
concept is that money has a ‘time value’ to it. In support of the time value argument people often 
postulate, “Would you give me an interest-free loan? I didn’t think so”. Such postulating is 
supposed to substantiate the need for interest in society. However, the question is ill phrased. 
What we should ask ourselves is if we would grant a loan to our children or our parents interest-
free if we had a surplus amount of money, the likelihood of them repaying was exceptionally 
                                                                                                                                                             
claiming it was contradictory to divine and human law and that its spread would lead to the abandonment of 
industry.  
54 The way it is translated into Arabic even now shows this obfuscation as risk now means khattr (danger) or 
mukhaattra. Hence, low risk munkhafidh al mukhattr still gives the connotation of danger, which was never the case 
in classical jurisprudence.  
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high, and the amount requested was very reasonable. For this properly contextualizes lending by 
considering numerous other factors such as the dynamics of trust, kinship, credit worthiness and 
social setting. 
Nevertheless, a major framing breakthrough for usurers occurred by 1220 CE when the 
canonist Hispanus (d. 1277) identified an ostensibly legitimate charge that a lender could claim 
on a usury-free loan if a borrower was late in repaying. The point argued was that legitimate 
compensation should be given to the owner of said funds for his ‘loss’ of the ability to use his 
funds in the interim period, for waiting for his funds to be returned. Capitalizing on the 
ambiguity of what defined money, the argument exploited the conflation between credit and 
commodity money, ignoring the fact that credit, issuing a debt obligation, holds almost no 
opportunity cost. Nonetheless, the argument gained traction. In Latin, ‘interess’ (inter esse) 
derived from ‘in-between’, signified the ‘lost period’ of waiting; it later became ‘interest’ (El-
Diwany, 2010). Soon, “fictitious late payments became an accepted if disingenuous way of 
circumventing usury laws” (Persky, 2007, p. 228). 
Soon thereafter, arguments arose to justify a payment from the onset of the loan (El-
Diwany, 2010). Additional ploys came about that circumvented the usury prohibition by padding 
three contracts into one, called contractum trinius (Rehman, 2007).55 An investor would invest 
money with an entrepreneur with one contract; a second agreement would insure against any 
possible loss; and a third would waive the rights to any profits above an agreed percentage 
(Chown, 1994). Combining three contracts in such a manner resulted in a guaranteed interest 
payment to the initial ‘lender’ who marauded as a ‘seller’. 
                                                 
55 To illustrate contractum trinius (Latin) linked to banking families like the Medicis, A loans B 100 coins in order 
to start a business. A then sells another promise to B that claims A will not ask for any interest, however, this 
contract costs 20 coins. Finally, B would sell A another contract insuring him that he would pay back all of the 
money, an insurance policy, and for that B would charge A 10 coins. The result is that B ends up owing A 110 coins 
rather than 100, which is a guaranteed 10% interest return. 
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The growing societal tolerance of such practices allowed an astute class of merchants to 
develop banking in northern Italy and the periphery during the 15th century. The circumvention 
of usury laws between the 14th and 16th centuries led to the adoption of similar techniques 
throughout Europe, which attracted investment, but discriminated against the poor who were 
charged a minimum of “35% compound interest” (Mews & Abraham, 2007, p. 6). 
 
2.1.12 The Protestant Reformation: A Paradigm Shift in Tolerating Interest  
 
It is difficult to make a paradigmatic statement on an entire movement, but in general, the 
Protestant Reformation (1517-1648) effectively embraced usury as a positive function and within 
its milieu, usury increasingly became conceived as an archaic and obsolete term. Several 
individuals, self-identifying as reformers, protested the ecclesiastical hierarchy and claims of 
apostolic legitimacy of the Catholic Church, and thereafter galvanized support for a rearticulated 
Christian discourse. Martin Luther’s The Ninety-Five Theses (1517) is often credited as the 
starting-off point of the movement, which had some peculiar characteristics. On the one hand, 
those protesting wanted nothing to do with ecclesiastical traditions, courts and rituals. On the 
other hand, since individual and lay interpretation of the Bible had little established precedent, 
the movement had to forge religious jurisprudence ad hoc.56 When the issue of usury came up, 
the leaders of the Reformation disputed, leading to further schism. The strongest Christian 
arguments against usury and immense wealth grabbing had always taken the form of rational 
arguments articulated by clergy, so when Protestants began construing transactions from purely 
                                                 
56 The Reformation was precipitated by events such as the Western (Papal) Schism (1378-1417), the wide 
dissemination of Bibles and Renaissance ideas, the Black Death, and the vacuum created by the fall of Byzantium 
(1453). Much of the ideological underpinnings relied on Augustinianism (Augustus of Hippo 354-430 CE), which 
was heavily reflected in John Calvin’s writings.  
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economic perspectives, by default, it meant excluding many of the strongest available Christian 
moral filters. 
Since the distinction between interest and usury assembled in a nuanced decree of 
whatever was considered the legal rate imposed by any said government on a case-by-case basis, 
the difference between the two remained rather arbitrary and relative. Martin Luther started his 
preaching career copiously against usury saying, “Money is an unfruitful commodity which I 
cannot sell in such a way as to entitle me profit” (Wilson, 1941, p. 104). He did struggle with 
articulating his position consistently, but he spoke against it nonetheless (Zarlenga, 2002).57  
 
2.1.13 Calvinism and Usury 
 
In contrast, personal commentary and statements made in letters written by the French 
John Calvin (d. 1564) would have an entirely different effect on the discourse on usury. 58 
Noonan (1995) narrates that from 1150-1550 there existed a consensus that asking for any 
compensation on a loan, not an investment, was against natural law, the gospel and the Church. 
Calvin seemed to disagree. His theological writings opined that signs of God’s favor could be 
evidenced by people’s ability to amass wealth (Glaeser & Glendon, 1998).59 Moreover, this 
                                                 
57 Then, there is a period (1523-1525) where political pressures forced his theology to accommodate some room for 
the practice, viewing it as an “evil necessity” (p. 191). Then in 1539, reformer Martin Bucer’s (1491-1551) polemics 
against the anti-usury stance, claiming only the neshekh, or biting usury was prohibited prodded Luther to respond 
emphatically against every type of increase on loans. Lutherism was more of a Germanic phenomenon. By simply 
condemning usury without offering an alternative macroeconomic model, the periphery where his followers resided 
remained in the same pre-capitalist conditions, where usury was illegal, but still widely practiced and unregulated. 
58 Calvin’s treatment of usury is limited. It is not an emphasis in his theology. However, three of his commentaries 
discuss biblical texts that cover the topic of usury covering Ex 23.25; Lev 25. 35-38 and Deut 23. 19-20 and a 
reference to the eighth commandment. There is also a posthumously published commentary on Ezek. 18. 8-17 and a 
lucid personal letter on usury written in 1545 to his companion Claude de Sachin, published by Beza in 1575. 
59 This paradox has been discussed because it is highly contentious amongst Christian scholars, that there is “faith” 
with “no works”. 
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sentiment influenced Christian movements in Holland, where capitalism’s foundations would 
assimilate the new embracing attitudes and frames related to the charging of interest on loans.  
A snapshot of Calvin’s imprint on this discourse provides a purview into Protestant 
thoughts on the issue. In 1536 in The Institutes of the Christian Religion, his seminal work, 
Calvin remarks, “I do not consider that usury be forbidden amongst us”. He then rhetorically 
asks, “When I buy a field does it not breed money?” The implication is that money grows 
without labor. Yet the perennial truth is that fields have multiple potentialities, none guaranteed. 
They may either perish or grow with guided assistance. In contrast, as a representation of 
measurement, money has no such qualities. Yet, Calvin acknowledges, “It is a very rare thing for 
a man to be honest and at the same time a usurer” although the teachings can be semantically 
interpreted in different ways, and because of the nuanced rhetorical devices he employs, Calvin’s 
words are interpreted as approval for the practice of charging interest (Calvin, 1813, p. 4.3.9).  
The most influential pronouncement of Calvin in this sense was semantic, which was that 
civil society – not scripture – should decide on an acceptable interest rate, in the pursuit of social 
utility (this theme is recurrent in modern history). Calvin made no distinction between wealth 
and money as productive capital, a conflation that gave great strength to the rationale of lending 
at interest. Moreover, in Book I Ch. IX he criticized Luther’s case against usury as “abandoning 
the scripture” and “much misled by error” (Calvin, 1813). Hence, these pronouncements 
encouraged “a shift in focus away from the need to protect vulnerable consumers toward 
supporting the demands of a nascent bourgeoisie, needing capital to fuel economic expansion” 
(Mews & Abraham, 2007, p. 6). Some would argue that voices like Jeremey Bentham had more 
of an influence in defending usury than Calvin, although this is a minority opinion, because 
Calvin’s pro-interest slant quickly gained popularity with the European upper echelons of society 
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(Dunn, 2008).60 Therefore, as a tool adopted by power, the next step was the institutionalization 
of practices that imbibed the values of such discourse shapers. 
 
2.1.14 The Protestant Work Ethic and Capitalism 
 
Once interest is cognitively framed as an accepted mechanism within Protestant 
discourse, the emphasis shifts away from debating its legality to debating other aspects of its 
effect on culture, aptly labeled as capitalist. Several writers on The Reformation have tried to 
gauge the significance and impact that Calvinism had on the rise of capitalism and the reasons 
why its paradigm emerges from Holland and England to lead to the industrial revolution. In 
Protestantism and Progress (1912), Ernst Troelstch claims the great problem of economic 
history is defining the “character and origin of capitalism” (p. 139). He claims that capitalism 
largely grew out of a perversion of Reformist thought, inscribing, “Its turning to gain for gains 
sake, to fierce and ruthless competition, its agonizing for lust and victory, its blatant satisfaction 
of the tyrannical power of the merchant class has entirely loosed it from its former ethical 
foundation…” (p. 139).  
In The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905), Max Weber flouts at 
the possibility that capitalism is an adoption of usury and mammon. Instead, he apportions two 
distinct types of capitalism: a Jewish version he calls “speculative pariah capitalism, while the 
bourgeoisie [version] was [the] organization of labor” (p. 271); and an opposing Protestant 
                                                 
60 Calvinism would spread by other names; in England, it sailed under the flag of Puritanism. Important to note is 
that Calvin’s father had been denied the sacraments and a Church burial for being accused of embezzling the 
Church. Thus, we can see the existence of some clear animosity in Calvin’s teachings towards rituals, sacraments, 
traditional priesthood and good works. The rhetoric challenged the Catholic (Jamesian) moral message of balancing 
faith with good works, which sort of nullified the point of traditional Christian business ethics and limiting the 




version that he calls a “…rational industrial organization attuned to a regular market and neither 
to political nor irrationally speculative opportunities for profit” (p. 271). Weber’s statements 
played a significant part in the reframing of economic thought, especially in regards to treating 
the normalization of interest as a forgone conclusion that was disconnected from irrationally 
speculative practices in explaining how and why Christian populations embraced capitalism. 
Thus, many have built their works in response to Weber’s thesis.61 For instance, Werner 
Sombart’s reaction in The Jews and Modern Capitalism (1911), hones in on the similarities 
between the Calvinist and Judaic stances on usury. He argues, “That which is called Puritanism 
is in reality Judaism” because “those parts of the Puritan dogma which appear to be of real 
importance for the formulation of the spirit of capitalism are borrowed from the realm of ideas of 
the Jewish religion” (1951, p. xx). Sombart suggests that Calvin’s bibliolatry (excessive 
adherence to the Bible as the ‘literal word of God’) renders the Bible an easy political tool of 
zealotry. Calvin’s inclusion of Hebrews, a spurned scripture in Greek Bibles, is part of his 
argument that the Christian opinions are “founded on testimonies found in the Old Testament” 
rather than St. Paul’s authority (p. xx).  
It is further argued that Calvin’s use of Masoretic (Hebrew) texts rather than Greek texts 
gave a new significance to the Jewish peoples, their traditions, scriptures and ways.62 Similarly, 
Calvin’s theology taught a special ‘chosen people’ doctrine similar to Jewish orthodoxy 
(Tawney, 1920).63 Zarlenga (2000) further adds, “Calvinism’s legalization of usury would be 
                                                 
61 Weber’s thesis is considered a seminal work in the field of economics to this day, but his representation of 
capitalism seems oxymoronic as it dismisses the fact that Puritans and Jews were both culpable for the same market 
practices. Additionally, a ‘rational market’ had never previously incorporated usury in such a manner, but this seems 
to be overlooked. 
62 Masoretic here refers to any of Jewish scholars from the 6th – 10th centuries CE who contributed to a recognized 
text of the Hebrew Bible, and the compilation of the Masorah. 
63 In contrast, there were other works that deferred with Calvin. Using some of Weber’s research as a benchmark, 
R.H. Tawney’s thesis Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (1926) bemoans the way The Reformation brought a 
division between commerce and ethics, leading to the Christian religion’s subordination to the pursuit of material 
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very important to the Jews, condoning their primary monetary activity at that time” (p. 196). The 
consequence was the “elevation of Jerusalem over Athens” and that meant a slighting of 
Aristotle, Scholasticism and the Christian/Islamic moral argument against charging interest (p. 
196).  
 
Part 2: A Precursor to Capitalism: The Birth of Banking 
 
2.2.1 The Pre-Capitalist Sphere of Exchange and its Credit System of Trust 
 
Highlighting a significant departure from how cosmopolitan trading networks comprised 
of both Muslim and international traders traditionally dealt with credit helps contextualize the 
reframing of interest that took place in the West. Abu-Lughod (1989) contrasts the main 
differences between the trade parameters established by the Muslim civilization and those that 
later spawned banking and capitalism in Europe. In traditional Muslim societies, most notably 
those throughout the Middle Ages, both commodity and fiat specie circulated simultaneously 
throughout global trading networks. Abu-Lughod notes that Muslims first popularized ‘promises 
to pay’ (hawala) notes through the Mediterranean trade routes in the 14th and 15th centuries, that 
were, essentially, bills of credit. Financiers would back ambitious international traders by issuing 
‘promises to pay’ that could be redeemed for gold and silver at safekeeping storage houses 
within their trading networks.  
In contrast, the key innovation in Europe was a civilizational pivot back to using credit 
money under the auspices that it was still redeemable for specie. That is, a proliferation of 
                                                                                                                                                             
wealth. Tawney’s criticism was expanded from his work The Acquisitive Society (1920) in which he argues for a 
more egalitarian and principled society and censures against capitalism due to it propelling modern society towards 
extreme individualism.  
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conflating different qualities of commodity money with credit money. This move capitalized on 
the social capital built by centuries of trustworthy international trade and the acceptance of credit 
bills in a manner intrinsically similar to how commodity money was accepted. As Geoffrey 
Ingham (1999) mentions (in footnote 17), “in Islam the bills of credit were not transformed into 
credit money as they were in early modern Europe” (p. 96). This meant that credit obligations in 
Muslim trade networks had limited transferability, and they were not discounted. Discounting is 
a mechanism in which a debtor pays a creditor a fee for delaying repayment, essentially an 
interest charge for the ‘time value of money’. Discounting would become a key mechanism in 
the development of banking. 
 
2.2.2 Goldsmiths Monopolize the Money Supply 
 
The word banking likely derives from the word ‘bench’ (Hong-tao, 2007).64 The first 
banks started when merchants in Europe, like the Italian Medici family, circumvented usury laws 
and began extending commercial loans for profit. The practices spread through Europe and later 
culminated into a full-fledged system of lending networks. In Europe, there had been a return to 
                                                 
64 Bench refers to the benches on which the medieval moneychangers conducted their affairs. When moneylenders 
went broke the law officials would come destroy their place of business, leading to the rise of the term ‘bankrupt’. 
The climate that allowed the procurement of credit money was a decline in state powers as Europe’s political 
structure described best as acephalous and fragmented; in addition there was diminishing religious adherence to 
strict Catholic and Orthodox pronouncements on usury. The process entailed transforming an abstract commitment 
of money into a future commitment of credit and thereby monetizing it, turning it into currency. However, banks 
lent signifiers that did not contain within them any specific usufruct or utility, like that of a home, a vehicle or even 
an animal. This is where the semantics again become important. Banks did not begin by renting out items. They 
began by renting out credit, however, not credit based on people’s creditworthiness, but they instead rented out slips 
of paper that gave the impression that the banks were backing their operations with gold and silver. Specie lending 
was replaced by the lending of IOUs created ex nihilo, which was done by utilizing the future goods and resources in 
society – the public’s credit – and spuriously charging the public to pay interest for what it did not understand was 
nothing more than people’s monetized commitments to each other. The proliferation of this practice happened only 
upon goldsmiths discovering that breaching their clients’ safe-depositing contracts and utilizing the clients’ gold 
savings to back up this scheme was possible under the provision that the goldsmiths had a monopoly over this right, 
and that others in society could not create their own credit slips. 
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using precious metals over credit as money, although there was a historical dearth in the supply 
of such coinage, which created economic stagnation and collapse as metals stayed in the East due 
to its trade imbalance with the West (Day, 1978).65 Goldsmiths served as depositories; people 
would leave their commodity monies (coins) with goldsmiths in order to safeguard their funds. 
Upon depositing gold, goldsmiths would issue a bailment, a receipt of deposit, to the depositor 
confirming its legitimacy and quantity. Soon, goldsmiths realized that patrons who left their gold 
in the safe houses did not all return to pick up their gold at the same time. Moreover, the 
aggregate demand of gold reclaimed daily was significantly smaller than general deposits. 
People in society gained so much confidence in the goldsmiths’ abilities to always furnish the 
gold back to the redeemer that they began accepting the bailment ‘receipts’ as payment for goods 
and services. This acceptance was critical (Ingham, 2004).  
During 1664-1699, a major transition happens whereby one to one commitments became 
transferrable as third party bills of exchange. For something to become money, society must 
accept it as payment. Any person in possession of a bailment pledge could present it and reclaim 
whatever good was stored later. Therefore, by the year 1670 the words ‘bearer receipt’ began 
appearing on slips. Due to growing confidence the ‘bearer receipts’ began circulating as 
currency. Goldsmiths began circulating indistinguishable, purely fiduciary slips that mimicked 
the ‘bearer receipts’ in appearance. The slips were not ‘backed by gold or silver’, but the 
goldsmiths led on that they were (Tomlinson, 1993, p. 28). The oldest surviving British record of 
a goldsmith furnishing a ‘bearer receipt’ as money is dated back to 1634 (Morgan, 1965). 
Society’s confidence remained so high in the receipts, now operating as currency, that people’s 
                                                 
65 In particular, the Great Bullion Famine (1457-1464) showed that the mercantile trade imbalances were susceptible 
to manipulation of market forces.  
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preferences began to shift towards holding the paper currency over gold; it was generally easier 
to carry and more manageable.  
Goldsmiths had been granted the power of creating and extinguishing money, but as for-
profit entities; they would typically never lend money on a profit and loss sharing basis. They 
saw no benefit in ‘unnecessary risk’ and preferred artificially guaranteeing their returns through 
interest fees (El-Diwany, 2010). This fundamental aspect has always underpinned commercial 
banking. To maintain public confidence in this system, the goldsmiths had to procure gold to 
their patrons 100% of the time. They were careful to keep a certain proportion of coins in the 
vault as a reserve. This amount came to be known as the ‘cash reserve ratio’ (Ingham, 2004). 
Playing the odds, only a fraction of the people’s gold was kept on hand in the vaults. This was 
the creation of what is called ‘fractional-reserve banking’ (FRB), meaning that the slips being 
circulated in society were only backed by a fraction of their actual representative number. As 
long as this process was managed carefully (today this is called liquidity management), no issues 
would occur because new patrons taking on new debts continuously paid more interest payments, 
which was seemingly an endless flow of profit generation for the goldsmiths, thereafter known 
as bankers.  
Naturally, bankers began to loan out more credit slips to borrowers they deemed 
creditworthy, even though the gold did not exist in the vault to back up the loans. It was simply 
the confidence exuded by bankers, and their leading on as if gold existed to back up loans, which 
ultimately underpinned the system. In addition, gold was scarce, whereas paper receipts were 
easy and cheap to manufacture. This policy was obviously controversial and breached certain 
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ethical limits; in order to bring some stability to the system some opined that the bankers should 
keep 100% of the gold in the vaults at all times (Ingham, 1999).66  
Regarding meaning, Ludwig Wittgenstein (d. 1951) authoritatively said, “The meaning of 
a word is its use in the language” (Biletzki & Matar, 2014, p. 1). Bank receipts became ‘money’ 
in society. Thus, bank money, as discourse rendered it, became prevalent in medieval Europe 
(1300-1500) and differed from any other payment media in history. Its implementation by 
governments heavily politicized the money supply because the public could now be taxed 
through direct tax as well as through inflation (Goldsmith, 1987). Ingham (1999) maintains that, 
“In all its essential structural features the system remains the same today” (p. 88). 
 
2.2.3 The Moral Hazards Created by Banking 
 
Banking created several moral hazards. For whatever market reasons (crisis, war, fear, 
yearn to invest), people would disproportionately require their gold at simultaneous intervals, 
and in such events the bankers were unable to procure the gold to every customer in possession 
of ‘bearer receipts’ (now functioning as money). During such times, the façade would be 
unveiled, confidence would be lost, and the banker would go out of business, causing society 
                                                 
66 This is known today as the 100% reserve requirement argument. Others thought that different numbers like 20% 
or 30% in reserves could suffice. The percentages, regardless of their amounts were only nominal because the 
system was running on confidence, not gold. A 100% reserve requirement is more beneficial to society because 
among other factors it reduces (interest-bearing) debt and mitigates issues linked to the business cycle. On p.4, 
Ingham writes “Depersonalized, transferable promises to pay were eventually woven into deep and complex layers 
of debt in which the most trustworthy promises, such as those of an established bank or – even more effectively – a 
strong legitimate state, became a base-money for the entire system. Of course, this was a hesitant, fragile and 
unstable process and there were many spectacular failures. But lessons were learned and a legal and normative 
framework of banking practice and trustworthy relations was painstakingly fabricated over the period between the 
fourteen and late seventeenth centuries”. 
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much anguish and forfeiture (Laeven & Valencia, 2013).67 This became known as ‘making a run 
on the bank’. It still happens occasionally.68 However, bankers became better at managing ratios. 
Eventually, the ratio no longer required that anyone holding a note be paid in gold, each bill 
became simply fiduciary and redeemable for another like bill (Ingham, 2004). The necessity of 
any restricted commodity was removed from the process and the reserve became known as the 
‘statutory reserve requirement’. Legal precedent in support of this was established in the Carr vs. 
Carr case of 1811, wherein the UK courts confirmed that when money is deposited with a bank 
its ownership is transferred to the bank, thus, interest is paid on it as if it is a loan. This was 
reiterated again in 1846, in Foley vs. Hill, which changed English law in its treatment of 
bailment, which thereafter excluded money even though banks were engaged in what was 
delineated as fraud since they were creating multiple legal claims of ownership on single receipts 
(Serval & Jean-Pascal, 2014).69 
The concept of lending out money that does not belong to a person has a connection to 
the environment of nominalism that it was birthed in wherein universals and moral truths do not 
exist. The practice of double entry bookkeeping appears in two places, in Dubrovnik in Benedikt 
Kotruljević’s (1458) Book On the Art of Trade, and in Milan, in the Franciscan monk Luca 
Pacioli’s Summa de Arithmetica (1494), which centers on the Pythagorean cosmological fixation 
on the belief that numbers constitute the true nature of things. This esoteric cosmology placed an 
emphasis on the transmigration of souls, and hence keeping exact hypothetical measurements. 
This translated into businesses focusing on the calculation of profits (the bottom line) and losses 
                                                 
67 On average, bank runs cost societies up to 20% of their yearly GDP according to a study of major bank runs from 
1970 to 2007.  
68 In the UK Northern Rock in Newcastle suffered a bank run during the economic crisis of 2008. The bank was 
phased out in 2012; lack of consumer confidence was cited as one of the reasons. This bank was one of the banks 
that were allowed to count securitized credit as tradable assets as Lehmann Brothers and Dutch Ambro banks were 
allowed to by their respective governments.   
69 See page 108 for information of the Carr vs. Carr case of 1811. 
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on money that only existed in theory. Inculcating this idea into a banking culture that charged 
hypothetical rents on hypothetical money, bankers in Milan made use of this development and 
garnered mammoth profits.  
Bank money therefore became only a signifier of an exchangeable agreement, which 
would seem to be a positive development away from using gold, which limits the money supply 
and has historically encouraged lending at interest. However, FRB, as practiced by banks that 
charge interest on that money supply, has raised perceptible moral hazards. Thus, similar to 
ancient sovereigns, contemporary governments have created legislation that attempts to mitigate 
the perceived negative systematic externalities of banking through the implementation of 
offsetting schemes, like federal deposit insurance (Brusco, 2007).70 In The Ecology of Money 
(2000) Douthwaite points out that among numerous other negative effects, this system of 
monopolizing money creation produces a highly unstable economic climate, that it necessitates 
constant growth, which is not sustainable; and that it promotes competition over cooperation.71 
El-Diwany (2010) writes, “Gradually, word spread among the wealthier classes that the 
provision of banking ‘services’ was nothing other than the most profitable business idea of all 
time” (p. 42). Principal-plus-interest was always a larger sum than the principal was of any loan. 
Hence, FRB created mathematically impossible-to-pay debts allowing banks to create money 
that made real claims on real wealth and an imbalanced economy that led to issues such as 
                                                 
70 Such schemes typically employ analogous disreputable arrangements. 
71 Douthwaite points out democratization rather than monopolization of money creation can mitigate many of the 
resultant issues. Although bankers came to enjoy monopolies on the power of money creation, they definitively 
could not create their own money and spend it in these networks because eventually those bills of currency would 
repatriate to their own storage rooms. There would be a demand for gold, which had never existed in commensurate 
amounts in the first place. Therefore, lending the receipts at interest meant that the bills would circulate among 
others, and when returned, the borrowers would be forced to procure interest payments represented by actual goods 
and services rather than like slips. If the interest portion was repaid with gold – an actual item of value – it was more 
preferable to the banker, who would simply receive more free ‘reserves’. 
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bankruptcy, insolvency, recession and “slavery” (Merriam Online Dictionary, 2015).72 Certain 
family names became associated to the idea of banking. And due to the pressures against such 
banking families by people who objected to the unfair advantage bankers had in this process, 
bankers were forced to start paying interest dividends to shareholders who stored their money in 
banks, and this is essentially the arrangement that banks operate under until this day (Fugger, 
1932).73 
One of the many other negative externalities created by banking was the boom and bust 
cycle, a phenomenon created entirely by intentional human clairvoyance, recast in discourse as 
the business cycle, giving it a connotation of normalcy. Thus, it has become a very profitable 
venture for institutions to create boom and bust cycles by expanding, then contracting money 
supplies (Rowbotham, 1998).74 Werner (2003) mentions another moral hazard created, was that 
                                                 
72 Since the bankers had a monopoly on currency creation and they charged compounding interest fees, it was 
impossible for the debts in society to be repaid. If, for example, the bankers have 1 million (pounds, dollars or etc.) 
circulating in society at 10% interest per annum, after a year the debt on that 1 million grows to 1.1 million (pounds, 
dollars or any currency). How can the extra amount be repaid if it has not been created? It cannot, so it forms a 
binding agreement of perpetual debt that breaches the parameters of sovereignty, which draws comparisons with 
enslavement because by every definition of sovereignty, being beholden to an entity by an unconscionable and 
impossible to pay sum, is representative of being subordinated and subdued. Merriam Online Dictionary’s reference 
of the second definition of slavery is: 2. “Submission to a dominating influence”. 
73 The anecdotal evidence of the Fugger banking family’s rise and the subsequent decline of the Habsburg dynasty 
illustrates how powerful compound interest is. The Fuggers, who were invited to manage some financial affairs for 
the Habsburgs, made their first loan to them in 1494.  The Habsburg dynasty expanded their temporal powers and 
sovereign borders and thus came into possession of nearly all of the existing silver and gold mines in the discovered 
territories. Despite of the fact that they Habsburgs were consistently conquering new lands and mining new 
commodity money (gold and silver) Philip II, the Habsburg King of Spain went bankrupt trying to keep up on the 
usurious interest payments being made to the Fuggers within 70 years of the initial loan. Known for their usurious 
lending, many claim the four-letter f-word in English is thought to be a pejorative derived from the family’s name 
connoting disgust with usury. 
74 As the money supply grew, business would boom, people would take on more long-term projects, commitments 
would increase and things seemed merry. However, since goldsmiths would destroy slips upon repayment, it meant 
that destroying debts simultaneously destroyed the money supply. Bankers also realized that simultaneously calling 
in loans for payment would decrease the money supply, thus, people who were unable to find enough money in 
circulation to repay their debts (because there were not enough created in circulation) would end up having to give 
some other form of collateral in repayment – real wealth and real assets – not artificially created IOUs. The 
collateral was often negotiated unfairly due to the borrower’s disadvantageous position. Like a game of musical 
chairs, someone must mathematically end up without a chair, and when they do, they are in the weakest bargaining 
position, easily exploitable if and when they want to return to the market (game). Rowbotham has argued that this 
well-orchestrated game, called commercial banking in today’s terms, is more aptly defined as “institutionalized 
usury” (p. 28).  
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banks usurped what should be a democratic decision about how much money (volume) is created 
for societal use, and what it will fund, as for-profit institutions banks have tended to always lend 
to certain industries disproportionately, which always leads to asset bubbles and more collapses 
instead of productive ends. At the highest levels within government, it has been acknowledged 
that this has cycle causes recessions (Bernanke, 2000).75 
 
Part 3: The Emergence of Capitalism 
 
Banking would summon the intellectual aid of the elite rationalist, Enlightenment 
philosophers that largely spurned religious conviction, and consequently the associated morality 
that had previously underpinned Western societies and markets. Hawkes (2001) narrates in Idols 
of the Marketplace how, what he calls ‘idolatry’ and ‘commodity fetishism’ in the market, really 
took form in Europe between 1580 and 1680 CE. In that period, money had taken on its own 
autonomous power, making its own demands. Engraining the legitimacy of banking into the 
public psyche would require a cognitive framing aided by the Enlightenment principles’ 
interlocutors, the shapers of discourse, who articulated the rationale of interest, which supported 
the notion of governments backing private commercial banks in their enterprises. A shift in 
consciousness and an institutionalization of banking would transition capitalism from a private 
affair of minimal risk, into a state-sponsored function of wagering public assets and posterity as 
the norm. This reframing was essentially fueled by ideology.  
 
                                                 
75 It was acknowledged by ex-chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank that the intentional reduction in the money 
supply was a significant trigger in leading to the first Great Depression. Bernanke acknowledges this in addressing 
Milton Friedman as he remarks, “Let me end my talk by abusing slightly my status as an official representative of 
the Federal Reserve System. I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You are right; 
we did it. We are very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again”. 
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2.3.1 Capitalism Emerges in Holland: The Origins of Institutionalized Usury  
 
Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), who the Dutch now claim as their greatest philosopher, was 
instrumental in developing a philosophy that would pave the way for a new secular world, one 
that included secular humanist ethics as a replacement for religion (Vardoulakis, 2011).76 
Nevertheless, Spinoza’s pantheistic ideas did not conform to the status quo and his writings were 
initially suppressed (Kasher & Biderman, 2013).77 The notion of a ‘secular Jew’ challenged his 
climate tremendously within the realm of exchanging ideas about pluralism and democratic 
liberalism (Joyce, 2013).78 Spinoza’s thoughts would become influential on important figures 
shaping the discourse on capitalism through interlocutors from the neoconservative bent (Halper 
& Clarke, 2005).79 Despite the fact that Spinoza was persecuted, his 17th century Holland was 
                                                 
76 His thought is typically linked to his predecessor Descartes. Yet, it would be imprecise to label him as a Cartesian 
philosopher, although, he was indeed a rationalist. Descartes laid foundations for other thinkers to later expand his 
worldview of atomic physics and motion. Descartes divided the world into matter (res extensa) and thought (res 
cogitans). Matter to Descartes, was all connected into one fabric and motion occurred when atoms bumped into one 
another. He makes inquiries into the nature of validating religious knowledge and contrasts faith with other areas of 
understanding. Some historians claim Spinoza was affected by the milieu of his time, whereas others see his 
rejection of it. However, Spinoza’s criticism of Descartes’s world of doubt, in his Ethics, is where he distances 
himself from Descartes’s alleged errors and arrives upon his own epistemology. It may or may not explain why his 
Jewish community first offered him money to conform to specific prescripts, and later excommunicated him for 
nonconformance. 
77 The Jewish community quickly established themselves there in banking activities and in the field of printing. As 
the Jews enjoyed hegemony on printing, editorial decisions were held in the hands of few. At age 23 Spinoza was 
excommunicated in a practice called “cherem” (Hebrew חרם). His writings are acknowledged by some as the 
beginning of transcendent ethics overtaking religion, thus, adding to the societal progression towards massive 
dismissal of literal acceptance of scripture where good and evil become relative concepts. While at the same time, 
Puritans were starting to do the exact opposite as Bibles were flooding the market in Holland and England. 
Spinoza’s Ethics (n.d) however, was only published after his death, and although he did enjoy more intellectual 
freedoms than his European contemporaries did, he was somewhat persecuted by the state as well as shunned by the 
Sephardic community. 
78
 His image has ranged from ‘pariah to messiah’. He explicitly believed in a non-providential God, and Mason 
claims he was likely a cabbalist (p. 88).  Spinoza did not take much stock in capital being the connector of all things 
– the materialist tradition that thrived in his milieu. 
79 ‘Spinozism’ has become the aberration that fuels the neoconservative war mongering. Leo Strauss’s interpretation 
of Spinoza would go on to become the underpinning of neoconservative ideology. Once in the United States, and 
during stints at New York’s New School for Social Research, and later at the University of Chicago, Strauss was 
able to combine his love for ‘Spinozism’ with his decisive role in the founding of neo-conservatism. This ideology 
would have profound effects on the economy and hinder peace between the East and West because of the so-called 
“Clash of Civilizations”.  
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distinctly liberal in comparison to other states, and liberalism meant open attitudes and tolerance, 
an environment wherein previously unacceptable notions like usury could thrive (Israel, 1995).80 
The underpinnings for all of the aspects of modern capitalism considered exploitative, 
speculative and usurious were principally introduced and cultivated in Amsterdam during the 
liberal 1600s, which included the first stock exchange, the first multinational corporation, the 
first central bank, the first legal monetized speculation, the first bubble (tulips) and the first legal 
financialization of ‘everything’ (French, 2006).81 Most of Antwerp’s Jewish and Protestant 
traders had moved to Amsterdam.82 They provided services such as currency exchange. They 
also lent capital at interest. However, their offered rates were deemed usurious because the debt 
servicing fees fluctuated wildly. Usury, by this time, meant that the interest being charged was 
higher than the going ‘acceptable’ rate. Thus, sentiments soured quickly, and in 1609, the 
government forbade Jews from engaging in banking. A culmination of these events spurred 
support for the eventual founding of the first central bank, the Bank of Amsterdam, in late 1609 
(Morgan, 1965). Some of its features are still debated amongst economic historians (Van Dillen, 
                                                 
80 Holland was more liberal than predominantly Christian states that enforced the ideologies of the predestination of 
human souls and state enforcement of religious creed. In contrast, Holland preached the concepts of religious 
tolerance and free will, expanding upon natural law and concepts extolled by the Dutch theologian Jacobus 
Arminius. However, the climate of prevailing Jacobism did not always protect radical thinkers. Ben Israel was 
known for exerting control over the printing industry in the Dutch Republic during the 17th century and was behind 
the plan to print one million Athias Bibles starting in 1627 after converting to Judaism and sensing the need for 
reconciling puritanical Christianity with Judaism. 
81 Nearby Antwerp was a major financial center in the 1500s. However, due to politico-religious turmoil between 
Catholic Spain and the Protestant North, Antwerp fell in 1585 forcing a wave of the city’s intellectual elite and its 
trading class, especially Protestants and Jews, to migrate, many of whom ended up in Holland, a sought-after land of 
refuge. Holland’s climate was one of change and a cultivator of new norms; the first European enactment of a “free 
coinage” law put in place by Holland (1575) facilitated the ease by which bullion and coinage could be exchanged 
by entrepreneurs. Additionally, governmental support of monopolies in both trade and banking played a large part in 
emboldening the birth of the stock market. In 1540 an imperial ordinance in the Habsburg Netherlands had 
permitted interest payments up to 12%, although meant only for commercial loans, the financial restrictions had 
begun taking a lax stance on money abuses. 
82 Holland had commerce from its shipping industry that was so efficient it could flood the market with goods 
imported by its newly acquired control of Indian trade, which by that time had overtaken Portugal’s previously 
dominant position there. The city comprised of 1.5 - 2 million Dutch, approximately 6 million English and roughly 
20 million French. Additionally, Jews emigrated there to fill the vacuum created by the absence of a banking 
industry able to efficiently accommodate various needs associated with large-scale trading. 
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1964).83 However, there is a consensus that Holland was undoubtedly the first nation-state to 
legitimize and protect usurious bank practices through state legislation (Israel, 1989).84  
 
2.3.2 Limited Liability Corporations as Institutional Platforms for Power 
 
Van Dijk, who is one of the most authoritative researchers working in the field of critical 
discourse analysis, has attempted to study the relationship between knowledge and discourse 
because relatively little has explored this relationship except for a few works in the fields of 
cognitive and social psychology. What his research shows is that from a socio-cognitive 
perspective, knowledge is justified belief shared by members of an epistemic community (called 
K-communities); and furthermore, that different knowledge communities may have different 
epistemic criteria and standards. Van Dijk enumerates “K-criteria may be formulated by 
recognized organizations, institutions or experts of the community” and that “knowledge is 
contextual” and is further categorized into different categories i.e. declarative knowledge, 
procedural knowledge and social (shared) knowledge. Regarding this shared knowledge he 
writes, “Social knowledge is represented as distributed cognition in the semantic memory” 
(2012, p. 588).  
                                                 
83 Documents are scanty. Much of what is known about the bank is from Van Dillen. The Bank of Amsterdam 
exhibits critical features that later generations of monetary reformers have been able to examine which unearth 
possible solutions to ethical quagmires in today’s banking sector. 
84 The key feature was perceptibly simple; it started as a bank for the public, and was run by the government. It did 
not charge interest. This mitigated the likelihood for usurers to thrive or make money by clipping coinage and 
benefitting from seigniorage. That is, the difference in the cost of producing or minting a coin and the actual cost of 
the bullion it is made of. The pivotal decision, to allow the civic bank to facilitate the banking needs of the market 
essentially prohibited a banking class of private merchants to rise to an elite level. And for a short time this 
seemingly ingenious move was successful. Nevertheless, the bank did temporarily succumb to creating debt-based 
money that was serviced with interest. The principle reason for establishing the bank “was not to provide credit but 
to prevent unscrupulous money changers ruling the course of exchanges for all places and to provide fast efficient 
and reliable exchange facilities. The Bank’s most vital feature was that it was a civic and not a privately owned and 
managed institution” (p. 88).   
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Hence, we are able to contextualize the link between power, knowledge and discourse 
that aided the concept of limited liability corporations in their garnering wide acceptance within 
an elite discourse community for their potential utility as vehicles (institutions) through which 
power could be further extended. As such, limited liability corporations were a perfect 
institutional formation for the newly emergent practice of banking, a practice that had an 
epistemic community supporting the rationale of interest charges benefiting wealthy and 
powerful shareholders. This community had already embraced the concept of interest; it was now 
only an issue of institutional formation and negotiating how this formation would merge into the 
concept of the nation-state and the liberal democratic process. Pushing this recognition would 
meet much resistance and take an immense amount of effort and articulation in reshaping social 
knowledge represented as distributed cognition of the semantic memory within the discourse 
community. 
However, the ethicality of states granting special privileges to corporations has been 
controversial from its inception, because individuals have historically been able to shield 
themselves from retribution, litigation and prosecution for personal decisions taken at the helm 
of businesses in ways unprecedented in legal history. Lawmakers have since struggled with the 
concept of a corporation as a legal entity, and the legal status it is granted. This relates to two 
ethical issues connected to banks as such institutions. Firstly, governments, at war and otherwise, 
felt pressures to spend money they did not possess (deficit spending). Thus, such states could 
now borrow at interest from private institutions intimately tied to government, although not 
beholden to the electoral political process. Secondly, loans grew at rates of interest impossible to 
service, which transferred escalating debts to citizens. This operation sequentially undermined 
the sovereign statuses of countries because state credibility has always been contingent upon a 
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state’s ability to pay its debts (Chown, 1994). The implicit ideology in this discourse was first 
negotiated in Holland (Zarlenga, 2002).85 It then transferred to England before becoming part of 
the global discourse on how contemporary nation-states organize economically.  
 
2.3.3 Reframing the Discourse of Usury in the English Milieu of the 16th - 18th Centuries 
 
This section looks at how the discourse focused primarily on the rational promotion of 
grounding this knowledge in the neurological structure of the discourse participants in the 
English milieu. To backtrack, the discourse community that was responsible for formulating the 
epistemological support for social (shared) knowledge was primarily an elite class of writers of 
various backgrounds and disciplines. The discourse arguably starts with English statesman and 
philosopher Francis Bacon’s (1561-1626) arguments in support of legalizing interest, which are 
important to consider in a major shift towards empiricism in the West. Bacon acknowledges that 
usury reduces the profits of merchants and that it similarly causes destitution and “bringeth the 
treasure of a realm or state into few hands” (Bacon, 2008, p. 471). However, Bacon’s discourse 
favored naturalistic explanations, scientific analysis, and as the ‘father of empiricism’, he 
discounts even his own moral musings. He furthermore vociferously attacks the Scholastics and 
their moral arguments against usury for “almost having incorporated the contentious philosophy 
of Aristotle into the body of Christian religion”, labeling Aristotle an ostentatious heretic (Bacon, 
2008, p. 499).  
                                                 
85 Zarlenga discusses how in Holland the special relationship of the Dutch East India Corporation (DEIC) 
compromised the nation’s sovereignty by inhibiting Holland’s elected officials from maintaining its accounts 
current. The large secret overdrafts of the DEIC “Changed the nature of the bank into a covert issue. It was really a 
mixed system of precious metals and bank credits, pretending these two were the same” (p. 230). 
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Ad hominem attacks against persons, however, do not rebut their arguments, and in this 
case, Bacon’s attacks do not address the Scholastic position against usury. Nevertheless, Bacon 
shifts the direction of the discussion away from addressing the moral issues and instead discusses 
the pragmatics of lending at interest. He later endorsed state regulation of 5% interest and 9% on 
loans to merchants and large centers. Writing on this issue, Bacon reflexively construes a 
dynamic, pragmatic model of the communicative situation as he sees it (i.e. a context model that 
sets the discourse appropriateness). In his essay titled Of Usury (1625), he argues, “[People say] 
That usurers should have orange-tawny bonnets, because they do judaize. That it is against 
nature for money to beget money; and the like. I say this only, that usury is a concessum propter 
duritiem cordis (a thing allowed by reason due to the hardness of men’s hearts); for since there 
must be borrowing and lending, and men are so hard of heart, as they will not lend freely, usury 
must be permitted” (Bacon, pp. 91-92). Here we can note two things: Bacon conflates lending 
with investing; secondly, Bacon contextualizes criticism of usury as something connected to 
Judaism, and hatred of Jews, a key contextualization. He also contrasts criticism of usury with 
the naturalistic argument that humans are fundamentally unable to construct a usury-free system, 
a notion bereft of ethic yet at the same time lucidly ideological. Bacon’s thought centered around 
the utopian idea of conquering nature, which he promoted in his (1626) New Atlantis, a work that 
influenced subsequent generations of physicians and natural philosophers into taking up the ‘new 
science’ of empiricism, which later culminated into influential organizations like The Royal 
Society. 
 




Alchemy may appear like an odd interjection to segue into discussing Newtonian thought 
at this point in the discussion, but there is relevance in the common ground its contextual 
discourse has with writers who framed the discussion on usury. According to some scholars, 
alchemy was the result of an amalgamation of occult philosophies, thought to have intersected in 
the 6th century BCE as Persian armies advanced westward (Cumont & Marie, 1922).86 John 
Hopkins (1934) claims alchemy was born in Alexandria and that Plato and Aristotle furnished 
the underpinning philosophical fundamentals for it.87 Alchemy promoted the ancient belief that 
matter consists of atoms that could be manipulated (Sertima, 1994). The essential understanding 
was allegorical. The concept, improved by the Byzantine historian Zosimus (491-518AD), was 
that the mystic’s aim was to free the soul prior to it returning to anointment with God (Lindsay, 
1970). This emblematically meant that gold had to be freed from the base materials that 
imprisoned and soiled it. In this understanding, transmutation of lead into gold was synonymous 
with purification of the soul and it took on the astrological connotation of ascending through the 
six planets, shaping an image of the sun as gold (Lindsay, 1970). In essence, alchemists engaged 
in the occult in order to make money, through the realm of what many consider magic. Van Dijk 
writes, “Context models not only feature a knowledge device to handle epistemic strategies. 
                                                 
86 Primarily Persian, Egyptian (Greco-Roman Alexandrian) and Greek. The culmination of these traditions swapping 
their knowledge became an amalgam later very influential on some of the philosophical foundations of capitalism. 
The tradition was maintained in the West throughout the Hellenistic period in history (323-31 BCE) and later 
manifested in the works of the mystery schools. Works attributed to the Persian sage Zoroaster, likely of 
pseudepigraphical nature, preserved the rites and traditions of the Chaldean Magi of Babylon. Belgian historian 
Franz Cumont, the founder of Mithraic studies, suggests such a connection was due to heretical Magi’s influence on 
the Orphic cult of Dionysis during the Hellenistic Age. For some, alchemy’s purpose was to circumvent the process 
by which humankind toiled in labor in order to produce a good or service. Alchemists sought to exploit certain 
natural properties in order to produce gold and silver, thereby bypassing the entire process of searching, mining, 
sifting and welding. 
87 The Zurvanite understanding of Zoroastrianism, or magic, either had an effect or a coincidental likeness to the 
Hermetic traditions in the sense that the belief systems both maintained that mankind could elevate above the 
repercussions of fate. Moreover, the Ionian philosopher Democritus (BCE 460-370) had preserved the Babylonian 
folkloric belief of the Magi purporting that base metals ostensibly had a connection to the seven planets in the 
Hermetic cosmogony: Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, the Moon and the Sun. After passing these spheres, it 
is thought that the soul may attain a purer understanding (p. 27). 
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They also represent the mutual intentions of the participants. Recognizing the intentions of others 
is a basic condition of all human interaction” (Van Dijk, 2012, p. 589). A clear parallel can be 
made between the contextual framing of writers on alchemy and those arguing for the general 
acceptance of wealth generation through institutionalizing interest banking, based on a very 
similar concept, that wealth, or claims on hypothetical wealth, could be created ex nihilo through 
concealed knowledge. 
  
2.3.5 Newtonian Framing of the Discourse on Interest 
 
English statesman and scholar Sir Isaac Newton simultaneously belonged to several 
discourse and epistemic communities. In the scientific realm, a distinctly positivist trend in 
scholarship was continuing to construct context models built on presupposed relevant knowledge 
of discourse recipients. Interest was semantically being represented as such, and the term usury 
was receding from common use. Newton was also a closet alchemist for over three decades 
(Angier, 2010). Subsequently, his alchemical research had an influence on his discursive 
scientific and economic views, which in turn would heavily influence the economic discourse in 
England, and later, the world. Newton’s alchemical philosophy was partially borrowed from 
Empedocles (490-430 BCE) who saw the sphere of commerce under his macro vision of the 
entire universe as a coherent system functioning under the governance of laws (Hopkins, 
1934).88 Newton corroborated the belief that all matter consisted of atoms while rejecting the 
Aristotelian view of stagnancy (Sertima, 1994). The laws pushed towards general ends; thus, the 
universe, as he framed it, was a ‘complete machine’. Professor William Newman has attempted 
                                                 
88 Plato and Aristotle inherited their ideas about the universe being composed of four fundamental elements: fire, 
water, earth and air. Plato admits this in his surviving dialogue Timaeus.  
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to explain Newton’s alchemical thought as a “perfectly reasonable” pursuit for someone in his 
milieu because most of his 17th century contemporaries found legitimacy in it, which Newman 
claims, was for them a field synonymous with chemistry (Angier, 2010, p. 1).  
Newton’s Principia Mathematic Philosophia Naturae (1687) revolutionized science by 
uniting Johannes Keplar’s (d. 1630) celestial mechanics with Galileo Galilei’s (d. 1642) 
terrestrial mechanics into a unified system defined by the inverse square law. Newton simplified 
the celestial movements by claiming two laws governed them: inertia and gravity (Solmsen, 
1965).89 This mirrors Empedocles’s ancient view of matter in connection with love and strife 
(Kneirim, 2013). Empedocles had contended that love and strife were the two primary moving 
factors in a cyclical and eternal universe, and Newton acknowledged that long-held belief 
(Sertima, 1994). Gravity and inertia plausibly came to Newton via the alchemical tradition and 
his exposure to study of Greek thought at Cambridge University. However, many of Newton’s 
contemporaries would question the scientific veracity of Newton’s claims because they had 
detected occult elements present in his explanations, which at the time, were hard to triangulate 
(Westfall, 1983).90 
Newton’s timely influence on ideology through discourse in England came at a time of 
revolution and political machinations that would change the governing paradigm. Newtonian 
thought replaced the Aristotelian version of the universe, in which things were naturally static 
and had an ultimate goal, with the concept of inertia (discord). He contended that all bodies in 
motion would continue in motion unless acted upon by other bodies. In addition to inertia, 
                                                 
89 Love and strife are spoken of as diametric opposites in Empodocles’s cosmology. Love is harmony, an attractor 
and uniting force whereas strife is a destroyer of all things. The notion bears resemblance to the yin and yang 
concepts of ancient Chinese wisdom. 
90 See p. ix. Where he talks about the dissent Newton’s Principia received from Christiaan Huygens and Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz who rejected his thesis as absurd. Leibniz thought Newton’s gravity reduced attraction to a 
mechanical cause but was amazed that he had not found the cause of it remaining a law. Leibniz and Huygens were 
unable to identify alchemy as the route by which Newton’s system emerged rather than Papism or Scholasticism as 
they had claimed. 
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Newton claimed that gravity was the force that brought everything in the universe together, the 
universal force of attraction (love). To Aristotle, this would have consisted of violent motion, 
unnecessary movement away from a place of natural rest (Solmsen, 1965).91 But to Newton, as 
Michael White’s Isaac Newton: The Last Sorcerer (1999) points out, his Cartesian universal 
view of atoms and motion combined with his laws of ‘love versus discord’ would come to serve 
as one of the principle underpinnings of modern scientific, economic and political thought.  
 
2.3.6 Usury Formally Returns in England’s ‘Glorious Revolution’ 
 
The legal basis of today’s capitalist system culminates in the financial structure 
implemented in late 17th century England, often called the ‘Financial Revolution’. The turn of 
events that transpired during this short period were unprecedented. Written in 1215 CE The 
Magna Carta alludes to the perennial usury problem stating “If anyone has taken anything, 
whether much or little, by way of loan from the Jews, and if he dies before that debt is paid, the 
debt shall not carry usury…” (Magna Carta, n.d.).92 Likewise, Jews had been banned from 
England since 1290 for clipping coinage and usury. Since that time, the law had prevented them 
from working in finance. However, an ordinance initiated by Henry VIII in the 16th century 
confirmed a reversal of the long-standing prohibition. Notably, the discourse at that time, still 
within the cognitive framing initiated in Bacon’s milieu whereby statements made careful 
semantic differentiations between usury and interest, were set within a context that inferred that 
                                                 
91 For Aristotle motion was not the rule, it was the exception whereby the four elements slowly made their way 
toward their natural places and, upon arrival, would remain static. Violent motion would be any movement away 
from a place of natural rest.  
92 This is an annotated translation from the original Latin in clause 10, which reads: “Si quis mutuo ceperit aliquid a 
Judaeis, plus vel minus, et moriatur antequam debitum illud solvatur, debitum non usuret quamdiu haeres fuerit infra 
aetatem, de quocumque teneat; et si debitum illud inciderit in manus nostras, nos non capiemus nisi catallum 
contentum in carta”. 
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recipients had the general knowledge to differentiate between amounts legislated by states as 
being legitimate, rational, and hence intrinsically unalike rates that were not sanctioned by states. 
Monroe (2011) chronologically narrates the discourse formations that produced certain 
understandings and initiated political machinations to the effect that interest rates set by 
governments were absolved of any negative connotation: 
 
In England, Henry VIII's Parliament of 1545 enacted a statute permitting interest 
payments up to 10% (on all loans); any higher rates constituted usury. But, in 
1552, a hostile Parliament, with radical Protestants, revoked that statute, and 
revived it only under Elizabeth, in 1571. Since the maximum rate was also taken 
to be the minimum, subsequent Parliaments, seeking to foster trade, reduced that 
rate: to 8% in 1624, to 6% in 1651 (ratified 1660-61), and to 5% in 1713: a rate 
maintained until the abolition of the usury laws in 1854 (p. 1).  
 
However, the first major consequence of states (England and the Low Countries) 
legalizing interest, and consistently decreasing the rates considered usurious, had far-reaching 
effects. The legalization of interest included the approval of discounting (Munro, 2011).93 This 
meant commercial bills could now be discounted openly, and money again became a commodity. 
It benchmarked the beginning of an identifiable gravitation towards the discourse implicitly 
adopting the ideological ‘time value of money’ argument in economics. Munro (2011) notes that 
evidence “…demonstrates that discounting, with legal transfers either by bearer bills or by 
endorsement, with full negotiability, began and became widespread only after the legalization of 
interest payments…” (p. 1). From there, the commercial manufacturing of money took off. This 
is best observable in examining the simultaneous political machinations in England. 
                                                 
93 Monroe mentions that medieval bills of exchange were also often usurious, but “the usury doctrine [of the 
Church] nevertheless required that they be non-negotiable, held until maturity, since discounting would have 




During the reign of Charles I (1625-49), the king found himself overwrought in financial 
woes, paying excessive interest to moneylenders; and when he was strained to seize 130,000 
pounds from the Tower of London claimed by merchants, he made enemies with the 
moneylending class that was getting rich through discounting bills of exchange. Later, and with 
the financial assistance of moneylending investors, Oliver Cromwell won the English Civil War 
in 1649 and Charles I was executed (Munro, 2011). Cromwell established the short-lived 
Commonwealth of England, which challenged the house of Stuart and the ‘Divine Right of 
Kings’. Religious tensions were high, and it could be considered a revolt in many ways sectarian 
in addition to being an ideological victory for usurers because Cromwell mildly tolerated the 
informal homecoming of Jews who began returning to England in 1650 (Ben Israel, 1987).94  
From a discourse perspective, the thought of polemicist and public servant under 
Cromwell, John Milton (d. 1674), encapsulates the changing tolerance towards usury as a 
reflection of quickly changing social cognition. This analysis is extrapolated from Milton’s 
various semantic usages of the verb ‘to use’, which show his reframing of its legal and semantic 
heritage. Hawkes writes,  
 
While he sometimes echoes the popular denunciation of usurers as living from ‘the sweat 
of other men,’ Milton also defends usury in certain circumstances. He does not view 
usury as a narrowly economic phenomenon, but explores its impact on politics, 
aesthetics, theology and sexuality. Despite his complex and nuanced treatment of the 
subject, Milton ultimately portrays usury as Satanic. It involves the attribution of 
autonomous reproductive power to financial signs, and thus stands convicted of the same 
epistemological error as liturgical idolatry (Hawkes, 2011, p. 503).  
 
 
                                                 
94 Manassah Ben Israel and Rabbi Ben Ayabel were instrumental in arguing for the re-admittance of Jews to 
England. Manasseh pleaded that the messiah would return once Jews were all over the earth and that their 
admittance to England would herald his return. He published a book in conglomeration with a Puritan preacher 
named Moses Will who sought to unify the Jewish and Puritanical movements. 
98 
 
Intriguingly, despite his criticism, Milton and his father were lifetime usurers. This is 
explainable in Milton’s iconoclasm, which seemed to find idolatry in the representation of all 
things, except the original semiotic rendering of usury, a signifier that he redrafted to mean the 
idolization of money over God. Hence, while Milton condemned usury, he overtly accepted the 
legitimacy of interest rates on money lent, which he made a semantic differentiation of because 
he did not consider usury any longer associated to its original meaning (Hawkes, 2011). One 
written statement stands out where Milton appeals to the authority of a certain discourse 
community, “As for what they instance of usury, let them first prove usury to be wholly 
unlawfull, as the law allows it; which learned men as numerous on the other side will defend 
them” (Wolfe, 1980, p. 425). 
A similar parallel can be drawn in changing semiotics if William Shakespeare’s (d. 1616) 
writings related to the issue are examined. Shakespeare’s father John (d. 1601) similarly lent at 
usury, an offence he was fined for in the 1570s (Bryson, 2007). Furthermore, Shakespeare’s 
Merchant of Venice portrays the historic dispute of usurers versus equitable risk taking investors 
as a dispute between Shylock and Antonio, a portrayal that is also anti-Jewish in sentiment. 
Shylock hates Antonio because “He lends out money gratis and brings down/ the rate of usance 
here with us in Venice” (Shakespeare, 2003).95 But Shakespeare’s framing here is part of a wider 
discourse that was taking place within an environment that saw the 1571 Act Against Usury pass 
legislation, and thereafter the release of several impactful pamphlets such as The Death of Usury 
(London, 1594) and Money Monger, Or the Usurers Almanacke (London, 1626).  
Thus, one generation later, the political machinations reflect the changing sentiments. 
Upon Charles II’s return (1660-85) in The Restoration, the moneylenders’ demonstrable sway 
over Parliament had grown, and by the time James II’s designation as King came about, the 
                                                 
95 This discussion takes place in Act I, Scene III. 
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Parliament had reduced the powers held by sitting monarchs. The Free Coinage Act of 1666 had 
weakened the Crown’s monetary prerogative and strengthened the goldsmiths and lenders 
significantly. Moreover, James II’s Catholicism and anti-usury stances were now viewed as 
intrinsically unacceptable to the Whig party of Puritan persuasion. Along with the help of some 
influential Tories, Parliament invited William of Orange from Holland to become King (Firth & 
Lomas, 2006).96 William, himself a foreigner to England, was hesitant to invade. His wife was 
the Protestant daughter of James II. However, William’s financial worldview was congenial to 
bankers because, among other reasons, it would bring state enforcement and legitimacy to 
usurious contracts (Rowbotham, 1998). Many of his supporters, Protestant and Jewish 
merchants, had become wealthy in Holland via such means. Davie (1988) writes that William, 
the “ideal banker’s man” arrived in England “with Francisco Lopes Suasso, the banker, followed 
by many financiers” (p. 10). The usurious debts he legitimized through the state would hinder 
English posterity (Abrahams, 1937).97 
 
2.3.7 The Bank of England and the Capitalist State 
 
Charging interest makes a gigantic leap into institutional legitimacy with the 
establishment of The Bank of England in 1694 as it garners state protection (Baxter, 1989).98 In 
1841 Archibald Alison narrates, “Various motives combined to induce the Government, 
                                                 
96 Edward Hyde, 1st Earl of Clarendon (1609-1674), wrote of the changing milieu: “Bankers were a tribe that had 
risen and grown in Cromwell’s time, and had never ever been heard of before the late troubles, till when the whole 
trade of money had passed through the hands of the scriveners: they were for the most part goldsmiths” (p. 73).  
97 Wisselbank ledgers in the City of Amsterdam archives show “that William received 1.5 million guilders between 
1689 and 1690, as a result of which the British people were Amsterdammed”. It has also been alleged that nepotism 
was a concern in his administration. Isaac Lopez Suasso, a Jewish financier from the Hague, gave William an 
interest-free loan of two million crowns, later receiving repayment as becoming Baron d’avernas le Gras. 
98 It would replace the centuries old tally-stick system of interest free credit in England and precipitate banking’s 
global vanquish under the salvation of state protection. 
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immediately after the Revolution, to adopt a system of borrowing on the credit of the State” (p. 
256). The state effortlessly commoditized the public’s promises because it proclaimed in official 
declarations that metals were money, all while operating with the gnosis that modern credit 
money was really the future promises of people; Van Dillen (1964) recapitulates, “The bank was 
founded upon a reserve that could not fail but with the nation” (pp. 92-93). In its final form 
(1757) the bank “meant the establishment of permanent, funded, national debt based not on the 
sale of interest-bearing bonds but on perpetual annuities or rentes” (Munro, 2011, p. 1).  
Sir Edmundbury Godfrey and Charles Montagu facilitated the organization of London’s 
merchants with the intent of galvanizing their support for the bank’s charter (Bannister, 1859).99 
The bank’s establishment was precipitated by a scarcity in coinage; subsequently the public 
yearned for some type of positive development in public finance. Evidence of this is that there 
were 60 charters proposed before it (Broz & Grossman, 2004).100 Only possessing 72,000 pounds 
in gold, the bank loaned William 16.75 times that amount, 1.2 million pounds at 8.25% interest, 
which was legislated to be paid back in perpetuity by the citizenry; and thus, under William’s 
tenure the interjection of the new concept of a ‘National Debt’ was legitimized.101  
 
2.3.8 Usury as a Tax on the Money Supply  
 
With this shift in institutional formation, usury became a civil affair. Alison (1841) 
narrates that government “was taught the dangerous secret of providing for the necessities and 
                                                 
99 Charles Montagu later became Chancellor of the Exchequer, in charge of all economic and financial matters. 
Montagu’s family had held heavy sway in England since the Norman Conquest of William of Normandy (1066). A 
rehash of the political and social connections associated with the founding of the bank is covered in Paterson’s 
biography on pp. 24, 68 and 69. 
100 The work is a detailed history of the bank charters, failed and otherwise. 
101 The professed reason for the loan was to fund William’s third government. The bank would pay 4% to the 
shareholders and issue its own banknotes that were used as money and redeemable in gold.  
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maintaining the influence of present times by borrowing money and laying its payment on 
posterity” (p. 256). The repayments of 8.25% in interest on £1.2 million brought £100,000 in 
revenue per year for the bank.  
The pivotal development was that the state declared the receipts legal tender (Feavearyear 
& Morgan, Oxford).102 Therefore, the bank enjoyed a monopoly on its notes being the lone 
media accepted for all tax payments due, governmentally sanctioned for all official expenditures. 
This gave the privately owned bank an affiliation with the government that seemed to denote an 
official status; as a result, the public naturally began to associate the bank with being a 
governmental entity, when it had never been the actual case in legal terms, again an operation 
built on semantic ambiguity. Sir Francis Baring (d. 1812) echoed the people’s thoughts, 
commenting later in 1794 that the gullible public has “always considered their notes as 
government paper” (Bloom, 1935, p. 172). The major conflict of interest was that private 
ownership meant that control was placed in the hands of a small monopoly that benefited off of 
interest paid by the public (Quigley, 1966).103   
Bannister (1859) notes that William Patterson headed the project. Hinting at its low 
visibility he comments, “The very name of a bank or corporation was avoided, though the notion 
of both was intended…to soften and remove, the prejudices and bad impression…” (pp. 83-84). 
These ‘bad impressions’ were essentially the full disclosures that free societies would 
legislatively require about such institutions in order to make informed decisions about how to 
                                                 
102 It brought in £100,000 but it had only possessed £72,000 at inception; the total was a 140% profit per year. When 
it was rumored the bank lacked the amount of gold to meet its commensurate demand in receipts it was floating, the 
state declared the receipts legal tender. This narrative is corroborated by numerous scholars of philology and 
economic history. 
103 William Patterson became involved with William of Orange in 1685. He returned with William’s army, became 
influential and established the North London Water Company. He helped pass the charter for the Bank of England 
but resigned within one year. Later, he fought the national debt and proposed it be cancelled or paid off. His 
proposal was burnt. Quigley adds to this phenomenal claim that “This was repeated by Sir Edward Holden, founder 
of the Midland Bank, on December 18, 1907, and is, of course, generally admitted today”. 
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vote on them. However, Patterson would later become disillusioned with the bank and sell his 
shares when he realized the national debt he had helped create was an un-payable detriment to 
the nation, conceding, “The Bank hath benefit of interest on all moneys which it creates out of 
nothing” (p. 84).  
 
2.3.9 Central Banking and Political Capture 
 
The establishment of the Bank of England was a consequence of wider political 
machinations as well; the Whig’s were being heavily financed in their war ambitions, and an 
economy dependent on growth and consumption demand welcomed wars that increased 
production. Some of his peers described Isaac Newton as puritanical and an “extreme Whig” 
(White, 1999, p. 232). Equally important is that he voiced no moral qualms about usury. 
According to Westfall (1983), in Newton’s days at university, and against the standing rules 
there, he “made loans to a number of … [his colleagues]… though to be sure most of his 
extensive business in usury was conducted among his fellow sizars” (p. 76). Statesman Charles 
Montagu (d. 1715) appointed Newton to the title of Master of the Royal Mint in 1696. By then 
the Whigs had begun to rack up war debts, and the newly created National Debt was growing 
(Broz & Grossman, 2004).  
Newton had made a study of economics with his colleagues John Locke, Francis 
Brewster, William Lowndes and Jean Boizard. He saw a way out of the financial crisis that was 
threatening the Whig revolution and its legitimacy. Westfall (1983) writes, “The monetary crisis, 
which bedeviled the financial crisis by reaching a climax when it could least be tolerated, 
occupied him almost completely for more than two years” (p. 551). Secretary of the Treasury 
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William Lowndes wanted to debase (inflate) the currency to repay the debt and Newton was 
“one of the few who agreed with Lowndes’s plan” (p. 555).  
Among others, Locke, another ideological supporter of usury who had likewise practiced 
alchemy with Newton, argued that instead of debasement, the state needed to begin the 
production of a stable currency by reminting coins, another oscillation back to commodity 
money. These sentiments culminated into Newton becoming a remorseless vigilante tracker of 
currency debasers (Solmsen, 1965).104 Tom Levenson’s Newton and the Counterfeiter (2011) 
narrates an account of Newton’s pursuit of notorious counterfeiters like William Chaloner, who 
he would have hanged, part of a narrative of the endemic problem of counterfeiting in London 
that was accounting for about 10% of all coins (The Science Show, 2013). Lydon (2009) adds, 
“Chaloner’s fatal sin was trying to debase not only England’s currency but also Newton’s 
beloved quasi-religious art and science of alchemy” (p. 1). Newton’s clear message was that only 
the new revolutionary authority was allowed to monetize credit and charge interest on it, which 
was an ideological stance, and another assertion of inertia (White, 1999).105  
States have traditionally enjoyed monopolies on force. Furthermore, as part of a 
government’s responsibility, preventing the act of counterfeiting is considered by many to be a 
noble aspect of running a sound economy. However, when private banks are allowed to 
counterfeit and produce as much money as they wish for profit, it is not hard to fathom why 
                                                 
104 Locke and Newton had a strained relationship. In 1692, they had tried to create philosopher’s stone together. Yet, 
in 1693, Newton wrote a scathing letter about Locke’s intention to force Newton to be “embroiled” with women. 
Newton had a manic personality, which is well documented by his biographers. His resignation to live a life of 
solitude, working on alchemical transmutation, fit his personality, which may have also been scarred by the fact that 
his mother had abandoned him at a young age to marry a rich man who stipulated in the marriage proposal that the 
young Newton was to be left with his grandmother. It is only speculation, but psychiatrists or psychoanalysts may 
make the connection between his documented threats against his mother, bottled up hatred and his later scientific 
conclusions that elevated strife, gravity and discord over the property of inertia and love. 
105 After the revolution, Newton was able to escape his boring and intellectual stifling life at Cambridge and travel to 
London’s circles of elite. He dined with the king two nights after being elected MP in the 1688 revolution coup of 
James II, a Catholic. James II was feared for his potential to convert England to a Catholic nation, a notion Newton 
was allegedly horrified of. Solmsen mentions this on p. 252. 
104 
 
counterfeiters do not respect legal tender laws. Power dynamics are again visible in institutional 
formations around the support of interest charging and monopolies on credit. One of the most 
perilous aspects of the Bank of England’s development was that the government could have 
created the exact same paper notes based on creditworthiness (the public’s commitments) 
without paying interest to the bank or any other entity. 
 
2.3.10 Adam Smith’s Impact on the Discourse about Interest  
 
The positivist continuum of Enlightenment framing on the discourse about interest 
continued to influence writers of significance. Adam Smith (1723-1790) was an interlocutor in 
this discourse, which influenced his philosophy and career trajectory. Smith, a Scotsman from 
Glasgow, lived through the period of the last Jacobite revolt that had been brutally defeated in 
1745. Scotland was attempting to recover from a pogrom and subordination; it was a period of 
Scottish humility and resurgence in attentiveness towards intellectualism (Winch, 1978).106 Whig 
oligarchs recruited the ambitious and aspiring Smith to help augment the principles underpinning 
regional legal institutions and normative traditions. Motives were explicit; Whigs coveted the 
prospects of a biddable workforce over constant insurgence, and saw philosophy as a way to 
encourage industry (Ross, 2010).107 When Smith returned to Scotland and started lecturing in 
1748 at the University of Edinburgh, he transitioned away from his Oxford (Scholastic) training 
in favor of ‘modern’ philosophical foundations, which were among other trends comprised of: 
                                                 
106 Smith, with his London accent and Oxford training represented the ideal modern Scot, he was also a Whig and 
did not relate with the common sentiment. Smith studied at Oxford on scholarship but found it stifling, later 
lamenting about its curriculum’s emphasis on Scholasticism and Ontology and its lack of what he considered top 
caliber lecturers. 
107 Smith’s father had also been a Whig. Smith sums up their family’s political struggle and plight on page 2 saying 
“Our forefathers kicked out the Pope and the pretender [to] preserve the pretious right of private judgment”. 
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Newtonian physics, the philosophy of John Locke, and sentimental morals, and within these 
discussions was the now entirely reframed outlook on interest.  
The apparatus of social engineering highly emphasized laissez fair economics, which 
grew out of a larger “programme for the science of man” that Smith had collaborated on together 
with his mentor and contemporary David Hume, another important interlocutor (Hume, 2013, p. 
1). Smith’s belief in what was labeled the ‘free market’ was strengthened by physiocracy, which 
was a school of economics popularized by François Quesnay (1694–1774) that derived value 
from a nation’s ability to develop land and agriculture (Vaggi, 1987).108 Smith appears to adopt 
Quesnay’s discourse via the physiocratic belief that the economy, like the human body, should 
not be tinkered with.  
On the subject of interest, Smith supported the right to charge it and in his 
epistemological system, “the interest of the use of money…is the compensation which the 
borrower pays to the lender, for the profit which he has an opportunity of making by the use of 
the money. Part of that profit naturally belongs to the borrower who runs the risk and takes the 
trouble of employing it; and part to the lender, who affords him the opportunity of making this 
profit” (Smith, 1776, p. 55). By this time, conflating loans with investments was a standard part 
of the justification of charging interest. Leaning to the left, Smith further professed his belief in 
“allowing every man to pursue his own interest in his own way, upon the liberal plan of equality, 
liberty and justice” (Aspromourgos, 2006, p. 215).  
Smith’s reliance on interest rates as an indelible mechanism to control the business cycle 
was in line with his discourse community’s stance. Although Smith was willing to debate Jeremy 
                                                 
108 An interesting note about Quesnay was the effect his background as a physician to the king of France had on his 
economics. Thus, physiocrats viewed the economy analogous to the human body and so intervention into the human 
body’s natural metabolism was not preferred as to not upset its natural harmony. They also believed in directing 
commerce and industry through some type of government planning or moral interventions whereas Smith did not. 
Vaggi offers an interpretation of how Hume’s relationship with Smith goes deeper than simply an exchange of ideas. 
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Bentham, who propagated usury in his Defence of Usury (1787), Smith ignores the point that an 
elite ‘fourth class’ has occupied money renting. In fact, this aspect is entirely removed from the 
semantic field of terms comprising an explanation of his political economy. Therefore, Smith 
and Bentham had a debate surrounding the limits of how much interest/usury should be charged 
as regulated by the state, rather than why it is immoral and unnecessary. The fact that it should be 
charged, for them, is already a given. By attempting to “revalorize the notion of ‘usury’ Bentham 
wanted to rupture the tradition linking finance to ethics, for which he had little sympathy” (Mews 
& Abraham, 2007, p. 7).  
 
2.3.11 Smith’s Lasting Imprint on Economic Discourse  
 
Smith’s articulation of the Newtonian view of commerce helped shift the field of 
economics out of moral philosophy and into the realm of physics, and arguably pseudoscience. 
Essentially, the two fields were reversed; moral philosophy and the study of sentiments became a 
branch of wider economic study. Smith’s value theory, heavily dependent on Hume and John 
Locke, was that “everything in this world is purchased by labor, and our passions are the only 
causes of labor” (Hume, 2013, p. 1). However, inexplicably, Smith supported the commodity 
definition of money. This influenced later thinkers like William Stanley Jevons who affirmed 
Smith’s narrative that money developed from barter, who had a “great influence which helped to 
condition conventional economic thought for a century” (Davies, 1996).109 Here we can only 
hypothesize that this stance was due to the influence of Hume, for whom moral judgments were 
                                                 
109 This is discussed in the context of how economics now teaches that if banks were to cease existing that society 
would somehow revert to barter. It is extended through an anecdote Jevons used about a community that would go 
home hungry if barter did not suffice its trade needs in the Malay Archipelago, a falsely constructed narrative to 
substantiate banks. The trajectory would continue to leave its imprint and the last remaining usury laws limiting 
percentages would finally be abolished in 1854. 
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logically independent of empirical beliefs (Hume, 1752).110 Moreover, the notion of ‘progress’ 
introduced by the French physciocrat Turgot (d. 1781) was becoming commonly accepted 
(Nisbet, 1980). As was the idea that ethics and economics were separate endeavors.111 
Smith began his career as a moral philosopher attempting to answer the questions of how 
and why people make moral decisions. In his first book The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), 
he seeks to find out where human virtues come from. He identifies the key to morality and self-
identity as social unity, which is enabled through sympathy. He also writes about self-interest, 
borrowing Al-Ghazali’s illustration of the division of labor (Graeber, 2011).112 With this moral 
assertion he refutes Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville in their relativist assertions that 
benevolence does no good, and that vice is ultimately behind explaining human progress 
(Boonin, 1994).113 Interestingly, Smith initially avoids this nihilistic road in his moral philosophy 
and instead repudiates it, asserting that altruism is possible.  
                                                 
110 Hume’s stance was largely a reaction to mercantilists who overstated the importance of gold as money. Gold and 
silver were being plundered from the Americas by slave labor during Smith’s time and it is hard to understand how 
his value theory matches his definition of money considering that the Bank of England had been operating for nearly 
a century using commercial money.  
111 Ann Robert Jacque Turgot (d.1781), in his A Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of the Human 
Mind (1750) makes the first mention of the idea of progress. For Turgot progress encompasses not only the arts and 
sciences but also culture comprehensively including law and its application, the economy, institutions and societal 
norms. Nisbet discusses that (Ch. 5) Hume’s embrace of the concept is clear by his assertion that industry leads to 
refinement of society and virtuosity. In addition to moral arguments it was necessary to demonstrate that commerce 
led to civilizing; “the more these refined arts advance the more sociable men become…Thus industry, knowledge 
and humanity are linked together by an indissoluble chain.” 
112 Smith’s example of the division of labor borrows Al-Ghazali’s illustration of how markets work in which he 
narrates the production in a needle factory. Al-Ghazali explains that different people take on different 
responsibilities and come together to make the needle, or whatever product, better than an individual trying to 
complete each individual task himself. Smith repeats Al-Ghazali’s words ipsis litteris, choosing to use a pin instead 
of a needle. Graeber covers this in Debt (2011). In today’s terms, this would be deemed plagiarism. It is noted by 
some scholars that Smith spoke in morally contradictory ways, one was utilitarian and the other was moral – or as a 
philosopher who understands morality. 
113 Thomas Hobbes argued that ‘good’ is just another term for ‘that which people desire’; Mandeville goes as far in 
The Fable of the Bees: Private Vices, Public Benefits (1714) as to say that benevolence does no good, and that bad 
behavior in fact has a positive social impact. Contrasted with Christian values, Mandeville promotes vice as the root 
of human motivation. Hume and Smith never agreed with this extreme nihilism although some neoliberals would 
disagree. Smith was influenced by Latin translations of Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and Smith’s conception of why 
markets work employs Al-Ghazali’s explanation that people naturally prefer to cooperate, although Smith dismisses 
the moral content of that argument.  
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Seventeen years later, however, Smith published The Wealth of Nations (1776) in which 
he extended his theory on economic growth brought forward by the division of labor and the 
interconnectedness of people’s decisions. As an admirer of Newton’s physics, Smith wanted to 
develop economics as a discipline that operated by its own rules, unassociated to morality or 
politics. In the work, Smith deviates from the moral conclusion drawn by Al-Ghazali to the 
incongruous view that market participants are only interested in egoist selfish gain, which is a 
key reversal.  
What matters most is not as much what Smith asserted, but how economists have 
interpreted his convictions in discourse. In the second half of the 20th century economists like 
Frank Hahn, Gerard Debreu and Kenneth Arrow presented a certain conception of Smith’s ideas 
about the ‘free market’ and the ‘invisible hand’, terms sparingly used in his works. However, 
classical and neoclassical economists disagree about the central message of Smith’s works, 
especially in The Wealth of Nations. Moreover, neoclassical economists assert that Smith’s 
referral to an ‘invisible hand’ is an acquiescence of the fact that everyone following his or her 
own greed and self-interest best fosters the economy (Wight, 2002). This reading of the 
‘invisible hand’ has helped catapult the conviction in ostensibly ‘free markets’ and non-
interventionism into discourse recipients’ consciousness, extending the occult emphasis on 
numbers, hypothetical bottom-line profits and an unsound etiological account of money’s origins 
that defines it as a commodity.  
However, there are some apparent contradictions in Smith’s writings and their 
interpretations (Dobb, 1975).114 The word ‘fair’ is subverted by Smith’s usage of ‘free’ 
interpreted by later economists to mean an exchange between a consumer and a producer that has 
                                                 
114 Classical economists tend to focus on Smith’s physiocratic stance of deepening the division of labor and 
mitigating unproductive labor. Smith propagates labor, but does not seem to consider the exploitation of the labor 
force under his division of labor scheme, which ironically has been an impetus in exploiting labor. 
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the least amount of cultural or legal market friction between it. Furthermore, Smith does give 
primacy to the law of price on important items like labor and land. Hence, for economists fair 
trade is free trade. However, this is possibly a departure from Smith’s contextualization of trade 
stipulations, which mention necessary restraints on governmental oversight and monopoly. He 
also exempts basic needs like food and shelter. However, the position of economists causes them 
to reject notions such as fair trade because its framework disrupts their overemphasis on 
dependence on the law of price. In fact, there are passages from Smith that can entirely reframe 
what is believed of his episteme. For instance: 
 
How unnatural, how impiously ungrateful not to reverence the precepts that were 
prescribed to him by the infinite goodness of his Creator, even though no punishment was 
to follow their violation! This sense of propriety, too, is here well supported by the 
strongest motive of self-interest. The idea that, however, we may escape the observation 
of man, or be placed above the reach of human punishment of God, the greatest avenger 
of injustice, is motive capable of restraining the most headstrong passions, with those at 
least who, by consultant reflection, have rendered in familiar to them (Smith, 2010).115 
 
It is rare to see Smith contextualized in this fashion. Clearly, economists have ignored 
this encapsulation of his writings. However, the case can be made that the economics profession 
has overlooked much of Smith’s contextualization in order to make him the scapegoat for the 
profit-maximization model that has become very damaging to societies and natural systems.  
  
2.3.12 Evolutionary Discourse Merges with Economic Thought  
 
                                                 
115 Credit must be given to a lecture by Prof. Michael Northcott titled “Fair Trade or Free Trade? Competing Moral 
Economies in a Changing World” for articulating this line of questioning about Smith’s different voices, which tend 
to be interpreted in favor of unrestricted pursuit of the material, whereas there is much said by Smith about certain 
necessary restrictions.  
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Smith’s views on economics seem to be vitiated by his ideological commitment to the 
moral Newtonianism that prevailed in his discourse community, that people are driven by their 
own desires, essentially egoism. Moreover, regardless of his personal conviction in this matter, 
these notions, along with assuming that people are essentially rational beings driven by greed, 
culminate in making up the most fundamental assumptions of classical economics. In his 
Principia (1687), a very important passage summarizes Newton’s ideological support for 
institutionalizing ‘natural’ forces into capitalism:   
  
…Strength should be the lord of imbecility. 
And the rude son should strike his father dead.  
Force should be right, or rather right and wrong, 
Between whose endless jar justice resides 
Should lose their names, and so should justice too. 
Then everything includes itself in power, 
Power into will, will into appetite, 
And appetite, a universal wolf, 
So doubly second with will and power 
Must make perforce a universal prey, 
And last eat it self up. 
 
Inheriting a similitude of this sentiment, Adam Smith would construe gravity and inertia 
as economic competition and greed whereby such greed, checked by competition, and under the 
guidance of an invisible hand, would presumably create a perfect equilibrium of motion within 
the economy. The notion was prevailing that this assertion could be scientifically substantiated. 
Furthermore, economists built on this momentum of ‘positivism’ (to use Comte’s term) and 
progress, creating a basis for establishing a separate field for economics that excluded ethics.  
Various influential thinkers would respond to the intellectual assertions of Newton. 
However, these sweeping conclusions were reframing vitally important traditional truths, and the 
effects were ruinous. For instance, Anglican priest Thomas Malthus (1834) advanced the 
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Lockean liberal principles of natural (property) rights and Smith’s version of ‘competition versus 
greed’ to arrive at an apathetic conclusion, that ethnic cleansing was a somber necessity because 
of overpopulation. In Malthus’s An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects Future 
Improvements of Society (1798) he “portrayed the economy as a competitive struggle for survival 
and a constant race between a population’s growth and humankind’s ability to improve its 
productivity” (Beinhocker, 2007, p. 17). 
Malthus surmised that the world had a population problem that, combined with the notion 
of unlimited greed, could only lead to mounting claims on limited amounts of resources 
(Malthus, 1798).116 These conclusions then naturally affected policy-making. Malthus worked 
for the imperialist tool, the British East India Company, known for plundering weaker nations, 
and his callous philosophy led him to opine for engineered population reduction. He advocated 
against Anglican Church assistance to the poor and promoted the idea that “Instead of 
recommending cleanliness to the poor, we should encourage contrary habits. In our towns we 
should make the streets narrower, crowd more people into the houses, and court the return of the 
plague”, thereby principally encouraging population control instead of dealing with the issue of 
wealth stratification (Malthus, 1798).117 This evolutionary economic discourse starkly differed 
from the normative positions of traditional exchange parameters built on Christian and Islamic 
ethics (although there has been some interesting pushback to this myth) (Thornton, 2005). 
Beinhocker’s (2007) The Origin of Wealth compares and contrasts the dissemination of 
English economic ideology that began manifesting in various fields, and most specifically 
between economics and biology. The connections he presents between ideologues are important 
                                                 
116 See Chapter II, p.18. Many wars have been launched, including economic and psychological, in defense of this 
false doctrine i.e. Nazi Germany. 
117 See: book IV Chapter 5 in Malthus and Chapter II where the (now refuted) ‘science’ of Malthus is on display. 
Since his postulations, economics has often been called the ‘dismal science’.  
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to note. For example, Charles Darwin (1809-82) would discover his substructure after reading 
Malthus’s thesis. Hindus (1994) notes Darwin remarked that:  
 
Being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on 
from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it once struck me 
that under these circumstances favorable variations would tend to be preserved and 
unfavorable ones would be destroyed. The result would be the formation of a new 
species. Here then I had at last got the theory by which to work (p. 122).  
 
Thus, “Darwin’s great insight into the critical role of natural selection in evolution was 
inspired, at least in part, by economic ideology. It was not long after Darwin published his 
Origin of Species (1859) that the intellectual currents began to flow back the other way from 
evolutionary theorists to economists” (Beinhocker, 2007, p. 39). Darwin was a late product of the 
18th century Scottish Enlightenment, who had contact with Smith, was influenced by him, and 
therefore, produced a theory of evolution remarkably compatible with the invisible hand theory 
of free enterprise economics and natural selection. This is, by every definition, what critical 
discourse analysts would call a discourse community best described as privileged, and one able 
to shape social knowledge and create institutions, all of which suit the purposes of power 




All of the functionalities in the word usury were accepted as the term was discarded. The 
same phenomenon was called interest, which took on a positive connotation as the cost of money 
and the legitimate return for money lent, as lending was equated with investing. Open to many 
interpretations, Smith’s writings are used today as support for the continuation of Newtonianism 
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in economics, [my greed is my inertia and your greed (competition) is the only thing stopping me 
(gravity)]. Some attempt to defend him from this interpretation, like Noam Chomsky, who in 
(1995) Class Warfare argues that Smith’s teachings are exploited.118 However, most classical 
and neoclassical economists choose to hail Smith as the father of the ‘free market’, where greed 
governs, and the survival of the fittest extends to the marketplace, and what this allows is for 
interest to serve a function in finance that is difficult to augment (1995).119 
Smith’s articulation of intellectual tradition “endured in the new industrial world that 
emerged in Britain in the late eighteenth century and prevailed in the nineteenth. Evidence of this 
is to be found in the currency of the phrase ‘the system’, meaning the mechanized production 
unit in which all the parts of the plant [textile mill, etc.] had to cooperate” (Ross, 2010, p. 8). 
Although Smith never uses the term capitalism, he instead refers to it as ‘commercial society’, 
the discussion continues. According to Smith (in Book I Ch. 6), it is “A complete system, 
governed by and directed to general ends, viz. its own preservation and prosperity” and this 
ideology embedded in discourse fundamentally describes the ‘free market capitalist system’ that 
underpins neoclassical and neoliberal economics today (1776). 
Perhaps it is blasé, but this ‘system’ is best described as promoting a cognitive frame that 
is distinct in exonerating usury, framing it as a necessity and a right, a rationale justified by a 
positivist tradition of writings stretching back several centuries. Since this key reversal, 
mainstream discourse has not revisited the once axiomatic universals prohibiting this action. 
                                                 
118 Chomsky further argues on page 19, “What we would call capitalism he despised. People read snippets of Adam 
Smith, the few phrases they teach in school… not many people get to the point hundreds of pages later, where he 
says that division of labor will destroy human beings and turn people into creatures as stupid and ignorant as it is 
possible for a human being to be. And therefore in any civilized society the government is going to have to take 
some measures to prevent division of labor from proceeding to its limits”. 
119 Chomsky thinks that Smith is subversive, however, as poignant as some of his analysis is, he opines for anarchy 
which is not an alternative; and in many ways it serves as another form of exploitation through the management of 
chaos. The Adam Smith institute in the UK maintains the stance that Smith does not necessarily mean ‘greed’ when 
he alludes to the leading motivational factor of the human being and that “he has in mind a concern for our own 
welfare that is only natural.” However, there is much evidence to the contrary in Smith’s two works. 
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Regarding this, Hawkes (2010) suggests “Perhaps the reason for this neglect is that usury has so 
successfully remolded postmodern culture in its own image that it has rendered itself, or at least 



























This chapter builds on the previous discussion and expands on the maqasid methodology 
by considering how this transcendental composite can take into consideration all new sources of 
knowledge in discourse in order to develop a reimagined vision of ethical exchange. This 
methodology sets the normative discourse. The chapter first considers some of the various 
obstacles faced in presenting an analysis from an ethics informed by ‘Islam’, a term defined 
herein. It further contrasts ‘Islamic’ objectives with those of today’s overarching capitalist 
paradigm and addresses the complications created in amalgamating these two different systems.  
 
Part 1: Contextualizing Islamic Ethics 
 
3.1.2 Shariah: Context, Sources and Immutabilities 
 
There are several immutable aspects to Islam.120 Immutable is God’s oneness (tawheed). 
Tawheed is a concept that elevates God’s transcendent status as the ontologically necessary 
existent entity, a being above all conceptualizations and physical boundaries. Islam’s immutable 
source is the Quran.121 Equally immutable, are the sound, authentic pronouncements (ahadith) 
from the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص. All teachings become susceptible to dilution or expropriation 
                                                 
120 As for immutability, the areas primarily subjected to the ultimate authority of religious texts are beliefs (‘aqa’id) 
and ritual worship (ibadat); otherwise, the scholarly consensus is that permissibility in all things is the fundamental 
starting point of rationalizations pertaining to any social issues outside of those sine qua non mandates of God.  
121 From the Islamic perspective the Quran enjoys a sublime position in Islamic philosophy and law as the verbatim 
word of The Creator delivered to the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, via the angel Gabriel during the 7th century in Arabia. 
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and therefore in every epoch, reaching an authentic scholarly consensus is necessary for 
preventing against culturally influenced misreading and or spatiotemporal restrictions in textual 
interpretation.122 As the ultimate source of all divine inspiration, God has transmitted messages 
that stand as the basis of the moral, theological and legal tradition, the Shariah. As a term, 
Shariah has its linguistic root in the ‘path to water’, but it also has taken the religious connotation 
of ‘divine legislation’, or ‘The Way towards correct action’. A simple rendering as ‘law’ in the 
Western sense of the word renders a deficient denotation of it. Traditionally Shariah has meant 
the legal guarantee of the ‘rights of humans’, which entail life, the protection of property and 
legal process. It has also differentiated those rights from the ones God has over believers, hence, 
it is a comprehensive and evolving corpus of legislation that holds the final say on certain 
fundamental aspects of life, and what things are legislated halal (good/praiseworthy) and haram 
(prohibited). 
Contemporarily, this word has become a semiotic trigger point because “To many, the 
word ‘Shariah’ conjures horrors of hands cut off, adulterers stoned and women oppressed” 
(Feldman, 2008, p. 2). Therefore, referring to this source as an immutable, in this context, is one 
observable obstacle for proposing an Islamic ethics.123 Additionally we must consider the 
pervasive Orientalist-generated thesis, oft echoed uncritically by Muslims, about the Shariah. 
That is, that Islamic scholarship closed the gates of exhaustive interpretive reasoning (ijtihad), or 
                                                 
122 In essence, the overall Quranic message is, in essence, no different from previous dispensations, “Nothing is said 
to you, [O Muhammad], except what was already said to the messengers before you” (Quran 41:43). This ayah 
endorses the validity of preexisting dispensations (of the Israelites, Christians and others), which has given Islamic 
civilizations a more tolerant attitude towards multicultural societies historically. The guarantee in the Quran 
promises its own protection, “Absolutely, We have revealed the reminder, and, absolutely, we will preserve it” 
(15:9). 
123 Although some of this is attributable to an unsavory image of Islam in the news cycle, there is some validity to 
the stereotype; the modern nation state has removed the traditional institutions for cultivating Shariah scholarship, 
which has rendered it an ineffectual and punitive practice as implemented in many modern contexts.  
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relegated it only to an elite class (Kamali, 2003).124 This idea emerged in the context of an 
Orientalist attempt by Schacht (1965) and others to cast the Shariah as inferior to Enlightenment 
principles. This ‘reconstruction’ has been challenged by Muslims, but also by academics of non-
Muslim background. For instance, there is the argument of the scholar of Sharia, Wael Hallaq 
(1984), who calls this narrative a ‘myth’ designed in order to prove the inflexibility of Islamic 
law, all of which served to foster the integration of Muslim lands into capitalist nation states. 
Hallaq’s later work (2012) The Impossible State expands upon all of the moral, political 
and economic issues that are quintessential parts of the modern nation state. He further explains 
why the deleterious effects of the nation state program make merging it with the ethical nature of 
the Shariah an impossibility, elucidating why modern attempts to do so have been unsuccessful 
models focused on overly punitive aspects of law. He further argues that the modern state has its 
own idiosyncratic history, formulated out of everything but altruistic diplomacy, and thus it 
remains an unsuitable vehicle for direct transference and application in Muslim societies 
(Anderson, 1998).125 Additionally, the colonial dismantling of the institutions necessary for 
cultivating Shariah, like endowments (awqaf) and religious schools (madaris), led to their 
replacement with European legal codes contextually insensitive and often irrelevant to non-
European societies. The classical application of Shariah in Islamic societies was not punitive; to 
the contrary, Shariah was an ethical institution with the sole purpose of functioning as a 
maintainer of social harmony and cohesion and it prevented the centralization of power by giving 
local judges the authority to mediate between disputing factions.  
In a classical context, the basis of morality in the Islamic episteme begins with God’s 
definitive descriptions of right and wrong: “Have we not shown him the two highways [of good 
                                                 
124 Kamali’s text focuses on the principles of Usul al Fiqh wherein he takes up this thesis and in the process cites 
Schacht, Coulson and other Orientalists as authorities on this contentious interpretive history of Islam. 
125 Anderson offers a chronology of how diplomacy came about in Europe. 
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and evil]?” (Quran 90:10). Although profane logic would opine that certain behaviors, and 
aspects of business are innocuous (i.e. drug trafficking or pornography), the Islamic perspective, 
on the other hand, fundamentally begins with accepting the prohibitions of the Shariah regarding 
such things without necessarily reaching the telos for them, thus, differentiating between the 
wisdom (hikma) and the obligation is important. This is because the virtue of obedience has an 
inherent metaphysical aspect connected to recompense in the after-life.126 Yusuf asserted this 
difference at the 2010 conference in Oxford, declaring that by their very essential natures the 
Shariah and the post-modern world’s capitalist nation state are ‘non-complimentary paradigms’. 
 
3.1.3 The Islamic Legal Tradition and the Human Task of Interpretation 
 
It is often said that the problem with religious textual interpretation is in the faulty 
understanding of its interpreters. Within mainstream Islamic thought, exegetical methods have 
historically centered on issues like whether to interpret verses with naturalistic or formulaic 
language (Hawting & Abdul-Kader, 1993).127 Meaning is an incredible phenomenon and 
linguists are constantly having to update theories on language transmission. Yet, interpreting the 
Quran is not purely a rational pursuit, it requires context, which is the justification of why a 
messenger is necessary.128 In the Quran, there are successive reminders to “…obey God and 
obey the messenger” (Quran 4:58) and that “Whatever the messenger gives you, take it and 
                                                 
126 Surah Al-Taubah (9:11) elaborates on this principle of later rewards in a bargain/pact between believers and God: 
“Surely Allah has bought of the believers their persons and their property for this, that they shall have the garden; 
they fight in Allah's way, so they slay and are slain; a promise which is binding on Him in the Taurat and the Injeel 
and the Quran; and who is more faithful to his covenant than Allah? Rejoice therefore in the pledge which you have 
made; and that is the mighty achievement”.  
127 This source is an academic work undertaken in the modern age, including issues that the classical exegetes like 
Tabari and Ibn Kathir faced (such as discerning problems related to genre). 
128 A befitting manner for Him to propagate his message, “Just as We have sent among you a messenger from 
yourselves reciting to you Our verses and purifying you and teaching you the Book and wisdom and teaching you 
that which you did not know” (2:151). 
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whatever he forbids, abstain from it” (Quran 59:7). Some rulings are plainly clear, whereas 
others require a study of the Prophet’s actions, his Sunnah and the context (Abdal-Haqq, 
2002).129 Departure from this epistemology appears when questions arise not directly answered 
from reading the corpus of Islamic texts, and this is where the culpability of the rational 
component comes in to play.  
The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص encouraged the interpretive effort of independent reasoning (ijtihad) in his 
well-known exchange with the companion Muadh Ibn Jabl where Muadh was asked what he 
would do if solutions for a predicament were not found in the religious canon, to which Muadh 
replied that he would use reasoning (Glasse, 2008).130 Thus, scholarship is also dignified in its 
interpretive role and its utilization of rationality (‘aql). Hallaq classifies the manner in which 
legal sources came to utilize interdisciplinary methods of legal reasoning, interpretation and the 
sanctioning instrument of consensus (ijma’); he highlights that creative jurists (mujtahideen) 
representing the community at large can render issues conclusive and epistemologically certain. 
This process of reasoning, “subsumed under the rubric of qiyas (analogical reasoning)” 
represents the fourth source of Shariah. Alternative methods are based on “juristic preference 
(istihsan) or public welfare and interest (istaslah)” (1997, p. 1).  
                                                 
129 The Sunnah, however, is not analogous to hadith (a written report of something the Prophet did). Hadith are 
susceptible to fabrications and numerous other issues like the ambiguity of context in certain narrations. Hadith 
scholarship is an entire discipline in itself, which tries to verify the limitations and scope of the hadith, whether it is 
something accurate, or whether it was something situational, dated, or even abrogated. The Sunnah then, is 
something that was an actual Prophetic practice, established with the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص intent of the act being to facilitate 
later replication of the act by his followers. Confirming what constitutes a Sunnah is verifiable through the 
observation of that established practice being replicated elsewhere by the Prophet’s family and closest disciples. 
Thereafter established, it would gain acceptance by an undeniable majority of people who were witness to its 
formation. Abdal-Haqq’s view is classical, that the hierarchy of authority in Islam is best expressed through the 
verse (ayah) in Surah al-Imran that states: “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those 
in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should 
believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result” (Quran 4:59). 
130 Muadh was on his way to act as a judge in Yemen; the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص asks Muadh what he will use to judge if the 
Quran and prophetic practices have no precedence in a matter, and Muadh replies “ijtihad”, to which the Prophet 
approved (p. 188).  
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The way in which the immutable sources are used varies, as does the approach to ensuing 
judgments. Reiner (1983) enumerates that by the end of the 11th century “these different 
approaches had crystallized into four schools of thought (madhhab). These were the Hanafi 
(named after Abu Hanifah), the Maliki (named after Malik Ibn Anas), the Shafi’i (followers of 
Muhammad Ibn Idris al-Shafi’i) and the latest school to develop, the Hanbali” (p. 200). These 
schools essentially established the normative scholastic tradition in Islamic thought, and it is the 
continuum of thought evolving from this corpus of knowledge that is referred to when the term 
‘Islamic’ is used herein.131  
During the evolution of the legal schools, differences of opinion were tolerated because at 
the root of the Islamic system of legislation (usul al-fiqh) is nuance, flexibility and calculated 
ambiguity. Al Ghazali says, “The roots (usul) of moral discernment (fiqh) are the indicators 
(adillah) [that point] to [moral] determinations (ahkam)” (Al-Ghazali, 1997, p. 5). However, 
aside from the cut and dry injunctions that in Western legal terms would be classified as statute 
law, in Islam there are more fluid directives, possibly comparable to constitutional law, whereby 
a judge or someone of authority is not restricted in his or her ability to make concessions or 
amendments to the legal limits (Johnston, 2004).132  
 
3.1.4 Human Fallibility and Attaining Certainty 
 
                                                 
131 The focus here is on how mainstream Islamic discourse has treated these issues, and not on strands within Islamic 
thought. In orthodox Islamic legal theory, incremental and fluid development of the Shariah emerged over a span of 
several centuries, reaching its final stage as an integrated methodology in the 10th century. Whereas prior to that 
point it was rudimentarily assembled in various ways by various approaches. 
132 Quranic verses related to this are categorized as ‘qa’tiatil dilala, meaning that they are predisposed to suit 
multiple interpretations. Additionally, methodologies differ in trying to ascertain the answers to hypothetical 
answers. Some prefer scholarly interpretation made from personal independent reasoning (ijtihad); others prefer to 
achieve consensus with logic and analogical reasoning (ra’y and qiyas respectively). 
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The Shariah therefore is interminable, and can never be annulled by Muslims in their 
personal lives. Acceptable Shariah reorganization (islah), then, can manifest in method, but it 
cannot happen faithfully through esoteric annihilation of the law; nor can it evolve precisely as 
Enlightenment thinking did, by seeking to reduce the religiously inspired law to its lowest 
common denominators and relative principles in order to asphyxiate potential disputation (Ward, 
2008).133 Nevertheless, certainty in some affairs remains elusive. As Ibn Qayyim (d. 1350) has 
noted, fatawa (edicts pl.) are simply human, non-binding attempts to approximate what God may 
intend or want (Al-Jauziyah, 1991).134 Notably, the classical Arabic word for ‘certainty’ (yaqeen) 
is used in the Quran in one context to mean death, implying that entire certainty is not always 
possible in this domain; “And worship your lord until there comes to you the certainty/death” 
(al-yaqeen) (Quran 15:99) (Ar-Razi, 1990).135 Lastly, certainty is contrasted with despair, and it 
is a tenet of faith to never give in to despondency. As the renowned scholar of creed Imam At-
Tahawi (d. 933) understood it, people should remain conscious of God’s final reckoning, but also 
remain hopeful about His mercy (Pill, 2014).136 
 
3.1.5 The Prophetic Example in Ethics 
 
                                                 
133 Again, refer to the unfolding of the Western tradition’s trajectory that arrived upon a distinctly different view of 
human rights and the role of the human being in the universe. 
134 Remaining fully cognizant of human limitations provides a context of emphasizing human fallibility versus 
God’s infallibility. The renowned scholar Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziya (d.1350) famously addressed the issue of calling 
one’s own fatwa ‘a ruling of God’ with full certainty – that a fatwa is only a fallible human attempt to articulate 
God’s intended meaning.  
135 The classical exegete Al-Razi expounds yaqeen in the following manner; “That Day, the people will depart 
separated [into categories] to be shown [the result of] their deeds. So whoever does an atom's weight of good will 
see it, And whoever does an atom's weight of evil will see it” (99:8). 
136 Pill relates this from Abu Ja’far al-Tahawi al-Hanafi’s (239-321 AH) point number 60 from the famous 
summation of 130 beliefs in Aqidah al-Tahawiyya. 
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With the legal sources characterized, we now need to focus on what the essence of an 
Islamic ethic is. One Prophetic tradition is expressly cumulative, that, “Actions are only but by 
intentions” (Zarabozo, 1999, p. 1). The connotation is that the essence of akhlaq (character) is 
purity, an inward action (Nasr, 2002).137 Another impactful Prophetic tradition is the eminent 
proverb, “I was only sent to perfect noble character” (Zarabozo, p. 1). Aisha, the wife of the 
Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, said of him “He was the embodiment of the Quran” (Muslim, n.d.). The Quran 
confirms in the second person, “Indeed you [Muhammad] are of noble character” (68:4). This 
type of emphasis on personal virtues translates into today’s terms as virtue ethics. Reinheart 
(1983) hypothesizes that schools of jurisprudence were not compelled to classify ethics (akhlaq) 
as a standalone science because theology, philosophy and ethics were all integrated into one 
normative body of thought and practice as an ample amalgam, classical fiqh.  
However, in developing an applied ethic for how Muslims should behave contemporarily 
in an environment entirely different from that, which witnessed the birth and spread of Islam, 
careful articulation and introspection is necessary. In contemporary society, there has been a lack 
of emphasis in this area, and this has been problematic. For instance, ethicist and sociologist 
Raymond Baumhart’s classic study on business ethics asked over 100 businesspeople, “What 
does ethical mean to you?” Over 50 percent of the respondents defined ethical as “What my 
feelings tell me is right,” and 25 percent defined it as whatever is “in accord with my religious 
beliefs,” (Velasquez, 2006, pp. 7-8). The subject matter that ethics investigates is morality. 
Velasquez defines morality as “The standards that an individual or group has about what is right 
                                                 
137 The Muslim belief is that the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was an exemplary figure in demonstrating ethical behavior 
in a wide variety of difficult scenarios, including but not limited to: his ability to deal with persecution, attempted 
assassinations, economic exclusions and boycotts made against his family and followers, physical abuse, libelous 
attacks and experiencing the tragedies of war. The moral qualities and virtues espoused by the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص in various 
situations translate into the essence of Islamic ethics, which at its core is an attempt at replicating prophetic character 
to one’s own abilities whereby attaining prophetic virtues is the telos by which God is pleased. 
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or wrong, or good and evil” (p. 8). Thus, different communities ascribe to different moral 
standards, and moral standards are based on impartial considerations, not law or legislature. In 
contrast, non-moral standards are “the standards we call the law by which we judge legal right 
and wrong” (p. 9). Thus, it becomes clear that actions can be deemed legal, and yet very 
divergent from what is right.  
In regards to how the Islamic tradition would articulate it, a ruling from a jurist (faqih) 
deeming an action legal does not necessarily mean the action is ethical. In fact, a legal action 
may be entirely unethical. We can see for instance the prophetic narration that “I am only a 
human being, and you people (opponents) come to me with your cases; and it may be that one of 
you can present his case eloquently in a more convincing way than the other, and I give my 
verdict according to what I hear. So if ever I judge (by error) and give the right of a brother to his 
other (brother) then he (the latter) should not take it, for I am giving him only a piece of the Fire” 
(al-Bukhari, 1987, p. 281). The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was not himself a theorist or philosopher. Rather, he as 
all prophets were, was an inspirational figure that encouraged and inspired people towards better 
behavior and upholding justice.  
 
3.1.6 Prioritizing the Higher Objectives: The Maqasid Al Shariah 
 
The ideas of seeking justice, fighting against tyranny and covetous behavior are indeed 
collective principles. Muslims cannot make a claim that they are in any way only ‘Islamic’ 
principles. However, there is an established tradition within Islamic thought of identifying and 
examining such principles. The ‘higher objectives’ (maqasid al-shariah) (plural) is a 
methodological classification of thought that ruminates on the philosophy underpinning the 
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Islamic legal tradition. It identifies virtues and principles. Developing axioms from maqasid 
understandings facilitates the transference of the Prophetic virtue ethics into applied practice. 
The maqasid are human attempts at explaining the teleological purposes behind Islamic moral 
teachings and legal decrees. The profound expansion in this area emerged around the fifth 
Islamic century. Auda (2008) categorizes the historical development of maqasid theory into three 
chronological periods: the era of the companions, the foundational era of Islamic schools of 
thought, and the successive epoch between the 5th and 8th centuries CE.  
As time elapsed and certain contextual Shariah constraints became problematic for 
scholars, it was identified that that societal needs were shifting and evolving, and that some 
societal norms could become needs as new means became available. Scholars developed 
concepts like ‘unrestricted interests’ of the people (al maslahah al mursilah) in order to 
compensate for the dependence on analytical reasoning (qiyas) in areas where textual 
ambiguities involving the immutable sources caused problems with legal rulings. 
Starting with Al-Juwaini (d. 1085) a trend in scholarship dealing with a more complex 
world sought to identify the rational basis of the Shariah, the “Purpose, objective, principle, 
intent, goal, end, or principle in the Islamic law” which in other words could be understood as 
pursuits in the “interest of humanity” (p. 4). Al Juwaini’s Al-Burhan fi Usul al-Fiqh (The Proof 
in the Fundamentals of Law) was the first treatise to construct a legal theory for different levels 
of societal needs by classifying: necessities (darurat), public needs (al-hajah al-aamah), moral 
behavior (al-makrumat), recommendations (al-mandubat), and anomalous things not attributable 
to any specific reason.  
On the meta-question of why Allah revealed the Shariah, scholars have weighed in 
differently. Al Juwaini proposed that it was for the protection (ismah) of people’s faith, souls, 
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minds, private parts (honor), and wealth (Al-Juwaini, 1977). He further hypothesized that if all 
legal theory vanished, a faithful reconstruction of the Shariah could be reassembled from using 
“fundamental principles, upon which all rulings of law are based and to which all rulings of law 
converge” (Al-Juwaini, 1979, p. 434). Notably, a key element of business and trade he identified 
was that all trade should be based on mutual agreement, that manipulation, speculation and 
usurious agreements were prohibited because of the disadvantage they placed the weaker parties 
in. 
Al Juwaini’s student, Abu Hamid Al Ghazali (d. 1111) believed the maqasid were simply 
a means for achieving the realization of human benefits in this world. However, his faithful 
adherence to the (Shafi’i) legal tradition restrained him from giving the maqasid independent 
legitimacy (hujiyah) (Auda, 2008).138 He expanded on the necessities of his teacher’s 
classification in his Al Mustasfa (The Purified Source), which consisted of the preservation of 
religion, life, lineage, intellect and property (Al-Allaf, 2003). Thereafter these categorizations 
were widely accepted as the Shariah standard par excellence (Al-Ghazali, 1997).139  
However, a significant departure would occur. Imam Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, a prominent 
medieval Maliki scholar from Andalus (d. 1388), incorporated the maqasid into his legal 
thinking. Al-Shatibi’s Al-Muwafaqaat fi Usool al-Sharia (The Reconciliation of the 
Fundamentals of Islamic Law) made three significant improvements to the science. First, he 
expanded on Al-Ghazali’s conception of maslaha by dividing all human needs into three 
                                                 
138 It should be considered that Auda’s training in systems analysis has given him a different perception of dissecting 
concepts within an overall macro-analysis of the Islamic corpus of knowledge as an episteme, or system of 
knowledge. In the modern era, Maslow organized a human hierarchy of needs ranging from basic physiological 
requirements to then moved on to the emotional support systems like love, to the final point of ‘self-actualization’. 
Maslow’s suggested five levels of needs later became seven, which Auda contends, is a natural progression of 
thought similar to the way the maqasid has grown in the minds of Islamic scholars throughout time.  
139 See page 416 where Al-Ghazili elaborates on the concept calling it ‘unrestricted interests’ (al-masalih al-
mursilah). Al-Ghazali’s definition of the maslahah is imbued with the deeper understanding as that which ‘secures a 
benefit’ or ‘prevents harm’. 
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categories according to their religious significance. Since he believed the maqasid to be 
“fundamentals of religion, basic rules of the law, and universals of belief” he unpegged the 
‘unrestricted interests’ from their delineation and made them ‘fundamentals of law’ (Al-Shatibi, 
2003, p. 25). He also made a radical departure from classical Maliki thought by shifting the 
‘wisdoms’ (hikma) behind rulings to becoming the ‘bases’ for rulings (El-Raisouni, 1992).140 
Furthermore, Al-Shatibi argued for the status of attaining certainty (qat’iyah) by using the 
inductive method, arguing that it was not speculative (dhaniyya), a departure from a heavy 
dependence on Greek thought that had dissuaded philosophy-based arguments in that manner.  
Al-Shatibi’s proposals, which called for accepting induced universals to serve as the basis 
of the Shariah was a fundamental shift in methodology.  In fact, it could be misconstrued in some 
respects as a thrust towards the esoteric if not carefully constrained. His contemporaries widely 
rejected this shift and it failed to secure the status of ‘consensus’ (ijma). However, despite the 
historical preservation of certain theoretical limits in Islamic thought, researchers have noted the 
popularity of the maqasid being reintegrated in ‘modernity’ as both a philosophy and a method 
of determining the ratio legis (‘illah) behind Islamic injunctions. According to Johnston (2004), 
since the 1970s the method has grown even more significantly, witnessed in works such as Ibn 
Ashur’s (d.  1973) Treatise of Maqasid Al-Shariah (2006), as well as in work by Rane (2010).141  
                                                 
140 See El-Raisouni on p. 169 where he discusses that Maliki fiqh usually gives precedence to specific and partial 
evidences (daleel) over general principles that can transcendentally permeate into various fields. This is a major 
move towards philosophical rationalism. He made the caveat that knowledge of the maqasid should be a condition 
for the correctness of juridical reasoning on all levels. This is something accepted although not practiced with as 
much cognizance as necessary.  
141 This arguably begins with the Tunisian scholar Muhammad Al-Tahir Ibn Ashur (1879- 1973). He fashioned a 
criteria by which to approach the prophetic hadiths, which would seek to understand the intentions behind prophetic 
actions. In his method, he differentiates contextual restrictions of time and place in realms of prophetic commentary 
regarding different issues like political statements, conflict resolution and marital advice. He also interjected modern 
concepts into the discussion on the original five maqasid and extended them to include freedom, rights, civility and 
equality. Professor Halim Rane has utilized the maqasid to look at issues of human rights, political struggle and 
Islam’s relationship with the West. Rane gives context to why the maqasid approach is both true to Islamic values 
and mandates from the Quran and Sunnah, but at the same time takes more contemporary context into consideration 
than an ultra-literalist approach.  
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Nonetheless, some Muslim scholars have pointed out the associated dangers of putting 
too much of an onus on the maqasid as an independent ‘school’ by raising the concern that the 
legal tradition can be circumvented by over-rationalizing and over-emphasizing ‘social benefit’ 
to the point where the intents of the Shariah are manipulated to suit ‘other’ aims (Al-Allaf, 
2003).142 Historically though, identifying the ethical higher objectives behind Islamic rulings has 
added a multi-dimensional vastness to the classical Islamic tradition (Raysuni, 2005). And it is 
towards identifying such moral ends within the boundaries of the legal tradition that this research 
seeks to extend the utilization of the maqasid to the realm of human affairs, chiefly to 
commercial exchange and the discussion of how rights are infringed upon in markets (Soualhi, 
2009).143  
 
3.1.7 Arriving Upon a Methodology in Islamic Ethics 
 
Muslims have preserved a rich tradition that encompasses all spheres of life, but in the 
‘modern’ era, they have struggled to negotiate an applied ethics, imbued by Islam, whereby 
religious values and higher objectives (maqasid al-shariah) visibly benefit greater society in the 
public sphere. There are numerous reasons why, most notably of which is modernity’s disastrous 
annihilation of the traditionally cohesive Muslim political system, indispensable as the historical 
                                                 
142 Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328) for example, believed that the purpose behind the divine law was simply to achieve 
justice. Others argued the purpose was merely for attaining happiness. All of these views are essentially 
complementary according to Al-Allaf. One of the earliest contributors to the concept was Abd al-Malik al-Juwayni 
(d. 1185 CE). He used maslahah and maqasid interchangeably; thus, to al-Juwayni the peoples’ ‘public interests’ 
were, in fact, the ‘higher objectives’ of the Islamic doctrine. 
143 Different Muslim commentators have arrived upon different definitions of the ultimate ends and objectives 
through utilization of ijtihad. Building on the precedent of the prophetic usage of ijtihad as well as that of the 
companions, different scholars induce different principles from the Quran and Sunnah. Yet, different names have 
been applied to what we can view as a comprehensive understanding of the exact same phenomena. Younes Soualhi 
argues that during Al-Shatibi’s era attempts were made at utilizing the maqasid as a method in order to revitalize the 
methods of inference, but that this has ultimately had little effect on the dynamicity of fiqh. He is rightly critical, that 
often, scholars subsumed in fulfilling the letter of the law have overlooked the spirit of the law. 
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protector of requisite Islamic ‘rights’ (huquuq). Nevertheless, the reality is that Western secular 
civilization has come to dominate in determining the acceptable forms of political and economic 
expression, as well as dissent. Subsequently, Muslims like others, have imbibed secular Western 
values, which have consequentially affected their interpretations of religion. But such 
amalgamations have created problems because of secularism’s irreverent sequester of religion to 
the personal sphere, which diminishes the traditional role it has played in shaping ethics and law; 
this phenomenon threatens essential components of citizens’ identities who feel that religious 
identity is a major part of ephemeral existence on earth (Ar-Razi, 1990).144 
In the mid-20th century, M.A. Draz developed an ethical theory based on concepts that 
emerge from the Quran, which center on: obligation, responsibility, sanction, intention and 
inclinations, and effort. Several writers on ethics have utilized Draz’s framework, yet much has 
transpired since then in terms of how complicated various fields have become.145 In his (2008) 
Radical Reform, Professor Tariq Ramadan seeks ways of continuing the pursuit for a 
transformative paradigm shift in the approach to an applied Islamic ethics through a combination 
of scholastic Islamic thought in tandem with an emphasis on the maqasid. In the work, he makes 
three propositions, which stem largely from propositions made by Ibn Ashur (2006) decades ago. 
(1) Muslims must reconsider the “terms and modalities of the reform process (islah, tajdid)” 
because the preexisting modalities have reached their functional limits. (2) “The geography and 
sources of usul al-fiqh must certainly be reconsidered” because it is no longer enough to rely 
only upon “scriptural sources” in order to “examine the relationship between human knowledge 
                                                 
144 Al-Razi builds a human needs theory. Classically ethics in Islam used to be called ilm-al-akhlaq, more similar to 
virtue ethics, whereas contemporarily the shift in ethical focus has witnessed gravitation towards an evolving 
applied, or meta-ethics. In a challenging field that requires a pronounced capability of navigating both the Western 
tradition and the rich Islamic legal tradition. 
145 In practical ethics, other others build ijtihadaat on ethical models that mimic Platonic or Peripatetic (Aristotelian) 
models, such as Ibn Miskawayh’s Tahdib Al-Akhlaq.  
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and applied ethics”. (3) “The center of gravity of authority in the Islamic Universe of reference 
must be shifted by ranking more clearly the respective competences and the roles of scholars in 
the different fields” (pp. 3-4). 
Ramadan’s methodology was inherited from the prodigious discussion surrounding how 
to best arrive at legitimate understandings of Islamic textual sources, how to reconcile content 
related to textual ambiguities, and how to find harmony between faith and practice in sundry 
environments. In this sense, he displays a lucid respect for the sources of the legal tradition and 
emphasizes faithfulness to them. Still, the manner of such advocacy is not without criticism, 
strife and conflict from numerous angles. Nonetheless, the entire discussion leading up to this 
point forces taking a normative position in discussing concepts like usury, interest and money, 
which affect the rights of people. Therefore, the remainder of the thesis will extend and expand 
on these three propositions in examining the institutional realm of capitalism (neoliberalism, 
‘Islamic’ banking, etc.).146  
 
3.1.8 Extending and Expanding on the Maqasid Methodology  
 
Epistemology can be understood through analyzing methodology and tacit 
categorizations of knowledge. Ramadan opines that scholars today, like the scholars of old, can 
employ the tools of evaluation and faithfully weigh issues lacking historical precedent or 
articulation in religious texts. Regarding Ramadan's first proposition about changing the terms 
and modalities of fiqh, he argues that the way ‘critical reasoning’ (ijtihad) has been approached 
in modernity has reached its limits. He further points out that Muslims want to participate in 
society, as Islam calls for them to do so, but that they do not want this participation to force a 
                                                 
146 Expansion here in means a word’s employment as a rhetorical device. 
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ceding of their dearly held values. Furthermore, secularism has proposed big challenges, and for 
centuries, Muslims have largely been simply “adapting” to all of the changes associated with the 
annihilation of the traditional economic, civil and political systems that previously addressed 
these issues in Muslim societies. 
Such adaptation cannot bring the change needed, and as Ramadan puts it, the “crises are 
still there and are getting deeper” and “Muslims seem to be at a loss for a vision and projects for 
the present and future” (p. 7). Therefore, the conclusion he draws is that the modalities of 
reforming the methods and approaches have to be reconsidered in order to produce 
“transformation reform which equips itself with the spiritual, intellectual, and scientific means to 
act on the real, to master all fields of knowledge, and to anticipate the complexity of social, 
political, philosophical, and ethical challenges” (p. 3). 
There is not anything profoundly new about these propositions, and Ibn Ashur preceded 
Ramadan in this dialogue. However, contemporarily dealing with the second one, which 
necessitates changing the contents and geography of the sources of fiqh,is a task that requires 
Islamic scholars to refer to the “Universe, the social and human context” as a “source of Law” 
and not merely an object or fact of law to be considered (pp. 82-83). Because only then, 
Ramadan opines, will transcendental change come to fruition because Islamic scholars “cannot 
lead the way alone” (p. 4). Reminiscent of Al-Shatibi’s medieval proposal, there are associated 
dangers about this slippery slope towards perpetual and unrestrained rationalism, which is 
possibly the reason why this method never reached the status of consensus.  
But why Ramadan thinks this is necessary is his contention that the world changes so 
drastically now that the phenomenological innovations and applications through various sciences 
are far surpassing the abilities of Islamic scholarship in its ability to even react to the systems 
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and their growing epistemic knowledge. This argument is indubitably true and is substantiated in 
examining the lacking scholastic erudition displayed in current fatwas. Therefore, rather than 
remaining in a perpetual condition of reactionary philosophy, and slow at best responses, what is 
suggested is a dynamic leap to the next paradigm in consciousness – fundamentally changing the 
approaches to the way Muslims view knowledge in contemporary times.  
Ramadan’s rationale focuses on expanding the instruments available within the classical 
tradition utilized for understanding Islamic philosophical legal theory and praxis (usul al fiqh). 
Over the last few centuries, such relentless pursuit of rational truth seems to have diminished in 
the Muslim world and Ramadan complains that the dearth of sophisticated critiques is one of the 
“evils undermining Islamic thought” (p. 4). Such thought never leads to transcendent thinking. 
Hence, in order to achieve transcendence, the relationship between human knowledge and 
applied ethics cannot rely purely on Islamic textual sources. Scholars of modern sciences and 
sub-fields cannot only “shed light on scriptural sources” but must also “constitute a source of law 
on their own” (2008, p. 83).  
This has been proposed before in a similar manner. However, the most contentious aspect 
of his analysis is in his third proposition, that the authority of knowledge must be shifted, and 
that Islamic scholars should be placed on “equal and permanent footing” with (secular) 
technocrats of each field (p. 2). Ramadan argues that what is required in order to produce fatawa 
that are truly transformative, is that the scholars of the texts (nusus) and the scholars of the 
various branches of knowledge (khubara’) must come together in producing fatawa aimed at 
reaching the higher objectives (maqasid). On one hand, Ramadan says that his argument is 
“much clearer and more radical than simply calling for a punctual consultation of experts and 
specialists (khubara’) in the different fields of knowledge (pp. 4-5). On the other hand, as one 
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observer notes “he does not specify how such a [consultative] body is to be established, who 
would fund it, how it would function, or from where it would derive its authority. As a result, the 
idea remains vague” (Al-Mutawa, 2012, pp. 311-312). Thus, there is some functional ambiguity 
on how each community will integrate these knowledge exchange colloquiums. 
These far-reaching recommendations have drawn substantial criticism. Some secular 
academics have argued that the way this is proposed seems to have an unambiguous inclination 
towards natural law (March, 2010).147 It is also alleged that Ramadan seeks to “dissolve 
[Shariah] law and its frame of mind in favor of holistic ethics” (p. 266). Such accusations cannot 
be entirely ignored, but after a serious study of what is actually proposed in his text and 
numerous expansive presentations, one must conclude that this is not the case (Baum, 2009).148 
Despite all of the criticism and opposition, and some functional ambiguities that remain in the 
third proposition, Ramadan displays his cognizance of the issue being addressed herein. The fact 
that Ramadan has identified neoliberal capitalism precisely as a paradigm that contains within it 
“homogenizing” factors that have the propensity of manifesting in what he calls “murderous” 
manners, speaks to the lucidness of his analysis, and further refutes the idea that he is simply 
pandering to audiences yearning to hear populist rhetoric. However, he is still accused of such 
and much worse according to Bawer (2010), and Berman (2010).149 Nevertheless, the fact that 
his take on the maqasid methodology is robust in extending the dialogue to a sphere wider than 
                                                 
147 In Andrew March’s critique of Radical Reform, he appears either unwilling or unable to distinguish the 
difference between Ramadan’s usage of “applied ethics” and that of “law”.  
148 Baum argues that Ramadan’s methodology attempts to remain faithful to Islamic principles while at the same 
time attempting to integrate through ‘pillerization’ and finding honest spaces of negotiation within multi-cultural 
polities. 
149 The attacks come from various perspectives, take for instance this study that claims that Tariq Ramadan is trying 
to undermine the West and that his comments against capitalism undermine him as a potential bridge builder. Much 
of Bawer’s argument is incoherent. He accuses Ramadan of “habitual practice” of “taqiyya” the age-old art of 
religious dissimilation, a practice that – although practiced by certain Islamic sects – is not even allowed in 
Orthodox Islam. In addition, the attacks against Ramadan come from within the community as well. For instance, 
Paul Berman identifies Bassam Tibi as a bridge builder because he thinks Islam should be practiced privately 
whereas he condemns Ramadan’s support of finding a way to be faithful to the Shariah while still maintaining 
faithful citizenship to Western nations. 
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just a coterie of Islamic scholars in a way that addresses power makes it a very effective platform 
for discussing institutional power. 
 
3.1.9 Further Methodological Expansion 
 
Expanding principles and axioms can be very beneficial. However, essential caveats are 
needed are in primarily two areas: (a) the methodology behind determining beneficial knowledge 
in the sciences, and (b) how the relationships should be governed.150 If the higher objectives are 
not properly contextualized, what may result is the championing of a flawed and obfuscated 
system of knowledge. Nadwi (2012) has been vocal about warning of such potential 
deconstruction of the Shariah by way of promoting the maqasid as a source of law and rendering 
the Shariah to mere principles, easily taken apart and reconstructed in any neo-rationalistic 
desired manner.151 Therefore, in the first case, some necessary precautions should be taken when 
placing the ‘textual scholars’ and ‘contextual scholars’ on the same footing. This is because the 
issue of authority is so pivotal and because not all knowledge is value-free. Sometimes the 
                                                 
150 Putting scholars of any science on par with textual scholars on a permanent basis and on equal footing, however, 
is still tricky, because by extension, even with the noble intention of safeguarding it, this proposal opens the door to 
the possible further annihilation of the Shariah. Because what Ramadan proposes is to widen the scope of the 
classical higher objectives in Islam by identifying and universalizing certain Islamic principles, which those 
qualified can then reorganize rationally. On page 138 he reduces the maqasid to “respecting and protecting Life 
(hayah), Nature (khalq, tabiʿah), and Peace (salam)”. My trepidation is valid though and I elaborate further on the 
historical reasons for this in Chapter 5 where I discuss how Muslims reduced much of the Shariah to principles in 
the development of ‘Islamic’ banking. Under descending levels of importance the daruriyyat (the essential), the 
hajiyyat (the complementary) and the tahsiniyyat (the desirable or the embellishments), the five objectives 
(maqasid) of the maslahah are life, faith, intellect, lineage, and property. Other scholars have added honor as a sixth 
universal principle. 
151 At the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies Mohammad Akram Nadwi has written on the topic at 
nadwifoundation.co.uk about the dangers of manipulating the maqasid. He argues that Islamic finance is essentially 
a farce because moneylending is not Islamic and neither is creating money out of thin air as an arithmetic trick of 
accounting. This, Nadwi argues, is done in the name of breaking the Shariah down to principles and then applying 
them in any way desired in order to appease investors and banks.  
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intrinsic values within a given science are antithetical to human freedom, even though they may 
have become institutional norms in society.152  
Van Dijk argues that opinions and ideologies involve both beliefs and mental 
representations. Ideology plays a critical role in coaxing people toward action. It also succeeds in 
validating the psychological feelings that mobilize people towards action and provides the terrain 
on which people acquire perceptions. Van Dijk’s definition of ideology is interdisciplinary, as is 
this study’s inquiry. However, where it is underpinned by naturalism, this study differs. 
Regarding the normative stances taken in being critical of the abuses of power, we need to 
replace the relativism that underpins naturalism with ethics that refer back to a worldview that 
recognizes the divine in a context that places man in a dignified role in the universe, as a 
responsible custodian on earth (khalifa).153 
Therefore, we must take a cognitive perspective, one that does not look primarily at 
personal beliefs but at institutional beliefs that translate into the mobilization of people (in this 
case Muslim customers). It must be adroitly understood that power can infuse itself into every 
aspect of every field, from the religious and the profane, to the economic and the medical. Thus, 
regarding the second caveat, whenever professionals are consulted, whoever they may be, the 
shared goal must be the most ethical solution for society (maslahah), and not what is most 
                                                 
152 Take the study medicine for example. Eastern medicine, which has amalgamated millenniums worth of 
knowledge, places a greater emphasis on diagnosing problems and treating them from the ‘inside out’. Meaning in 
essence that concepts such as energy meridians, yin and yang balance, and the notion of qi (internal energy) are 
considerably incorporated in many treatments in Eastern medicine. In fact, the oldest chronological medicinal 
knowledge stems from the Ayurveda, which has been linked to several modern medical breakthroughs. 
153 In Genesis 1:28 New International Version (NIV) God blessed them and said to them, “Be fruitful and increase in 
number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky and over every living 
creature that moves on the ground.” The Islamic concept of khalifa draws some similarities to this concept of Radah 
in the OT in giving man a higher, dignified purpose.  
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profitable. Because, from the effects of ideology, this influence happens both knowingly and 
unknowingly.154  
 
Part 2: Contextual Considerations 
 
3.2.1 Contextualizing the Obstacles of an Islamic Alternative 
 
Before normative statements can be fully considered, that utilize Islamic ethics as a driver 
in identifying ethical spheres of exchange, several contextual considerations need to be presented 
and discussed for the challenges they present to paradigmatically ‘Islamic’ normative analyses. 
By examining a few of the characteristics of the episteme underpinning Western economic 
assumptions, this section first covers some of the obstacles associated with presenting an Islam-
oriented ethical solution to this already developed realm of discourse and thought. This pertains 
specifically to the role that greed and interest are allowed to play in underpinning economic 
thinking, as well as concepts like ‘progress’, and the issues created by treating economics as a 
separate amoral discipline disconnected from ethics, as it is in capitalism. 
 
3.2.2 Economic Discourse Develops into a ‘Scientific’ Discipline  
 
                                                 
154 Ramadan seems adroitly aware of this potentially misleading convergence of misrepresentation; his example is 
the converse in which he mentions the fuqaha rejecting massive bodies of work in psychoanalysis due to a 
reductionist understanding of Freud's work which leads them to ignore advances in cognitivism and behaviorism (p. 
117). Regarding the economy he mentions that some Muslim economists and fuqaha have carried out "thorough" 
work but that the fatawa being produced are still seriously lacking in transformative qualities and rigor, asking "after 
all, what is truly 'Islamic' in this economy - its tools, its methods, its norms, its goals?"   
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Adam Smith and others who adopted free market attitudes fundamentally agreed on 
specific values, which created the classical position established in Western economic thinking. 
For Smith and those who accepted the axiomatic premise that greed was the driving force of the 
market, an entirely separate positive discipline was substantiated (Smith, 1776).155 In the process, 
credit was conflated with wealth, and the notion of harm was understated as metaphysical 
questions were deferred (Keynes, 1930).156 The emergent practice, banking, propelled the 
already rich to become ostentatiously richer through a monopoly on credit creation, promoted as 
a ‘business’ (Beinhocker, 2007). Furthermore, this inkling staunchly opposed any interference, 
and such aptly defined market fundamentalism has come to outline the environment where the 
West’s version of economic justice is determined. This inequitable market, vacuous of morality, 
has become the accepted default apparatus for the regulation of human interactions.  
Furthermore, Smith, Hume and their ilk were philosophers who never reduced their 
assertions to mathematical expressions. However, those who followed them did by attempting to 
apply emerging theories of 19th century physics to the economy.157 There remained apparent 
paradoxes of ‘why’ people behave certain ways; for instance ‘why’ people willingly paid more 
for diamonds or gold than they would for water, even though water possesses more utility. And 
from these inductions emerged the late 19th century ‘Marginal Revolution’ led by Stanley 
                                                 
155 The oft-cited passage from The Wealth of Nations in 1776 (Book I. Ch. 2.) by Smith reads “[i]t is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities 
but of their advantages”. This encapsulates what has become the bedrock of consumer utility maximization models, 
producer profit maximization models and an indispensable assumption in positive neoclassical thought. 
156 Keynes traces this thought to Senior Mill Carnes’ methodology and premise, that it’s scientifically possible to 
distinguish between the alleged positive science of economics between preferred and real, or ‘what is’ and ‘what 
ought to be’ notions. That economic events can somewhat be isolated from other phenomena. That a posteriori 
induction is an unacceptable point for assumptions. That a priori deductive Darwinist ‘indispensable’ assumptions 
about human nature provide the best starting points; and that political science is a science of tendencies, not facts, 
because the economic subject studied is a hypothetical maximizer. 
157 Examples of this are James Maxwell’s electromagnetism or Joseph Schumpeter’s attempt to put 
entrepreneurialism at the forefront of economic models and ignore or downplay the effect of production relegating 
to the economy as being in perpetual dynamic change. 
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Jevons, Carl Menger and Leon Walrus who all desired to resolve the paradoxes surrounding the 
concepts of value and utility (Tag el-Din, 2013).158 French economist Leon Walras (d. 1910), for 
example, yearned with alacrity to reduce economical axioms into the most quantitative 
(mathematical) language as possible, so that economics could become a true ‘science’. The 
filtration of the elite ‘consensus’ on economic debates boiled down to accepting a cognitive 
frame that is distinctly Newtonian, Darwinist, positivistic, reductionist and materialistic, which 
likewise defined parameters of exchange in such terms (Nanay, 2010).159 Within a world 
described as such, everything material can be commoditized and hence bought and sold. This 
included, of course, money and credit itself (Glausser, 1990).160 However, the oversimplification 
of complex equations (borrowed from physics) had enormous effects, and “Walrus’s willingness 
to make trade-offs in realism for the sake of mathematical predictability would set a pattern 
followed by economists over the next century” (Beinhocker, 2007, p. 2)161 
 
                                                 
158 The theory of marginal utility was developed in response to this paradox and economics developed into a 
dangerous independent discipline that eschewed purely non metaphysical answers to the ‘what is’ questions rather 
than addressing the ‘what should be’ axioms in order to employ the postulate of self-interest and greed so that it 
could inform corrective policies (p. 57). Marginal utility is the gain from an increase or, in contrast, the loss from a 
decrease in the consumption of that good or service – the first unit of consumption of something yields more utility 
then the subsequent consumption. 
159 The British political philosopher, proponent of liberalism, and Bentham’s utilitarianism, John Stewart Mill wrote 
a text (Principles of Political Philosophy) (1848) that became the go-to standard text around this time at institutions 
like Oxford until Principles of Economics by Alfred Marshal (d. 1924) replaced it in 1919 and became the leading 
text taught for generations to economics students. By this time, usury was an afterthought and not a single chapter is 
dedicated to it. The obsession with defining the inquiry as to why has overshadowed the attempt to inquire into how, 
the German’s have called this the Adam Smith Problem. 
160 Equally long-standing was the commoditization of humans of non-Anglo heritage. It is amazing to read the calls 
of John Locke and others for reforms against tyrannies and pursuits of liberty all the while their practices and 
writings supported slavery of ethnic peoples and mutinies in the colonies. John Locke consistently invested in the 
slave trade while simultaneously arguing the minutiae of rights and liberties. Glausser somewhat elaborates on this 
hypocrisy. 
161 Walrus called this the equilibrium of cleared markets, which largely assumed that Smith’s ideas on equilibrium 
were correct. Thus, the assumptions made in the model were very simplifying and hence, led to some trade-offs 
between reality and predictability. Schumpeter disagreed and proposed that markets are never in equilibrium. 
Instead they were, according to Schumpeter, always in a dynamic state of change. Similarly, John Kenneth Galbraith 
famously said “the only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable…We must always 
remember that economists make forecasts not because they know but because they are asked to”. 
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3.2.3 Greed as a Prime Motivator 
 
Upon deeper introspection, there are unifying ideological themes to be found within the 
‘system’, which affect the discussion here. One of them is the role that greed plays in economic 
discourse and epistemology, which again, presents an issue to applying ethics informed by Islam. 
Proponents of the system allege it to be a complex ‘design without a designer’ that naturally 
finds its equilibrium, even as it enables a select few to conglomerate wealth and power. 
These reductionist assumptions are built on several suppositions, one being that 
individual greed is the “moral equivalent of the force of gravity in nature”; and this arrangement 
stands as the genesis of money creation and market participation (Meyers, 1983, p. 4). Clearly 
then, economics is not actually ‘value-free’ because of the epistemological dependence on a 
scientific worldview that is a belief system which implies deep suppositions about the nature of 
reality and the human relationship to it.  
 
3.2.4 The Incommensurable Relationship between Progress and Ethics 
 
Looking at this pecuniary scenario from a wider lens, we can place the subject of 
exchange into greater context by observing that the Western philosophical tradition has 
principally embraced progress, the notion that mankind has become morally refined as 
technology and empirical sciences have advanced, even though this notion is just “an act of 
faith” (Bury, 2011, p. 2). Many assume that since capitalism has become the governing 
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paradigm, it must be a result of such progress, a logical fallacy.162 Another misnomer is the 
understanding that capitalism is purely an economic and political system of commerce built on 
private ownership, as its proponents claim (Weintraub, 2013).163 Yet it is much more than that. It 
is an over-arching ideology, a Weltanschauung, which comes along with policies that create and 
extinguish privileges, making it political because it affects how people are governed. 
Undoubtedly, the distribution of power is linked to human freedom; and so political elements 
remain associated in the deciding of whose interests are best served in various economic 
arrangements. 
The political economist Karl Polanyi (d.1964) contended in The Great Transformation 
(1957) that ‘modernity’ only emerged when this inexorable combination of ‘modern’ Western 
nation-states and ‘modern’ markets yielded the ‘Market Society’ where the market became 
paramount.164 However, as Gray (2004) asserts, making decisions on things like politics, ethics 
or economics falls prey to confirmation bias, rather than creating a forced reassessment of 
values, “Ethics and politics do not advance in line with the growth of knowledge—not even in 
the long run” (p. 1).165 
                                                 
162 The false premise of accepting progress has led to many researchers to a skewed and myopic understanding of 
economic history; progress is indeed still a philosophical assertion, one 19th century historian J.B. Bury challenged 
for its validity. 
163 Neoclassical economics rests on three assumptions: 1. That people have rational preferences, which lead to an 
establishment of value; 2. That people act independently on the basis of accurate information and full disclosure; 3. 
That all people maximize utility, and that all corporations maximize profits. 
164 Polanyi further argued that people only started behaving rationally in ‘modern’ times because of the “Market 
Society” and that this truly culminated into manifestation during 18th century England. 
165 He writes, “The core of the belief in progress is that human values and goals converge in parallel with our 
increasing knowledge. The 20th century shows the contrary. Human beings use the power of scientific knowledge to 
assert and defend the values and goals they already have. New technologies can be used to alleviate suffering and 
enhance freedom. They can—and will—also be used to wage war and strengthen tyranny. Science made possible the 
technologies that powered the industrial revolution. In the 20th century, these technologies were used to implement 
state terror and genocide on an unprecedented scale. Ethics and politics do not advance in line with the growth of 
knowledge—not even in the long run”. Gray questions whether human nature exists. He claims that there is 
unanimity between the unlikeliest groups on the matter such as Marxists, feminists and liberals who would 
otherwise disagree on fundamentals. He further asserts that humans are just another type of animal with no soul and 
no greater purpose. 
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Thus, contrary to what was previously forecasted by disciples of progress, Beinhocker 
(2007) points out, “The field of economics [today] is going through its most profound change in 
more than a hundred years” in reference to the growing acceptance that economics has erred in 
trying to use a few simple equations to model the economy as an equilibrium decision. In reality, 
the phenomena related to economic markets and wealth creation are complex systems that 
economic formulas cannot provide comprehensive understandings of (p. 2).166 Nevertheless, 
even this buoyant analysis seems not to appreciate that even the computer simulation he 
advocates cannot and will not recreate morality; exchange will always be a human interaction, 
and thus, it is not a pure science, but an issue of ethics, which should be a matter of moral policy. 
Although the recent debate has cast the relationship between religion and ethics in a negative 
light, there is some academic recognition that religious belief can provide moral vision and 
motivation (Sia, 2008).  
 
Part 3: The Idiosyncratic Nature of Knowledge and Discourse in the Western Episteme 
 
3.3.1 Limiting the Scope of Examining Idiosyncrasy 
 
This section focuses on the ways epistemic knowledge forces the discourses of 
interlocutors and ostensibly unbiased researchers to accept designated truths – in this case – the 
normative parameters of discourse that implicitly have negative ramifications on drawing 
conclusions in support of ethics-based conclusions (Islamic or otherwise). That is, it is necessary 
                                                 
166 Beinhocker proposes that computers (programed with agent-based social simulation programs and evolutionary 
theory) are more qualified to do the analysis than humans are. Beinhocker contends that the economic system is an 
advanced biological development analogous to wealth creation, both he argues, are simply functions and products of 
evolution. The background for this are simulation programs like Sugarscape, which seek to simulate human 
behavior in an evolutionary model. 
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to identify how the mainstream and academic discourses are tacitly cultivated by a culture of 
post-Christian secularity that has a history of anti-Islamic influences on discourse, and how these 
areas may potentially affect the conclusions reached herein. The following sections consider the 
nature and development of several distinctly liberal, Western and secular idiosyncrasies in 
regards to literature, which is at the center of discourse (text and talk) in most civilizations. It 
does so in order to analyze how ideology affects social structures. Therefore, it additionally 
considers some of the peculiar characteristics and ideologies the epistemology of the 
aforementioned culture has retained in modernity that have reached a status beyond 
reconsideration. 
 
3.3.2 Western Civilization as Sacred Myth  
 
Western civilization is, in the academic sense, a sacred myth; “Myths are prose narratives 
which, in the society in which they are told, are considered to be truthful accounts of what 
happened in the remote past. They are accepted on faith; they are taught to be believed….Myths 
are the embodiment of dogma, they are usually sacred…” (Bascom, 1984, p. 9). The sacred myth 
of Western civilization is no different. It is presented as a construct with tacitly dogmatic and 
distinct characteristics, and fathomably so because various experiences of despotic, sectarian, 
and partisan rule long-ravaged Europe in its history, a continent that remained embroiled in 
disputes for centuries. In reaction, a certain counter movement of unanimity emerged which 
sought to replace the role of Christianity as the source of Western values. Hobbes, Locke and 
others are renowned for their contributions towards constructing principles meant to replace 
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Christianity while still being accepted universally. Thus, certain identifiable ideological stances 
were adopted in its discourse as a result. 
The Hegelian vision of humankind, disputably Cabbalistic, sees the progress of Western 
civilization as a continuum that begins in Greece and evolves until people reach the 
Enlightenment realization that man, in fact, is the deity it has been searching to deify all along. 
Rather, that “Man, finite spirit, is to be seen as a finite ‘moment’ of the infinite divine spirit who 
is God” (Lauer, 1982, p. 141). It is for that reason that Hegel’s, and subsequently the West’s 
admiration for Ancient Greece is elevated, as Greece was ostensibly the first civilization to reject 
religious dogma and pursue reason – in other words – Greek thought is in this sense considered 
genius because of its advancement of materialism (Taylor, 2015).167 Thus, terms like ‘liberty’ 
and ‘freedom’ are laden with an entire circumstantial context, not easily summarized, but made 
essentially as expressions of freedom against religion, and hence, the divine. Upon closer 
inspection, of course, there are cracks in this sacred narrative; for example, newer information 
points out that Iona, the birthplace of ‘Greek’ philosophy, was under Persian occupation and 
intellectual influence during the birth of philosophy in the Greek language (Cumont & Marie, 
1922).168 Yet so much is built on fundamental assumptions that some may be beyond reproach, 
                                                 
167 Where Islamic ethics faces potential obstacles from the governing paradigm is here. For example, Taylor, in 
Chapter VII “The Road to Manifest Religion” writes “the gods are seen as subject to a blind fat, just as men are; 
whereas later in Christian theology, this will be seen as divine providence….The reconciliation of Greek civilization 
is thus doomed to be rent asunder: and yet it has a special beauty and fascination for Hegel. For unlike the higher 
solution which will succeed it, it is not dependent on fully explicit rational thought. The universal norms of reason 
can only be brought to fruition is men’s lives by the hard conquest of rational consciousness….The universal Geist 
on the other hand is exalted in the Jewish religion. And here too it demands a reconciliation with subjectivity, which 
comes in the Incarnation…..But the only external reality which it can accept is one which reflects the universal 
spirit…This it finds in the incarnation”. 
168 Although this area of probing has not become fully mainstream within academia, there are several leading 
scholars in the area of Greek and Babylonian thought that have argued that it was not orthodox Zoroastrian thought 
that affected Greek thinking, but rather, it was a heterodox or heretical version of Zoroastrianism, or Zurvanism, that 
transferred the first elements of what is called ‘Greek philosophy’ from the Babylonian Magi to Ionia. Franz 
Cumont’s work on Hellenism has been carried on by Walter Burkert and M.L. West. 
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hence, it may be as George Orwell wrote, “He who controls the past controls the future…He who 
controls the present controls the past” (Orwell, 1977, p. 35).  
This context is pertinent to the discussion under examination, of what constitutes right or 
wrong action. If religion is to be rejected, and humans are given the divine authority to legislate 
all morality, then obviously, not all will agree on right and wrong. The corresponding thought of 
Nietzsche also displays an acknowledgment that by proclaiming God as ‘dead’ and replacing the 
Divine Legislator with the whims of men (Übermensch), (even as man progressed to become 
superhuman by mastering the sciences and etcetera) that a genuine possibility of descending into 
nihilism was likely without the construction of an alternate narrative (Nietzche, 1883).169  
Such a narrative has been presented to the world under the banners of human rights, 
secular humanism and liberal democracy, which, for the West, began underpinning philosophical 
ethics after religion was thought superfluous. The problem with this in a global context is that the 
rest of the entire world with its cultural and religious intricacies cannot always fit into this 
Western post-Enlightenment vision of the world without being forced to rescind certain 
fundamental and precious aspects of identity. So the general question at hand is what is morality? 
If it is just a set of manufactured principles, and there is no divine order to the universe then what 
is the point of it? And why should an idiosyncratic Euro-centric discourse dictate it for others?  
One of many palpable answers is that morality is a primordial, cultural universal inspired 
by the divine, evidenced by the fact that every single language has words to express ‘good’ as 
                                                 
169 Most Nietzsche scholars shy away from interpreting this concept in categorical ways, and claim that this is one of 
his least comprehensive writings. Nevertheless, certain interpretations of Nietzche’s key concepts of the ‘Superman’ 
or ‘Overman’ discussed in Thus Spake Zarathurstra (1883) have been disastrous in their 20th century application: 
one example is the Nazi substantiation of a super Arian race and an entire eugenics program intended for breeding 
‘super’ people instead of ‘inferior’ people. Nietzsche did recognize that people would do terrible things in his name, 
but did not seem to care. Of course this continuum of esoteric thought was discussed by others before Nietzche such 
as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in his Faust as ‘Beyond-man’; also it was discussed by Ralph Waldo Emerson, in 
fact, this discussion can be traced all the way back to the concept of hyperanthropos as discussed by the Greek 
Lucian of Samosota (d. 180 CE). 
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something desirable, and ‘bad’ as something undesirable. Therefore, as we unfortunately label 
these cultures as ‘primitive’ it seems that this is in fact an oversight, and that all cultures have 
conceptualized the sacred, the divine, and a cosmology that derives morals and ethics from other 
than human whims. Brown (1991) has mentioned it as some version of the Golden Rule (do unto 
others...) in perennial contrast with materialistic nihilism. In this sense, Western civilization 
would be the outlier, as it has uniquely made a significant departure away from traditional 
understandings of universals. 
 
3.3.3 Consequences of Nihilism 
 
Once the divine is discarded with, there are consequences. Nihilism, denying any moral 
order, allows the rationalization that some people are inherently unequal, that some are inferior 
and that there is no moral obligation to assist them. How then does this pertain to business or 
human interaction? If business is profitable, some ask, ‘why should I not maximize my profits at 
any cost?’ Unfortunately, we have witnessed that human rights cannot deter such nihilism. This 
amoral stance is intriguing because it tolerates the commodification of every single materially 
quantifiable aspect in existence. Everything is for sale in the modern age including both ‘good’ 
things and ‘bad’ things. Humans are commodities. Sex, child labor, contraband, narcotics and 
every sort of vice imaginable all have a ‘price’ whether it is registered in the ‘legitimate’ market 
and thus legally sanctioned, or whether it is in the black underground antipodal.  
 




We must also take a look at how today’s paradigm has an effect on the way Islam as a 
civilization and religion informing ethical worldviews is, in turn, viewed by the West. And, how 
this relates to the way that Western thought has classified knowledge, specifically in the way it 
has classified and projected its epistemology as ‘global’ or ‘universal’ truth. When the concept of 
globalization started to gain traction, making its way into human consciousness by appearing in 
writings during the late 18th century, many of its associated hitches were still unforeseen. In 
response, the emergent concept of a global ethic has been tossed around recently (Religions, 
1993).170 However, if we are to look back and put this expansive type of proposition into context, 
we must look to fields like the study of history, philosophy or literature, a diverse and rich proof 
of the highest levels of eloquence human civilizations have to offer. 
 
3.3.5 Western Literature and Global Literature 
 
We see the idea of a global literature first being discussed shortly after Johan Gottfried 
Herder (d.1803) proposed a “World Culture” in his Ideen zur Geschichte der Menscheit (Ideas 
for the History of Mankind), that the creation of world history is not as much political as it is an 
ideological construct built by people (Botz-Bornstein, 2006, p. 15). This postulation was directed 
towards history and philosophy, but we can also understand that these questions arose within an 
emerging capitalist construct, which would soon encompass every human sphere. 
We see for instance, only forty years after Herder’s utterance of the notion, the German 
polymath Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832), known for aesthetic criticism among many 
                                                 
170 People like Australian philosopher Peter Singer and others have tried to articulate morality without religion. The 
Parliament of the World’s Religions created The Declaration Towards a Global Ethic in Chicago, Illinois on 
September 4, 1993. It recognizes that the planet is being destroyed societally and ecologically through global 
politics and the global economy. 
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other talents, injecting the word Weltliteratur into his writings pertaining to the international 
reception of Western literary works. He did include international works into that scope, but they 
remained embedded within a Eurocentric outlook of value judgments being applied towards 
‘exotic’ manuscripts (Spivak, 2003).171 The rest of the world’s literature was eventually 
incorporated under one large umbrella, but the value judgments used to decide the inclusiveness 
were always value-laden.172 Goethe’s classification of “World Literature” as not being bound by 
geography or class is admirable. Yet his view oscillates between traditional elitism and 
relativism as he was confounded by the task of structuring the entire world’s literature after 
making the decision to divide its contents into aesthetic and ethical truths (Botz-Bornstein, 
2006). 
Goethe’s suggestion displays the type of partiality we are trying to identify in this grand 
examination of bias and ideology projected in discourse, which links back to meta-ethics. He 
suggests as a temporary set of abstract guidelines for judging and measuring value, that Greek 
beauty should be used as an aesthetic exemplar of beauty by which one may evaluate the 
literatures of other cultures, like ancient China and Egypt (Botz-Bornstein, 2006). Thus, although 
Goethe is able to somewhat remove the subjectivity of value in world literature by claiming that 
everyone has the ability to produce it, he “did not really know what to think of this ‘space’ in 
which the new exotic could be discovered on a daily basis” (p. 16). Furthermore, the problem 
was that Goethe, as others, could not fuse together an entire corpus of human knowledge without 
first taking a stance on where the epistemology was to begin.  
                                                 
171 Marx and Engels would borrow the term in their overgeneralization of the arts and project it as the bourgeoisie’s 
intellectual production resulting from human desires beyond the material. This was called the “cosmopolitan 
character” in Marx’s Communist Manifesto (1848). 
172 The delimitations of what comprises “World Literature” is still debated; Gavatri argues that translation debases 
the richness of textual messages, whereas authors like Franco Moretti claim that a distant reading of observing 
patterns in foreign works serves as the best method for preserving their richness as works are translated. Westerners 
hoping to extract meaning on a point-by-point basis cannot capture it, in this sense. 
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Global philosophy has suffered the same fate of being a futile pursuit of fusing 
antagonistic values into one mélange. Russian Pan-Slavism took this up in stride, as has Pan-
African and Pan-Asian studies. However, we can see that in all areas of thought that a dominant 
role must be played in steering the discourse. In psychology for instance, the school of 
‘universalist scientific’ positions claim that cultural differences are simply conventions that will 
pass away with the rise of scientific knowledge (Botz-Bornstein, 2006). All of these shifts are 
dynamically headed towards supporting a global infrastructure of thought as it is codified and 
represented by ‘liberal democracy in general’ as the world’s foremost philosophical principle. 
Yet all of this is under the guise of a system that defends certain human rights while allowing 
certain carnages, one of which is the decimation of the planet’s resources and human societies as 
compound interest ravages through long-standing social institutions, benefiting only a very small 
number of people.  
Therefore, certainly an extreme paradigm shift is necessary when discussing what Islam 
has to offer towards a global ethic on how human beings should exchange items, create and 
manage money, and conduct business affairs. Because proposing that the role of interest should 
be reevaluated in any future system, or that money should at least be neutral, rather than interest 
bearing, is considered very radical when being evaluated within a system that values interest as 
the central tool for managing credit. Compound interest is one of the few consecrated concepts to 
have safely escaped the wrath of poststructuralist and deconstructionist critiques, belying the 
prerogative of postmodernism, which ostensibly privileges no such dogma to remain sanctified 
and unquestioned. 
 




Developing an Islamic applied ethic to deal with an interest-driven economy is not a 
simple task. For one reason, the lexicon associated with hegemonic power that is initiated in the 
Western world of dominant discourse has impeded the West from viewing Islam in morally 
relevant ways. This phenomenon has lingered since the Middle Ages because of Islam’s seeming 
inability to compete with the West’s recent temporal achievements (Southern, 1978). The way in 
which “the West narrates itself in relation to Islam and Muslims is not only a window into its 
collective psyche, but also consequential for its own moral growth” (Barlas, 2012, p. 1).  
According to anthropologist Alan McFarlane (2012), there are essentially four domains 
of human pursuit: economic, political, social and ideological.173 This enumeration is quite 
materialistic, but still, what McFarlane points out, and this is also the case with Islam, is that 
these four areas have historically only been partially separated. True, the conception of 
separating ideology and state is commonplace today, and hence not accepting it is to some 
staunch defenders ‘indefensible’ simply because Western values have been conflated with 
‘universalness’.  In fact, the West succumbs to the paradox of tolerance in this area, the notion 
that ‘tolerant’ peoples might be antagonistic to what they view as ‘intolerant’ peoples or religions 
(Popper, 1945).174 
We also must consider the three “travelling tropes” that have defined the relationship 
between Islam and the West for over a millennium, and how they may skew Western bias in 
                                                 
173 There is the drive towards material sufficiency, getting physical needs met through exchange mechanisms in 
what we now call ‘the economy.’ The second area where humans strive is in the realm of power, seeking to 
dominate each other through both physical and symbolic violence - we call this ‘politics.’ The third area where 
humans strive is in the realm of social relations, the relationships that people make through kinship and reproduction 
- this is called ‘the social sphere.’ And the fourth and final drive is the pursuit of knowledge and understanding 
through belief systems, religions and ethics - the realm of ‘ideology’. 
174 Austrian-British philosopher Karl Popper’s assertion is that the West is warranted in not tolerating “intolerance”. 
John Rawls on the other hand, disagrees with this notion, seeing the logical flaw in the argument by presenting his 
own similarly flawed analysis that the West should accept “intolerant” people out of fear of being labeled unjust. 
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accepting what an Islamic applied ethics has to offer in today’s discussion about global business 
ethics (Barlas, 2012, p. 1). The 20th century medievalist R.W. Southern developed a thesis in 
Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages (1978) that divided the West’s views towards Islam 
into three eras. First, according to medieval Christianity, Islam was the farthest-reaching 
problem. In modernity, remnants of this ideology have been retained from the secular West’s 
inheritance from Christian European civilization. This trope is not an uninterrupted continuum of 
loathing, but it remains despite epochal shifts in consciousness, and harbors in the Western 
psyche. The second concept is the depiction of Islam as an antichrist, which lingers in Western 
secular society by painting Islam and the West as antithetical. Thus, the retained Christian 
description of Muslims as infidels and barbarians now translates into a secular depiction of 
Muslims as the ‘new barbarians’ instead of the enemies of the faith (Bisaha, 2004). In fact, in the 
West egregious depictions of the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص historically precede the emergence of 
free speech. This fact is probably not given its due consideration. The last point is that the 
practice of burning the Quran and banning its reading has a long tradition in the West, and thus 
revived attempts at replicating this behavior as public relations stunts today have some 
connection to the long-held tropes on the ‘Islam versus the West’ antithesis.  
Thus, in summation of these points, the following needs to be very much recognized, 
considered and put into perspective. Capitalism is the eccentric economic child that was born 
from an entire evolution of European thought (of a certain bent), which became secular 
hegemony after a process including, but not limited to, the Enlightenment, ideological wars, 
imperialism and colonialism, all of which culminated into the Western rise to dominance after 
the industrial revolution. Furthermore, ethics must be approached with the understanding of 
existing biases and nuances because “Occidentalism created the epistemic privilege and the 
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hegemonic identity politics of the West from which to judge and produce knowledge about the 
Others” (Grosfoguel, 2012, p. 18). In addition, when the social sciences were formed, these 
assumptions were wrapped up together with the ego politics expressed and encapsulated by 
Descartes proclaiming “I think therefore I am” (ego cogito); however, Enrique Dussel (2012) 
reminds us that the aforementioned era was preceded by, and therefore connected to, centuries of 
“I conquer therefore I am” (ego conquirius) (p. 9). 
Entire academic careers have been built on erroneous revisionism that is easily dismissed 
with the discovery of one or two 7th century manuscripts. Unfortunately, these pseudointellectual 
ideas permeate within the highest echelons of authoritative discussions on Islam as they circulate 
under the guise of ‘academic’ studies undertaken by seasoned antagonists towards the faith. For 
instance, in God’s Rule Crone (2004) erroneously alleges that if Muslims are to remain faithful 
to Islam, that they are under a ‘religious obligation’ to subdue the “infidels” wherever they 
live.175 The implications of such affronts are tragic (Wessely, 2012).176 
 
3.3.7 Remnants of Orientalism: Considerations and Suitable Disciplines 
 
Scrutinizing conceptions of the human requires analysis of the human role within 
modernity’s essential constituents like capitalism, democracy and secularism. This can be done 
                                                 
175 The circles of modern Orientalists are also known for promoting the refuted theory of Hagarism which alleges 
the erroneous claim that the Qur’an was not revealed during the time of the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, but that it was 
written and compiled by a collection of other figures in a later period and later attributed to the Prophetic era. The 
entire corpus of work in this field is now essentially refuted as 7th century Qurans continue to be discovered. 
176 Similarly, Crone’s contention is that Muslims can only live within a non-Muslim majority polity by relaxing their 
loyalty and faithfulness to their religion. The implications of such affronts and allegations are tragic because we can 
witness the rise of ultra-right groups and the culmination of violent events stemming from some of these thoughts 
and movements. For instance, the English Defence League which has sewn enmity between groups in the UK, has 
also influenced similar groups such as the Norwegian Defence League of which Anders Brevik attributes his killing 




best through the lens of the human sciences. One relevant field, anthropology, the study of 
humans, is contemporarily divided into four rudimentary categories: social, linguistic, physical 
and archeological. We can essentially find that Islamic law, like most religious legal systems, is 
steeped in social, cultural and linguistic anthropology. Islamic philosophers like Nasr have long 
placed prescriptive caveats on accepting the mainstream interpretations of archaeological and 
paleontological data (Nasr, 1968).177 For theists, this aspect of the field is the most contentious 
because of its unabashedly tacit authentication of an essential macro-evolutionary version of the 
human being and its analogous place in the universe as an evolved soulless animal temporarily 
on top of a hierarchy of animals, which has no purpose, form or finality (Laats, 2010).178 
However, other central tenets to the field are also imbued with the thought process that the 
pioneers of the field charted as they applied their theories to the study of human cultures. This 
was done under the premise that all species evolve from earlier forms of natural selection, but 
since some cultures became more advanced than others, that we must now attribute such fruition 
to the their shedding of mystical and superstitious beliefs in the supernatural. Within this 
purview, all religion is scoffed at as primitive ideation. 
This positivistic concept of the ‘primitive’ versus ‘civilized’ peoples was present in the 
discourse of the pioneers of anthropology as it developed. We can see it for instance in English 
Alfred Radcliff-Brown’s (d. 1955) work on structural functionalism, and in the Polish Bronislaw 
                                                 
177 The Islamic perspective of evolution and creation accepts scientific data, but it does not accept the proposed 
theory that the first cell, and hence, the universe brought itself into existence. In line with Darwin’s question “Why, 
if species have descended by insensibly fine gradations, do we not everywhere see innumerable transitional forms? 
Why is not all nature in confusion instead of species being, as we see them, well defined?” (Ch. 6) Muslim 
scholarship answers the same way that evolutionist scholars do: the answer is that we simply do not know. Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr argued for decades, from as early as the 1960s, that by Muslims accepting the paleontological data that 
is presented as evidence for macro evolution they are rendered no longer ‘serious Muslims’ because it, in his view, 
is not so much scientific proof, but rather is pure ideology. 
178 Islam does not deny the possibility of much of what is called evolutionary theory. Professor Adam Laats uses 
cultural anthropology to follow the 20th century discourse between fundamentalism, creationism and evolutionary 
theory, and how they have influenced education.  
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Malinowski’s (d. 1945) work on the superstitions of ‘primitive’ peoples. Such works, although 
heralded, remained steeped in certain conceptions about the ‘Other’, developed by Orientalists. 
In another example, there is Edward Burnet Tylor’s (d. 1917) proposition, in tune with the 
Hegelian theory that animism evolved into polytheism, which then evolved into monotheism, 
which then itself served as a jaundiced interlocutor of such monotheistic cultures. Burnett’s 
theory asserted that science was the next sequential step to be taken after monotheism by which 
all such superstition and imitative magic could be summarily dismissed as ‘nonsense’ by the 
‘enlightened’ and ‘evolved’ cultures (Tylor, 1871).179  
 
3.3.8 Cultural Baggage of ‘The Secular’ 
 
In recognition that anthropology developed out of a milieu of imperialism, there have 
been earnest contemporary attempts at offering an Islamic perspective on the field for purposes 
of presentational fairness, for instance, Davies (1988) and Ahmed (1986). Nevertheless, amidst 
the tendentious universality of secular (Eurocentric) hegemony, it is difficult to devise and define 
what an Islamic anthropology or an Islamic ‘ethic’ truly would be in the ‘Western’ sense. It is 
partly because at the heart of the Western episteme, the minds working with the concepts of the 
ideals of secularism and modernity have largely failed to redress some of the implicit aspects of 
secularism and modernity that contain within them immutable cultural baggage, like 
conceptualizing religion and non-Western societies as ‘primitive’ (Tapper, 1995).180  
                                                 
179 Tylor’s two-set volume on Primitive Culture consists of Volume 1 The Origins of Culture and Volume 2. 
Religion in Primitive Culture. On page 410, this evolution of religion is discussed. 
180 A representation of this is skewed outlook is best exemplified in a paper by Tapper in which he admits that 
European ethnography failed to incorporate diversity, and hence, ended up with the pejorative label ‘primitive’ for 
societies the West could not properly engage with or understand. Then he ironically argues in a revealing manner 
that Muslims “cannot start with despising other ways. There is no room for otherness, nor for the relativist or 
rationalist extremes, but it [an Islamic anthropology] calls for the distinct synthesis between them” (p. 191). 
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In discussing ethics and ideology, this cultural blind spot in the West should be noted. 
According to Talal Asad, an anthropologist responsible for devising the most in-depth research 
available about the construction of the West as an episteme, the ignorance of these value-laden 
aspects of secularism and modernity have hindered any progress of the West fully understanding 
the Other. Although Asad falls short of constructing what we can call an entire anthropology of 
the secular, he nevertheless does outline in Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity the ways in which the secular is itself an episteme. He also describes the way that 
secularism is used as a political tool which allows the presentation of the “strangeness of the 
non-European world” and its ‘non-rational’ dimensions of social life, including religion (2003, p. 
22). One elucidation of this proposition is that the notion that the secular can assume any neutral 
epistemological ground needs to be discarded with (Smith, 2003). 
Asad’s Formations of the Secular (2003) questions the secular’s self-evident character, 
epistemic categorization, dogmatic, and doctrinal aspects, all while remaining cognizant that the 
discussion’s over-arching effects have historically inhibited a critical self-reflection of 
secularism as a “political doctrine” (Smith, 2003, p. 2). Asad’s attempt in avoiding similar bias is 
ubiquitous and he evades pronouncing explicit value judgments. Instead, he asserts as his main 
premise that “the secular” as a system is a formation of a variety of value-laden concepts, 
practices and “sensibilities” that have amalgamated over time in relationship with Enlightenment 
thinking (p.16). The foundational setting was entirely “in modern Euro-America” and therefore 
“it is easy to think of it simply as requiring the separation of religious from secular institutions in 
government, but that is not all it is” (p. 2). Because to understand ‘it’ one must understand what 
its goal was, to find an “overlapping consensus” (to use John Rawls’s term) from ideas, sort of 
‘Christian’, but omitting any beliefs that could possibly lead to sectarian divergence (Rawls, 
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1999).181 So this search for what Graham Ward has called the “true religion”, a lowest common 
denominator of acceptable propositions for the public realm, led to inherently under-defining 
characteristics of ‘the person’, omitted from secular life out of fear of sectarian reprisal (Graham, 
2008).182 This amalgamation cannot be viewed as some rational successor to Christian religious 
belief, but rather, ‘the secular’ is morally connected to fundamental assumptions “backing human 
rights, democracy and modernity” as they are conceptually presented as universal premises today 
(Sabet, 2003, pp. 112-114).  
With the modern secular separation of religion from politics comes the proposition of 
new conceptions of religion itself, as well as new conceptions of ethics and what defines ethical 
behavior. Studying these relationships requires challenging the way that religion has been 
academically approached in modernity (Asad, 1983).183 Yet, Asad (2003) argues, that as far-
removed as they may seem from religious practices, secular political practices still maintain a 
dichotomous relational dependence on religion and recreating religious acts. In the Western 
tradition, this terrain is evidenced by remnants of the “sacred myth” of redemption that have 
been retained in the ways nations behave (2003, p. 25). Because to be quite candid, the usurer 
too seeks redemption, for he wants not to appear as a criminal. As the modern nation-state is the 
alacritous preserver of the usurious system of unrestrained rent seeking by granting it salvation 
                                                 
181 The political philosopher John Rawls developed this idea. He boils the argument down to the common underlying 
principles, arguably a humanist pursuit of futility because there is no such thing as a universal – which is 
increasingly becoming a consensus position. 
182 Ward discusses the past, present and future conceptions of religion where he offers up the notion that religion is 
not really making a comeback because it “never went anywhere” to begin with. True, people are reinventing certain 
religious practices and forging new alliances between the modern secular state and their belief systems, but this is 
not really anything new if the secular realm is seen as a religion, of sorts, itself.  
183 Asad criticized Geerts’s proposed dichotomy and lack of depth utilized in defining religion in universal terms 
whereby the “cultural system” and “social reality” are far apart from fitting into the proposed system of study. Asad 
has also challenged long-standing theories pioneered by Clifford Geerts, (d. 2006), the renowned American 
anthropologist of the 20th century, who through works like The Interpretation of Cultures (1973) advocated that the 
study of religions be conducted through a semiotic lens of interpretation. 
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through legal means, this system forms the foundation of a sacred pyramid and an episteme in 
support of it (hierarchy of beliefs).  
One regrettable negative externality that results from this program of secularism is the 
legislated retention of an alarmingly subjective view of human suffering (Scott & Hirschkind, 
2006).184 It is through a new legal and ethical structure of human rights that ‘the secular’ seeks to 
“redeem the autonomous human subject” (Sabet, 2003, p. 113). However, within this construct 
Asad inadvertently points out a fundamental flaw, “Nothing essential to a person’s human 
essence is violated if he or she suffers as a consequence of military action or of market 
manipulation from beyond his own state when that is permitted by international law” (2003, 
p.129). This is profound, to consider, that the law serves as the only ethical boundary of what is 
permissible, and since the universal commitment to the legal preservation of the banking system 
is already a foregone conclusion, human suffering directly caused by its effects is summarily 
snubbed. This is an obvious ideological weakness in the present framework regarding the 
discussion of social justice. 
Consequently, despite statistical evidence that a monopoly exists in finance, what persists 
is still regarded as legal, and therefore the law thwarts human intervention. Calling the banking 
system one is not hyperbole when a monopoly comprised of 49 banks directly controls most of 
the world’s money (Vitali, et al., 2011). Where the secular cannot proclaim the injustice of such 
a cartel’s actions due to its limitations and legalities, religion can. Ethical arguments informed by 
                                                 
184 The authors chime in that this notion is not only related to the redemption of Christ, but it extends to the ways 
nations galvanize support for “liberal internationalism to Christian crusade and Islamic jihad”. The fundamental 
difference between the two approaches though is the issue of “grace” or God’s divine redemption of the human, 
whereas in the secular formation of society the lack thereof is celebrated as “the human redeemer, as an inhabitant of 
this world, [who] must first redeem himself” (p. 63). Concomitantly the two dependent constructs thrive off each 
other and center on the conceptions of agency and pain, which is central to secularism’s purported objectives 
including the aim of eliminating human suffering. 
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religion contend that interest is a wealth transfer from the poor to rich.185 This is not only a 
conviction, but also a belief backed by modern studies. Yet, interest is still defended 
ideologically. Not the outcome just described of course, but the legality of the arrangement. To 
conclude, Asad appropriately identifies this subjective promotion of inequality:  
 
The difficulty with secularism as a doctrine of war and peace in the world is not that it is 
European but that it is closely connected with the rise of a system of capitalist nation-
states – mutually suspicious and grossly unequal in power and prosperity, each 
possessing a collective personality that is differently mediated and therefore differently 
















                                                 
185 The prohibition of usury is instituted in Orthodox Islam, Judaism and Christianity. In addition it is written about 
in the Hindu Sutra (700-100 BCE) and the Buddhist Jatakas (600-400 BCE). 
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CHAPTER 4: EXPANDING MARKET AXIOMS AND FRAMING JUSTICE  
 
“Every people (ummah) has a test to undergo; my ummah will be tried through the wealth” – The 
Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص (Al-Tirmidhi, 1986, p. 2324).  
 
4.0.1 Introduction to Islamic Justice 
 
Islam has a distinct epistemology regarding the purpose of life, which is not pleasure 
maximization, or accumulation of the material, but a centering on service to God by increasing in 
taqwa (a rational fear and consciousness of God), a paradigm distinct from ‘the secular’. 
Throughout history, Islamic scholars have recognized that spheres of exchange are vulnerable to 
allowing the production of unjust distribution in society’s markets; thus, protectionist regulation 
has served as an invaluable instrument. However, the methods for constructing such legislation 
have differed widely because Islam does not have a unified theory on justice, nor does it have 
one on money. Jurists were historically not interested in theories as much as they were in 
practical solutions. Such understanding underpins the Islamic discourse on exchange, which 
often revolves around the axiom of justice. Justice (al-‘adl) and equity (al-qist) are two concepts 
that are featured in the Quran and the Sunnah. The word ‘adl denotes the moral virtue of putting 
things in their rightful places, and qist denotes dealing with people equitably. The Islamic 
tradition heavily emphasizes justice as an axiom, but it remains an axiom, a signifier of a 
concept, until put into practice.  
There are different Islamic legal opinions on how liberal or how restricted markets should 
be; thus, no consensus exists. To contextualize what justice connotes within the tradition, we can 
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look in Aristotle’s labor theory of value regarding initial exchanges, which draws a similarity to 
Pareto efficiency in economics, wherein no normative statement is asserted about the wellbeing 
of overall society, and distribution is essentially based on merits (Aristotle, 1952).186 Since 
several prominent Muslim jurists have subscribed to this theory of justice, an argument can be 
made that since the Shariah has functioned similar to the functionality of common law 
throughout history more than it has as a civil code, that rather like Aristotelian thought, Islamic 
practice seeks justice through legal justice. For instance, there is Ibn Rushd’s expansion on the 
Aristotelian statement that justice is found in such a manner (Ibn Rushd, 1997).187 In contrast, 
there is also a strong argument for distributive justice, a precedent that was set during the 
Prophet’s time ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص, and continued by Caliphs Abu-Bakr and Ali. This view of justice puts more of 
an emphasis on social safety nets, whereas Caliphs ‘Umar and ‘Uthman’s eras can be likened to 
the vision of distribution by merits, wherein justice is ensured by legal justice (Oxford Islamic 
Studies Online, 2014).188  
In this day and age, with the sophisticated scale of systemic exploitation in markets, 
implementing safety nets in addition to ensuring legal justice is more consistent with an applied 
ethic of the maqasid interested in upholding a more expansive understanding of justice. In other 
words, policy must consider using textual sources in combination with information that is now 
available on what unrestrained ‘free markets’ lead to, if left unchecked. Therefore, in 
conceptualizing market justice, this chapter’s scope is to highlight the potentiality for some 
already existing ethical platforms that reconcile with the concept of exchange cumulatively based 
                                                 
186 This discussion of justice appears in Book V of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
187 Ibn Rushd says “Thus, the ratio of exchanged quantities will be determined by the ratio of monetary values of 
different goods…As for [fungible] goods measured by volume or weight, equity requires equality, since they are 
relatively homogenous….justice in this case is achieved by equating some volume or weight, since the benefits are 
very similar”. Ibn Khaldun could be another example in this regard. 
188 On the socialist side of the debate, we can include Al-Ghazali, and in recent times the Syrian M.B. writer of 
Socialism in Islam, Mustafa al-Sibai, who argued that “Islam teaches a unique type of socialism conforming with 
human nature based on five natural rights: life, freedom, knowledge, dignity, and ownership”.  
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on the maqasid. Guiding this discussion is this chapter’s central focus, which is delimiting riba. 
In this sense, we seek to understand the ambit of its prohibition, and to explore its relation to 
political boundaries and personal rights so that reframing it in a contemporary context is 
conceivable.  
A debate has vacillated in scholastic Islamic theology between the Ash’ari school’s 
espousals that reason cannot discern right and wrong independent of God, and the espousals 
made by the Maturidi school, that such deduction is humanly possible (Hourani, 1960).189 
Nonetheless, man should seek to understand revelation, which is the starting point for identifying 
axioms, and in doing so, the ontological prerequisite looming over any interlocutor of Islamic 
ethics is to purify one’s intentions.190 In implementation, axioms must be paralleled by goals. 
Therefore, Islamic visions of justice can be measured by the implementation of fair standards 
and outcomes, for “God commands justice and fair dealing...” (16:90). Hence, poverty’s 
existence should provide the opportunity for corrective axiomatic moral and legal measures to be 
                                                 
189 Hourani discusses the Mutazilite understanding of objectivism, that good or justice is inherently so. Nevertheless, 
the Ash’arites won out the discussion, and the opinion prevailed that is theistic subjectivism, meaning that God 
decides the values of bad and good, also called “ethical volunteerism” which is more widespread in Islam than any 
other civilization (p.2). This view was contested by saying that if God had willed corruption, as a good virtue, then it 
would have been so ipso facto, just because he had said so. Al-Ghazali, Ibn Hazm and Al-Ash’ari did not back away 
from that even though it led to a conflict in morals. The defenders said that it would have consequently been against 
the fitra, or the natural disposition of knowing what is right and wrong, and that is a rational pursuit. Ibn Rushd 
pointed out it would weaken faith in God (pp. 2-3). Ash’arite thought won over the argument for three reasons, on 
ethical, rational and extraneous grounds. Regarding the ethical, there were two camps: (1) those who allowed 
personal opinions (ra’y) “The question that remained, then, was how duties and right actions were to be determined 
when they were not mentioned in the Qur’an or Traditions?” (p.3). And, (2) ihstahasan and istihbab “The term 
istihsan therefore came to signify a breach of strict analogy for reasons of public interest, convenience or similar 
considerations” (p. 3). A significant amount of contemporary research in this realm is still built upon this theory. 
The irony is that Mutazilites can defend objectivism, of making a choice for the general good (maslahah), because 
these can be recognized by (aql) human reason. Ra’y came about under trepidation. Some were persecuted for 
defending it. Two factors were: a. it falls into the hands of the sovereign: and b. the Shia would appeal because all 
scholars were fallible in their ra’y. D. Johnston (2004) discusses a meta-historical view of the trend in shifting 
towards using the maqasid as a school in itself, a Mutazili approach; this is a shift away from the historical position 
(Ash’ari) in which the human mind looks at the divine law and thereby extends it towards its end with the utilization 
of analogy (qiyas) and consensus building. He covers the thought of Muhammad 'Abduh, Muhammad Rashid Rida, 
'Abd al-Razzaq Sanhuri, 'Abdal-Wahhab Khallaf, Muhammad Abu Zahra, and Muhammad Hashim Kamali and 
finds an over-arching pattern in their thought in this respect. 
190 In employing the English term ‘man’ I use it in its etymologically connected meaning which comprises both men 
and women i.e. der mensch in German (die Menschen / human being) akin to ‘ins in Arabic 
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implemented. Moreover, ideology must not prevent its implementation. “O you who believe! 
Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even if it be against yourselves, your parents, 
and your relatives, or whether it is against the rich or the poor...” (4:135). “Let not the hatred of a 
people swerve you away from justice. Be just, for this is closest to righteousness…” (5:8). 
According to the exegete Fakhruddin Al-Razi (d. 1209) (1990), such justice is cultivated by 
socially conscious epistemologies that incorporate knowledge in the practice of justice, which by 
scholarly consensus must be a distribution of justice that extends to the entire human community, 
the animal kingdom, and the natural world. Furthermore, according to the scholarly opinion of 
Sarkhasi (d. 1096), rendering justice “ranks as the most noble of acts of devotion next to belief in 
God” (1993, pp. 59-60).  
 
Part 1: Exchange Parameters Informed by an Islamic Ethos 
 
4.1.1 The Highest Objective in Exchange: Mutual Consent 
 
Wealth creation is pertinent for any society. In contrast, wealth transference to a minority 
class is detrimental. In acknowledgement of this, scholastic Islamic scholarship has historically 
incorporated the development of axioms into religious legal framework. As a result, consensus 
has built Al Juwaini’s (d. 1085) construction of the maqasid that identifies ‘mutual agreement’, 
as the underlying fundamental objective of the laws of trade. It is an expansion of protecting 
people’s wealth, based on the Quranic ayah, “O you who have believed, do not consume one 
another's wealth unjustly but only [in lawful] business by mutual consent. And do not kill 
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yourselves [or one another]. Indeed, Allah is to you ever Merciful” (4.19).191 This underpins all 
legal protections of market participants and acts as the basis for the five identified maqasid of 
protecting (al-ismah) peoples’ faith, souls, minds, dignity, and wealth. In this understanding 
then, we can extend the higher objectives even further because they are just signifiers of 
meaning, and language is a cognitive interface that approximates to explain reality.  
Such developed axioms should steer decision-making and corrective policy, and 
minimize undesirable effects on societies and the environment from the real forces of greed and 
power. This approach is consistent with a point made by Keen (2011), that ascribing empirical 
scientific certainty to predictable outcomes is fallacious. Physics and other sciences are able to 
measure such outcomes with a certain accuracy. However, theories themselves cannot accurately 
predict economic outcomes, although the discipline of economics contemporarily still attempts to 
do this in its modeling. Furthermore, Karl Popper’s articulation of fallablism is an argument 
within the naturalist framework which posits that theories must be discarded in the moral pursuit 
of truth, if proven wrong through empirical research (Brewer, 2013). However, even though 
empirical research has concluded that the fundamentals underpinning economics need 
reevaluation, like the concept of equilibrium in the free market, the field refuses to do so. 
Economics is largely unable to be faithful to what it claims to represent – science – and this 
results in putting markets above ethics, law, morals and ultimately, above people.  
It is essential therefore, to approach the topic of policy-creation, and or promotion, with 
unpretentious flexibility because any discourse on trade, ultimately, is philosophical because it 
centers on how two or more parties convince each other to depart with, and exchange, rights over 
                                                 
191 Ghiyath al Umam (also popularly called al-ghayyathi) by Al Juwaini (n.d) is a book proposing how to reconstruct 
Islam from the bottom up in the hypothetical situation that if all Islamic legal texts were lost, Islam could still be 
reconstructed by simply identifying higher objectives, which he specifically called ‘al maqasid’. 
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property. Mutual agreement, however, is not a rule operating in exclusivity. As Al-Qarafi (d. 
1285) pointed out, ‘means leading to prohibited ends’ (exploitation) must be blocked (1998).192  
 
4.1.2 The Market of Medina: Principles and Legal Limitations 
 
The examination of a few characteristics of the 7th century economy in Medina allows the 
deduction of principles from a few normative examples (Dutton, 1998).193 Ramadan contends, 
“The greatness and exemplarity of the city of Medina do not lie so much in its form proper as in 
the adequacy—at that particular moment in history—between the eternal principles stated and 
the historical implementation elaborated by the Prophet” (2008, p. 4). The models used in the 
prophetic era were simply means by which that community was able to implement its goals. 
Thus, differentiating between goals and universal principles is important as well as recognizing 
that, “in Medina, [there] were models through which goals were implemented at a precise 
moment in history” and since times change “models must necessarily change as well” (p. 263). 
                                                 
192 If someone wants to lend to another person at interest, and the two parties agree, the ‘trade’ is still usurious even 
though it may fall under the category of ‘mutual agreement’. This is because the person accepting the loan is 
typically in a weaker position than the lender, which is the reason he is in need of borrowing in the first place. 
Hence, the lender is exploiting (using) this angle to profit, as the ayah alludes to “consuming” each other’s wealth 
and “killing” one another in the process, one of the negative externalities of a system built on debt and interest. 
193 Some have debated against giving priority to analysis of Medina, which is a position favored by the Maliki 
school. However, it has been well documented that, as Islam spread to the Levant and Iraq among other places, 
fabrications of hadith took place, which has been a point harped on and scrutinized by Orientalists. Dutton refutes 
the Western revisionist theory specifically attributed to Goldziher (1981), who sees religion as a psychological 
phenomenon, and Schacht (1950) who corroborates Goldziher’s hypothesis that the hadith collections are mostly 
forgeries. One cannot say with certainty that the 20th century phenomena of Jewish academic critics of Islam 
produced disingenuous efforts in historically revising the origins of Islam. But it must be considered that the over-
representation of such characters influencing the trends of Islamic scholarship did play into the hands of certain 
political movements and policies, and that in no other field are non-practitioners and their opinions so prevalently 
represented and taken as ‘mainstream’ analysis. Antagonistic views of Islam have been oft proven disreputable by a 
surge in classical scholarship focusing on the early Islamic period. In contrast, Dutton argues that no less than 
10,000 of the Prophet’s companions were buried in al-Baqi’ cemetery in Medina, meaning that a large community 
there had witnessed his normative practices, economic and otherwise; and that it was nearly impossible to fabricate a 
lie about the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص within that community. 
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 An atmosphere with administered justice simultaneously prohibits financial crimes from 
taking place while maintaining infrastructure that provides a platform for fair socioeconomic 
exchange that simultaneously rewards merits (Dutton, 1998).194 Axioms require 
contextualization in order to prevent their manipulation. The Medina of the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص was a 
pluralistic society, and deliberating on it divulges the desirable function of a state. The word 
‘state’ is used here as a loose affiliation of relationships and agreements that translated into a 
representative body for the pluralistic polity in Medina during that era. Its market was also 
mercantile (Tag el-Din, 2013).195 The market motivation for selling was no different from other 
markets – profit –, which undoubtedly also included pure greed and self-interest, called 
mughabana in classical fiqh (Al-Shatibi, 2003).196 Greed is perennially a problem and therefore 
policy-oriented economic protections continually need updating and institutionalization in order 
to minimize its undesirable effects.  
 
4.1.3 Legal Framework and Economic Freedom 
                                                 
194Analyzing the guidelines of the sphere of social and economic interactions (muamalat) in Medina’s market during 
the 10-year period of the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص domicile there offers invaluable context for how those ends were achieved. 
Moreover, besides the Quran, primary source literature involving commercial transactions from the time of the 
Prophet containing elaborate context is scant. Hence the importance of Malik’s perspective, who, after observing the 
actual normative commercial transactions of Medina (‘amal al-ahl Medina) came to the conclusion that Medina’s 
normative practice taken from very learned people held a preferential status in regards to deriving rulings in Islamic 
jurisprudence. Malik’s concept of the ‘amal was as a composite term. Its background encompassed both the Quran 
and Sunnah within their appropriate contexts, as well as elements of ijtihad made by knowledgeable companions of 
the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص whenever direct evidence from the texts was unavailable. 
195 In reaching this understanding we must look at the legislation and how it affected everyday transactions. It must 
also be considered that the economy of Medina was semi-mercantile, or also aptly demarcated as commercialist, 
which is defined in the dictionary as “the attitude or actions of people who are influenced too strongly by the desire 
to earn money or buy goods rather than by other values” Merriam-Webster Inc. Merriam-Webster's collegiate 
dictionary. Merriam-Webster, 2014 (p. 1). 
196 Defined similarly, “Ghaban is the tendency of the seller to bargain for more than the market price and for a buyer 
to bargain for less than a market price…..normally in response to changing market conditions…..Hence, mughabana 
is a an expression of price mechanism under the changing market conditions of supply and demand”. See Al-
Muwafaqat, vol. 2, p. 149 discussing different types of mughabana to include negative types like the receipt of 
insider market information (mughabana fahisha) and the distinction between this term and mushahha 
(shuhh/possessiveness) and outwitting (mukayasa). Ghaban occurs when a buyer is misinformed about market 
conditions and is thus duped, which is why there was a Sunnah in Medina to practice a three-day period of 




The preservation of economic freedom is paramount. The law governing the market of 
Medina was the constitution (hudna) of Medina, which consisted of at least two parts, and was 
issued at various times during the Prophet’s ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص first seven years or so in Medina. Serjeant (1978) 
has lamented that the constitution lacked too many essential components to denote it as such 
whereas Khan (2006) has contended otherwise.197 Without delving into the semantics between a 
charter and a constitution in the modern sense, it is unquestionable that the constitution acted as a 
social contract that provided social security for a pluralistic society; it also served as a truce 
between warring tribal factions (1978).198 These political arrangements also extended into the 
market, which became a sanctified area for conducting trade. It is important to note that the 
charter was never abrogated. 
Economic freedom was safeguarded through legal protections. For instance, the Prophet 
 refused on several occasions to fix prices, even when they rose exceptionally high. From ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص
similar instances, scholars deduced that Islamic principles are in line with reliance on market 
dependency in price setting, and that the principle of fair dealing in business cannot translate into 
forcing people to buy or sell goods at certain prices (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1995).199 However, this still 
                                                 
197 Occidental observers have contended that the constitution was generally secular, except for the stipulation that 
Allah and his Apostle held ultimate arbitration. In fact, Orientalists like R.B. Serjeant (1978) have lamented that the 
constitution was “not really a constitution at all” mentioning its lack of an expansive detail of precedents and 
fundamental principles (p. 2). There is a difference of opinion between scholars on whether the constitution 
consisted of eight parts, as Serjeant contends, or, whether it was a two-part agreement as Ali Khan contends. It did 
not survive in its entirety and is therefore best understood through studying Ibn Ishaq. Serjeant further contends, 
“Muhammad acted in accordance with Arabian political patterns in existence from the remote past. In one sense he 
is simply a judge-arbiter hakam, like his series of ancestors, and he was responsible for but few modifications to 
Arabian law and society” (pp. 2-3). 
198 The clans of Banu Aus and Banu Khazraj were reconciled through the constitution, which instituted a number of 
rights and responsibilities for Muslims, Christians, Jews and Pagans, allowing each community to maintain its own 
cultures and religions, although they were all fused together into one community “ummah”. Demonstrated by the 
fact that these social institutions were built upon constructive preexisting societal norms, the argument that Islamic 
applications can coexist with non-Muslim polities is further reinforced.  
199 Ibn Taymiyyah recognized supply and demand in analyzing markets, including saying, “causes of rise and fall in 
price are not always due to acts of injustice by people. Rather, this is due to shortages in the production or supply of 
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requires context. Such a mechanism can only function in its dictating fair prices if monopoly and 
manipulation are first removed. To differentiate here between goals and principles, we can look 
at another example. The preexisting taxes charged in pre-Islamic Arabia for participants to set up 
stalls in the market were forcibly removed by the ‘state’ because they created barriers that 
prevented individuals from entering (accessing) the market. We can deduce here that, in the 
pursuit of justice, the goal in this situation was to allow equal access to the market. However, 
before the market was allowed to self-regulate, monopolies that manipulated the supply and 
demand curves needed to be checked. 
 
4.1.4 The Scope of Governmental Intervention 
 
Checking markets, or intervention, however, is a legal issue. Shariah scholars assert that 
legal framework mandates the existence of a complete judiciary with robust elaboration of 
positive legal doctrine and method (Hallaq, 2005). A legal means must exist for distributing 
understandings of justice. Islamic law has a positivistic commentary within its scholastic 
tradition about the role of government and intervention. Coercion is the essence of politics and 
government is the agency that typically has a monopoly on the initiation of force. Therefore, by 
its nature politics is controversial. However, goals seeking to implement axioms must include a 
certain amount of interventionism in order to prevent specific crimes from happening; in the 
economic sense, financial crimes are civil affairs (Wolf, 2001).200  
                                                                                                                                                             
a particular good. If the latter increases and desire [demand] for it decreases, then price will rise. And if production 
[khalq] rises and desire falls the prices will fall” (p. 116). 
200 Wolf adds, “Mohammed did, however, transfer to the state the responsibility for the care of the poor, whose 
status had become increasingly exploitative under the guise of traditional kin relationships. He declared all interest 
payments stemming from the pagan times to be null and void. Usury was made illegal: ‘God hath allowed selling, 
but forbidden usury’. Both acts seem to have been aimed at the undercutting of the Koreish (sic) power and raising 
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In regards to checking monopolies, the amount of acceptable governmental intervention 
has been a contentious negotiation throughout Islamic history because an agent of the state 
working as a market watchdog (Al-Muhtasib) can principally infringe on economic freedoms of 
those thought to be enjoying a monopoly. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) later wrote Al Hisbah fi’l 
Islam (The Market Authority) to enumerate that people must be free to enter and leave the 
market, that they must have equitable access to market information, and that monopolies must be 
eliminated by the state (Sidiqqi, 2013). This corroborates that the state’s functional role is 
primarily to serve as a protector of rights, which in Islamic history became the identifiable 
priority because the state acted on behalf of those unable to maintain themselves above 
subsistence levels. Re-contextualized in contemporary times, this would encourage policies 
towards creating social safety nets. The second function of the state is defined by Kahf (1991), as 
“improving the quality of life rather than maintaining it” even to the extent of “imposing special 
taxes in addition to zakah (poor tax)” (pp. 4-5). This limits the function of the state and its scope 
to certain affairs, succinctly as protecting, maintaining and or improving the lives of its citizens.  
 
4.1.5 Extending Higher Objectives into Developing Axioms 
 
Economic stability is also important for social stability. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) has most 
eminently made this clear in his dynamic model on poverty. Extending Ibn Kahldun’s train of 
thought, one recent study has shown that better governance in contemporary times similarly 
correlates to parity and better socioeconomic situations (Affandi & Astuti, 2013).201 Thus, this 
                                                                                                                                                             
resistance against it. Poor Muhajirun were also granted a special part of the spoils, and poor Muslims were assigned 
land. Non-Muslims paid a special tax but were integrated into the new state without forced conversion” (p. 120). 
201 The authors explore how one traumatic recessionary cycle from the late 1990’s affected different Muslim-
majority countries dissimilarly. Although all of them were averse to the lingering economic effects of yet another 
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seems to be a lasting reality. The norms, however, are relativistic and should be expanded as the 
human subsistence level of humanity is increased. Whereas necessities, defined by the Al-
Shatibi, are things “…indispensable for the survival of human beings in areas of religion, life, 
mind, genealogical reproduction and property” (Kahf, 1991, pp. 4-5). Norms, needs, and luxuries 
change between time, place, and context, so too do the justifications and rulings for them (Auda, 
2008).202 Thus, these terms are semantically relative and governmental intervention regarding the 
levels of tax, or the amount of necessary governmental assistance in monetary terms, is flexible. 
In keeping with the concept of updating norms and needs, Ramadan, like other maqasid 
scholars, has expanded on the classical five maqasid to include the very protection of them by 
promoting maqasid linked to “being and action” including “Dignity”, “Welfare” and “Justice” 
(pp. 138-139). In connection to “ethics of the heart,” he adds “Subsistence”, “Education”, 
“Work”, “Contract” and the “Rule of Law” (p. 143). Whereas for the protection of society he 
includes safeguarding the rule of law among axioms like “Pluralism”, “Evolution” and 
“Deliberation” (p. 143). Most of the axioms that we can expand upon here would be widely 
accepted in a general context. In fact, most contemporary societies would have no issues with 
                                                                                                                                                             
painful bust cycle, countries with better governance, social programs and more overall distributive justice proved to 
weather the storms for their economically oppressed populations better than the countries that had weaker 
institutions. This adds credence to the value of justice and the importance of offsetting natural improprieties. Most 
notable is preserving the sanctity of Islamic practices so that the path of righteousness is paramount over all other 
temporal aspects of the government; it is a religious requirement: “…And if they seek help of you for the religion, 
then you must help, except against a people between yourselves and whom is a treaty” (Quran 8:72). 
202 Some scholars have categorized the higher objectives into necessities (daruriyaat), needs (hajiyyaat) and 
refinements (tahseenniyyaat). This word sounds quite awkward in Arabic because it is a technical word, only 
utilized in fiqh issues, but not in any standard Arabic discourse. It is the plural of tahseen and it denotes a part of the 
maslahah, or human need, that refines one’s life such as: recreational activities, refinements and other things that 
add elegance to one’s life. The classical and contemporary scholars of Islam classify the importance of certain 
essential needs and rights using these three categories. Auda writes “al-maqasid structure is best described as a 
‘multi- dimensional’ structure, in which levels of necessity, scope of rulings, scope of people, and levels of 
universality are all valid dimensions that represent valid viewpoints and classifications” (p. 10). 
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updating their higher objectives to support stronger property rights, the maximization of 
resources and the minimization of wastage (Muslim & Siddiqi, 1990).203  
Certainly, however, there are a few aspects, inspired by Islam, which would entail certain 
reframing in viewing economic exchange. In fact, many of these axioms are presently trumped 
by the negligence paid to one primary axiom. Moreover, being faithful to this one axiom is a 
very strong normative stance to take in a global society that has centuries of legislation, practice 
and ideological opposition to it in discourse, and that is the prohibition of riba. Therefore, the 
discussion must return to an analysis of this contentious concept. 
 
4.1.6 A Discussion on Riba as an Axiomatic Prohibition 
 
 The majority of the market prohibitions in Islamic law fall under three categories: (1): 
the prohibition of riba; (2): the prohibition of gharar, which is excessive speculation or 
fundamental uncertainty; and (3): the prohibition of dealing in illicit (haram) products (Saeed, 
1996). From a social aspect, policies can create legislation for crimes dealing with monopolies, 
cheating, fraud, speculation, hoarding, gambling etcetera. However, although the prohibition of 
riba is the ‘sin qua non’ of any Islamic financial ethos, it is very difficult to counter through 
prohibitions. That is, ‘preventing-riba’ is an immutable axiom from the Islamic perspective, but 
in contemporary reality, a maqasid approach to this issue must be nuanced.  
 
                                                 
203 The concept of maximum utilization of resources and minimum wastage comes from “Every landlord should 
farm his land but if he cannot do that, he should let his brother farm it” in Sahih Muslim (p. 172). The strongest 
argument for the concept of private property lies in the Quranic commandments for inheritance. People inherit what 
Allah has dictated for them rather than what they have necessarily earned. Some exegetes have tried to argue that 
53:39 “That man can have nothing but what he strives for” means that Islam only supports limited private property 
that someone has earned by their own efforts. However, the concept of inheritance trumps any speculative theology, 
and the inheritance laws in the Quran are very clear. Rather, that verse’s general connotation is that humans receive 
the ultimate judgment from God based on what deeds or sins they themselves have registered on their scales. 
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4.1.7 The Background on Riba 
 
There are essentially two different justifications for the axiom of ‘preventing-riba’. The 
first is an Islamic approach which utilizes: commentary from the Quran, commentary from the 
Hadith, scholastic commentary, the principle of consensus (ijma’), and proofs inferred and 
deduced from other sources (Judaism and Christianity: see Ch. 2). The other justification can be 
from the book of “The Universe” as Ramadan calls it, which can look at its measurably 
undesirable effects on society and the environment.  
Quite succinctly, the etymological meaning of riba is growth, augmentation or expansion, 
although it is used most often “in particular reference to the act of giving money at a fixed 
increase” (El-Eshkar, 1987, p. 38). Riba is associated linguistically with the Hebrew terms 
marbut and ribbit found in the OT and so it is synonymous with many aspects of both usury and 
interest, but is even broader as it can manifest in “73 ways (bab)” (Al-Tirmidhi, 1986, p. 2343). 
The number 73 here is figurative, representative of a composite term. In the Quran, the word 
family of riba is featured in different semantic contexts as meaning to rise, swell, prosper, 
increase, nurture, augment, or increase in power. Thus, an English rendering of usury is simply 
one aspect of a complex term. Riba described by Saud (1983) is “The excess of money paid by 
the borrower to the lender over and above the principal for the use of the lender’s liquid money 
over a certain period of time” (p. 64). Fakhruddin Al-Razi’s definition is “taking wealth of others 
without giving a counter-value for it” (1990, p. 2). Razi’s definition is general, yet 
comprehensive, because financial exploitation i.e. riba, can happen in sundry ways. 
In the pre-Islamic market, trade caravans were always in need of commercial loans for 
trips taken twice a year, to neighboring Syria in the summer, and to Yemen in the winter; 
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additionally, the poor were always in need of merchant loans. Essentially, the pre-Islamic society 
was no different from any other society where usury found a market due to a dearth in credit-
issuing facilities (Blankenship, 1994). The Quran would consider the context and the immorality 
of these loans by chronologically revealing verses over a period of several years, which 
progressively constructed the Islamic moral argument against the phenomenon. 
 
4.1.8 The Prohibition of Riba in the Quran: First Revelation 
 
The Quran treats riba in four places. In the chronology of revelation about riba, the first 
in sequence was revealed in Makkah in Surah Al-Rum: “And whatever you give for interest to 
increase within the wealth of people will not increase with Allah” (Quran 30:39). The 
connotation is negative, but it is not condemned (Kathir, 1983).204  
  
4.1.9 Second Revelation 
 
The next sequential mentioning of riba in the revelation of the Quran comes in the first 
year after the emigration to Medina. It connotes God’s displeasure with how people from 
previous dispensations, primarily the Israelites, were lending money usuriously even though it 
was prohibited for them to do so (see Chapter 2): “And [for] their taking of usury while they had 
been forbidden from it, and their consuming of the people's wealth unjustly. And we have 
                                                 
204 Exegetes like Ibn Kathir (d. 1373) expressed opinions that this verse did not specifically pertain to commercial 
transactions, but rather it pertained to one of its other manifestations in pagan society. The present tense of the verb 
meaning ‘to increase’ (yarboow) is used here to connote any increase whatsoever. The majority of exegetes have 
determined that this Mekkan surah is thus not treating interest and usury in the sense of a commercial transaction per 
se. But it is rather treating it as doing a favor for someone with the intention of recalling that favor at a future date 
and asking for something in return (Ibn Kathir, Ibn Abbas, and Abu Qatadah all held this view). 
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prepared for the disbelievers among them a painful punishment” (Quran 4:161). For the next two 
to three years, this was the extent of the commentary on riba and although it was mentioned with 
a negative association, it was still not specifically legislated that the Muslims had to abandon it 
(Nomani, 2002).205 
  
4.1.10 Third Revelation 
 
The next ayaat about riba were revealed just prior to the Battle of Uhud, which according 
to the historical accounts, took place on the 7th of Shawal in the third (Islamic lunar) year after 
the migration to Medina (625 CE). In Surah Al-Imran the Quranic perspective shifts into a 
prohibitive directive (nahee) towards a community that had attained belief (amanoo): “O you 
who have believed, do not consume usury (la ta’kuloo), doubled and multiplied, but fear Allah 
that you may be successful” (Quran 3:130). Hence, it took until the third year of the Prophet’s 
residence in Medina for the market to shift towards prohibition of this sin. Traders traditionally 
lent money for prescribed terms, typically one year, with the intention of doubling the loan if not 
paid in full at the end of the term, called riba al-jahiliyyah. The Arabic terminology was “taqdi 
aw tarbee”, meaning ‘pay me in full or increase me’, which was the ‘time value of money’ 
argument, and the Quran deemed that argument illegitimate (Nomani, 2002).206  
 
4.1.11 Fourth Revelation 
 
                                                 
205 According to the classical exegetes, the prohibition was still only a recommendation at this point in revelatory 
chronology. 
206 The language used here is a forbiddance (nahi). Indeed the previously revealed ayahs had been communicated 
with a negative undertone and connoted an action disliked (makruh) (tarbee –an imperative derivative form of riba). 
172 
 
The final revelation, and the most concise in its prohibition, came in the last ayaat of 
Surah Al-Baqara, which directly allude to riba as a heinous crime: “Those who consume riba 
cannot stand [on the Day of Resurrection] except as one stands who is being beaten by Satan into 
insanity. That is because they say, ‘Trade is [just] like riba.’ But Allah has permitted trade and 
has forbidden riba. So whoever has received an admonition from his Lord and desists may have 
what is past, and his affair rests with Allah. But whoever returns to [dealing in riba] - those are 
the companions of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein” (Quran 2:275). 
The next ayah, (2:276) follows up with “Allah destroys (yamhaq) riba and gives increase 
for charities. And Allah does not like every sinning disbeliever” (Quran 2:276). The Quran 
contrasts riba with charity, signifying that there are no rewards in an interest-based transaction, 
whereas God rewards people who pay the poor-tax as mentioned in ayah (2:277). Ayah (2:278) 
then states “O you who have believed, fear Allah and give up what remains [due to you] of riba, 
if you should be believers” and 2:279 follows this up with the consequence, “And if you do not, 
then be informed of a war [against you] from Allah and His Messenger. But if you repent, you 
may have your principal - [thus] you do no wrong, nor are you wronged”. This is the end of the 
commentary on the phenomenon in the Quran, which is clearly against the practice; however, as 
strong as the condemnation is, the specifics of the practice are not contextualized any further. In 
searching for supplementary context, one sequentially then examines the Hadith and scholastic 
commentary. 
 




In the Quran’s treatment of riba, the prohibition becomes clearly undisputed, yet the 
ambit, as a phenomenon, necessitates more clarification. A view attributed to de Saussure (d. 
1913) argues that semantic under-specification can be the cause of ambiguity when a word is 
used in various contexts, and the signifier riba appears in various contexts in the Quran, inviting 
copious commentary.207 Thus, classical scholarship has used the Hadith to add context and 
classify the scope of riba into different categories. Much of the Hadith literature describes the 
phenomenon of riba al-fadl, which is the usury of surplus and riba al-duyoon, interest on debts 
(Malik, 2005).208 Riba al-fadhl can be understood best as ‘usury on exchange surplus’ when an 
exchange happens regarding items of the same genus, as one narration emphasizes: “[Exchange] 
gold with gold, silver with silver, wheat with wheat, barley with barley, dates with dates, salt 
with salt in equal quantities and spot. Anyone who increases the quantity or asks for increase 
indulges in riba. The receiver and payer are equal in this” (Muslim & Siddiqi, 1990). This is not 
in reference to interest on the loaning of money, but regarding the injustice that happens in 
exchanges where an unfair surplus is granted to one side of a transaction. This has grave 
implications from a maqasid perspective because it requires the ethical reevaluation of various 
                                                 
207 The cognitive sciences have been dealing with the issue of how representations should be modeled. 
208 Imam Malik commented that besides ascribing partners to God (shirk) there is no sin more tantamount that riba. 
In another hadith, it is considered one of the seven great sins in Islam, and Imam Al-Qurtubi (d. 1273) mentions in 
his Tafsir that the traditionalist Ibn Khuwayzimandad stated that believing riba to be lawful was considered 
apostasy. With firm belief, the early Muslim community realized the severity of this crime for its propensity to 
create injustice both socioeconomically and spiritually. The classical scholars organized maslahah into three kinds: 
ones acknowledged and accredited to a textual reference (masalah al-mu’tabarah), ones that are rejected outright 
masalih al-mulghat and those neither accredited nor denied (al-masalih al-mursalah). The first type are recognized 
benefits that are explicitly expressed in the shar’i texts; for example, the retaliation for murder (qisas) ultimately 
aims to protect human lives, or that the prayers (ibadah) ultimately aim to protect one from lewdness and raise 
personal levels of piety. These are analogically deduced even in lieu of their explicit mentioning. In contrast, there 
are perceived benefits, which are bluntly rejected and denounced by the shar’i texts. Riba is a good example of this 
concept, the usurer clearly ‘benefits’ by making a profit, but Islam rejects the concept. The notion is very 
straightforward. However, more complicated, is arriving upon a pronouncement for something that is neither 
explicitly accepted or prohibited (al-masalih al-mursalah). Using the masalih has several restrictions, most notably 
that its discovery cannot contradict an established and clear ruling (hukm) and that its realization must develop out 
of definitive references (qat’ee) and not speculative (dhanni) thought. 
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transactions and contracts for their potentially exploitative qualities, not just a reevaluation of 
loans.  
Another narration says, “Allah has cursed the one who consumes riba, the one who gives 
it, the one who witnesses over it, and the one who writes down the transaction” (Muslim & 
Siddiqi, 1990). If riba here means compound interest, the inference is an institutional 
condemnation of all aspects of creating interest-bearing loans. This renders the modern concept 
of a bank essentially problematic from an ethical perspective, if a bank is to retain its essential 
features as an intermediary institution granted credit-issuing privilege acting as a for-profit 
entity. Because comprised as such, charging compound interest as a combination of both 
opportunity cost and credit risk cost, a scenario is created whereby banking institutions unfairly 
benefit by charging for what is largely unnecessary. 
Regarding the prohibition of interest on loans, the number of hadith related to these 
dimensions of riba are too numerous to exhaustively enumerate, but to encapsulate their essence, 
one narration by Imam Ali succinctly says, “Every loan that reaps benefit is a form of riba” (kull 
qard jar munfa’a fa huwa riba) (I'la as-Sunan, p. 14).209 The rationale is because no matter how 
long the lender waits for his money to be returned, he still has not entered into any legitimate 
business venture, thus, has earned no right of compensation, meaning that lending and 
investment are not the same (Noor, 1988). The lexical context of Quranic treatment of riba is 
similar: it is illegitimate increase (ziyada); but, interest, the increase of money over time, is only 
one dimension of the prohibition, and is known as riba al-nasiy’ah (riba for waiting).210 In fact 
                                                 
209 Makhul reported from the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص “There is no interest between Muslims and people with whom they are at 
war”. The hadith is considered weak by some, as it is a mursal narration and appears in Shafi’i’s Kitab al-Umm. As 
this was recorded by Imam Al Shafi’I (359 CE) it was taken to mean that riba was not even accepted in non-Muslim 
lands in order to prevent the skewed hermeneutic that appeared in Jewish history (discussed comprehensively in Ch. 
2). 
210 Scholars have been interested in these verses and their significance as the last ayaat revealed before the Prophet 
Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص passed away. All of the ayaaat lie between verses 275-281. The connotation of the following verse is 
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the next verse in the sequence of Surah 2’s prohibition (Al-Baqarah) encourages offering respite 
to those in financial hardship, “And if someone is in hardship, then [let there be] postponement 
until [a time of] ease. But if you give [from your right as] charity, then it is better for you, if you 
only knew” (Quran 2:280).  
 
4.1.13 Different Aspects of Riba in Commentary 
 
The phenomenon of riba has various ways of manifesting, and articulating the manners 
by which it does so requires vigilance by contemporary scholars of each epoch. Another 
important narration reveals that riba is often hidden in transactions; “Bilal brought to the Prophet 
some barni (good quality dates) whereupon the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص asked him where these were from. 
Bilal replied, ‘I had some inferior dates which I exchanged for these - two amounts (sa’s) for one 
amount (sa’)’. The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص said, ‘Oh no, this is exactly riba. Do not do so, but when you wish 
to buy, sell the inferior dates against something (cash) and then buy the better dates with the 
price you receive’ ” (Muslim & Siddiqi, 1990). From this oft-discussed narration, scholars infer 
that a very close companion, likely well versed in theology, was unaware of the riba in unequal 
exchanges, a various aspect of riba. What would have been better for him to do was sell the 
lower quality dates for cash at their market value, and then purchase the premium dates with cash 
                                                                                                                                                             
that riba is a major and heinous sin and crime. Shortly after the revelation of the verses in Al-Baqara explicitly 
prohibiting and condemning any and all usury, the Quranic revelation ended. Hence, in order to understand the 
dimensions and scope of riba it is necessary to also look at what the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص spoke about the Quranic revelations 
regarding usury and the context of his added commentary and statements. Furthermore, it is essential to look at how 
the normative practice was understood by the early community in Medina. Indeed riba has different aspects to it. 
The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص has commented on riba in numerous transmissions. What this adds to the understanding of usury is 
that it is multidimensional. The other dimensions to the understanding of riba are no different than the 
comprehensive ways usury and interest have manifested in various forms throughout history into exchanges, timed 
agreements and as debts circulating as the money supply. Some of the intricacies regarding these manifestations of 
usury were not thoroughly articulated by the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص to his disciples, leaving an amount of knowledge still 
desired by disciples like Umar who commented that he wished he could have asked the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص several more 
questions related to riba. Ibn Kathir mentions this in his tafsir (1983). 
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for their market value. This narration highlights the necessity of a stable currency for 
measurement in the market in order to facilitate the way for precise exchanges to not unfairly 
benefit one side in (hidden) exchange surplus.211 An example of another way riba manifested in 
this manner, specifically in Arabia, was through contracts guaranteeing pre-determined profit 
ratios before a season’s harvest (mukhabarah); these agreements unfairly secured investors 
against risk, thereby transferring all of the risk to one party. 
Sh. Yusuf Qaradawi (1999) analyzed some of Al-Razi’s famous commentary on riba, 
enumerating its functions. He first mentions that its prohibition comes from a deep concern about 
the moral, social and economic welfare of humankind. He further alludes to the ruling on wealth 
and blood being sacred, and that taking interest appropriates one side’s wealth without offering 
anything of counter-value in exchange. Next, he points out that dependence on receiving interest 
payments creates a (4th) class of people (usurers) who will not be motivated to work or invest in 
real industry. Numerous Western commenters have made this same point, for instance Swan’s 
(2009) work on financial crashes. Thirdly, Qaradawi mentions that taking interest from one 
another breaks bonds and discourages friendliness between people; and the fourth point is that 
poor are likely to borrow from rich, which further stratifies society and widens the gap of 
inequality (Qaradawi, 1999). Therefore, the rationale for adhering to this wide scope of a 
prohibition is not only ritual obedience, but upon reflection one is able to identify the perceived 
and measurable injustice that is distributed by a system that ruins bonds (moral injustice), 
                                                 
211 Another narration from Imam Ahmad’s Musnad shows this multi-dimensional hidden property of riba: “Whoever 
makes a recommendation for his brother and accepts a gift offered by him has entered riba through one of its large 
gates”, narrated by Abu Umamah. In addition, another narration in Sahih Muslim “On the day of Khaybar he bought 
a necklace of gold and pearls for twelve dinars. On separating the two, he found that the gold itself was equal to 
more than twelve dinars. So he mentioned this to the Prophet, who replied, ‘It [jewelry] must not be sold until the 
contents have been valued separately’ ”, narrated by Fadalah ibn 'Ubayd al-Ansari. 
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exploits the weak (social injustice), provides social advantages to the wealthy, and affects the 
stability of money (economic injustice).  
 
Part 2: Arriving at an Understanding of Just Money 
 
4.2.1 A Clarification of Terms 
 
In acknowledging its various issues, interest should not be intricately tied to the genesis 
of money creation. Regarding the use of labels that attempt to communicate an understanding 
that financial transactions are an embodiment of such values, Ramadan argues; “The very idea 
that there could be an Islamic economy is misleading if not dishonest for after all what is truly 
Islamic in this economy – its tools, its methods, its norms, its goals?” (2008, p. 117). Indeed, for 
an economy to identify as ‘Islamic’ it needs have some measurable outcomes for the axioms it 
promotes in the pursuit of justice (Kahf, 2004). 
Such axioms necessitate that equitable access to money in the marketplace must also be 
just, and that the money used within the marketplace is not a signifier that unfairly harms its 
users. There are competing narratives and discourses attempting to shape the signifier ‘money’, 
which is oft mistranslated into Arabic as mal, which more accurately translates into ‘wealth’. 
However, as is the way of language, translations and terminologies are not always stagnant. 
Bank money, which is credit, has its own idiosyncratic history, as does the concept of mal in Pre 
Islamic Arabia. Making a distinction between the English signifiers ‘money’ and ‘credit’ is 
imperative as they are terms that etymologically developed in the Western episteme and 




4.2.2 The Competing Versions of Money 
 
In order for a definition of ‘just money’ to emerge that is consistent with the expanded 
maqasid, it is necessary to examine the historical evolution of money and the discrepancies about 
how to define it so that ethical considerations can be given to defining ‘just money’ in a 
contemporary context. Money above all else is an idea. Its primary use is as a medium of 
exchange. Whereas the notion of storing or preserving value in an instrument with lasting 
qualities is an entirely contrary concept. That would be a commodity. Money is not however 
intrinsically a commodity. Yet, framing in modern discourse has conflated these two concepts 
together under the auspices of one label, ‘money’, which has caused problems. Accordingly, the 
two competing definitions for money are:  
 
1. A medium of exchange or a unit of account; (Definition A) 
2. A store of value or a standard of deferred payment; (Definition B) 
 
These two definitions are in conflict because, as a medium of exchange, money needs to 
circulate in order to facilitate exchanges for society. However, as a store of value, money 
simultaneously contains a property that makes people want to hoard it. Definition A functions 
just like a token, whereas Definition B works more like an instrument of barter; thus, Definition 
B is susceptible to Gresham’s Law, which states that ‘bad money drives out good’ (Rothbart, 
2011).212 This means that when commodities are used as numeraire (i.e. coins) and their nominal 
                                                 
212 Sir Gresham (d. 1579) was an English financier who worked during the reign of the Tudors (UK) who realized 
that people would hoard good coins and tended to spend coins that had been clipped or had some other obvious 
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values are very similar to their commodity values, they are more likely to be hoarded than 
commodities with obvious defects in them (i.e. tarnished or clipped coins).  
The English word ‘money’ likely comes from the Latin word moneta.213 The study of 
numismatics is the broader study and collection of currency and items that have represented 
money in the past. Its Greek root stems from numisma, putative for ‘I think so’ and nomos, law, 
or something based on it.  The connotation is that money is something abstract that someone 
thinks, or has been made to believe, is representational of value. It also implies the connotation of 
a signifier that, in the event that money is not accepted freely, shall be legislated by law to serve 
as a representative replacement of value, usually for tax purposes; and because of this propensity 
to be linked to coercion, money has a political dimension (Davies, 1996). 
Various payment media used to resolve debts have signified money throughout history. 
Anthropological studies have substantiated that the earliest form of money in existence was debt, 
payment media comprised of simple bookkeeping, recordkeeping, tallies, and measurements of 
exchange surpluses among enclosed communities. Some allege this human practice may date as 
far back as 100,000 BCE (Mauss, 1954, p. 36).214 Yet, substantial records exist of credit and debt 
arrangements from at least 3000 BCE and onwards (Graeber, 2011).215 The default money in 
most societies took the form of record keeping of personal debts and IOUs because IOUs were 
                                                                                                                                                             
defect. This is such an age-old common sense notion although it is attributed to Gresham, and economists, 
particularly Austrians of the libertarian bent, have expanded upon it in modern times. 
213 The term is probably derived from an epithet of the Greek god Juno. Juno, also known as Hera, was also the 
name for the temple where Ancient Romans produced their money. As the Greek mythological anecdote goes, Zeus 
had tied up Hera; therefore, she became the lonely Hera or “Hera Mone Tas” (moneres signifies loneliness in 
Greek). 
214 Mauss was the French cousin of Emile Durkheim, and as a sociologist, he compared gift exchanges in different 
cultures around the world. Money could have emerged from this debit and credit type of gifting. 
215 Graeber has done extensive anthropological studies on the history of credit, debt and money in ancient 
civilizations. He proves that such transactions took place as far back as 3000 BCE. His research flies in the face of 
the theory that Adam Smith developed capitalism. 
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just promises that bore no opportunity costs (Definition A), and one’s capital was only as good 
as their word.  
A need for using commodities as money (Definition B) only emerged when people would 
trade with people outside their spheres of trust. For instance, a yearly swap of food for materials 
with a foreign tribe, possibly an enemy, could not be done on a debt basis. In such cases, a 
tangible commodity like gold would appease traders more than a promise. Commodity money 
can be defined as money with some type of other usage besides being money in itself. It has 
comprised of a plethora of commodities including but not limited to: coins minted from precious 
metals (gold and silver), tokens, coupons, shells, cows and even flowers. Commodity money 
contains binary attributes with intrinsic value, meaning that there is another usage or purpose for 
the material the money represents in its social or legal function. For instance, a person may not 
smoke or have use for tobacco, but he still might accept it as money because others value it and 
therefore it can function as a commodity currency.  
Lastly, delineating money is controversial and political. This is because giving theoretical 
primacy to, and thereby acknowledging certain historical narratives on money, means accepting 
certain associated definitions of money and its various functions. It further means ceding to an 
interpretation of evolutionary history, and implicitly adopting an entire embedded ideology, or at 
least part of its truth. 
 
4.2.3 The Origin of Money Systems 
 
There are competing narratives regarding the origins of money systems. Definition A: 
religious/law-based definition of money as credit. And Definition B: trade-based (barter). 
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Definition A encompasses several converging narratives on money, all of which agree that 
money is simply an agreement, an act of law, or religious adherence – which would again be a 
form of law – and this history is essentially irrefutable. In some communities this concept of 
money originated in the rise of religious priesthoods who conferred significance onto certain 
items. This narrative recounts that cults and mystery religions all established monopolies on 
which types of money were acceptable to pay tributes with; therefore, the adherents of religious 
schools were obliged to use preselected currencies in order to fulfill religious duties. Thus, value 
was placed into whatever was needed to discharge a religious obligation, very similar to levying 
tax. The exchange rate of specie was made commensurate to an established amount of produce, 
which was in most cases cattle (Chown, 1994).  
Other societies realized the inherent traits of money as a promise via another means, the 
submission to temporal governing authorities that issued IOUs and enforced their usage through 
tax and legal tender laws.216 The term ‘fiat’ in both Middle English and Latin plainly means ‘by 
decree’ or ‘let it be done’ and refers to a state mandating the usage of something as sanctioned 
currency. The process of monetization confers value onto the signifier of worth; this process is 
facilitated and fostered as an institutional decision. Therefore, instead of valuing commodities for 
their intrinsic qualities or usufruct, monetary units are valued by how many of them are in 
circulation, and legal authority regulates that number.  
 
4.2.4 The Inaccurate Claim that Money Evolved from Barter 
 
                                                 
216 The notion of abstract money transcends the concept that money must hold any value outside of its decreed 
value; thus, it does not necessarily need to contain any intrinsic or commodity value. This is the psychological 
consequence of money. 
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What has heavily influenced economic discourse is an inaccurate narrative, the ‘barter-
origin theory’ of money. This narrative, endorsed by Adam Smith (Book 1, Chapter 4 Of the 
Origin and Use of Money) and numerous others in the field of economics, delineates money as ‘a 
preservation of wealth’ or ‘a temporary to long-term store of value’ in addition to simultaneously 
serving as a medium of exchange (Hulsman, 2008). In this scheme, money contains two 
opposing qualities (Definition B) wherein money is something valuable in and of itself; the 
concept remains problematic because it delimits money as something that people are inclined to 
hoard. Coins fall under this category, which some claim first appeared in human civilizations in 
the form of monetary representation around 700 BCE (Beinhocker, 2007). This narrative is 
promoted by an essentially pro-interest charging camp. However, an entire corpus of data 
signifies that money was not introduced this way in most societies, if any (Ingham, 1999). This 
theory incorrectly presupposes advanced infrastructure and legal enforcement of market ethics in 
nascent societies that simply did not exist.217 A proponent of the theory, Varian (2010) claims, it 
became common understanding that two people who agreed upon exchanging items with each 
other would be in better positions after a transaction than they were before it. That societies 
                                                 
217 The commodity, in this interpretation of intrinsic, should contain value within itself outside of its monetary 
significance. One positive attribute of ‘intrinsic’ value, is that even if a monetary authority renders a commodity 
valueless (or the government collapses) commodity money still retains some of its purchasing power because people 
can still potentially use the usufruct within the commodity. However, precious metals do not circulate well (with 
high velocity) because they are valuable and possession of them gives confidence to the one holding them. For 
instance, $20 gold coins issued in 1906 are still worth their ‘weight in gold’ today even though they aren’t accepted 
by the government. This is why it is common to hear people lobbying for a return to gold and silver, that is, if a 
government decides not to accept a gold coin any longer as legal tender it can still be melted down and used in 
another way. Thus, according to this theory, a need for something came about to simplify the barter world’s 
complications.  The barter theory of money favors metals as money because metals, it is claimed, have set the 
precedent of natural monies for thousands of years not because of a priori determinations, but due to natural 
acceptance. It is accepted that some commodity properties were especially problematic for bartering. For instance, a 
cow would be hard to barter if forced to traverse long distances with one’s money. Thus, the weight, size, 
portability, perishability, unit value and composition consistency all became factors that would contribute towards 
the eventual wide acceptance of certain commodities serving as money. Moreover, proponents of this definition of 
money claim that money didn’t come about as a result of a social contract, but claim “it resulted from the 
spontaneous convergence of many individual choices, a convergence that was prompted through the objective 
physical characteristics of the precious metals” because they had the best propensity to serve as units of exchange. 
This is discussed on page 28. 
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would only conduct commerce with each other by using metals seems highly implausible, 
especially societies in lands without endemic gold or silver. Avoiding the embrace of this flawed 
narrative then brings us back to an ethical understanding, that money and credit are human 
creations, and social and legal commitments. 
 
4.2.5 A Demarcation of Money, Wealth and Currency in Human Networks  
 
The aforementioned definitions of money existed prior to the development of capitalism. 
However, understanding such intricate developments, their narratives and their effects on today’s 
narrative should be a prerequisite in making any Islamic pronouncements about money, 
especially bank created money. Some classical arguments asserted that law-based money was 
preferable over other genera. In this view, money is simply regarded as a legal creature that 
divides every transaction into two parts: a sale and a purchase. Islamic scholars have made a 
wide range of different rulings in different times upon monetary matters, but in the contemporary 
situation, rulings from the past must be reevaluated because they fail to consider that bank 
money is a new signifier that has no precedent in the history of Islamic discourse. If not all of the 
available facts are considered in this regard, there is a high susceptibility of supporting 
institutions that actually cause more harm than benefit. 
What can be said conclusively is that money supplies, including the aforementioned types 
and definitions, are advanced social structures comprising of two parties, the ones who create the 
supplies and the ones who need to use them (Ingham, 2004). The suppliers gain power, for they 
are able to charge for their services, and if their power is unchecked, they can siphon the money 
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supply by debasing the currency (inflation) and by charging seigniorage fees.218 This is just one 
of the various ways riba can manifest without directly charging interest on loans. History is 
replete with monarchs clipping coins and other fraudulent activities perennially designated as 
criminal behavior. However, in a modern economy institutions carry out similar actions in ways 
unprecedented, with the assistance of advanced software, and often with the impunity provided 
by operating within the confines of legal permissibility. Monetary systems are complex; their 
struggles are political and simultaneously serve sections of society with contradictory interests. 
Thus, a system that only eliminates, or sidesteps some aspects of bank interest, that still allows 
other aspects of unjust exploitation of the money supply (riba) is equally a system that still fails 
to prevent harms. 
 
4.2.6 Money in Islam: Commodity or False Commodity? 
  
Regarding money, an important thing to preface and reiterate is that in the history of 
Islam ‘the classical legal scholars do not develop a concise theory of money’ (Siegfried, 2001). 
The market of Medina was a mélange of Sassanid and Roman methods, and so there was nothing 
in it ‘Islamic’ in the sense that using that term would denote anything supererogatory. 
Furthermore, the earliest written account of delineating silver and gold as media for exchange 
with a conventional value appears in Islamic legal writings no earlier than the fourth Islamic 
century (Ritter, 1917). For centuries prior to that, money had operated as a commodity within all 
mercantile economies, including those in Islamic societies in which gold dinars (Roman 
denarius), silver dirhams (drachma), copper fulus (folis) and promises to pay (hawala) circulated 
                                                 
218 Seigniorage is the profit made by a government by issuing a currency. Governments have done this by clipping 
coins and reminting them, attempting to pass them off to the public with their previous values. 
185 
 
as money (Abu-Lughod, 1989). Early in Islamic history, money was treated for its conventional 
value, rather than its intrinsic value, whereas in the following centuries, counting began to 
supersede weighing as a legally valid method, and money became numeraire, which was a 
concept present before Islam.  
However, through the passage of time, the development of banking and the legal 
institutions that underpin capitalism, money has become something that can be created digitally, 
virtually cost-free. Although the narrative of this human discovery is nefarious because of what 
many banks have done with this power, this discovery is essentially a game changer, and a very 
important human ingenuity. Thus, money is no longer a commodity, but somehow it is still 
treated as such. This is primarily because economists who envisage an economy using 
commodity-money claim that money can represent a surplus to be saved or lent to borrowers. 
Furthermore, if money is viewed as a commodity then its value arises out of its scarcity, and like 
other commodities it is then subject to the forces of supply and demand. This creates the 
potential for human suffering in numerous forms because scarcity of money in the market causes 
negative effects, like deflation. Defining money as a commodity is, hence, to create a “false 
commodity”, as argued by Karl Polanyi (d. 1964) (1957) and many others (Pettifor, 2013).219 
This ‘context’ (al-waqi’a) must be considered in making determinations. Ramadan 
(2008) argues that the evolution in the experimental sciences (and in this case the evolution of 
money) must “…clearly acknowledge natural and universal laws and the constant or 
circumstantial principles of human action in history as full-fledged sources of Islamic law and 
jurisprudence” (p. 120). However, there is a danger that without considering the ethical 
                                                 
219 Pettifor mentions prominent economists who have argued for money as a social construct rather than as a 
traditional commodity, since it can now be created virtually for free. She enumerates a list of: John Law, John 
Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter, Karl Polanyi, Kenneth Galbraith and Herman Minsky; and of contemporary 
economists and sociologists like Victoria Chick, Steve Keen, Geoff Tily, Cullen Roche, Geoffrey Ingham and the 
school of ‘Modern Monetary Theory.’ 
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reevaluation Ramadan argues for, that what may result in economic discussion is “…utopian, 
illusionary, often naïve religious, philosophical, and ethical thought” (p. 150). This does happen 
as we can see that an unapt rendering of the texts prompts some to obstreperously elevate the 
literal status of gold and silver coins, arguing that they comprise ‘Sunnah money’ (Chulov, 
2014).220  
Surely not all metals advocates are demagogues, and neither are all of them entirely naïve 
for that matter. However, while some voices continue hearkening for the promotion of gold and 
silver as money in Muslim majority polities, serious discussions about monetary issues are 
indirectly derailed. Meanwhile, such proponents unsophisticatedly overlook the fact that the 
precious metals industry is a very unjust industry if examined. Among other things, it is a 
gargantuan industry that poisons global water tables with cyanide and mercury (Malm, 1998), 
retains slave and child labor (Bose-O'Reilly, 2008), and engages in heavy market price 
manipulation (Zhang & Wei, 2010).221 And while it is true that gold, silver and copper 
represented some of the payment media circulating in Medina and later Islamic civilizational 
markets, (with both Islamic images and ‘graven images’ on them), it is not an Islamic necessity 
that money must remain as it was in the past, especially if the usage of such specie leads to more 
injustice. As Ramadan contends, the tools may change but the principles remain.  
Adam Smith’s concept of justice is “not based on abstract rights or principles of justice, 
but on sentiments” (Frierson, 2006, p. 442). For Smith an action is only unjust if it has a sufferer 
and so nature can only be protected if it is sympathized with (Smith, 1896).222 In contrast, the 
                                                 
220 For instance, in late 2014 the media reported that the terrorist group Daesh announced its intent on creating and 
maintaining such currency.  
221 Ironically, such a narrative shares its ideology with libertarian (Definition B) delineations of money, a narrative 
that heavily promotes the ‘time value of money’ and money as a commodity. 
222 In the introduction by Edwin Cannan it says “Smith actually distinguishes between “several different meanings” 
of “justice” (VII.ii.1.10, p. 270).  The strict sense of justice, which Smith associates with Aristotle’s “commutative 
justice” and which is the only kind “which may be extorted by force, and the violation of which exposes to 
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Islamic conception of justice is primarily based on moral principles. Thus, the maqasid would 
necessitate that society and the environment must be protected from unnecessary and avoidable 
harm. Furthermore, one Prophetic narration prophesizes that “Islam will be undone knot by knot, 
every time a knot is undone, people will hold on to the next one, the first of which is judging 
according to what Allah has revealed and the last of them is (the prayer) salah” (Hanbal, n.d.).223 
The tools used in the prophetic era expectedly only lasted a short duration of 30 years. After that, 
successive generations were tasked with enduring to re-implement legal ethics using different 
tools in different ages. Comparatively, they have been more successful than others have in 
certain epochs. However, in contemporary times, Muslims have failed and the amount of 
injustice now transpiring in the name of ‘Islam’ is arguably unprecedented, which would suggest 
that the tools being currently utilized need revisiting. This is especially relevant to the discourse 
on money. 
 
4.2.7 Natural Resources and the Commons 
 
Money has been treated differently in each epoch within Islamic legal thinking. 
Furthermore, in the Quran (2: 188; 4: 29; 4: 10 and 9: 34), there are generally only four ways that 
possessions can legitimately change hands, through inheritance (which requires legal 
enforcement), an exchange, a loan or a grant. All except the first require mutual consent. Islam 
                                                                                                                                                             
punishment” (VII.ii.1.10, p. 270), is the one on which I focus here. The second sense – justice as benevolence – is 
covered in my account of benevolence, and the third – justice as propriety – is covered in my account of propriety.  
These senses of justice are important for an overall account of Smithian “environmental justice.”  A treatment of 
justice with respect to the environment of the kind popular within the environmental justice movement would also 
be appropriate for that context.  But these discussions do not specifically involve sympathy with nature, so I leave 
them out here”. 
223 This appears in both in Musnad and a separate narration by Abu Omamah Albahily. It was prophesized as well 
that the Islamic system in Medina would fall, and that it would never be restored. If the authenticity of this narration 
is accepted then it would be an exercise in futility trying to recreate the exact economic program that was instituted 
by the Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص in Medina.  
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views money as a medium of exchange. Furthermore, the ‘time value of money’ is a view of 
money that distorts the exchange mechanism and amalgams it with riba. As an entity of 
exchange that must be made a neutral signifier, money cannot bear such demands being placed 
on it. Therefore, what scholars contemporarily need to investigate, identify and promote is 
money that serves as a neutral measurement that does not provide an unjust advantage to its 
producer, and that does not provide an unjust disadvantage to its user. 
Thus, considering newly available knowledge and context, the most benevolent 
understanding of money delineates it as a part of the commons.224 The commons are the cultural 
and natural resources accessible to all members of society in which a denotation of traditional 
rights exists. Money is an idea, hence, immaterial, imaginary, and intangible; it is only symbolic 
of approximate value that humans conceptualize. Money is also barren, and this is a key, salient 
feature. As an abstract concept, it similar to numbers, worthless without being attached to 
representative items.225  
Yet, money, like anything else that is a part of the commons, is perennially under threat 
of being abused by individuals maximizing their self-interest. Therefore, as a part of the 
commons in an efficient and moral economy, it is preferable that money should not have any 
intrinsic value whatsoever, regardless of the form it takes as decided by society, this is primarily 
                                                 
224 If we are to understand the prohibitions by looking for the higher objectives we can see that protecting human life 
is a fundamental component of the ‘preservation’ aspect of the ‘necessities’ category. Furthermore, human lives 
(souls; nufoos) are in jeopardy if the economic environment is predatory, nonfunctioning, usurious, or in any way 
unjust. With that in mind, the rationale behind the prohibition of fraud, monopoly and usury becomes abundantly 
manifest. The prohibitions seek a teleological prescription for creating a just economic sphere of human interaction. 
In fact, Al Shatibi would say that preserving the necessities is ultimately the “objective behind any revealed law”. 
225 To illustrate, we can imagine two chickens, and instead of saying “chicken, chicken” to describe the items, we 
can say “two chickens”. The number two is abstract whereas the chickens are not. We cannot monopolize or charge 
for the use of the number itself. Similarly, currency is only something that approximates the intangible. It is the 
means by which the abstract is represented, and likewise, the abstract may be exchanged for additional conceptual 




because it is detrimental to circulation. Again, if money does not circulate (with a high velocity), 
the results are damaging.  
 
4.2.8 Interest-free Credit Unions: Creating Alternative Currencies 
 
The key conflict about money is between two rivaling factions: (a) those intent on 
maintaining the money supply’s characterization as ‘a store of value’ and (b) those who want to 
‘monetize’ their market power (Ingham, 2004).226 However, there is an equitable way to 
democratize the money creation process, which is more in line with a normative ethical policy. 
In what is possibly an ironic reference, it is interesting that the father of anarchism, Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon, first proposed interest-free credit unions, something with the potential for providing 
such societal stability. However, numerous others have reached similar conclusions. Succinctly, 
credit money bears little to no opportunity cost whereas claims against money as commodities 
have the propensity to be expensive. Moreover, by definition, interest comprises two types of 
cost, opportunity cost and credit risk cost. The opportunity cost is the fee incurred in creating the 
said money, whether it is extracted in a sophisticated manner from the earth, or whether it is 
simply imputed into an electronic ledger by a bank employee. The latter is obviously cheaper. 
The credit risk cost is the legitimate amount needed to cover potential default on the loan. By 
insuring credit against credit risk, credit loses its opportunity cost. In this way, credit becomes 
money, or numeraire.  
                                                 
226 The danger of the second group is that it risks inflation and debasement of the public’s savings. It is indicative of 
the milieu from which it emerged. J. K. Galbraith was a Keynesian economist and a proponent of liberalism, he 
recognized money could be created free of charge, but he did not stand against compound interest. The prevailing 
concept of money is an abstract unit of measurement established and recorded in primarily debts and price lists.  
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Centralizing the credit insuring capabilities into an institution makes that institution a 
credit bank, or a credit union. The implications of credit money being free from opportunity cost 
are enormous because most of what interest comprises is the opportunity cost, which banks 
charge several times over as they compound the fees combined under one label, ‘interest’. 
Furthermore, with only the credit risk cost affecting the cost of credit money, loans are less likely 
to default in such a system because the payments are substantially less without the bulk of the 
interest (opportunity cost) being compounded into the payments. Thus, such a system ultimately 
costs even less as the risk of default decreases. 
Once this is identified polities need ways to implement such changes. Regarding 
implementation, governments, institutions and departments looking to study interest-free, 
alternative currencies, and mutual credit can consult numerous sustainability programs that have 
begun running tests and quantifying data regarding alternative credit systems. There are 
university departments that study the creation and maintenance of alternative currencies.227 
Furthermore, Bernard Lietaer has written extensively on the issue of complimentary currencies 
in The Future of Money (2001), which shows the evidence of how more public access to interest-
free money benefits economic systems. For instance, JAK Bank relends already existing tokens 
in a non interest-charging manner, which is effective. Because every dollar or pound in existence 
has been borrowed into existence at least one time, the interest still affects its circulation as a 
token. The likelihood, however, is that it has been borrowed several times afterwards, plus 
interest, which translates into even more pressure to pay existing debts on goods and services 
                                                 
227 For instance, one University of Cumbria graduate program focuses on building more sustainable models. These 
include economic ingenuity in the area of producing working regional currencies designed to facilitate the exchange 
of local goods and services without the attached usurious fees of debt-based money stifling progress. 
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because of various mounting interest fees. Hence, value is never static and it can erode from 
interest, but it can also result because of the volume of a money supply. 
 Another work cites an example of a regional currency at work in Switzerland’s WIR 
Bank, founded in 1934. It is a business exchange network that serves approximately 60,000 
businesses and consumers and provides mutual credit currency “by clearing positive and 
negative balances between members when they trade; backed by the promise to support local 
goods and services” (Kennedy, et al., 2012).  The authors concede that WIR’s turnover of 1.627 
billion Swiss francs is a drop in the bucket (.32% of Swiss GDP), but Professor James Stodder 
contends with a 98% probability that WIR’s cash free settlement system plays a role in 
Switzerland’s well-reputed economic stability (Kennedy, et al., 2012).  
Contemporarily, cyber-communities and monetary activists are also creating new 
currencies. One example of this is the appearance of different virtual currencies that have gained 
considerable traction around the globe. This coincides with the emergence of innovative forms of 
money and ‘cryptographic currencies’ which force people to rethink their conceptions of money. 
What these new innovations provide in the ways people can interact with each other in the 
market are possibilities that may lead to a revolution in the way people understand money; and 
with any good fortune, in the way wealth is ultimately distributed. So far, the Islamic response to 
this discourse has been dismal because many of the best minds are still unable to move beyond 
IBF (Maurer & Schwartz, 2013).228  
 
                                                 
228 However, these alternative currencies have been out for several years and the debates are raging again, about 
what defines money. This paper takes a look at the semiotics of these currencies; yet from the Islamic world, no in-
depth fatwas have been produced about the viability, ethicality and possibilities of not only bitcoin, feather-coin, 
quark (trending alternative currencies), or any crypto or alternative currencies in general. 
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4.2.9 Open Sourcing: Breaking the Monopoly 
 
When the commons fall under private ownership, it creates problems. Regarding the 
money supply, it is no different. This is where the legal limitations of natural resources should be 
checked by any decent legal system. Breathable air, bodies of water and access to credit should 
not be privatized in ways that unfairly exclude people (Nomani & Rahnema, 1994).229 On the 
bright side, the world’s five billion poor have an emerging opportunity to mobilize and reclaim 
some collective buying power in the near future through the open source movement as detailed 
by Ahmed (2014).230 The monopoly on money creation is only one aspect of hegemony that the 
capitalist paradigm sustains. Islamic ethics should be utilized in order to lobby against all such 
monopolies including the monopolies on knowledge, which is kept under wraps through patents 
for medicines and inventions that, if open-sourced, could quantifiably alleviate suffering. Similar 
to the credit issue, medicines, for instance, are patented by rearranging isotopes and relabeling 
old products to be then re-marketed as new. Thus, open sourcing knowledge, including money, 
provides endless opportunities (BBC, 2010).231  
 
                                                 
229 By extension, many Islamic scholars today argue that this includes resources like vast mineral and oil deposits. 
From pp. 66-70 the discussion centers on how some scholars prohibit the privatization of numerous items that would 
all be considered the commons such as, inhabitable land, water, mines and etc. 
230 Ahmed writes, “The collective buying power of the five billion poor is four times that of the one billion rich 
according to the late Harvard business thinker Prof C. K. Prahalad – open source everything is about the five billion 
poor coming together to reclaim their collective wealth and mobilize it to transform their lives. There is zero chance 
of the revolution being put down. Public agency is emergent, and the ability of the public to literally put any bank or 
corporation out of business overnight is looming”. 
231 India for instance, is now producing a $35 computer, with plans for its price to come down to $10. All of these 
aspects of monopoly coincide ideologically. The monopoly issue is expansive. There is a great theological and 
philosophical difference, and grand implications between enforcing copyright laws on knowledge and allowing 
people to have trademarks. One justifiably distinguishes a person’s work and reputation from others, while the other 
monopolizes knowledge. Further research needs to investigate these issues with an ethical eye, especially the way 





In conclusion, creating an environment wherein transactions take place by utilizing a 
reliable and just measurement of exchange requires nothing other than public demand. The 
public must articulate what it wants in its discourse, which then shapes the relative knowledge 
and axioms identified as truths in communities (Van Dijk, 2012). In 7th century Medina, we can 
see that it took years to develop an understanding that riba was not a healthy part of an economic 
system, and so gradually, the polity moved towards a more equitable arrangement. It is clear that 
the study of political economy cannot be isolated and studied as a positivist science because in 
this fashion, ethics are thereby rendered obsolete; thus, corrective policies need to integrate the 
self-interest postulate into ‘what should be scenarios’ rather than the emphasis on ‘this is how it 
is’ quantifications. Studies continuously show that simply studying economics at university leads 
to becoming greedier, less virtuous and less likely to donate to charities (Gilovich & Regan, 
1993).232 This speaks volumes about how curriculum and policy design have gone seriously 
wrong in the field. 
If interest-free mortgages and loans were available and managed properly, the need for 
interest-bearing loans would almost disappear. This means people need equitable access to 
interest-free credit. However, the implementation of any laws prohibiting certain interest charges 
needs to be pragmatic and take into consideration the possible short-term transitional economic 
effects (Badawi, 2002 ).233In addition, societies cannot be forced into viewing interest as 
                                                 
232 It was revealed over two decades ago that studying economics makes people greedier and less likely to donate to 
charity. Several studies aim at revealing similar characteristics. This shows that economics students view greed as 
‘generally good’ after sustained study of it. This is normal because other research shows that people are influenced 
by groupthink the longer they remain committed to identifying themselves with the group and so the discipline of 
economics is no different. 
233 Dr. Jamal Badawi writes that “An ideal civilization requires two elements:  
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something that would play a smaller role in the economy. Polities have to negotiate these 
arrangements based on available information. This requires certain spheres to initiate ethical 
movements that can be modeled. In the West, much of the previously created legislation has 
attempted to offset imbalances in society in terms of socioeconomic injustice. However, there are 
ways to do this more effectively, which need base support, and a reevaluation of the role of 
interest is a crucial part of many potential platforms. As Ramadan asserts, Muslims need to find 
ways they can mobilize under common principles that seek common outcomes within their 
multicultural societies.  
If the pressing issues of today are to be addressed, policy-oriented legislation has to be 
informed by axioms that take into consideration the present context. At this time, the most 
pertinent corrective policies should create axioms that seek to return some equity to a system 
imbalanced by many factors, of which, riba features at the top of the list. Some of these re-
imagined axioms, informed by a maqasid perspective should generally encompass the following: 
 
a. Legitimate Access to Credit: reforming the right for people to access their own credit 
through localized interest-free cooperatives that assess a person’s credit profile, risks, 
assets, collateral, and investment intentions, which safeguard against default but 
minimize the opportunity-cost charges (compound interest).  
b. Checking Debt: without compound interest, debt does not grow. In the spirit of 
responsible debt-forgiveness there should be processes implemented to facilitate 
greater forgiveness of legitimately unrepayable long-term debts rather than creating 
                                                                                                                                                             
1) Divine guidance, which gives it a firm foundation, an incentive and a framework, which gives progress a sense of 
direction and an ethical orientation. 2) Secondly, an ideal civilization requires hard work, creativity and dynamism 
(not just wishful thinking or boasting past glories)”. The Quran first urged the releasing of slaves (releasing on 
necks- fakkoo raqabah) (90:13). 
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industries that aggressively collect debts, which are often punitive and detrimental to 
poor nations (Nili, 2004).234 
c. Promoting Ethical Investment: saving money is not wrong, but to make saving the 
default behavior of all economic participants because they are entitled to an interest 
payment leads to negative effects. Money cannot circulate if it is parked intentionally. 
This concept is reemphasized by the fact that a major pillar of Islam is paying the 
poor-tax (zakat), acting sort of like a reverse-interest tax (demurrage) on wealth 
(Murtaza & Ghazanfar, 1998).235  
 
The creation of axioms can continue endlessly as can the creation of goals and outcomes 
in the same regard. However, polities should engage in the consultative process regarding any 
prospective policies so that they become legitimate products of the political process, which is 
cumulatively a summary of negotiations. With enough grassroots support, policies embodying 
economic justice can be implemented, although it should be cautioned that benefactors of 




                                                 
234 A benevolent loan (qard hasan) foregoes any interest from the borrower and by such a gracious act, the lender is 
eligible for receiving a blessing from God. The prohibition of riba makes the lender forego the interest even though 
the lender may have a preference to receive his money back earlier rather than later. Loaning is different from actual 
business. 
235 If money diminishes in value via demurrage or zakat, it encourages circulation and investment, and prevents 
hoarding. Zakat: is a small wealth tax, which must be paid yearly, on savings, which has historically been 2.5%. 
Hoarding is condemned in the Quran, “O you who have believed, indeed many of the scholars and the monks devour 
the wealth of people unjustly and avert [them] from the way of Allah. And those who hoard gold and silver and 
spend it not in the way of Allah – give them tidings of a painful punishment” (9:34). Interestingly, the meaning of 
this verse was understood within a broader context in Medina. Ibn Umar claims that the verse was revealed before 
the legislation of zakat was revealed and that once a person has purified their wealth through paying the poor tax 
they are free to hoard it. However, the greater context of the Quran seems to trump that. The Quran shuns 
extravagance in Quran chapter 17:26-7.  
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CHAPTER 5: RECONTEXTUALIZING THE FACTORS BEHIND THE ISLAMIZATION OF 
BANKING 
 
“There will certainly come a time for humankind when everyone will take riba, and if he does 




Islam’s prohibition of riba comprehensively denounces moneylending as a for-profit 
enterprise, “Allah has permitted trade and has prohibited usury/interest” (2:275) (Ibn Majah, 
2007, p. 2274).236 It is significant then, that the 20th century witnessed the creation of private for-
profit institutions that lent ‘Islamic’ credibility to moneylending as a business. This chapter 
reexamines the unsatisfactory historical account of descriptive discourse, which contextualizes 
the emergence of IBF in the 1970s. It tries to backdate the discussion and cover a large territory 
of history belonging to the modern period. It would seem from the onset that Islam and 
capitalism are non-complementary paradigms – one based on emphasizing moral restraint in life, 
including market dealings – and the other – emphasizing uninhibited wealth seeking via any 
                                                 
236 The Prophet ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص elaborated upon the inclusive prohibition by adding that it is comprehensive of every type of 
unlawful increase in trade that is potentially exploitative. “Riba (usury/interest) has 73 manifestations (bab), the 
least serious being equivalent to a many fornicating with his mother”. Riba does not simply mean interest, for riba is 
any unlawful increase and encompasses all of the superfluous aspects of moneylending, rendering them all criminal 
acts. The argument that limits riba to mean only bank interest is a modern, one-dimensional rendering of the term. 
Exploitation can manifest in many different unfair agreements, both unilateral decisions as well as terms between 
stronger and weaker parties; speculation, unfairly low wages etc. This narration is not isolated; it is also found in 
Abu Dawud, Kitab al-Buyu’, Bab fi ijtinabi al-shubuhat. 
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feasible means (Kuhn, 1970).237 Hence, the framing of capitalism and banking has clearly been 
profound if Muslims have accepted this paradigm. So the pivotal question guiding this chapter is 
what are the wider sociopolitical, socioeconomic and power-influenced factors behind the 
formation, rise, trajectory and scope of IBF? 
The first section is dedicated to examining why Muslims adopted the amoral capitalist 
system’s assumptions and infrastructure, including its interest and debt-based banking 
mechanisms. It covers the disintegration of Muslim empires concurrent with the simultaneous 
crisis of Islamic thought amongst Muslims that included a dearth in mastery over Western 
economic thought and discourse. The second section covers the discourse and history of Western 
hegemony as enormous financial and political powers were vested in the United States after 
WWII, and the ideologies underpinning the discourse of neoliberalism. The third section covers 
the significant ‘Muslim’ response to all of this phenomena, which reacted concertedly by 
developing the Islamic Moral Economy (IME) and then Islamic Banking and Finance (IBF). 
 
5.0.2 A Brief History of IBF 
 
In December of 1973, a meeting held in Jeddah, KSA named the “Conference of Finance 
Ministers of Muslim Countries” convened regarding economic issues. The resultant agreements 
born therein resonated and developed into an inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors in 
July of 1975, and shortly thereafter, in December of 1975, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
                                                 
237 The term paradigm here is used in the Kuhnian sense, signifying an over-arching episteme. 
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was opened.238 The advertised and stated purpose of the bank abides until today, as “[To] foster 
the economic development and social progress of member countries and Muslim communities 
individually as well as jointly in accordance with the principles of Shari’ah i.e., Islamic Law” 
(Islamic Development Bank, 2014). Immediately thereafter, the Dubai Islamic Bank, the first 
commercial ‘Islamic’ bank, opened in 1975.  
From that point on, the amount of institutions realizing significant returns became a 
growing phenomenon within the market, increasing across the globe. Nowadays, there are 
‘Islamic’ banking windows at many of the world’s biggest banks, all keen on utilizing the rare 
opportunity of drawing traditionally apprehensive Muslim customers to the market, most of 
whom are oblivious to the mechanics of the transactions. In 2002, it was estimated there were 
over “250 establishments” worldwide offering some type of related ‘Islamic’ services (Zaher & 
Hassan, 2002, p. 167). By 2009, the number reached 300 (The Economist, 2009). The IBF 
market was approximately worth $1 trillion per year by 2000, it doubled in the period of 2012-
2014; and still at .5% of the global market, it has a projected market potential of $4 trillion 
annually (Standard and Poor's, 2012). IBF has become a complete discipline, taught in business 
schools at prestigious universities. The standard narrative in IBF literature accepts that there have 
been shortcomings and that the social aims of its initial axioms have not been achieved (Asutay, 
2012). Nevertheless, the standard narrative extant in IBF literature touts the sustained existence 
of the industry as a colossal achievement for Muslims (IOSCO, 2004).  
The IBF institutions were declaratively supposed to restructure the manner in which the 
interest-based global banking system operated in Muslim-majority nations where people yearned 
                                                 
238 The Islamic Development Bank was founded in December of 1973 by the Organization of the Islamic 




to distance their transactions away from iniquity. Yet, as Asutay (2012) notes, honest analyses of 
the actual operations have somberly disclosed that, “The transformation of Islamic banking into a 
commercial banking form since mid-1975 has resulted in unprecedentedly successful financial 
performance, which, however, has been at the expense of the ‘social and economic 
developmentalist’ aspirations of Islamic moral economy” (p. 93). In many ways, like traditional 
banks, the IBF industry is also predatory; however, the clientele is not necessarily exploited 
based on its societal class. Rather, it is an exploitation that capitalizes on religious-minded 
people who are both interested in avoiding what they believe is riba, and naïve about what 
actually hides within the fine print of the contracts (El-Gamal, 2006).  
The conventional narrative continues that IBF first started in an acephalous manner, 
originally emerging as a banking experiment in Mit Ghamr, Egypt, then as another two isolated 
and organic incidents in Pakistan and Malaysia (Kahf, 2004).239 Furthermore, it is narrated that 
the political and ideological impetus for the industry was made at the request of the “Algerian, 
Somali and Saudi Arabian heads of state”. This, according to Kahf, was allegedly in response to 
three very significant events; the Arab oil embargo (1973), the Yom Kippur War, and the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement (1971), which had set the monetary global order since 
WW II (2004, p. 19). Furthermore, it follows that the leading impetus for the industry was the 
alliance formed between Muslim financiers and Shariah scholars because the latter had long been 
                                                 
239 There are conflicting versions of how the first bank started and ended. According to Kahf, Najjar’s Mit Ghamr 
Saving House was inspired by the German interest-free banking model. Kahf notes that Najjar himself mentions this 
in his Harkat Al Bunuk Al Islamiya (1993, p. 32). He says he “started it in disguise of a saving bank using the name 
of a European government so that his step might succeed amid the interest based banks as it was a time when 
opposition to Islamic trend was at the peak”. He furthermore claims it was successful, which revealed its Islamic 
nature and that after that was exposed he was forced by the government of Egypt to merge it. Najjar was the nephew 
of Muhammad Abdullah al-Arabi one of the pioneers in arguing for an Islamic economics and banking movement. 
The late Egyptian secular political commentator Sami Soliman argued that the first bank was unsuccessful and 
liquidated in 1973. However, he also generally railed against Islamic identity politics and other Islamic sensibilities 
without much trepidation. In contrast, Kahf says it was closed and liquidated in 1967 due to its success, a threat to 
state power; Kahf says this prompted Gamal Abdul Nasser to open the Nasser Socialist Bank (NSB) in 1971.  
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sidelined from political participation and yearned to “reestablish their voices” in the realm of 
Islamic influence through advising the designers of a new ‘Islamic’ system (p. 32).  
However, even this chronological explanation of events – which stands out among IBF 
literature of an ordinarily very limited scope regarding much sociopolitical context (because it is 
designated to the study of business and economics) – disregards the immense influence of the 
power paradigm and the ideological currents that precipitated IBF’s emergence. It presents IBF 
as some type of organic Islamic experiment rather than a candid transcription of an industry 
erected as an accommodation to power, a depiction that begins to emerge once the discourse and 
history are reframed and contextualized.  
 
5.0.3 Reframing the Context of ‘Islamic’ Banking  
 
From utilizing an interdisciplinary perspective, and by reframing the historical context 
and associated religious and political influences, this chapter tackles what I consider the most 
important underlying factors behind ‘Islamic’ banking’s emergence:  
1. A vacuum created by the collapse of the Muslim political world order that had 
prohibited usury for over a millennium, which was supplanted by the colonial 
introduction of a new paradigm and its institutions that required dependence on 
interest, debt and subservience to a consumption and growth-based model. 
2. A new economic order of neoliberal economics manifested into the power 
vested in the post-World War United States through petrodollar hegemony; this 
hegemony engaged the oil-producing Muslim-majority countries in a manner 
that restrained the scope of their possible reactions. 
3. The rise of certain strands of Islamic reformist thought leading to various ends 
such as Islamic esotericism and utilitarianism produced decontextualized macro 
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evaluations of banking that facilitated the adoption of capitalism’s non-
complimentary institutions.  
4. The lack of political support for the moral framework being developed in IME, 
which led to a scrambled effort in religiously sanctioning banking by 
‘Islamizing’ it. 
 
The narrative most germane to the internal discussion that took place within Muslim 
polities in the Middle East during the 20th century is not only how Muslims perceived their 
Islamic identity merging with the dominant economic ideologies, dialectics and political 
formations (of both socialism and or capitalism). Nor is the method of that type of inquiry 
sufficient in grasping a systematic macro understanding of the IBF phenomena. Because there 
must be recognition that business models with the potential of generating trillions of dollars like 
IBF, do not emerge by osmosis, and that often, the institutional facilitation of such machinations 
are in some way manifestations submerged within spheres of power. As Niall Ferguson (2003) 
writes, “These days the tools for projecting power are more varied and dispersed than ever. And 
as the clout of terrorist networks, diplomatic alliances and international financiers seems to 
expand, lasting global supremacy may hinge on the skillful deployment of an increasingly 
elusive resource: moral authority” (p. 21). Capitalism has long held that moral authority and its 
proponents have presented economics as a value-neutral science for generations in discourse. 
Although that narrative is now being vociferously challenged, vituperated and systematically 
deconstructed by the realization that science can no longer be detached from ethics, its 
institutional vestiges remain entrenched in every sphere of modern economic life.  
 






Discussing the Ottoman Empire is contentious as it, like all empires, had its misconducts, 
which historians have documented (De Bellaigue, 2001). On the other hand, the empire did have 
its successes, including an unsurpassed level of stability and harmony amongst a multicultural 
and multi-faith society. At its zenith (15th – 16th c.), it was only one of several greater regional 
powers. Commencing the chronicle of IBF here is tactful primarily because the Ottoman Empire 
was the last power with institutional opposition to interest for reasons informed by Islam. 
Furthermore, it presided over lands under its suzerainty that would later become Arab nation-
states; thus, its disintegration was significant in creating a vacuum of fertile ground for pro-
interest policies.  
 
5.1.1 Ottoman Empire: The Sick Man of Europe 
 
Historians classify the economic history of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1923) into two 
periods: (a) an expansionary period, and then, (b) a reformative and contracting era of decline 
(Howard, 2001). The Ottoman Empire is another example of how debilitating the strategic 
utilization of debt and interest employed as geopolitical and tactical weapons can be on a nation. 
In this case, debt and interest played pivotal roles in collapsing the largest and longest-lasting 
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Muslim empire, deducing it to what some later mockingly called the “Sick Man of Europe” (De 
Bellaigue, 2001).240 
The Ottomans utilized a fiscal policy termed fiscalism in political science, meaning that 
government budgets influenced economic activity whereby taxation and spending existed as the 
two mechanisms used to create stability, the distribution of resources and income, and levels of 
(aggregate) demand. A cosmopolitan and successful multicultural society, the empire was known 
for its strong manufacturing base and just wages, negotiated by a strong guild system.  
Much of its decline can be attributed to economic reasons, primary of which was the late 
Ottoman implementation of trade embargos, and even later, its involvement with interest (Inalcik 
& Quataert, 1994).241 Indisputably, European imperialists had been looting gold and silver in the 
violent savaging of the Americas and using it to buy up the Ottoman market (Zarlenga, 2002). 
The sudden appearance of an overabundance of gold and silver created massive inflation with 
seemingly unlimited new sources of money chasing after limited supplies of Ottoman raw and 
manufactured goods constrained by the obvious natural and human limitations of production 
(Barkan & McCarthy, 1975).242  
                                                 
240 It is claimed that this epithet was started by Tsar Nicolas I of Russia in the lead up the Crimean War (1853) 
because it had fallen to “decrepitude” and was a “Sick Man”. This is how it appeared in a letter from Sir George 
Hamilton Seymour, British ambassador to Lord John Russell in St. Petersburg. 
241 On 245 and 246, it is mentioned that the Ottomans had a long history with trade embargos. For instance, Selim I 
used it as a weapon against Iran’s Shah Abbas I (1587-1629) starting in 1514, which lasted for only a few years until 
his son Suleyman I (1520-1566) tried to repair and revive the economic trade routes that his father had debilitated. 
Iran was keen on working with the Dutch and British who sought to undermine Ottoman trade routes to the East, 
their claim being that the tariffs were too high at ports. Iranian Abbas’ plan was ‘to divert the silk route from the 
Ottoman territory to the Indian Ocean’ by working with the English and the Dutch, imperialists who had established 
dominance in the region at that time through impressive navies.   
242 Some economic historians have argued that this rate of inflation was as high as 500 and 600 percent, caused by 
the influx of gold and silver stolen from the Americas. However, some have disputed this as the primary cause, 
citing the monetary theory that the high velocity of money caused the price rises, and even though this phenomenon 
subsided in the 19th century. Therefore, the argument seems very weak. 
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Moreover, Ottoman citizens had grown accustomed to high standards of living, provided 
by a consistent government and the protection of worker’s rights that guilds supplied. As a tactic 
for dealing with the inflation, the Ottomans, feeling outmaneuvered, instituted financial 
embargos against the West, which turned out to be a critical blunder (Karahasanoglu, 2009).243 
For this only led to the abundance of black markets that skillfully circumvented public policies, 
which in turn, only led to the spread of corruption and the wide-acceptance of bribe taking by 
public officials (Herzog, 2003).  
Ultimately, the over-influx of new money led to extreme destabilization for the 
Ottomans. Things would slowly reverse, and the Ottomans would stop producing, ending up as 
debtors and pure consumers of European products. One historian writes of the growing European 
influence in economic policies, “the guilds…also fell to new laissez fair economic policies. The 
Anglo-Turkish convention of 1838 and the Tanzimat decree of 1839 formally established a 
policy of free trade and removed the longstanding protections of domestic manufacturers” 
(Quataert, 2000, p. 232). By 1860, Lewis Farley’s exclamation after a visit was that “Turkey is 
no longer a manufacturing country” (Islamogu-Inan, 2004, p. 377). In addition, there was a rapid 
contraction of the empire subsiding with continuous military defeats; the major events were the 
losses to the Russian Catherine the Great in 1774, followed by the other tremendous loss to 
Napoleon in Egypt during 1798 (Howard, 2001).  
 
5.1.2 Imperialists Bring Interest and Debt to the Ottomans 
 
                                                 




Between 1854 and 1881, the Ottoman Empire suffered the most tumultuous period in its 
relations with European powers. Douglas Howard’s The History of Turkey (2001) marks the 
debilitating event as “when the Ottoman Empire first entered into loan contracts with European 
creditors” (p.71).244 Because prior to 1850 the Ottomans had never had to borrow money, and 
their policy was against entering into deficit spending (Pamuk, 1984). Throughout their history, 
the Ottomans articulated their cognizance of its associated dangers – knowledge both learned 
from history and inspired by Islam (Anderson, 1964 ). However, European financiers had long 
been keen on entangling the empire in debt (Clay, 2001).245 At the outset, the interest rate offered 
was low and European demands over Ottoman economic affairs remained sporadic and 
seemingly inconsequential, this gave the Ottomans an initial feeling that they had retained viable 
control over their affairs. 
However, as compound interest tends to, beginning in 1863, the interest rates 
exponentially increased. By 1873, the interest rate on the European loans to the Ottomans 
averaged 11.5%, which was “the highest rate in the history of Ottoman foreign borrowing” 
(Birdal, 2010, p. 37). There was a hurried attempt at debasing the currency, and then as that was 
rendered ineffective, an attempt at creating fiat currency, but to no avail (Clay, 2001). 
Discernibly, very soon thereafter the Ottomans declared bankruptcy on October 6, 1875. As 
Professor of Turkish history Edhem Eldem (2005) describes the scenario, the bankruptcy did the 
following: 
… [It] resulted in the collapse of the entire system in one of the most spectacular 
financial crashes of the period. It was only six years later, in 1881, that a solution 
was found in the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration that 
                                                 
244 The study surveys the history of what is known today as ‘Turkey’ from the Neolithic age to the Byzantine age, 
then up until 1923 and the birth of the secular revolution. 
245 Deficit spending refers to a government spending more than it can collect from taxes; the Ottomans were 
experiencing plummeting taxes. 
206 
 
would control a large portion of state revenues. The new system restored the 
financial stability of the Empire, but profoundly modified its rapports de force 
with Europe by imposing on it a form of foreign control that would have been 
unthinkable only ten or twenty years earlier. While bringing a much-needed 
stability to the flailing Ottoman financial situation and thus opening the way to 
economic development, the new system also radically changed the very nature of 
the process of integration, by introducing an imperialist dimension that had been 
lacking in the previous decades (p. 1).  
 
5.1.3 Nationalism, Interest and Debt Spreads to the Arabs 
 
The Ottomans had been outmaneuvered, which resulted in them losing their political and 
economic sovereignty. However, as the American historian Will Duran has said, “A great 
civilization is not conquered from without until it has destroyed itself from within” (Durant, 
2011).246 Hence, although it was not the only empire competing for power in the Muslim world, 
and furthermore, it is not the primary focus of this research, the importance of its financial ruin 
here is significant largely because much of the Arab world was under its suzerainty (Quataert, 
2000).247 Therefore, the collapse of the empire created a power-vacuum and crisis in the Muslim 
world. Hence, the general trend of debt permeated whereby Arab provinces formerly under 
Ottoman suzerainty also succumbed to accepting interest-bearing loans, and thereby similarly 
treaded the path towards bankruptcy soon thereafter, ushering in the new imperialist banking 
infrastructure. Egypt, for instance, received its first loan, arranged by the British-backed Herman 
                                                 
246 Durant was commenting on the fall of Rome, but the comparison is relevant. 
247 There were several regional powers in Europe, which challenged the Ottomans, and their alliance with the 
Germans and the Austro Hungarian Empire led to their defeat in the Great War because they opposed by the Serbs 
who were allied with Russia, France and the UK. We see that Europe gained an upper hand financially in various 
research. Quataert adds, “By the late eighteenth century the trend toward export of raw materials rather than finished 
cloth to European markets also created supply problems for the Ottoman textile industry….among the many goods 
considered strategic, hence controlled, were textiles….the guilds…also fell to new laissez fair economic policies. 
The Anglo-Turkish convention of 1838 and the Tanzimat decree of 1839 formally established a policy of free trade 
and removed the longstanding protections of domestic manufacturers” (p. 230). 
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Oppenheim and company in 1862, approved by Said Pasha under contemptible terms, which 
subsequently resulted in Egyptian state bankruptcy in 1876 (Borisovich, 1969).248 The British 
then opportunely occupied Egypt and seized the Suez Canal in 1882 with the backing of Lord 
Rothschild (Robinson, et al., 1961).249 Likewise, Tunisia’s steps mimicked the others and its 
bankruptcy occurred in 1868.  
Whether it is accurate or not, the narrative put forth by many Orientalist historians is that 
Arabs in Ottoman provinces are thought to have been alarmed by rising Ottoman nationalism, 
which was ushered in by the 1908 Young Turk Movement (Shlaim, 2008).250 Precipitating its 
own collapse, the British Empire had nefariously capitalized through a divide-and-conquer 
stratagem as colonial opportunists throughout the world (Kayali, 1997).251 Their presence in the 
Middle East was of a similar nature. Historians further argue that the British had long been keen 
on breaking up the Ottoman Empire with aspirations of accessing resources, trade routes and the 
political capital they provided. In addition, as a strategy the British simultaneously backed both 
Abdulaziz Ibn Saud (1876-1953) and his local rival Sharif Hussain (1854-1931) in the Arabian 
Peninsula, duplicitously promising them both the same kingdom (The Hejaz) upon the 
                                                 
248 This event was precipitated by the 1875 bankruptcy of the Ottoman debt, which shocked the confidence in Arab 
debts in the stock market in Europe. The author discusses this, specifically in Chapter 15 “The Financial 
Enslavement of Egypt”. Although it is Marxist in its leanings, the depiction of loan amounts and details regarding 
the stipulations is well documented. 
249 The mainstream interpretation of this imperialist tactic was challenged by University of Birmingham’s A.G. 
Hopkins who argues Egypt’s canal was of less importance than the tropical African possibilities and the prevention 
of certain economic formations.  
250 Page 2 discusses this notion that even the Sharif of Mecca was previously loyal to the Ottoman Empire; but that 
his son convinced him to seek the aid of the British’s Lord Kitchner in establishing an “Arab state” that 
simultaneously recognized him as the Caliph. The Sharif would later get impatient with the British and precipitate 
their stipulations.  He personally declared a holy war against the Ottomans within the framework of a secular 
nationalistic revolt (known as the Arab Revolt of 1916). The Orientalist narrative maintains however that the Arabs 
were sick and tired of years of Turkish abuse. 
251 The Lebanese-British historian Albert Hourani (d. 1993) succinctly inscribed that “We know by now something 
of what the British thought about the Arabs, and what Arabs thought about the British Turks, but what the Turks, 
and in particular the Turks of the Committee of Union and Progress, thought about the Arabs is still largely an 
unanswered question” (p.1). However, Islam-centric depictions of the era differ on the levels of Arab 
objectionableness to Ottoman rule. Kayali also discusses perceptions that Arabs may have had towards Ottoman rule 
by looking at and examining Ottoman policies, which clearly favored Turks over Arabs in administrative issues. 
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dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.252 The British furthermore instigated much of the tumult that 
ensued during the 20th century through their “deceptive and conflicting pledges to Arabs, and 
Zionists” (Kayali, 1997, p. 3).  
 
5.1.4 Interest Banking Institutionalized in Saudi Arabia 
 
The institutionalization of interest and banking policies in Arab states follows a pattern of 
colonial proposition and pliant nation state acceptance. This means that the capitalist 
infrastructure was transferred in a largely un-negotiated manner to the Muslim world. As former 
Ottoman provinces adopted Arab nationalism somewhat indiscriminately, World War I spawned 
the ushering in of many new regimes across the Middle East, regimes that all retained economic 
ties and the backing of imperial forces, without exception. Ibn Saud (1876-1953) managed to 
consolidate power during that period (1912-1925), signing a furtive alliance “treaty” in 1915, 
effectively installing the Saudi monarchy. Ibn Saud later “assumed control” over the two holy 
cities in a rogue fashion (Mecca and Medina) in 1933 (Zepezauer, 2003, p. 110). Eijk (2010) 
discloses, “Saudi Arabia, after all, had adopted little to no Western legislation, with one 
exception being the Ottoman Code of Commerce of 1850. The Code, based on the 1807 French 
Commercial Code, was stripped of all references to interest and implemented in the Hejaz in 
1931 in adjusted form” (italics mine) (p. 145). Islamic law is strongly against riba, and at that 
time the local Shariah courts in the Hejaz were still reticent about “accepting or implementing” 
the proposed secular laws (Vogel & Hayes, 1998, p. 285). An agreement had still not been 
                                                 
252 Sharif Hussein’s progeny received Transjordan, later Jordan whereas the Al Saud clan received the Hejaz. 
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reached amongst the scholarly class about whether all bank interest constituted riba. 
Nevertheless, in 1932 the Najd region and the Hejaz were both conglomerated into the nation-
state known as Saudi Arabia, and most notably, legislation was put in place to tolerate an 
economic order built on the interest-based model. According to the colonial forces, Abdulaziz 
Ibn Saud proved to be a “masterful tribal politician” and despite resistance from within, the 
interest-banking infrastructure was allowed to remain (Eijk, 2010, p. 145).  
 
5.1.5 Saudi Arabia and State Religion 
 
The religious doctrine promoted by 18th century religious campaigner Ibn Abdulwahab 
(1701-1793) was adopted by the tribes of Arabia after the Abdulwahab family united with the 
Al-Saud tribe and violently conquered many areas of the peninsula. Abdulwahab is a 
controversial figure, seen by some as a reformer and by others as an extremist and heretic 
(Commins, 2006).253 Its dissidents continuously claim the Islamic creed enforced by the state of 
Saudi Arabia (Wahhabism) employs policies based on religious interpretations at variance with 
the scholastic Islamic understandings of tolerance and mercy, that at times are observably 
“antithetical to the ethos of the Muslim world” in several regards (Zuhur, 2005, p. 14).  
The crux of the matter is that supporters of Abdulwahab followed a train of thought 
uncritically attributed to medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) of Harran, who preached in 
Damascus. Ibn Taymiyyah had declared takfeer (apostasy) against the invading groups of 
                                                 
253 Commins discusses how the state is seen as the third established in a succession of their pre-modern sequential 
history whereby in their narrative is comprised of events being the first proclaimed in 1795, which is then lost to 
Ottoman control in 1818, and is then finally regained in the 1830s under the same ideological banner. Wahhabism is 
used in a pejorative sense; it is more politely referred to as a branch of Salafism, or as the Najdi da’wa. 
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Mongols of his time and by virtue declared violence against them and anyone sympathetic to 
them as sanctioned (Ibn Abdulwahhab & Ibn Hasanin, n.d.).254 Ibn Taymiyyah had struggled 
with the issue of whether the invading Mongolian forces were truly Muslims, since they 
outwardly proclaimed the faith but were still committed to certain behaviors, legal practices and 
military campaigns against Muslim populations (Aigle, 2007).255 Ibn Taymiyyah eventually 
advocated that fighting them was morally justifiable, despite their profession to the faith, by 
arguing that their actions had taken them out of the fold of Islam, in three well-known fatwas 
against Mongol forces (Khan, 2005). 
Likewise, Abdulwahab sought to sanction fighting against those he deemed outside of the 
fold of Islam, even if they outwardly professed their belief in Islam (Green, 2009).256 Although 
this line of thinking is attributed to Ibn Taymiyyah, it is a misreading of his works and a 
misapprehension of his context because Abdulwahab’s followers declared takfeer against those 
who differed in creedal beliefs of tawheed (Islamic monotheism) even though they were not 
                                                 
254 Ibn Abdulwahab’s creedal position is made most abundantly clear in the very first opening part of Risālah Aslu 
Dīn Al-Islām wa Qā’idatuhu (n.d.). The English commentary written by his grandson Shaykh Abdur-Rahmān ibn 
Hasanin quotes the first page where Abdulwahhab states all of the various types of people he declares disbelievers, 
an anathematization of numerous types of Muslims. He writes, “The worst of them in opposition is the one who 
opposes all of this. And among the people is the one who worships Allāh alone but he has not rejected shirk and 
does not show enmity toward its people. And among them is the one who shows them enmity but does not declare 
takfīr upon them. And among them is the one who does not love tawhīd nor does he hate it. And among them is the 
one who declares takfīr upon them (the Muslims) and claims that this (tawhīd) is cursing at the righteous” (p.1). The 
text later makes explicit anathematization of certain people by name. 
255 Ibn Taymiyya’s three fatwas against the Mongols date back to three Mongol invasions of Mamluk Syria in 1299-
1303. The first justification for fighting the Mongols was their invasion of Little Armenia in 1298; the second being 
their non Shariah-compliant behavior in Mardin in June 1299. Overall the justification for fighting them was 
equating them to Khawarij, apostates (murtaddun) and because they were capturing Mamluk prisoners and forcing 
them to fight with them. 
256 The theological issue of apostasy has been furtively discussed in the classical period due to the destructive 
experience of the khawarij, an Islamic sect of fanatics from the early Islamic period that fought against the Prophet’s 
family members. In the first chapter, Green cites the numerous classical opinions on the khawarij, and what it was 
that forced the classical scholars to excommunicate them. The Quran references the notion that the wider 
community, Islamic and otherwise, will perennially differ on issues, “And if your Lord had willed, He could have 
made mankind one community; but they will not cease to differ” (Quran 11:118). The treatment here is not to 
anathematize the Salafi doctrine as entirely debauched, but to point out and recognize that politically it has been 
used as the tool for violence and dissoluteness in numerous circumstances, while simultaneously being promulgated 
as the only true doctrine of Islamic legitimacy. 
211 
 
guilty of the real crime, which was the military invasion of Muslim lands. Hence, the argument 
was based on creedal disputations alone. Abdulwahab’s contemporaries criticized the fanaticism 
he and his followers exhibited as well as their unrepentant disregard for the sanctity of Muslims, 
their traditions, histories and properties (El Fadl, 2007).  
In addition to the sectarianism, Alexei Vassiliev’s (1998) The History of Saudi Arabia 
points out that Wahhabism was utilized instrumentally as a banner of the Arab nationalist 
movement in order to galvanize Arabs against all Ottoman influence in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Muslim Arabs were able to contort an exegetical commentary that legitimately anathematized 
Muslim Turks and extricated them as non-Muslims, therefore legitimizing violent resistance 
against the Ottoman Empire. Quite remarkably, this was done with the aid of the British, an 
empire infamous for historically recurrent displays of violent and ruthless imperialism.  
In that period the Islamic message of unity was replaced with a causus belum for violent 
rebellion against Ottoman leadership, serving as a rallying call for trampling the Caliphate in the 
name of nationalism (Al-Kahtani, 2004).257 The Muslim world thereafter remained in much 
disarray politically, socially, economically, and vulnerable to all encroaching hegemons. Saudi 
Arabia’s lack of a sophisticated economic protectionist policy, its full adoption of economic 
legislation embedded with interest policies foreign to Islam, and its dearth of politically and 
                                                 
257 Saudi Arabian scholars have constructed a cautious narrative regarding how Ibn Saud formulated the British 
relationship. Al-Kahtani’s thesis (2004) depicts this transaction in the following manner: “There were no changes in 
his relationship with the British until 1910 when a meeting took place between him and Captain Shakespear, the 
Political Agent in Kuwait, during his visit to the Amir of Kuwait. The following year, they met again in Ibn Saud's 
camp. Ibn Saud told Shakespear about his desire to capture al-Hasa in order to end the Turkish presence in the 
region. He asked Britain to support him and to deal with him as they did with the other Gulf leaders. Shakespear 
confirmed to Ibn Saud that Britain was unable to be hostile to Turkey for fear of driving it into an alliance with 
Germany. The British Foreign Office issued orders to the Indian Bureau to stay totally neutral and not to intervene 
directly or indirectly in the affairs of Najd” (pp. 32-33). Al-Kahtani further maintains that Ibn Saud did not intend to 
invade the Hejaz, nor did he want to declare himself Caliph; however, his sources seem to be biased as they include 
face-to-face interviews with members of the Saudi family. (For instance, he writes, with praises, in footnote 1 on 
p.36 “His Royal Highness Prince Mamduh Ibn Abdulaziz” in citing his source on this topic, which is quite revealing 
in an analysis of pragmatics). 
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economically perceptive scholars would make it instrumental in becoming a cog in a greater 
economic order entirely brokered outside of the Islamic sphere. This economic organization was 
of such a nature that later attempts at imbuing it with Islamic ethics would prove difficult.  
 




 The second factor to consider is that the nature of economic imperialism evolved with 
such a rapid sophistication in the post WWII era of the mid-20th century. Considering power, this 
section covers key developments in that regard, that neoliberal capitalism developed as such a 
conspicuously isolated instrument of power and that essentially no Muslim-majority polity had a 
scholarly class astute enough to address it.  
 
5.2.2 Shaping the Capitalist Dialectic 
 
The two World Wars reshaped the geopolitical landscape, and borders were reshaped. 
Colonial forces enveloped territorial leftovers in Muslim majority lands by installing rulers 
subservient to, and dependent upon the emergent political order envisioned by the wars’ allied 
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victors (Hanania, 1953).258 The ‘free’ market was declared the efficient and value-neutral 
regulator of human affairs despite the fact that the proposition that markets can ever be value-
neutral has been constantly rebuffed by mathematical evidence (Smith, 2000). This momentum 
was nevertheless combined with an idiosyncratic ideological underpinning of economic thought 
that supported granting banks a monopoly on money-creation, which was secured through the 
enforcement of legal tender laws (Keen, 2011). Subsequently, state economies, ostensibly 
sovereign, became entirely dependent on the rented amount of credit money that banks deemed 
to dispense. 
 
5.2.3 The Marxism vs. Capitalism Dialectic 
 
Cogent and coherent monetary reforms have appeared repeatedly in Western history 
(Swan, 2009).259 Unfortunately, Karl Marx (1818-1883) and his associate Friedrich Engels 
(1820-1895), who together co-authored the Communist Manifesto in 1848, would wholeheartedly 
commandeer the discourse of coherent anti-capitalist critiques. Communism would come to be 
viewed as the antithesis to capitalism, creating a false dialectic whereby logical reforms 
centering on the issue of usury would be stifled (Swan, 2009).  
Engels was involved with the Young Hegelians in a discourse attempting to find 
rationality in the antithesis of the core of Western society’s values (Carver, 2003).260 Together, 
                                                 
258 It was recognized quite early by astute academics that the leaders were military dictators dependent on policies 
coming from ‘on high’, which perennially meant ‘The West’. 
259 This history has been under-reported; however, Swan documents the arguments that stemmed from Hayek and 
led to a monetary reform debate in the Western world. 
260 For example, Engels was against the institution of marriage, which he saw as state oppression (pp. 71-72). 
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Engels and Marx would develop Darwinist-influenced dialectical materialism and transfer 
Hegel’s ideas from the theoretical realm into the material world of economic exchange, asserting 
that economic history progresses to eventually form a superstructure (like capitalism) (The 
Smithsonian, 2013).261 Marx did reject the argument for usury, which he said, “…does not 
change the mode of production, but clings on to it like a parasite and impoverishes it.” Adding 
further that, “It sucks it dry, emasculates it and forces reproduction to proceed under ever more 
pitiable conditions” (Marx, 1976, p. 731). However, Marx, taking the extreme position, was 
adverse to not only usury, but to the notion of capital itself. Hence, he and Engels developed a 
system that opposed capital and its accumulation as a social paradigm, rejecting the concept of 
natural property rights. He witnessed the injustice and the destructive role that usury had played 
in feudal Europe. Hence, he was also convinced that the credit and debit system of moneylending 
allowed “Capitalists to unjustly extend their control over others, far in excess of the capital they 
actually owned” (Mews & Abraham, 2007, pp. 2-3).  
However, Marx and Engels’ theoretical motivations created issues. Marx separated and 
mechanized the process of value (Cline, 2014).262 Its source, he believed, to be purely derived 
from human labor, as did Locke and Smith, but unlike previous commentaries Marx left no place 
for a metaphysical understanding of fortune, bounty or distributive ethics. Marx’s loath of 
religion, and by extension any associated morality, separated and mechanized his concept of 
value, vacuously limiting his paradigm. Resnick and Wolff (1987) comment on this aspect that 
“Marxist theory then recognizes no single reality of absolute truth or epistemological standard 
                                                 
261 The relationship between Marx and Engels has been debated, but essentially, Marx relied on Engels for financial 
support. The reasons why Engels would support such revolutionary radicalism are debatable but he was certainly 
from the wealthy class of those exploiting labor and getting rich from the cotton industry at his family business in 
Lancashire where he worked in upper management. 
262 In the preface of his doctoral thesis, Marx adopted the words “I hate all gods” because “they do not recognize 
man’s self-consciousness as the highest divinity”. Marx thought religion was irrational, that it made man subservient 
to the pathetic status quo, and that it was hypocritical.  
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that can serve to validate one theory as against another” (pp. 6-7). His view limited the world-
system theories to perpetual conflict and disequilibrium. As Masudal Choudary (2007) writes, 
“Hence, equilibrium, consensus, integration and stability of meaning and standards are not 
within, and cannot be conceived by the Marxian program” (p. 12). The enormous failures of 
Marxism substantially set back the brooding concept that capitalism needed reforming (Swan, 
2009). 
Within Charles Darwin’s thought, detectable is a continuum of competition, (natural) 
selection, and the survival of the fittest in life as well as markets (Hodgson, 2006).263 Marx and 
Engels adopted Darwin’s assumptions in a materialist manner, which made them feel despondent 
about the entire system being inherently unjust, and therefore they proposed (violent) revolution 
as a remedy (Harris, 1974).264 Communism fueled wars and carnage that would force the human 
project to reevaluate its entire epistemology during the 20th century (Dobbs, 2000).265 Lastly, 
imagined or not, the threat of a communist conspiracy was used as a motive for expanding the 
territories ripe for capitalist penetration. 
 
5.2.4 Early 20th Century Economic Thought and Keynesianism  
 
                                                 
263 Hodgson offers an analysis of these concepts and their convergence. 
264 The violent and equally rigid communism put into practice by governments making their own interpretations of 
this ideology led to sequential catastrophes and unimaginable human suffering in numerous places where it was 
adopted in the 20th century, (the most notable examples were China and Russia). Harris articulates an analysis of 
Marx’s concept of violence and its proportionate use. 
265 Marxism’s fundamental assumptions are that nationalizing all property, in effect a state monopoly on capital, 
would somehow fix the perennial problem of wealth distribution. In this social paradigm, Marx and Engels attack 
various imaginable conceptualizations of property. 
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In the first half of the 20th century, the English economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-
1946) spearheaded much of the economic debate. Keynes’s theory was the corollary to the idea 
that supply creates its own demand (Say’s Law) because he saw that boom and bust cycles were 
inherently part of the banking system as constructed (Swan, 2009). He also had an understanding 
that interest was a major problem and inhibitor to fair market functionality (Keynes, 1936). Thus, 
according to Keynesian economics, sovereign states needed to intervene in markets in order to 
offset the imbalances that led to depressions so that major crashes could potentially be 
mitigated.266  
Keynes further advocated fiscal policy as a mechanism of controlling the economy. 
Accordingly, he was heralded for “His radical idea that governments should spend money they 
don't have [which] may have saved capitalism” (Reich, p. 1). Keynes was aware of the heterodox 
antagonists of usury and he engaged them in lively debate (Keynes, 1936). Moreover, in his 
(1936) General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, he acutely recognized that interest 
payments were a root cause of unemployment, but instead of advocating a zero-interest policy he 
buttressed the price of money as the “marginal efficiency for capital” (p. 135).267 He did opine 
for a rate of less than 2%, claiming the rate should be as close to zero as possible.268 However, 
this aspect of Keynes’ theory was not heeded (Swan, 2009). 
 
                                                 
266 Identifiably an adherent in a continuum of English (materialist) ideology, Keynes proposed that aggregate 
demand (more greed and inertia) was what stimulated the economy. He saw the insatiability of human wants as a 
stimulus divided into absolute needs and desirables. However, with his objections aside, Keynes still furthered 
several mainstream false assumptions. He drove to defend Senior Mill Cairns’ methodology against 19th century 
German Historicism. 
267 Keynes (pp. 353-8) discusses Silvio Gesell's ideas for monetary reform and a proposed end of fractional-reserve 
banking. 
268 Keynes defines the marginal rate as “the rate of discount which would make the present value of the series of 
annuities given by the returns expected from the capital asset during its life just equal its supply price” on page 135. 
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5.2.5 The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 
 
In 1944, World War II was coming to an end. From July1-22nd of 1944 730 delegates 
from the forty-four Allied nations met at the “United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference” in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire with the stated objective of creating a new 
global economic system (Smithies, 1954). Keynes negotiated the stated imperatives presented on 
behalf of Britain, whereas those views presented by Harry Dexter White represented the 
initiatives of the U.S. Treasury department. Transpiring from the economic pact signed at the 
meeting, the baton would informally pass from the flailing, debt-ridden and war-torn British 
Empire, to the newly emergent world superpower, the United States (Stone, 1991).269  
Ostensibly, the meeting’s imperative was the promotion of ‘open markets’ by generally 
restricting capital and liberalizing trade, which it was claimed, would aid political stability and 
foster peace (Stone & Kuznik, 2013).270 However, Smith (2000) has argued among many others 
that this strategy simply replaced ‘plunder by raid’ with ‘plunder by trade’ by opening up 
markets for exploitation through sophisticated trade agreements with inexpert nations. Moreover, 
embedded in such extensions of economic ideology were sentiments clearly motivated by an 
anti-communist platform, ideologically against governmental central-planning. Keynes was 
reticent about the institutionalization of unfair exchange mechanisms, most notably that weaker 
nations would perpetually remain in debt and unable to pay down their debt due to growing 
                                                 
269 Like many other narratives, the mainstream narrative explaining the events of this economic pact has been 
challenged. Stone’s piece (p. A35) narrates a general understanding of how this history is being used as a political 
tool.  
270 This was the emphasis of U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s closing remarks, which were 
ideologically in line with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal” (A series of domestic programs enacted between 
1933-36 in response to the Great Depression). 
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interest payments (Markwell, 2006). However, White dominated the conference, imposing his 
internationalist and neoliberal free-market ideology. Notably, Keynes’s insights about the 
dangers of interest were unheeded and unable to stop the forthcoming rapid capitalist expansion. 
The plan put into implementation had ideological commitments towards economic 
warfare against non-Allied Nations (Kubek, 1989).271 The macroeconomic policy procured at the 
meeting would set the global paradigm for coming decades by promoting a liberalized 
international trade environment and by establishing institutions that would uphold an agenda 
desired by powerful corporations (Navarro, 1998). Conceived at this meeting were the agencies 
that would come to regulate world finance and trade parameters for the remainder of the 20th 
century and beyond (Overbeek, 1993). Out of the conference emerged the following institutions: 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), designated for addressing global fiscal spending and 
monetary issues; The World Bank (WB), designated for dealing with global financial and 
structural issues; and The International Trade Organization (ITO), designated to reinforce liberal 
trade and ‘cooperation’ (Smithies, 1954). These institutions have all abided, dominating 
policymaking for world finance and trade as they proclaim to “supervise and liberalize 
international trade” (Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, 2013, p. 1).272  
 
5.2.6 Economic Neoliberalism: The Culler and Convener of Doctrines 
                                                 
271 White had an economic background and ideology that aligned with the Chicago School and was somewhat 
sentimental towards the Russians. His training took place at Columbia and then Stanford where he published a PhD 
thesis on French accounts, which drew the attention of certain ideologues who believed in maintaining order through 
their interpretation of institutionalized trade. He thus became the head of the independently funded Office of 
Monetary Research. Then University of Chicago’s Jacob Viner hired him at the Treasury Department where he 
wrote the Morgenthau Plan – a plan to eliminate German forces through subduing their economy and 
deindustrializing them. White was later entangled in a conspiracy in which he was accused of being a Soviet spy and 
a communist. He died suddenly after testifying in his own defense in 1948.  




The Bretton Woods conference established the state-backed institutional structure of a 
new economic world order under the auspices of promoting ‘free-market’ liberalism. Although 
the loudest voices championing ‘free market’ principles appear to have historically been 
libertarian and neoconservative, in actuality, it is more accurate to label them neoliberal. Philip 
Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe’s (2009) The Road From Mont Pelerin: The Making of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective functionally explains how and why neoliberalism has become the 
bedrock of the most hegemonic form of capitalism in history by exploring the way “…neoliberal 
ideas have been related to each other, to social classes, and to political and economic regimes” 
(p. 3). Their study draws from, and builds on, previous comparative studies by Czerny (2008) 
and Overbeek (1993) that examine the transnational linkages and far-reaching dimensions of the 
ideology.273  
The term neoliberalism first appears in Hans Honegger’s work in 1925 in which he 
identified the theoretical works of his predecessors as neoliberal to mean whoever propagated 
doctrines of capitalism against the encroaching socialist and Bolshevist ideologies (Walpen, 
2004). It fell in line with the controlling dialectic of oscillation between capitalism and socialism. 
The mid-1920s was filled with works proposing new approaches to liberalism that always railed 
against the role of states and their alleged socialist interferences in markets. In that sense, the 
                                                 
273 Centered on the historical origins of the movement in France, Germany, the UK and the USA, the study closely 
examines the ascendancy of the most important movement in political and economic thought during the second half 
of the 20th century. Neoliberal ideological history has some of its roots in late 19th century German and Austrian 
intellectual and economic thought. The libertarians would differ and eventually split over whether their future 
utopian capitalist project would promote Minarchism or the welfare state, an event called the Methodonstreit; and it 
was the point of departure that led many from the German economic milieu to migrate over to Austrian economics. 
Minarchism beckons for minimalist statism, rendering the role of the state to minimal policing, whereas the welfare 
state intends to form a social safety net for those who slip through the cracks. This seemed too close to socialism for 
some, and given the fact that the cultural milieu existing during that time saw socialism as anathema, it is 
understandable that many would diverge on the issue. 
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milieu of The Great Depression (1929) and an over-reaction to Marxism gave birth to neoliberal 
thought. In the 1930s, the term began to appear in multiple contexts. As members of the different 
spectrum converged, the ideology gained more popularity amongst the elite circles and anarcho-
capitalists (free-market fundamentalists).274  
 
5.2.7 Manufacturing Consent  
 
Walter Lippmann, a Council on Foreign Relations member and Woodrow Wilson 
administration advisor, was keen on identifying ways to shift public perception. His book Public 
Opinion (1922) sought ways to simplify the entirely “too complex” world for the layperson (p. 
1). Lippmann sums up the ideological rhetoric succinctly, “In a free society the state does not 
administer the affairs of men. It administers justice among men who conduct their own affairs. 
Statesmanship is the ability to elucidate the confused and clamorous interests which converge 
upon the seat of government” (Plehwe, 2009, p. 13). In addition to anti-statism, Lippmann 
expressed the notion that most people needed to have their world summarized for them by the 
well informed. This, he believed, should happen through the “manufacture of consent” and pre-
confirmed news, which is presented as indisputable (Lippman, 1922, p. 15). Lippmann was 
instrumental in organizing a colloquium of twenty-five of the most prominent thinkers on the 
issues of liberalism and the economy held in Paris in August of 1938, which was a precursor to 
                                                 
274 The core message that markets were superior to state intervention attracted all types of attention from anarcho-
capitalists. Many markets had protections against foreign investors coming in and exploiting the local economies, 
which global investing firms detested. 
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the Bretton Woods consensus and the start of several (clandestine) organizations promoting 
neoliberalism (Plehwe, 2009).  
Research by Roehner (2007) meticulously traces the funding sources responsible for 
catapulting neoliberal thought into the mainstream in a revealing study that links back to banking 
industry funded foundations, like the Volker Fund.275 The ideology, widely considered on the 
fringe, would ascend to legitimacy through widespread corruption in the Nobel committee 
selection system that took the fringe neoliberal proponents and awarded them with accolades 
based on ideological grounds and political connections alone. Roehner’s study links “58 
laureates” in this manner (pp. 115-132). The proliferation of neoliberal thought would continue 
manufacturing consent through creating the image of consensus within economic thought. It was 
a consensus that supported the continued rent-seeking behavior and exploitation that bank 
shareholders yearned for (Roehner, 2007).276  
 
5.2.8 Pseudo Alternative: The Austrian School of Economics 
 
                                                 
275 Most important to note are National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) IUHEI (Institut Universitaire des 
Hautes Etudes Internationales), a series of conferences organized by Rockefeller starting in 1927, and the Volker 
Fund, which would later provide funding for the Mont Pelerin Society. This ideological continuum is so pertinent in 
understanding why neoliberalism was ‘selected’ as the chosen ideology in the 20th century. 
276 The story behind this is almost too incredible. The first of such awards was awarded to Frederic Hayek, and the 
trend would continue hijacking the mainstream economic argument for several decades. On pages 115-132 Roehner 
covers this manufactured consent behind neoliberalism in a systematic way that traces funding sources, illegitimate 
awards and unproven theses. Alfred Nobel did not even set up an economic award; in fact, he delineated five 
categories that have been handed out since 1901: physics, chemistry, physiology, medicine and literature promoting 
peace – and there was no voiced intention from him calling for an extension of the list. The Riksbank Prize was 
started by the central bank of Sweden (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences) in 1968 in conglomeration with the 
Nobel committee because of a large donation made. 
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The same enormous efforts and fortunes spent on liberalism funded another offshoot, 
libertarianism. The ideology similarly promoted ‘true capitalism’ and anti-socialism, and the 
Volker Fund similarly funded it (Hulsmann, 2007).277 What originated from the pivotal meeting 
amongst the coterie, organized by Lippmann in 1938, amalgamated into an “international ‘who’s 
who’ of the classical liberal and neo-liberal intellectuals” (Nash, 1976, p. 26). The list included 
Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Röpke and Alexander Rustow among others, 
some of whom identified with the subjective theory of value, and therefore warranted the distinct 
label of “Austrian” (p. 26). The Austrian School of Economics best pinpoints its ideological 
exodus with Carl Menger’s (1840-1921) proposition that value is subjective; thus, Austrians 
reject econometrics (mathematically predicting economic behavior) and abhor governmental 
intervention (protection) in the market. They tend to be libertarian, anarcho-capitalist and free-
market proponents, meshing well under the broader neoliberal camp.278 
 
5.2.9 Consensus on the Function of Interest 
 
Economists have categorized Austrians as heterodox. Nevertheless, withstanding all of 
the seemingly mammoth methodological differences, as libertarians, Austrians are big supporters 
                                                 
277 Hulsman, an advocate for Austrianism, does not shy away from the funding sources, although his narrative is 
shaped in a way where money does not seem to play a part in being responsible for the ideologies it created. 
However, it is reported in Austrian literature that Mises and other founders received funding from similar sources. 
On page 895, there is a source for the funding claim.  
278 Additionally, they claim that humans, if left to their own devices and free choices, are best able to settle on the 
most reasonable representative form of money – which they believe is gold and silver. Befittingly, Austrians support 
the ‘emerged from barter’ history of money akin to gold bugs that all trade emerged from an unorganized barter 
system even though this notion has been disproven by anthropology. They favor praxeology, an a priori assumption 
that all human action is teleological, and that based on such an axiom deductive study is possible. Ludwig von Mises 
has written their most pertinent literature. 
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of what they view as the ‘right’ to charge interest. In this sense, even the supposed ‘opposition’ 
and ‘alternative’ to neoclassical economics is principally ‘pro-interest’. Influenced by Menger, 
Vienna graduate Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) galvanized support for the Austrian movement 
and became very influential. Inspired by Lippmann’s delineation of private property and state 
limitations, the colloquium held in 1938 defined neoliberalism in several axioms. It emphasized 
“The priority of the price mechanism”, which by this time meant to ensure that the ‘price’ of 
money was controlled by an interest rate. It also emphasized “The free enterprise”, which would 
allow corporations to move transnationally, lobby to privatize nations’ assets and then purchase 
them. It further emphasized “The system of competition”, which would allow the lowest bidder 
to win enormous privatization contracts by employing the cheapest possible labor. Additionally, 
it emphasized “A strong impartial state”, which would not intervene on moral grounds or as a 
representation of any democratic initiative to intervene (Plehwe, 2009, pp. 1-4).  
  
5.2.10 The Mont Pelerin Society 
 
Growing out of Lippmann’s initial colloquium, The Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) was 
officially founded in Switzerland after WWII (1947) by loosely collected neoliberals, including 
neoclassical economist Friedrich von Hayek. The William Volker Fund and the Foundation for 
Economic Education provided subsidies; Credit Swiss paid 93 percent of the conference costs 
(Plehwe, 2009). Banks had much to gain by opening up the world’s markets to perceptive 
investors well versed in ways of generating profits for big corporations. The MPS was founded 
“to uphold the principles of what Europeans call ‘liberalism’ and what we Americans call 
224 
 
‘conservatism’: free markets, limited governments, and personal liberty under the rule of law” 
(Plehwe, 2009, p. 2). Its advocates have publically acknowledged this.279  
Hayek opined for privacy stating that the aims and affiliations “remain a closed society, 
not open to all and sundry” as the group felt only comfortable elaborating the principles to those 
“in agreement on fundamentals, and among whom basic conceptions are not questioned at every 
step” (Plehwe, 2009, p. 16). Over the next forty years, the MPS would hold 24 private 
conferences, privacy being the hallmark of archetypal sedition. Moreover, although Hayek did 
not wish to issue a manifesto, a draft statement with ten aims was released, which remains the 
only official statement. The aims focus on limiting government activity, correcting “wrong 
assumptions” that lead to policies alleged to further lead to totalitarianism; and finally, a strong 
avocation of intellectual ‘freedom’ (Hartwell, 1995, pp. 49-50). Paradoxically, the group 
bleatingly stressed science and research rather than ideology and beliefs, but when it came to 
managing and pricing society’s money, the interest rate mechanism was defended vociferously 
against any non-believers.  
 
5.2.11 Monetarism: The Application of Neoliberalism 
 
United under an ideological umbrella, MPS has historically maintained a very close 
association with Austrian economics and aligned on issues such as the desire in facilitating the 
                                                 
279 Edwin J. Feulner was president of the prominent neoconservative think tank in the U.S, the Heritage Foundation, 
from 1977-2013. Members have spoken quite candidly about institutional goals and principles. 
225 
 
rise of a world super state (Ebeling, 2000).280 Seen in a continuum of thought, neoliberalism of 
the latter half of the 20th century was identifiably influenced by Milton Friedman (1912-2006) 
who is hailed by mainstream economics as the most prominent economist of that period. His 
school of thought is called monetarism (The Economist, 2006).281 However, as a neoliberal he 
opined, “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon” while eschewing the 
reexamination of the function of interest (Friedman, 1963, p. 2). Though neoliberalism lived on 
for decades in practice, the term became a pejorative or sorts, and money was thrown at attempts 
at reforming it (Roehner, 2007).282 In the 21st century, its advocates have stalwartly practiced it 
on the ground even while sometimes vocally eschewing it (Galbraith, 2008).283 
                                                 
280 Along with Mises, Murray Rothbart and Israel Kirzner prominent Austrians regularly attended MPS meetings 
and although there were two antagonistic factions within MPS (the neoliberals and the laissez-faire liberals), the 
groups’ initial disenchantment with each other was settled in favor of building on global concepts. Mises wrote of 
his hope that “a world superstate really deserving of the name may someday be able to develop that would be 
capable of assuring the nations the peace that they require” (p.1) Another MPS member William E. Rappard, states 
in the article, “Science cannot be liberal or illiberal. In a sense it cannot be anything but liberal. An economist as a 
scholar may be learned or ignorant, intelligent or dull, profound or superficial, but he cannot be liberal or illiberal. 
Rather, if he is illiberal as a man of science, that is, if he dogmatically and intolerantly denies the rights of liberty of 
thought without which there can be no true science, then he is not worthy of being called a man of science. Policies 
can however be liberal or illiberal. Most policies all over the world today are in fact illiberal and it is because we 
believe that they should be liberal that we are assembled here today. It is as economists in the second sense of that 
equivocal word that we are liberal” (p.1). This notion is now challenged by arguments that morality and ethics must 
be considered in all sciences, including economics. 
281 Friedman generally accepted the Newtonian enclosed systematic view as well as Keynesian assumptions. 
However, he dismissed some of Keynes’s initial assumptions although he still carried on within the framework of 
substantiating the interest mechanism. Rejecting the gold standard, Friedman developed a macroeconomic model 
called ‘monetarism’ at the University of Chicago that focused primarily on controlling inflation through 
governmental control over the printing of money. Keynes had written that money did not matter, that consumption 
needed to continue no matter what industry got the first tranche, and Friedman disagreed, saying ‘money did matter’ 
and that is how monetarism was coined. Like the other neoliberals Friedman supported ‘free markets’ and minimal 
intervention on the part of government; essentially he further traversed neoliberalism. 
282 Professor Joseph Stiglitz ironically won the Nobel ‘award’ in 2001 for refuting the scientific claim that Austrians 
and neoliberals have been making for a century - that markets are efficient. It is untrue and ‘mathematically and 
formally demonstrated the potential efficiency-enhancing properties of the state based on the Greenwald-Stiglitz 
theorems’. 
283 Friedman’s advocacy for free markets, which is essentially ‘no government intervention and privatization’, 
(adopted by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan among others), transformed the West from a production 
economy to a service economy. It is largely what brought about the contemporary problems of economic cataclysm. 
The term neoliberalism declined when it became associated to failed experiments like Pinochet’s Chile in the 1970s.  
Keynesianism and monetarism as applied visions both projected the same lowly aspirations, simply for all people to 
obtain any type of employment, reducing humanis economicus to the lowest level of economic agency, wage 




5.2.12 Collapse of the Bretton Woods System 
 
The Bretton Woods system that essentially governed the world monetary affairs lasted 
from 1944-1971. Several key events precipitated its demise and replacement. As would be 
expected, France, Britain, Germany and many other foreign nations were unscrupulously trying 
to figure out ways to circumvent the U.S. hegemony on economic domination, which the U.S. 
had been exploiting in sundry ways (Eichengreen, 2004). Almost immediately after the 
agreement was reached, the U.S. had stopped honoring the commitment in order to begin the 
biggest military spending expedition in the history of human civilization, known as ‘the military 
industrial complex’ (Peterson, 1991). 
A country only has four options for balancing its fiscal budget: (a) it can increase taxes; 
(b) cut spending; (c) borrow; or (d) create money (inflate). The U.S. and its military industrial 
complex that provided lucrative, undemocratic, no-bid contracts to the war industry could not 
entertain fiscal responsibility, so it chose the fourth option: money creation. The Bretton Woods 
agreement mandated that the U.S. could only create $35 for each ounce of gold it possessed, 
whereby the amount of U.S. gold would act as a restriction on the global money supply; but 
instead the U.S. began consistently ‘deficit spending’ on warfare and empire expansionism 
(Stone & Kuznik, 2013).284 Essentially, the U.S. had created a system dependent on continuously 
expanding trade imbalances with other nations.  
                                                 
284 The Vietnam War cost about $200 billion. However, deficit spending also allowed presidents like Lyndon 
Johnson to create social programs like Medicare and Medicaid in the realization of a ‘Great Society’. 
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By the 1960’s the deficit spending made the Bretton Woods unfeasible and the U.S. was 
caught in a precarious situation. Foreign states were flooded with excessive U.S. dollars that the 
U.S. had printed and then exported in exchange for the real, limited, goods and services of other 
countries. Realizing that the U.S. had been excessively printing money grossly incommensurate 
to real economic output, foreign nations lined up for dollar conversion into gold at the agreed 
upon 35 to 1 ratio. France’s Charles De Gaulle spearheaded the scramble (Tripp, 2006). Finally, 
the agreement was rendered unsustainable because the U.S., like goldsmiths of old, had been 
creating credit as part of a confidence trick. This led President Richard Nixon to end 
international convertibility of dollars to gold on August 1971 (nixed by Nixon). What initially 
followed was a significantly depreciating U.S. dollar, as it began to float in the global market 
(Pavlos, 2013). Subsequently, oil-producing nations holding dollars, and selling their products in 
dollars, suffered financially.  
 
5.2.13 The Petrodollar System 
 
Conflict in the Middle East amplified during the second half of the 20th century. In 
response to the previous 1967 Six-Day War (Arab Israeli War), Syria and Egypt launched an 
attack in attempted retribution on October 6, 1973 by, known as the Yom Kippur War (Tessler, 
1994).285 The U.S. responded by increasing military and financial support to Israel. As an act of 
defiance and protest, the Arab members of OPEC raised oil prices on October 16, 1973, by a 
                                                 
285 The 1967 Arab Israeli War was between Israel and Arab states Egypt, (at the time, it was called the United Arab 
Republic) and neighboring states Syria and Jordan. It took place between the dates of June 5 - 10 and was started by 
Israel. It is covered by Tessler on p. 58. 
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whopping 70%, to $5.11 a barrel (Yergin, 2008). By the end of the embargo in March of 1974, 
the price per barrel was nearly $12 (Barsky & Kilian, 2004).286 This in turn sent the United 
States, the world’s largest importer of oil, into an oil crisis. David Spiro’s exploration of these 
events titled The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International 
Markets (1999) compiles an extensive account of the logistics behind the financial arrangement 
brokered by then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in a calculated diplomatic response to 
the 1973 Oil Crisis known as the petrodollar agreement.287  
The terms of the Saudi-U.S. agreement were intently kept clandestine because the U.S. 
was breaching agreements it had in place with its allies in the developed world (Pavlos, 2013). 
However, to the fledgling Saudi Arabian state that had been heavily indebted by the 
administration of King Saud’s ostentatious spending and borrowing at high rates of interest, the 
deal was too enticing to turn down (Alrasheed, 2002).288 From a series of meetings that began in 
1973 between Kissinger and the Saudis, the crux of the outcome was an agreement that Saudi 
Arabia agreed it would only sell its oil in U.S. dollar denominations (Spiro, 1999). Saudi Arabia 
was able to influence their Arab allies to do the same, which guaranteed artificial demand for the 
dollar since all of the world’s nations in need of oil were forced to seek after U.S. dollars in order 
to purchase it, and value is driven by demand.  
As part of the agreement, the Saudi dollars had to be deposited into U.S. securities and 
Wall Street bank accounts where the funds would collect interest (Comptroller of the United 
                                                 
286 The members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and Egypt, Syria and 
Tunisia proclaimed the embargo although it is alleged that Saudi played an instrumentally leading role. The effects 
have been lasting. 
287 Spiro’s research uproots the conventional theory regarding the U.S. Saudi Arabian financial and political 
relationship, negating the assertion that it is market driven. Released declassified documents also now attest to this 
fact.  
288 By 1958, Saud’s debts reached $450 million. His ostentatious palaces and lavish spending habits were the 
precursor of his half-brother Faisal later pulling a coup and taking power in the kingdom. 
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States, 1978).289 Much of the remaining Saudi funds were managed by a U.S. governmental 
entity, whereby it was continuously invested in American-made advanced weaponry. In effect, 
Saudi and Arab oil producers were propping up the military industrial complex, likely with no 
intention of ever using the weaponry, because in return, the Saudi monarchy and its allies were to 
receive endless military protection from the world’s greatest military superpower, which secured 
their endurance. The details of the agreement have led to several critical exposes of the 
arrangement (Perkins, 2004).290 
A 1978 report by the Comptroller General of the United States reveals the following:  
The United States-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission of Economic Cooperation, 
established on the heels of the Arab oil embargo and price increases, --fosters 
closer political ties between the two countries through economic cooperation; 
assists Saudi industrialization and development while recycling petro-dollars; and 
facilitates the flow to Saudi Arabia of American goods, services and technology 
(Comptroller of the United States, 1978, p. 9).  
 
The deal was fully functioning by 1974, and by 1975, each OPEC country also agreed to 
similar terms whereby most of the world’s oil was sold only in exchange for U.S. dollars (Hardy, 
2007). This catapulted the U.S. into an era of licentious deficit and war spending because there 
was tremendous demand for the dollar and U.S. debt securities, meaning that the Federal Reserve 
could literally create money whenever it wanted with almost no limit – because it was backed by 
the most sought after commodity – oil. Other nations now had to finance the U.S. fiscal 
overspending with their hard work and exports. For instance, Asian nations like Japan, heavily 
                                                 
289 In the Saudi Arabian Trust Account’s deposit and obligations table as of September 30, 1978 there was already 
12$ million in collected interest payments. 
290 Perkins, one of the contractors involved with the implementation of the operation has elaborated on the detailed 
aspects of the agreement in his expose. The official state narrative behind these events is starkly different. It opines 
that an efficient neoliberal market simply adjusted remarkably well, that enormous amounts of money simply just 
flowed into oil-rich states due to efficient investing, and that efficient markets funneled the hot money into cash-
depleted poor Third World economies.  
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dependent on oil, would change their economic strategies to become significant export nations. 
Japan would, for example, send the U.S. Toyotas and Hondas in exchange for dollars whereby it 
could then go out and attain the oil it needed on the market. 
The dollar hegemony gave the U.S. enormous power. It also complicated relations with 
its allies. U.S. vocal support for Israel as its ‘closest ally’ conflicted with the U.S. giving several 
times the amount in aid to Israel’s adversaries. Nevertheless, a functionalist view of the political 
reality is more tenable than any analysis of political rhetoric. The reality is that world oil 
consumption is an estimated 80-100 million barrels per day (U.S. Foreign Aid, 2013).291 William 
Clark in Petrodollar Warfare (2005) also discusses the realpolitik and accompanying economic 
arrangements regarding the ways they have affected U.S. foreign policy. Notably, Clark notes 
that countries (like Iraq) that have tried to diversify or leave the petrodollar recycling sequence in 
recent history, have either been sanctioned or attacked militarily (Engdal, 2004).292 In fact, 
according to related research, the U.S. has invaded over 70 nations since 1945. It is argued that 
one of the reasons why has been in order to ensure that the right conditions exist for capitalist 
penetration (Blum, 2003).293 It seems quite plausible if further contextualized. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, longtime Whitehouse advisor, spoke very brazenly about such policies. In his book 
(1998), he presents the U.S. geostrategic interests for continued global pre-eminence, and the 
suppression of any global challengers by arguing that it is necessary for the U.S. to, “…prevent 
collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and 
protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together” (p. 40). Therefore, support from 
                                                 
291 For example if looking at the recipients of U.S. aid in the Middle East in billions of dollars, the allocations are 
disbursed to enemies of the U.S.’s alleged allies. Israel $3, 100; Afghanistan $2,505; Pakistan $2,228; Iraq $ 2,045; 
Egypt $1,563; Jordan $671. These disbursements are followed by four African countries. 
292 Engdal follows the financial relationships from George W. Bush’s elections, administration, and the wars in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and other places and how these events tie in to oil. 
293 Blum’s detailed analysis of the numbers quantifies those directly and indirectly killed due to military invasions 
that changed local economic environments, ripening them for neoliberalism. 
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Arab oil producing nations like Saudi Arabia has remained instrumental in safeguarding the 
present world order of U.S. dollar hegemony, which in contrast has spelled disaster for economic 
independence in such regions. 
 
Part 3: Reframing Muslim Cognitions to Accept Banking  
 
 The third recognizable factor behind the development of IBF occurred after the economic 
legislation was in place to safeguard capitalism and its banking system globally. The rise of 
pragmatism in Muslim majority countries increased significantly during this period because of 
the awareness that the U.S. Empire and the associated global banking system had become so 
authoritative that being isolated by its apparatus rendered any state beyond rapprochement. Such 
uncharted territory required devising a serious intellectual program. However, the necessary 
cadre of Muslim erudition did not emerge. Anti-imperialist sentiment was fervently strong in the 
Muslim world, and so was the inkling for reform. Nonetheless, the reform methods that were 
thrust into the mainstream discussion adopted an overly esoteric and non-transformative nature, 
and they ultimately led to the construction of subverted responses to capitalism. Weak education, 
ill-equipped scholarship, and the abandonment of age-old convictions in Islamic law 
complimented by a gross misunderstanding and misrepresentation of banking and currency, all 
played factors that would lead to IBF’s emergence.  
 




In the modern Muslim world, knowledge transference and a lack of conceptual foresight 
became a serious problem. Aaron Segal recapitulates in a (1996) paper titled “Why Does the 
Muslim World Lag in Science?” that, “In a nutshell, the Muslim experience consists of a golden 
age in the tenth through thirteenth centuries, a subsequent collapse, a modest rebirth in the 
nineteenth century, and a history of frustration in the twentieth century” (p. 2). Returning briefly 
to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim world had been in decline for centuries, 
characterized by low standards of education and a dearth of scientific advancements and 
necessities, like printing presses, but chief amongst its problems was a dearth in prolific thinking 
(Anderson, 1964 ). There was a growing sense of inferiority and the belief that the entire Islamic 
system needed reform. Early participant in Young Turk reforms, Ziya Gokalp, coined the famous 
concept ‘Turkify, Islamize and Modernize’ but this was later supplanted by Mustafa Kemal’s 
ultra-secularization program; Kemal, as many other secular thinkers did, believed that Islam was 
the main hindrance in preventing ‘progress’ in Turkey (Cornell & Svanberg, 1999).294 
 
5.3.2 Intellectual Inferiority and the Late Push Towards Hard Sciences 
 
These were not sentiments shared only by Turks, for Central Asian Muslims’ sentiments 
were indistinguishable. The Muslim world received a limited transfer of scientific and 
technological knowledge from the West. Soon thereafter, a new education system was adopted. 
Initially it was opposed, but it soon penetrated social consciousness, embraced first by an elite 
                                                 
294 Gokalp authored Türkçügün Esaslari (The Essence of Turkism), and opined for an Islamic revival. 
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minority, and later by the masses (Segal, 1996). Russia had conquered Central Asia by 1890. 
Ismail Bey Gasparali (d. 1914), a Crimean Tatar educated in Europe, lobbied for the adoption of 
Western institutions and secular education in what he called ‘new method’ schools (usul al-
jadid). The first was opened in 1888. The Bolsheviks felt drawn towards inculcating a 
relationship between Gesparali’s supporters based on modernization until it became evident that 
communism sought to annihilate Islamic beliefs, and so the strife persisted (Svanberg & 
Westerlund, 2012, p. 7). 
In the Indian subcontinent, the events were similar. Vasco de Gama had arrived in India 
in 1498 discovering a new sea route that stimulated the European economy, and in turn 
ultimately threatened the Mughal Empire. In time, the Mughal Empire collapsed and the 
subcontinent succumbed to colonial rule by the British. The entire experience also created an 
experiential awareness amongst Muslim polities that their system was substandard. What 
postcolonial scholars like Sanjay Seth (2007) point out is that imperial control is always about 
subjectivity, which largely centers on education. The British yearned to maintain control of their 
subjects by reconfiguring indigenous modes of knowledge only to replace them with their own 
‘discourses’. In order to implement this vision they facilitated the means by which their colonial 
subjects adopted British educational curriculums, which latently retained the world-view of the 
colonizer. Within one generation, Indians themselves were teaching such curriculums to the next 
generation of Indians thereby augmenting understandings of being, and the imaginative spheres 
of politics, religion, gender, sexuality ethics and economics. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) 
was one leader who strove to implement the new curriculum in combination with Islamic virtues, 
and he argued that no conflict existed between Islam and modern science (Ziadat, 1986). In 
contrast, Dar al Ulum, the center of traditional Islamic sciences founded in Deoband, Uttar 
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Pradesh, failed to embrace any of the natural sciences from the West; this was representative of a 
wider phenomenon. Consequently, there was essentially no scientific activity happening across 
the majority of the Muslim world (Ziadat, 1986).  
This was ubiquitously the case in the Arab world. It had been very similar in Egypt where 
Napoleon’s arrival in 1798 and subsequent assessment of the education system led to the 
establishment of Institut d’Egypt the very same year. Khedive Muhammad Ali Pasha (d. 1849) 
had recognized the inferiority of the Egyptian educational system and implemented changes that 
began in his first year in power (1805) (Ziadat, 1986). It was commonplace to send convoys to 
Europe in order to study the hard sciences, but the efforts of playing ‘catch-up’ were 
unsubstantial. In the end, such reconfigurations of the approaches to knowledge dismantled the 
traditional cultivation of knowledge, and knowledge of the Shariah, without providing an 
adequate infrastructure to replace it (Hallaq, 2005).  
 
5.3.3 The Muslim Non-Response to Newtonian and Darwinian Thought 
 
Understanding banking without grasping the nuances of the milieu in which it was 
cultivated is impossible. Furthermore, Muslim ethics played no direct part in shaping the 
Enlightenment discourse, and grasping Newtonian thought and Darwinian evolution is critical in 
understanding European thought, science and its economic system. The extent of this lag in 
knowledge is evidenced by the lacking Muslim responses towards these sciences. As time 
traversed and the modern era approached, technology took root with an extraordinarily rapid 
diffusion of Western technology penetrating the Muslim world between the mid-nineteenth 
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century and the beginning of WWI. At that time “Railways, telegraphs, steamships and steam 
engines, automobiles, and telephones all appeared. Much of this technology transfer took the 
form of Middle Eastern governments’ granting monopoly concessions to European firms. 
Muslim rulers had little concern about developing indigenous capabilities in technology 
adaptation, design, or maintenance” (Segal, 1996, p. 4). This lack of sophistication continued for 
decades and beyond (Salam, 1989).295  
Adel Ziadat (1986) discusses one of the critical reasons why Muslims were ill equipped 
to confirm or negate specific scientific – and by extension – economic values, beliefs and models 
in Western Science in the Arab World – The Impact of Darwinism 1860-1930. Ziadat emphasizes 
that as Western ideologies reached Muslims, there was a profound awareness that there were 
serious theological challenges being presented to Islam, distinct from any of the medieval 
polemics. However, the attitude prevailed that there were no scholars of merit worthy enough of 
succinctly tackling the issues in a cogent manner.296 As a result, few were trained to properly 
respond to ideologies imperative for understanding the West’s economic system.  
 
5.3.4 Pan Islamism and the Salafi Movement 
 
                                                 
295 The trend remains two decades later: Segal adds that “Pakistan, Turkey, Malaysia, Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, and 
Saudi Arabia -- account for 90 percent of this total” and that “Other measures -- annual expenditures on research and 
development, numbers of research scientists and engineers -- confirm the disparity between populations and 
scientific research.” (p. 1). After WWI most political efforts centered on gaining political independence, thus, the 
sciences have not flourished in the Middle East. This remains the case today where 41 Muslim majority countries 
that comprise approximately 20% of the global population generate less than 5% of its science. 
296 In fact, the Eastern-rite Christian populations were the first to address and rebut some of Darwin’s points when 
his work, published in 1859, was first translated into Arabic in 1876. There was also trepidation among some 
scholars willing to delve into science who feared finding contradictions in Islam that they could not articulately 
reconcile. Others saw no contradictions but responded in heuristic ways, failing to address science in critical terms. 
For instance, Afghani responded to Darwin in a somewhat rudimentary manner, which avoided an articulation of the 
complexity of the argument. 
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It was to this onslaught of every aspect of traditional Muslim life that created the impetus 
for Pan-Islamism (Keddie, 1969).297 Much of the sentiment during its emergence related to 
questions about leadership, independence and allegiance to governments and religious leaders 
(Van Bruinessen, 1995).298 The movement is largely attributed to two figures: Jamal al-Din Al-
Afghani (d. 1897) and his disciple Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), who were controversial 
characters and political insurrectionists linked to neo-rationalist reform at the turn of the 20th 
century.299 It is difficult to arrive at a conclusion regarding what the intents of these figures were 
because there are competing narratives about their movement. Nevertheless, discussing their 
pronouncements made on bank interest, taken to sanction the explosion of banking in the Middle 
East, emerge out of the discourse in their movement and are thus pertinent. 
On one hand, Afghani seems like an indefatigable and vehement anti-imperialist, which 
many have construed to mean that he was organizing a program of resistance against colonial 
forces in the best interest of Pan-Islamic unity (Mathee, 1989). To illustrate, he drew up a 
                                                 
297 Namik Kemal, a member of the Young Ottomans, first used the term “ittihad-I Islam” or ‘unity of Islam’ 
although the usage is a modern coinage with no verified usage stemming from the classical Islamic era. The Young 
Ottoman intellectuals were initially calling for ‘modern’ reforms rooted in Islam; they possibly were influenced by 
Italy and Germany and the successful Pan-Slavic movement bred from their unification. They thereby influenced 
Sultan Abdulaziz as he increasingly claimed his position as caliph of all Muslims, which Keddie claims, is not 
traditional because the Ottoman caliphs had not traditionally envisioned their roles in that manner (p. 20). Others 
may have visualized it differently, especially those at the mercy of British and Russian rule in the earlier period such 
as Central Asiatic and Indian Muslims who appealed for Ottoman aid and discussed the idea of a Muslim league. 
Moreover, we can look at the Dutch oppression in the East, even after formal submission in the 16th century to the 
Ottomans, and see similar sentiments.  
298 According to Van Bruinessen, there was never any formal effort on the behalf of Ottoman rulers made to far off 
lands like Indonesia: “The pan-Islamic propaganda of Sultan Abdulhamid II had a distinct, though modest, impact 
on the Muslim communities of the Indies. This was no doubt in part because his reign coincided with the 
establishment of effective Dutch colonial rule over much of the Archipelago. The very existence of a strong Muslim 
state headed by the sultan-caliph served as a reminder that there were alternatives to infidel rule, however 
hypothetical. Again one gets the impression that the Indonesians saw Abdulhamid primarily as the ruler of the last 
remaining strong Muslim state rather than as the caliph of all believers” (p. 115). 
299 The current had stemmed from Ottoman sentiments, which spread to Egypt whereby a certain class became 
endearing towards the Ottoman sultan as a means for protection against British imperialism. 
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modernization plan for Afghanistan intent on impeding further British penetration.300 In addition, 
he harshly criticized rulers about their economic mismanagement, leading to his continuous 
expulsion from lands, and he was the first Muslim to respond to Darwin’s concepts in his 
attempted refutation of materialism (al-Ridd al-Dahriyyin). Yet on the other hand, since the late 
1940s research by Toynbee (1948) and Kedourie (1966) has critically examined his 
nonconformist views and participation in clandestine activities, revealing a very different, 
irreligious figure who practiced religious dissimilation and befriended European powers (Keddie, 
1969).301 The obfuscation about Afghani seems to stem from the fact that he “made up stories 
about his life and tried to hide his true beliefs for reasons of political expediency” (Keddie, 1969, 
p. 21). 
In contrast, Afghani’s disciple, Abduh, is known to have developed a belief system based 
on reason saying that religion ‘must be a friend to science’, that it should push man to investigate 
its secrets (Hourani, 1991, p. 308). His most famous work was (1897) Risalat al-tawhid (the 
English version is The Theology of Unity) in which Keddie (1969) argues that he tries to 
persuade the audience of his a priori arguments by rhetoric, rather than relying on logic. In that 
work, Abduh gives his definition of shirk (polytheism), which is rather telling – that Muslim 
taqlid is shirk – meaning that ultimate blasphemy is the abandoning those “paths and precepts He 
[God] has ordained whereby happiness might be ours in this world and the next” (Abduh, 1897, 
p. 64). Taqlid in the religious sense refers to following classical Islamic scholarship and relying 
                                                 
300 This happened during his residence there in 1866; his plan was to make an alliance with Russia. Muhammad 
A’zam Khan was in power, upon succession his three sons fought in a power struggle. When the situation was 
settled, Afghani was expelled and considered a ‘foreigner who spoke Dari with a Persian accent’. 
301 Keddie’s numerous works on this matter delve into Afghani’s dubious background and connections to the 
establishment of freemasonic lodges built on principles antithetical to orthodox Islamic teachings as well as his 
affiliations with European power.  Other notable scholars who have examined Afghani are Homa Pakdaman, Syliva 
Haim and a coterie of Iranian scholars. Iran’s claiming of Afghani to their intellectual heritage, has conducted the 
most extensive enquiry regarding his origins and travels. Whereas Arnold J. Toynbee's most interesting related 
discussion is in a work titled “The Ineffectiveness of Pan Islamism”. 
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upon its soundness and methodologies for deriving rulings (Rapoport, 2003). Hence, some have 
called it ‘blind following’. Therefore, Abduh (1897) denounced the Shariah’s systematic 
restraints because to him it “is represented as an autonomous system of authority, dominating 
theology to the exclusion of reason” (p. 126).  
 
5.3.5 Potentially Subversive Aspects of Salafi Reform  
 
Under the Pan-Islamist banner, Afghani and Abduh originated the Salafi movement, a 
movement that demanded to return to the principles of what Muslims consider to be the most 
‘pious predecessors’, the earliest community of Muslims. This concept would continue to be 
attractive for decades out of its perceived purity and rejection of ‘blind following’. In later 
stages, the movement would splinter into the ideological underpinnings of modern radical groups 
(Lambert, 2008).302 However, in its initial stages the movement was imbued with Islamic 
rhetoric, although it was later revealed to contain a distinct resemblance to “Proto-nationalist 
movements” (Keddie, 1969, p. 18). Afghani would orate to audiences employing nationalist 
rhetoric in order to tie multi-religious communities together by drawing upon commonalities like 
language, rather than stressing religion, and would exhort Hindu scriptures in front of Indians, 
Azali Babi scriptures in front of Babis, and so on (Rida, 1932).303  
                                                 
302 Salafi strands would unite against the violent extremist groups who they deemed outside of the faith altogether. 
The extremist groups believed that a syncretism of Islam occurred, that heretical views had crept into normative 
Islam and that Ibn Abdulwahhab had correctly identified them and the necessity of purging them. As a movement, 
however, there seems to be obliviousness to the apparent esoteric origins of the movement. 
303 In one of the Persian Maqalat-e jamaliyyeh sources Aghani lectures to a primarily Muslim audience in India but 
he draws on Hindu concepts in order to galvanize Hindu support. In another instance Salim al-Anhuri prints in 
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The movement did though, have a subversive nature, and its embrace of this utility would 
become a pivotal departure in Islamic thought for the remainder of the 20th century, sowing the 
seeds for an entire reevaluation of classical Islam. Take for instance the notorious statement by 
Afghani, “We never cut the head of religion (ra’s al-din) except with the sword of religion (saif 
al-din). Therefore, if you were to see us now, you would see ascetics and worshipers, kneeling 
and genuflecting, never disobeying God’s commands and doing all that they are ordered to do” 
(Kedourie, 1966, p. 145). Regarding this statement Abduh defended his disciple, claiming that 
his comments needed proper contextualization (Moazzam, 1983). Abduh’s defense of Afghani is 
noted, but largely because of this movement, there has remained justifiable trepidation around 
the entire project of reevaluation and reform in the Muslim world. This is important to mention 
mainly because Abduh makes the most definitive statements on banking and riba at the turn of 
the 20th century. 
Moazzam (1983) argues that Afghani’s exhortation gives us a glimpse of the contempt 
that some Muslim intellectuals felt for their inadequate state of affairs. That it also encapsulates 
the desperation they felt in their inability to mobilize a pushback against the codification of 
“dogmatic thinking” considered by many to be the reason that Muslims were held behind (pp. 
117-8). In contrast, the following was noted as early as 1942:  
It would appear, indeed, that Pan-Islamism has always had either behind it or paralleling 
it the imperialistic policy of some European power whose aims and interests at the 
moment seemed to coincide with those of Islam or of some Moslem potentate. Thus one 
may come to the tentative conclusion that without British support in the beginning and 
that of others later, Pan-Islamism would never have developed into a significant 
movement (Lee, 1942, p. 286).304  
                                                                                                                                                             
Rida’s text that in 1878 Aghani started incorporating rhetoric including the praise of the Ancient Egyptian society 
and Pharaonic dominance in order to galvanize a pan-Arab unity.   
304 Professor Lee accepted that Western interference was the best explanation for Pan-Islamism, citing the 
interventions from the British (1870s), then WWI and then Italy in the 1930s. He argues that “Only after such a 




The dogma that neo-rationalists despised was the strict adherence to the classical law 
schools (al-madhahib), their rulings, and their exoteric practices and systematic methods, 
thought outdated. Yet, at the same time, those law schools and their long-standing interpretations 
of rulings had abided for centuries as the most coherent means available to provide Muslims with 
context for concepts like riba. Among other desires, the British yearned for a way in which the 
normative practice of prohibiting riba could cease being exoteric and this desire was fulfilled by 
the push towards esoteric understandings of Islam, deducing it to principles.  
In fact, this is how reformers made the law “nominally Islamic and dominantly 
utilitarian” in order to support their views (Hallaq, 1997, p. 224). Formed therefrom was a type 
of pseudo-scholarship in which it was evident that general Shariah principles had succumbed to 
the forces of colonialism and its capitalist system (Kerr, 1966). It was in this manner, that 
Muslims in positions of scholarly authority first deemed interest permissible (Hourani, 1962).305 
Furthermore, it was done based upon an understanding of the function of banking and credit 
creation that authorities now admit is truncated and “mythological” (Turner, 2014).306 
All of this must be considered in examining Abduh’s relationship to Evelyn Baring, 
known as Lord Cromer, a member of the powerful Baring banking family, and British controller 
                                                                                                                                                             
movement was a phantasm or a reality and whether Pan-Islamism was a genuine Moslem reaction to Western 
encroachment or merely a weapon of imperialism, conceived by Western brains and forged by Western hands” 
(278). 
305 Different viewpoints exist on how the reformers Jamal Ad-Din Al Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida 
thought and applied their Islamic philosophy. For instance, Hourani builds on Kerr, but departs in many instances. 
Hourani consulted Kerr’s ideas, which had initially appeared in his PhD thesis ten years prior. Kerr points out that 
these reformers are trying to conform to ‘natural law’ and bend the Shariah towards it. Hourani denies this and 
claims that the reformers were staying within the bounds of the tradition, utilizing thought of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn 
al Qayyim, but cedes to the point that they were trying to reveal what was “half hidden in in their writings” (p. 233). 
306 Lord Adair Turner (2014) notes, “As a description of what modern advanced economy banking systems does 
(sic) this [what is taught] is completely mythological”. The context was about teaching the fallacy to economic 
undergraduate and graduate students about the fundamental function of banks – that they allegedly borrow from 
savers and lend to businesses and make their profit off spread.  
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general during Abduh’s era (Ziegler, 1998).307 Cromer, who believed any “upper class Moslem 
must be a fanatic or a concealed infidel” and thought Abduh to be “agnostic”, was instrumental 
in having Abduh appointed as Egypt’s Grand Mufti (Sedgwick, 2014).308 Once instated, Abduh 
became the first in his position to produce a fatwa approving of banking and the charging and 
collecting of interest during his short tenure. Rashid Rida, a disciple of Abduh, was instrumental 
in promoting his reformist vision through the acclaimed newspaper Al-Manar, in English 
translated as The Lighthouse, an esoteric appellation. Regarding riba, the door Rida’s 
hermeneutics opened would serve as the lynchpin of ‘Islamic’ banking because they proposed 
that the Quran prohibited a different type of riba than the hadith. He argued that the Quran’s riba 
prohibition of doubling and tripling “does not cover the simple interest charged on loans by 
banks or paid by banks to their depositors” (Nyazee, 1995, p. 10). The Quran was presented as 
unchallengeable, whereas the hadith’s prohibition was “lighter or secondary, and may be 
permitted in cases of necessity” (darurah) (p. 10). If one type of interest is what is deemed 
legally permissible, it does not take long for banks to seek legal counsel and reorganize in order 
to exploit such legality; and thus began a trend that rationalized all types of banking practices by 
determining them to be necessities (Nyazee, 1995).309  
                                                 
307 Cromer was the son of Henry Baring (d. 1848) a banker and the son of Sir Francis Baring, the founder of Barings 
Bank. The bank finally closed in 1995 after Nick Leeson made speculative investments totalling $1.3 billion in 
losses. Prior to that, however, the Barings were long known as a great power. 
308 It is interesting that Abduh was seen as a liberal by Cromer, they were both possibly members of the same lodge. 
Mark Sedgewick notes that Cromer had written about Abduh that “an upper-class Moslem must be a fanatic or a 
concealed infidel,” and that “I suspect that my friend Abdu, although he would have resented the appellation being 
applied to him, was in reality an Agnostic” in Chapter 7 which is titled “The Mufti: The Enemy of God?”. 
309 This trend has continued to receive support by modernists. Nyazee quotes Abu Zahrah saying, “Before we put 
down the pen, we will discuss the legal issue related to riba, which is that the excess in lieu of the period [or 
repayment] is the riba of jahiliyah. It is also called riba al-nasiah, because the excess in it is in lieu of the period, 
that is, the duration of the delay. The scholars are all in agreement about its prohibition, and it is the riba of the 




To attempt at impartiality here, the Muslims responsible for making positive 
pronouncements on banking surely did not have the requisite tools made available to them, 
which would have been required in order to make informed decisions on the entire banking 
apparatus and its macro effects on societies and environments. Furthermore, the critique here 
attempts to be multidimensional. However, regarding economics, it must be noted that the 
historical enforcement of classical jurisprudence had served as the foremost protector against 
riba, and that voices like Rida were very instrumental in dissuading support for ‘foreign’ (non-
Arab) Caliphs, lobbying for nationalism and calling for Arab ‘independence’. These moves all 
generally led to what in retrospect seem like hasty transitions from old systems to new systems 
without observing requisite evaluation periods. Moreover, what is vital here, is pinpointing the 
critical decisions that appeared in public discourse that led to the proliferation of banking in the 
Muslim lands, as well as the accompanying religious arguments that tacitly and overtly 
sanctioned neoliberalism.  
 
5.3.6 Exoteric Practices Become Esoteric Principles 
 
The process of Islamic reform in the 20th century took what is best described, in many 
ways, as an esoteric path. The reform was esoteric in the sense that, at its root, it espoused an 
imagined perennial truth that anteceded Islam, promoting the vision of syncretism and 
‘universality’ within all religious traditions, which is a theme of the occult. Perennialist 
philosophers therefore attempt to extend this type of thinking into Islamic discourse. Moreover, 
religious reformers from the early part of the century were lured by the opportunity of operating 
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within elite circles. Consequently, many were active in occult organizations that offered 
opportune settings for elites from multiple faith perspectives to unite upon what they perceived 
to be certain hidden truths. The most common occult affiliation was freemasonry, and defining 
such a vast tradition is beyond the scope of this research, but in a nutshell it is a tradition that 
sees its initiates as ‘free’ and ‘liberated’ masons, or ‘builders’ of society (Harland-Jacobs, 2007). 
This path was utilized as a tool for realizing ends that stressed the communicative properties of 
symbolism (Guenon, 2004).310 It was a trend continued by many noteworthy reformers of the 
early 20th century (Churchill, 1867).311  
The classical Islamic commentary is replete with historical trepidation about esoteric 
paths. The most erudite scholars in Islamic history have warned against reducing Islam to 
principles; for instance, Al-Ghazali (1997) said that such “illusory interests” (masalih al-
muhawama) should be denied any independent legitimacy (p. 172). It was noted in 1876 by 
Edward Freeman that for a “…Mohametan government, to become really tolerant, [it] must 
cease to be Mohometan” (Freeman, 1876, p. 200). Tolerance was an idea central to the new 
global paradigm of surrendering sovereignty to the nation-state. Asad (2003) writes, “The notion 
of toleration between religiously defined groups is differently inflected in each” (p. 6). Because 
to the encroaching banking apparatus – and extension of the colonial period –  the Shariah was 
seen as an obstacle, for its lack of tolerance, to above all else, the exploitation of interest. The 
                                                 
310 Rashid Rida was a freemason as well as Hassan al-Banna and Rene Guenon. Guenon endorsed the idea of ‘sophia 
perennis’ in his Traditionalism doctrine, the fundamental principle is that there is an omnipresent primordial 
tradition that is common to all traditions. The term Perennial Philosophy was coined by Leibniz and later made 
popular by Aldous Huxley. He later concluded that it was a largely degenerated offshoot of true initiatory lineage 
although its symbolism remains profound like that of Rosicrucianism. Guenon discusses esoteric traditions in depth 
and concludes that they all lead to an equal spiritual summit of initiation. Islamic scholars however do not accept 
this notion. 
311 The 19th and 20th centuries both have several prominent Muslim leaders that joined freemasonry. According to 
Churchill, the Algerian leader AbdulQadir Al-Jaza’iri (1808-83) joined a lodge in June of 1964 (p. 328). In Egypt, 
there were approximately 70 lodges from 1940-57. They were in Iraq by 1919. Moreover, Afghani was the founder 
of several lodges. 
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esoteric philosophy of religion doggedly reduced religious law to pure objectives and principles, 
rendering classical Shariah as dormant and restrictive theology. Principles are valiant and can 
serve just causes, but reducing contracts and legal contexts purely into principles can also 
facilitate an annihilation of the law. Through this esoteric manner, the departure of one domain 
facilitates the entrance into another. And it was essentially in this manner that capitalism 
permeated Islamic thought. I suggest that this happened in roughly five stages: 
1. Religion was restricted to a zone that no longer had any affinity to economic affairs. 
2. Islamic scholars adopted fundamental misunderstandings of the capitalist banking 
system as economics was presented to them as an ostensibly neutral science. The 
market was presented as a neutral sphere of economic exchange and Muslim scholars 
accepted the Enlightenment economic epistemology unreservedly. 
3. Islamic contracts were reduced to principles guided by objectives. 
4. These new principles differentiated between the riba in the Quran and the riba in 
hadith so that the riba in the hadith could be tolerated in times of necessity. 
5. Considering the necessity of interest in a modern state, the principles were 
reassembled ‘in spirit’ and used to create ‘Islamic’ products acceptable to the 
capitalist paradigm. 
 
5.3.7 Abusing the Maslahah: Modernist versus Neo-Revivalist Interpretations of Riba 
 
The modern Islamic revival lacks a connecting uniformity. In fact, scholars jaded with 
the narrative that the revival is attributable to the 18th century puritanism of reformers like Ibn 
Abdulwahab have done critical analyses based on this contention (Dallal, 1993).312 Still yet, 
others see the narrative of Pan-Islamism and Salafism manifesting into different movements 
                                                 
312 Ahmad Dallal was rather jaded with the crudeness of such a rudimentary lumping of concepts together and 
produced an in-depth analysis of the four major intellectual trends of Islamic thought from that mid-eighteenth 
century period. He rebuts the earlier narrative that classifies Ibn Abdulwahhab under the same rubric as the Indian 
Shah Wali Allah (d. 1762), the West African Uthman Ibn Fudi (d. 1787), and the North African Muhammad Ali al 
Sanusi (d. 1859). 
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(Keddie, 1969). Nevertheless, to skip over the ideological origins of the movement and to focus 
on the uniting ideas about riba unearths that the approaches towards understanding bank interest 
were not very diverse. 
In the modern period there has been debate among scholars whether or not the riba 
prohibited by the Quran correlates to a prohibition on bank interest. In somewhat of a crude 
categorization, Saeed (1996) classifies the disagreement into two camps based upon their views: 
modernist or neo-revivalist. Yet, for the sake of brevity, we can make use of his categorization, 
although there are some outliers. Saeed writes of the conflicting opinions that “These differences 
appear to stem from one basic issue: should the emphasis be on the rationale for the prohibition 
of riba, that is, injustice or should it be on the legal form in which riba came to be formally 
conceptualized in Islamic law?” (p. 42). Included in the modernist categories are several well-
known scholars who generally accepted bank interest as a necessary tool in controlling the price 
of money; they thereby relegated the Islamic prohibition to a secondary status.313  
 
5.3.8 Why the Modernists Got it Wrong 
 
Because modernists saw banking as a social need and banks as facilitators of that need, 
most of them proclaimed that interest was a necessary instrument for controlling the economy, as 
the price of money that would ultimately serve society positively. One of the reasons this belief 
prevailed was because most inquiries into how the banking system worked did little else than 
                                                 
313 Saeed mentions the likes of Fazlur Rahman, Muhammad Asad, Sa’id al-Najjar and ‘Abd al-Mumin Al-Namir. 
These scholars took the approach that bank interest was essentially permissible to engage in out of necessity.  
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corroborate the notion prevalent at that time, that banks were the lenders of people’s savings 
rather than creators of credit. The history of how banks breached bailment laws in England and 
how their power influenced politics and changing perceptions, as evidenced through cases like 
Foley vs. Hill, was not part of a discourse narrative that was widely available to Muslim 
societies. However, it is now known with more certainty than ever that the myth that banks lend 
savings emanates from a discourse affected by power (Beinhocker, 2007). 
Looking at the sub-discourse community of Muslims taking on this issue, on the side of 
accepting the validity of bank interest in agreement with Abduh and Rida were several prominent 
scholars. Vogel and Hayes cite that Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abu Zayd (d. 1930) and Syrian 
scholar Marouf al-Daoualibi adopted this argument (1998). Other names include the writer on 
ethics, MA Draz, and Abdullah Yusef Ali, famous for his translation of the Quran, as well as 
another famous translator, Muhammad Asad (d. 1992).314 Of these prominent individuals, the 
most elaborate and pronounced among them is Fazlur Rahman (1919-1988). His views are 
representative of the position articulated by liberals and modernists on this issue quite succinctly, 
which chronologically begins with Abduh.  
Rahman writes in a treatise dedicated to the topic entitled Riba and Interest (1964) “Any 
attempt to translate the Quranic term riba into any language, is not only futile, but is also the 
source of much confused thinking on the subject” (p. 39). Rahman goes on further to downplay 
the negative externalities of the modern banking system by claiming that it is actually less 
usurious that the pre-Islamic pagan society in Arabia. He continues in this framing by 
contemplating, “A natural question arises here, viz., if riba is only that form of usurious 
                                                 




transaction which has been described above and if only this form is banned, then why is it that, 
as an effect of the riba ordinance of the Qur’an, all interest seems to have been abolished as is, 
indeed, testified by historical evidence?” (p. 8). Rahman recognizes that he is at odds with the 
orthodoxy. However, he elaborates further:  
But what matters is that all these individual cases were part of one riba-system in 
whose nature it was to be so exorbitantly usurious. Therefore, what had to be 
banned was the system as a whole, and hence no exceptions could be made in 
individual cases. When the entire system was banned, the milder cases within that 
system were also naturally abolished since the system itself was tyrannical. It 
cannot, therefore, be argued that since the Qur’an abolished even the milder cases, 
it must be concluded that the bank-interest of today also stands condemned. This 
is because the bank system of today is a separate type of system (pp. 7-8).  
 
In retrospect, this position seems absurd in the light of what is now known empirically 
about the unjust nature of the entire system as something far more encompassing than a small 
usury network limited to the 7th century in the Arabian Peninsula. Furthermore, Rahman’s neo-
rationalist logic on this point is understandably defective as his methodology surfaces to the 
forefront in his defense of interest because he considers it the only reliable mechanism available 
that can control insatiable need (taken as an axiom directly from neoclassical and neoliberal 
economics). But in the defense of Rahman and others with such views, considering the wider 
discourse that they consulted, their conclusions are entirely understandable because Muslim 
intellectuals who looked into the banking mechanism by reading orthodox literature on the 
subject during that era were not privy to any practical literature of how interest-free operations 
could even theoretically function. However, whether conscious of it or not the modernist sub-
discourse of Muslim modernists like Rahman mimicked the position of the pro-usury neoliberals. 
This discourse took place amongst a minority of influential Muslims who tried to justify this 
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position through religious means by incorrectly attributing the existence of interest payments to 
the concept of maslahah (public benefit). At some point, the translation of interest into Arabic 
departed entirely with riba, and became fa’ida, a word that means benefit. Thus, even when 
someone is making interest payments, the word used is fa’ida. This is quite a significant 
reframing. Hence, the opinion of Abduh has had a significant effect. In contemporary times, the 
Egyptian Al-Azhari scholar Muhammad Tantawi reasserted this position again in a 2002 fatwa 
about bank interest. The basis for the fatwa, however, was over a century old (El-Gamal, 
2006).315  
It is not that Muslim intellectuals were not diligent in research, but nearly all economic 
text and talk in the 20th century promoted the same type of fundamental untruths and 
hagiographic accounts of the history of money and interest, safeguarding the industry that was 
funding the research into the field. Furthermore, Rahman did recognize that a country such as 
Pakistan should try its best to push the rate down to as close as it could to zero, which was likely 
an influence from Keynes who argued the same thing. However, the willingness to negotiate 
with a sophisticated system designed to essentially make fraudulent claims on real wealth 
worldwide through interest mechanisms, was not designed to ever allow a zero interest rate, and 
this miscalculation was critical. Entering into a negotiation about the terms of interest rather than 
its stipulated non-existence in a market signifies that a form of resignation in understanding has 
already taken place. 
 
                                                 
315 El-Gamal mentions some would argue that the fatwa is based on the misconception that the bank is in a 
partnership with the depositor. Tantawi however carefully writes that hypothetically a bank acting as an agent could 
invest money on a fixed return, le yekoon wakeela (agent) anhom fee istathmarha fe muamalaato asmashroa (in 
investing it for them). Although some interest is permitted in this fatwa, it does not explicitly say that all bank 
interest is permitted, which some falsely accused it of. 
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5.3.9 Muslim Support for Socialism 
 
While some Muslims were negotiating capital in capitalist terms, others were engaging 
its dialectical counterpart. Although Marx’s ideas were not entirely original (Nesta Webster 
claimed they were not), many social movements in the 20th century took up his ideas, and the 
effects were disastrous (Webster, 1921).316 The sentiment from approximately the 1940s until the 
1960s in Arab states was, as others, fed up with the insufferable conditions of predatory 
capitalism. Thus, without a unified theory on justice, many sought communism and socialism out 
as alternative means, and Islamic texts were extrapolated in attempts to support the position 
(Anvar, 1989).317 In practice, the state never withered away as Marx had forecasted, in reality, 
the state apparatus under communism just became increasingly totalitarian, and it resulted in yet 
another usurious type of plunder through confiscation. As capitalist (Allied) countries claimed 
military victories and communist countries suffered defeats, famines and collapses, a consensus 
emerged on capitalism’s alleged superiority.  
                                                 
316 Webster, (the originator of Theosophy), writes, “[Marx’s] Communism was that of Babeuf, his theory of wage 
slavery was current during the French Revolution, his idea of the class war had originated with Weishaupt, the 
Illuminist, his theory that labour produces all wealth had been formulated by Robert Owen and the Chartists, his 
theory of surplus value had also been proclaimed by the Chartists”.  
317 Anvar discusses that well-known advocates were Taha Hussein and Syed Qutb. Some even claimed that the first 
two Caliphs of Islam had operated in a socialist manner. The quintessential nature of the system they projected onto 
the discourse was that socializing ownership of the means of production was preferable to privatizing ownership. 
Thus, socialism and communism at their cores share a common element; they both lead to monopolies (state or 
banking) and therefore capitalism versus communism (and socialism) have formed a dichotomous relationship in 
recent history which is nothing more than another false dialectic avoiding the issue of usury as a pathway to 
oligarchy. This was recognized by Afghani who argued that the poor only supported socialist visions out of 
vindictiveness because of the disparity between the rich and the poor, but that the only legitimate socialism (al-
ishtirakiya) in Islam was the kind of Abu Bakr’s and Umar’s Caliphates whereby the administration lived as 
austerely as the commoners (pp. 35-37). 
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For the Arab world, this social experiment was very brief.318 Much of the sentiment 
associated to socialism in the Muslim world was connected to the perception of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s Egypt of the 1950’s and 60’s and the associated failed social institutions of the country 
underpinned by ideological support of state-owned resources (al-Bishri, 1996).319 Furthermore it 
was pointed out by Tripp (2006) that the “Nasserist state’s elaboration of the edifice of ‘Islamic 
socialism’ was more closely tied to its immediate interests and to secular ideas of socialist 
development” than it was to any kind of ideal Islamic operation (p. 79). However, because 
communism brought such cataclysmic destruction, a certain version of liberalism emerged that 
presented itself as an antithesis to communism, and Muslims continued along the pathway of 
developing an ‘Islamic’ vision of capitalist economics. 
 
5.3.10 A Failed Attempt at Islamizing Economics 
 
Inherited by the West were paradoxical extremes. Studying the system from an Islamic 
perspective included discerning how to interpret the idealization of material wealth and beauty, 
on the one hand, and its promotion of human rights, pluralism and tolerance on the other. As 
early as the late 1940’s literature started to appear that promoted the idea that Muslims should 
struggle to establish an ‘Islamic’ monetary system, or something at least compatible with the 
Shariah (Kahf, 2004). This idea was tied in to political struggles. For instance, Muslims in India 
                                                 
318 20th century communism failed to suffice the public’s aspirations for a more just system, and since communism 
and capitalism are mistakenly viewed as antithetical like ‘right versus left’ paradigms of ‘liberalism versus 
conservatism’, all of these dialectical debates created a synthesis and macroeconomic codification of capitalism. It is 
a synthesis that has extended its global hegemony beyond anything imagined or articulated by Newton, Smith or 
Marx. 




connected this to a vision that Muslims were inherently different, and needed an inherently 
different economics in order to build a new state (Pakistan).  
An early influential writer on the subject was Abu al-A’la Al-Mawdudi (1903-1979) of 
Pakistan’s Jamat-i-Islami. Whereas Syed Qutb (1906 -1966) was an influential writer on the 
issue in the Arab world. The alternative proposition these thinkers suggested was a migration to 
what was known as ‘profit and loss systems’ (PLS). Adopting this stance, the founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan Al-Banna (d. 1949) sent a letter in 1947 urging the governments of 
Arab states to give up “usury” or “be at war with Allah and Rasool” as he identified inherently 
usurious features in the banking system and connected them to riba (p. 137). 
PLS systems had operated within Muslim and non-Muslim contexts for centuries. 
However, the arguments of Mawdudi and others were not made on grounds from the Quran or 
hadith, but were instead based on opinions of medieval Islamic jurists. Furthermore, profit and 
loss was not a utopian replacement; it required vigilance in protecting equitable distributions of 
shares, risks and profits. However, the Mawdudist school of thought’s emphasis was on creating 
‘Islamic’ contracts. The thinking was that if contracts mimicked medieval contracts in form that 
they would be of ‘Islamic’ substance. What was not considered was that many of these medieval 
contracts were based on arrangements equally susceptible to exploitation. Regarding this issue in 
Islamic history, Saeed (1996) writes: 
Since there was no adequate mechanism in the Sharia to deal with loans for non-
humanitarian purposes, and jurists had blocked any redefinition of qard [a benevolent 
loan] people had to resort to various stratagems in order to lend and borrow…These 
stratagems, which appear to be largely the invention of jurists, became widely accepted 
by Muslims since the need was there, while the stratagems were regarded as lawful by the 




The opinion in favor of adopting PLS contracts swayed the Muslim Brotherhood. Other 
groups took up the concept as well. However, this concept received no state support in any of the 
Arab states. As Eijk (2010) mentions, the irony was that in Saudi Arabia this idea was 
suppressed with the most force because “To allow some banks to call themselves ‘Islamic’ 
would indicate that the others are not” (p. 167). Without state support, the dialogue remained 
temporarily sidelined and politically maligned.  
Deemed part of a neo-revivalism, this cadre of writers set the assumptions, values and 
axioms for the envisaged system. Their ideas would develop its “organizational culture”, a robust 
term describing the “meanings, understandings, beliefs, knowledge, and other intangibles” 
(Alvesson, 2002, p. 6). This backdrop spawned the replication of their stated terms regarding 
accounting, governing structures and processes (Schein, 2004).320 The first book to appear 
propagating the notion of an ‘Islamic’ economics was Anwar Iqbal Quraishi’s Islam and the 
Theory of Interest (1948) and soon thereafter Abu’l A’la Mawdudi’s Riba (1950). Mawdudi 
wrote books on the issue such as his Economic System of Islam (1948), which swayed the 
Pakistani group Jamaat Islami into adopting this position. Mawdudi displayed a significant grasp 
of much of the capitalist mechanisms, but, like others, he delineated riba in a one-dimensional 
manner as compound interest on loans, excluding the riba associated in the credit creation 
process of fractional reserve banking. In 1956, Muhammad Uzair published an article suggesting 
how an interest-free bank operating on PLS models would theoretically run (Siddiqi, 1989).321 
                                                 
320 Schein’s work focuses on analyzing the theoretical structure of organizational culture and leadership. 20th century 
Muslims too opined for a PLS system, which simply meant no loans would be guaranteed by the interest mechanism 
of transferred risk. Instead, banks – like all other entities – would be rewarded only through successful projects, like 
venture capitalists. In profitable ventures, all parties would share equitably in the profits; however, in the event of a 
loss, all investors would share equitably in the losses. The promulgation of this concept was because all parties 
believed it to embody the spirit of justice while simultaneously being faithful to the Shariah.  
321 Siddiqi’s most oft-cited source is Uzair as he explains the two-tier mudaraba model of profit sharing, which 
became the fundamental ideological platform although not the normative practice. Siddiqi mentions 55 works in 
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The belief within this camp was that PLS contracts would work efficiently, and that if explicit 
compound interest on loans could be avoided then riba could be successfully abated as well. 
This, however, was a misunderstanding of the distorted economic environment created by the 
banking system that lent no structural support to such an idea.  
 
5.3.11 A Lack of Power: PLS Models and Political Capture 
 
Religious discussions were taking place around what was largely a political issue (Iqbal, 
1934). 322 And despite its theoretical imperfections, profit sharing and equitability models 
seemed to offer a potential alternative to interest-based modes of economics. However, with no 
political support for shaping an economy based on PLS concepts, the model never took off. 
States that wanted international recognition and entrance into world markets had to agree to 
established parameters of trade (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). Having a central bank was required 
for such participation, which meant that sovereign debt at interest was ubiquitously the genesis 
                                                                                                                                                             
Arabic, English and Urdu in his survey of IBF literature written from the 50s to the 70s including A Groundwork for 
Interest-free Banking by Uzair (probably the first). Furthermore, Baqir Al-Sadr (1935-1980) wrote Al Bank Al La 
Ribawi in 1964. 
322 20th century Muslim intellectuals and reformers opined that returning to a Caliphate type of system was 
unnecessary and antiquated. For instance, Pakistani intellectual Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938) supported the new 
interpretation of Islamic texts that transferred political authority from a Caliph to a constitutional legislature, stating 
the method was “perfectly sound” (p. 124). Nation-state legislation commonly utilized this method, for instance, in 
Egypt where the constitution was modified from having the Shariah as ‘a principle source’ of legislation to 
becoming ‘the principle source’, even though this semantic alteration possessed no legal imperative. Iqbal thought 
that the Republican form of government was thoroughly consistent with Islam and that it was a necessity for 
Muslims to form republics. (He commented regarding Turkey’s first implementation of this method that Turkey’s 
ijtihad to replace the Imam/Caliph by vesting such powers into a republic). It is clear that Muslim discourse did not 
display an entire grasp of the circumstance that one of the primary purposes of the nation state was to safeguard the 
rights of capitalist practices, i.e. the banking system – and that the banking system was intrinsically dependent on 
interest. A copious understanding of this may have changed the negotiation of banking’s boundaries earlier on, but 
there were many issues being reframed simultaneously with no precedent in Islamic history. 
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of state money supplies (Khan & Mirakhor, 1990).323 Nation-states were inept as pliant 
signatories to treaties drafted outside of their influence. Moreover, interest-based banks were 
operating freely in the entire Middle East, which made it difficult for risk-sharing models to 
compete. Thus, for various reasons the PLS model was abandoned and rendered inoperable. A 
consensus quickly formed that the next functional stage was to ‘Islamize’ the present banking 
system as a temporary segue. As early as 1982 this was being accepted in IBF journals, for 
example, Nienhaus (1982) writes that since the entire economic climate is usurious, “It is not 
permissible to apply, without further considerations and reservations, the results of these theories 
to the real world of Islamic banks and their performance” (p. 39).  
Thereafter, the functional practices of banks identifying their products as ‘Islamic’ 
principally became a part of conventional banking with niche branding. This resulted in the rise 
of extreme pragmatism in dealing with interest, and the utilization of subterfuges and stratagems 
that dealt in interest, but under labels that called it different terms. An overall pattern emerges in 
examining how this method prevailed. Shariah ‘principles’ were used as a source of reference in 
legislation in order to develop a ‘Shariah compliant’ model rather than a ‘Shariah-based’ one. 
These nuances are evident in works by Qutb (1960) and others.324 Noting the semantics here is 
significant. Furthermore, the decision to abandon the PLS system was never announced or 
expressly communicated in banking promotional material. To the contrary, the industry 
insistently advocated its moral superiority due to its dependence on profit and loss sharing, often 
as its leading axiom on advertisements in addition to its utilization of halal, Islamic, riba free, 
and interest-free financing slogans. Farooq (2006) summarizes succinctly,  
                                                 
323 Iran and Pakistan are two countries that witnessed earnest attempts at delving into solving this issue comparative 
to other nations. They also failed, but it was a valuable learning experience. 
324 Qutb mentions, “In constructing Islamic society, the thing which we are bound to is not Islamic fiqh. Though we 




To completely avoid interest as its central allocation tool, IBF has developed an 
impressive array of modes of transactions that is claimed to be primarily based on profit-
loss-sharing (PLS) modes. PLS modes are to avoid debt-financing and use partnership 
and equity-financing, similar to venture capitalism. Paradoxically, while the pertinent 
literature continues to emphasize PLS modes as the main modes, the practice of Islamic 
financial institutions (IFIs) is such that they have deliberately and systematically avoided 
PLS modes. Such modes are often presented as various forms of partnership financing 
(Farooq, 2007, p. 1). 
 
Many decades later, this aspect is now recognized in IBF research and literature, although 
bank advertisements have not changed much. But there are few, if any, moves in place to change 
the fundamental mechanisms of the industry. 
 
5.3.12 The Final Step: Misapplication of Classical Rulings 
 
Even though the PLS model had been abandoned in IBF practice, pioneers of IME like 
Mohammed Uzair, N.M. Siddiqi and Umar Chapra continued throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s 
to develop the theoretical field. Amongst this rhetoric were calls to Islamize all knowledge (Al-
Faruqi, 1982). Despite the fact that neoliberalism became a tool for the rich to exploit weak 
nations, Muslim polities largely embraced neoliberal policies and tried to make them ‘Shariah 
compliant’ (Shaikh, 2010).325  
Many sought classical sources for guidance, but classical jurists had never developed a 
consensus view on money. Furthermore, the classical rulings were primarily based on the 
assumption that the genus of monies would forever remain as commodities and that money 
                                                 
325 Many observers realized that Muslims had misapprehended capitalism. However, this phenomenon happened all 
around the Muslim world.  
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would be mined and controlled by successive governments. The introduction of interest-based 
debt as money presented new problems to old rulings. Furthermore, the most authoritative 
classical jurists, like Imam Malik had postulated that if future Muslim societies ever adopted new 
monies (of a different genus), that the same methodology and rulings should apply to them 
(Malik, 2005).  
In semantic legal (Shariah) terms (usul al-fiqh), scholars analyzed bank money in order to 
make rulings on it by using the speculative and rationalist tool of qiyas (analogical deduction). 
Qiyas is measuring or ascertaining the length, weight or quality of something, or establishing 
similarity between two things in order to make an analogy. The aim of using this analogy is to 
extend a ruling (hukm) of an original case (asl) to a new case (far’) since the new case is 
considered to have the same ‘illah (effective cause). Scholars in the modern era conflated the 
‘illah of bank money with that of fulus, which was a type of interest-free fiat money used at 
various times in Islamic history. The assumption was that the same rules developed by jurists on 
fulus and metals of the past could be directly applied to any new monies (Haneef & Barakat, 
2006).326 Although jurists from all legal schools have keenly pointed out that the rulings of riba 
are not only restricted to gold and silver, and that they need vigilant re-visitation on any money 
of a new genus, money created as a digital debt obligation on a bank ledger, and its attached 
interest, was something unprecedented in the history of Islamic jurisprudence. Hence, it required 
more than an application of old rulings.  
                                                 
326 The work is a collection of the various fiqh opinions, which compare and contrast the types of monies appearing 
throughout Islamic history. They mention scholars from the Hanafi School like al-Shaybani, Maliki scholars like al-
Wansharisi, Shafi’i scholars, and famous Hanbalis like Ibn Taymiyyah.  
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Therefore, according to Haneef and Barakat (2006) the reasoning (ijtihad) for supporting 
the permissibility of bank money was that its impermissibility had not been established.327 With 
many of these arguments lending support to general permissibility of any new type of money, the 
scope of the scholarly inquiries did not consider the long and complicated history of usury in its 
association to bank credit money and banking in general, and in this regard, expressed opinions 
that were ineffectual in preventing the adoption of problematic banking mechanisms. The 
chronological development of the tools at a scholar’s disposal in usul al fiqh were, although quite 
elaborate, not necessarily able to treat such a complex issue without understanding the history of 
its development through reliable interlocutors (Hallaq, 1997).328 
 
5.3.13 Understanding the Psychology behind the Development of ‘Islamic’ Banking 
 
Humans have the natural inclination towards cooperating in common interest. The social 
sciences reveal this fact through studies of various societies, confirming that at all times during 
                                                 
327 1. Everything is by default permissible (ibahah) unless evidence to the contrary is found in the textual sources. 2. 
Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab wanted to use leather from camels for a type of fiat money, inferring that he thought fiat 
money to be acceptable. 3. Money can take any form. All money issues fall under the consideration of public 
interest (maslahah al mursilah), thus, the decision of how it should be managed is a governmental decision. 4. 
Conventions and customs should be evaluated by their meaning. 5. The maqasid perspective, which identifies that 
the Shariah exists to remove hardships, and that avoiding the use of certain prevalent money in circulation, in turn 
causes hardship. However, Umar’s proposal was argued against by his companions out of mercy for the camels, not 
because the money as such was an issue. They cite Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan as the first to mint gold and silver 
coins as money 76 years after the migration (hijra) in order to show that money can take any form. 
328 A common example of this type of analogy is the prohibition of drugs through a deductive analytical 
understanding of the prohibition of wine. A traditional ruling (hukm) related to money would identify a sabab (a 
specific reason that a ruling needs to exist) with money by contrasting it with the ‘illah (the motive behind 
legislation for a ruling). For instance, wine drinking (asl) is prohibited; and since it is established that it is prohibited 
a scholar could make an analogy (qiyas) that narcotics (far’) should also be prohibited because they create the same 
intoxicating effects (‘illah). These were the tools of usul al-fiqh that had been developed in very different contexts 
and circumstances. But utilizing the same ‘illah of medieval rulings that were produced in mercantile economies in 
which gold, silver and copper coins were money, and applying such understandings to fiat money was a misuse of 
the ‘illah, for intrinsically the fiat money was different. 
258 
 
human civilization people have subscribed to social control belief systems in both conscious and 
unconscious ways. Muslims of the 20th century were no different. After such a systematic 
reframing of traditional spheres of knowledge from education, to governance, to economics, it is 
understandable that Muslim consciousness would produce scholarship of an intransigent essence. 
However, the influence of power and the control of colonially produced institutions created an 
environment wherein the festering of Muslim intransigent thought was converted, albeit 
unknowingly, to contritely subscribe to positions and formations within the acceptable 
parameters of the establishment, i.e. the capitalist mechanism. How Noam Chomsky (1998) 
describes it, “The smart way to keep people passive and obedient is to strictly limit the spectrum 
of acceptable opinion, but allow very lively debate within that spectrum” (p. 43).  
According to Warde (2000), most researchers attribute the IBF phenomenon to two 
general factors: the rise of pan-Islamism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the 
movement’s identification of bank interest as riba. However, Abdullah Saeed’s Islam and 
Interest (1996), narrows it down to three primary reasons. (a) Muslim neo-revivalism adopted a 
certain (one-dimensional) view of riba by concurring that it solitarily equaled bank interest on 
loans. (b) The adoption of this perspective by the middle-class put pressure on policymaking. (c) 
New oil wealth mobilized and influenced the facilitation of the IBF option as the principal 
response (Friedland & Robertson, 1990).329  
                                                 
329 It in many ways placated the middle-class’s desires as well. Essentially, the energy crises of the 1970s and the 
consequential agreements and political strategies that emerged therefrom resulted in an influx of oil rents in private 
hands. These factors put pressure on policymakers in Muslim majority states, especially in the Arabian Gulf, where 
the growing sentiments of their middle-classes grew abhorrent to bank interest – as they now associated it to the 
prohibited riba. These events thereby created a growing need for an ostensibly separate and distinct version of 
finance acceptable to that middle-class’s Islamic sympathies, in order to placate them. There was no way out, people 
who did not accept the market and its values were isolated. 
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The one-dimensional view of riba adopted by the modern Islamist parties led them to 
embrace IBF as the way forward. As Ramadan (2008) points about such movements, “despite the 
great diversity of their intellectual approaches and sociopolitical strategies, [they] determined a 
relationship to the texts and to political power based on analyses that date back to the early or 
mid-twentieth century; they find it difficult to evolve and make a comprehensive reassessment” 
(p. 287). The term “comprehensive” would equate to Ramadan’s term “radical reform”, and that 
type of ability has still eluded Muslim majority polities.330 
Tripp’s Islam and the Moral Economy (2006) argues reasons for how and why Muslims 
have reacted to capitalism in such “contradictory ways… justified with reference to a repertoire 
of identifiable Islamic beliefs”. Tripp’s argument is that the greater Muslim discourse can be 
studied by seeing its changing interpretation of maslahah (public benefit), and the debates 
around the issues of private property, the preservation of an Islamic identity, and the role that 
states played in the entire renegotiation of such terms.331  
[This field] can draw upon a repertoire of Islamic terms, narratives and 
prescriptions familiar to many, but assembled in particular combinations 
according to a logic that is not exclusive to Muslims, let alone to an abstracted 
‘Islam’. The fact that those responsible for these contrasting courses of action 
believe themselves to be acting upon specifically Islamic grounds is not 
                                                 
330 Ramadan names the Muslim Brotherhood, an-Nahda in Tunisia, Justice and Development in Morocco, an-Nahda 
and Hamas in Algeria, the Justice and Development party in Turkey, PAS and ABIM in Malaysia, the al-
Muhammadiya movement in Indonesia and anonymous ideologues in Iran. These parties have relationships with 
IBF. It is acknowledged that literalist reductionist (qira’a harfiyyah) movements were as limiting as restricted 
imitation (taqlid) in its extreme form, but that these two positions were born out of “a fear of deviations, of the texts 
not being respected, or of excessive influence from the West, or from homogenized global culture” (p. 293). 
331 The scope of Tripp’s study covers a wider range of Muslim reactions to capitalism encompassing violent political 
movements, activism, and state policies. His exploration is indeed valuable as it examines the evolution in thinking 
over the last century within Islamic thought as it pertains to Muslim social responses and issues raised by capitalism 
and socialism; it also adds to the corpus of knowledge regarding how the continuum of thought from Islamic social 
criticism has centered on certain themes. He contrasts why such varied reactions were all so dissimilar due to what 
certain abstractions of Islam centered on in their channeled reactions to capitalism. He asserts that the most 
prominent Muslim reactions and strategies were heavily influenced and limited by the very economic and political 
systems they were engaging, which were ironically created as byproducts of the capitalist system, “Indeed, the very 
insistence by some that economics is a value neutral science of ‘how things work’ could compound the ambivalence 
in this sphere” (p.113). 
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irrelevant, but their actions are also shaped by the economic and political 




The discussion centers on the idea that ‘Islamic’ banking is simply just a brand name of 
banking – an extension of capitalist institutionalization – and that it functions in full 
acquiescence to the global capitalist political hegemony and the various levels of its power 
apparatus that have forged financial arrangements with client states. Within this reframed 
context, it is difficult to shoulder the blame entirely on single individuals, Muslim scholars, or 
even specific political leaders for that matter. Tragically, at the state level there has been minimal 
support for changing the way banking functions, funding research initiatives intent on 
constructing interest-free cooperatives, or drastically changing legal tender laws. Furthermore, 
we must keep in mind conservative estimates, which reveal that between 10 and 15 million 
people have died as a direct result of U.S. military intervention related to the intended altering of 
economic regimes. Moreover, an estimated hundreds of millions have died as an indirect 
consequence of the violent structural changes facilitated by interventions in 70 plus nations 
(Unpeople, 2004).332 It is a feature of empires to carry out incursions with impunity and moral 
authority, and the 20th century witnessed many such incursions sailing under the flag of 
promoting liberty – in economics – and otherwise (Holland, 2007).333 As the dominant program 
                                                 
332 For a low estimate of the people directly killed see Mark Curtis’s figures which come in at 10 million, which he 
acknowledges is a very conservative estimate. There is other analysis on the interventions and the auspices for 
which they were made under and the resultant deaths and human suffering associated (12-15 million). 
333 Holland writes that the Roman Empire also saw itself as a moral authority: “It was an article of faith to the 
Romans that they were the most morally upright people in the world. How else was the size of their empire to be 
explained? Yet they also knew that the Republic's greatness carried its own risks. To abuse it would be to court 
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within this milieu was neoliberalism, polities on the outside of such power spheres (Muslim-
majority or otherwise) simply could not contend with such organized supremacy.  
The coopting nature of neoliberalism also affected religious thinking because 
contemporary to that period, the maqasid studies, revivified in the early 1970s, became in many 
ways a source of obfuscation. Neoliberal influence thereby assisted scholarship towards an over-
rationalistic and relativistic disassembling of certain Shariah principles in attempts towards 
functional compromise with the system. Some of the most prominent names in the furthering of 
maqasid studies have reached conclusions that have clearly only created more dissent, discord 
and confusion regarding the articulation of riba.334 Ramadan (2008) notes: 
The Western equation secularization = freedom = religious pluralism = 
democracy has no equivalent in Muslim-majority societies where, through the 
historical experiences of the past century, the equation has tended to associate 
other representations that would rather sound like: secularization = colonialism = 
de Islamization = dictatorship. The need to oppose Western imperialism and its 
efforts to impose on society development models has been such that Muslim 
thought has settled into a role of rejection and denial based on otherness, having 
lost the ability to reconcile with its own points of reference and develop a vision 
from within, relying on its own richness and assets. Compelled to oppose others, 
it has ended up ceasing to be true to itself (p. 265).  
 
The reality is that in a globalized world, the entire human community is essentially part 
of one culture. There is no room for any ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ rhetoric in building sustainable solutions. 
Islam has within its corpus concepts that give support to such a framing: (wa laqad karramna 
bani Adam) “We have honored/dignified the descendants of Adam” (17:70). The message is 
                                                                                                                                                             
divine anger. Hence the Roman's concern to refute all charges of bullying, and to insist they had won their empire 
purely in self-defense”. 
334 For instance, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, an Afghani long-time professor of law at Malaysia’s IIUM and 
member of many Shariah boards, used the maqasid in order to justify the permissibility of Islamic banking, futures 
contracts and options. 
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clear that the human family is one. Religious belief and understanding does not change that and 
allowing faith to be a divisive issue is counterproductive in mobilizing support for issues of 
shared interest. In many ways, it seems the biggest mistake made by Muslims working in the 
IME/IBF field was that they incorrectly thought that their principles were so distinct from what 
other ethically minded members of the human community would strive to realize in terms of an 
equitable distribution of resources. In doing so, they did not seek out counsel from the most 
articulate and organized modes of monetary reform in ethics and sustainability circles. 
 On the other hand, institutionalized power was clearly one of the most significant factors 
in shaping the way Muslims devised their understandings of the capitalist paradigm; and those 
negative externalities created the fog of war under which certain unethical practices were 
allowed to pass as ‘Islamic’ arguments because the crisis of legitimacy in the Muslim world was 
clearly that profound. Hence, under the auspices of presenting ‘Islamic’ solutions to Muslims in 
the ‘modern’ era (like lobbying that bank interest offers high social utility, or that recreating 
medieval contract forms would restore justice) were manifestations that paved the way for IBF to 
ultimately prevent Muslims from moving beyond facile models. As Tripp (2006) notes about the 
abuse of terms like maslahah, “such a definition could also open the way for an understanding of 
benefit or utility that was centred on the individual” (p. 121). If we take ‘individual’ here to 
mean the ‘consumer’ and the ‘rent-seeker’, then this analysis explains why the concerted 







CHAPTER 6: A MAQASID CRITIQUE OF THE ‘ISLAMIC’ BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
“Riba has 73 manifestations (bab), the least serious being equivalent to a man fornicating with 




Riba is difficult to define. Once it is defined, however, it is easy to circumvent. Maqasid 
methodology expands the modalities used in assessing ethical and moral choices, and our 
understanding of increasingly complex issues. Extending such principles, this chapter is a critical 
examination of the deficient ethicality of IBF practices. That its very existence is preventing 
Muslims from moving on to options that are more ethical is something that can only be 
understood in proper context now in the light of new information, and from the reframing of 
historical terms and events in discourse.  
 
6.0.2 Background on Criticism  
 
Scholars of varying disciplines have acknowledged that morally grounded spheres of 
exchange have boded well historically and when implemented with fastidiousness. However, 
because of the totalitarian ambiance of capitalist modernity, using religion to inspire ethics in 
business has generally suffered from the problem of unnecessarily oscillating between extremes. 
In The Great Transformation (1944), Karl Polanyi opined that economics had dual meanings. In 
the view of the neoclassical economists, it consisted of the decision-making and motivations 
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behind people’s material pursuits in a social-Darwinist envisaged struggle over scarce means. On 
the other side, there was a second substantive meaning that referred purely to the fact that 
humans adapt to their social environments in order to meet their material needs. This second 
approach, an anthropological view of economics, considered kinship, religion and politics as 
primary factors in worlds that were not entirely industrialized. The entire debate fashioned 
economic anthropology (Geertz, 1963).335 In the end, however, the maelstrom of globalization 
rendered the debate futile.  
Yet, Muslims ineffectually revivified it in the 1970’s, who borrowed from its 
nomenclature and developed the construct known in contemporary times as the ‘Islamic moral 
economy’ (IME). IME has been linked with a conscious attempt to imbue Islamic principles into 
legislation that regulates and extinguishes rights of participants within economies.336 Politically, 
it has received little support, which is why ‘Islamic’ banking and finance (IBF) is instead what 
predominates in practice, an industry that does not practice the PLS principles it claims to adhere 
to. Chapter 5 discussed some critical aspects of the 20th century power structure that controllably 
influenced the manner in which Muslims approached economics, and why the most identifiably 
‘Islamic’ response was the development of IBF (rather than other alternatives) (Ahmad & Fazel, 
2010).337 Because it was created by such circumstances, at the very root of IBF exist ideologies 
                                                 
335 The substantivism, formalism, culturalism debate in economic anthropology ended without a real triumph as 
globalization later rendered it less meaningful. However, there are still interesting insights to be made in concepts 
like the duel economy, charity and the ‘gift economy’. Besides Geertz, Paul Bohannan wrote of this in his research 
on the impact of money on Africa economies. 
336 The discussion of a ‘moral economy’ has been discussed before. The term was brought into academic usage 
through the study of capitalist Europe, most prominently by the Marxist historian E.P. Thompson’s (d. 1993) 
writings about 18th century England. Thompson’s writings inspired James Scott’s work, which analyzed Southeast 
Asian agrarian societies and the moral arrangements underpinning their economic orders. 
337 The work explains that there were partisan motives behind developing an ‘Islamized’ version of banking that was 
in compliance with neoliberal economic hegemony, while simultaneously being beneficial to the heads of fledgling 
Arab states that were forced to submit to, and benefit from, that authority. In addition, there was serious market 
demand for such a compromise from an emerging elite class that sought to secure its financial interests through 
religious legitimacy. That class found an eager coterie of Muslim scholars, tired of being maligned, which found a 
way to regain some temporal authority by presiding over new Shariah boards of banks. 
265 
 
that are intrinsically antithetical to the spirit of the maqasid. This irreconcilability has visible 
effects on the parameters of research, and how various interests frame the issue of ‘Islamic’ 
finance. 
An analysis of the discourse that is critical of IBF reveals a bifurcation, which 
complicates the nature of this research because maqasid-influenced criticism must not be 
subverted into purely deconstructing systems only to leave a vacuum ripe for nihilism. It must 
find a way to steer criticism toward the higher objectives. To categorize with some generality, 
there are two predominant existing types of criticism surrounding IBF. On one hand, there is a 
coterie of scholars who promote IBF – call them IBF advocates – who opine that IBF, as a 
representation of a ‘modern’ normative Islamic practice, is the second best-case scenario 
considering the hegemonic nature of capitalism. They recognize a growing level of criticism that 
subsists, but remain sympathetic to IBF. This attitude more or less encompasses the stance taken 
within the industry, and imbues the sentiments with which it is taught in business schools of 
prestigious universities as a full-fledged discipline. This train of thought is hence unable to 
‘move beyond’ IBF to sustainable and ethical models that require a paradigm shift in thinking. 
Furthermore, because IBF is a discipline taught in mainly secular universities, it adheres 
to modern curriculum standards and principles; thus, it additionally suffers from being restricted 
in its ability to transcend the limits placed on it by institutional boundaries as well as those 
created by accreditation bodies (Stenhouse, 1971).338 Typically, the approach within IBF circles 
                                                 
338 Since 1949 when the ‘father’ of modern curriculum study, Robert Taylor, developed his thesis for shaping 
curriculums (to reflect the model of syllabus, methodology and evaluation), there has been a phenomenon created 
which we can liken to a loop in a closed system. Information within such curriculums sometimes suffers because of 
the systematic and material approach to knowledge that Muslims traditionally did not suffer from. This also 
continued into the 1970s where Lawrence Stenhouse created an updated curriculum standard, which selected 
principles for content – what is to be taught; principles for teaching strategy; principles for sequences; and principles 
for identifying strengths and weaknesses. All of this is entirely relativistic and materialistic, meaning there is no 
metaphysical aspect to the approach to curriculum development. IBF is taught in this sterile manner. It is not 
surprising then the type of research it produces, and that it does not reflect the initial spirit behind the project. 
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is to be critical of the negative aspects of unfettered capitalism; but in regards to being self-
critical about IBF’s blatant breaches of Islamic ethics there are few who focus on the deep-
channeled criticism aimed at it. Much can be said about the ability to see the faults in others 
without being able to successfully engage in introspection. Consequently, instead of publishing 
on such sentiments, the generality of papers produced in IBF journals comprise a corpus of what 
some critics have called an emphasis on ‘form over substance’, meaning that the industry tends 
to address minor issues and tweaks rather than redressing its inherently fundamental problems. 
On what seems to be the opposite end of the spectrum, is a coterie of scholars that is very 
critical of IBF, and is very ready to ‘move beyond’ IBF. However, by understanding these 
thinkers’ objectives – best labeled as pro-capitalist IBF critics – it is clear that they ultimately 
call for reconciliation with the existing monetary system as is, and an endorsement of 
neoliberalism. These critics of IBF have all observed that the theoretical axioms IBF uses to 
strum up business among the Muslim faithful are simply ruses unaccompanied by the practice of 
its stated goals; and furthermore, they allege that the IBF products are largely fraudulent and 
less-advantageous carbon copies of conventional financial products. Unfortunately this coterie of 
scholars is erudite in its criticism, yet as a response, it unequivocally lobbies that IBF should 
simply become ‘conventional’ banking, which includes embracing the interest-based system and 
its mechanisms (Khan, 2010).  
Therefore, when looking for the critics most adroitly aware of IBF’s inherent problems, it 
is very easy to accept the conclusions of such critiques and thereby adopt alternatives that are not 
in any respect ethical ones in line with the aims of the maqasid. Moreover, generally speaking, 
this ‘cheerleading-for-capitalism’ type of rhetoric ignores the macro-problem, which is that 
neoliberal capitalism has irreconcilable characteristics that have measurably led to the social and 
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environmental crises we all face. Therefore, ‘moving beyond’ IBF also requires moving beyond 
our current model of capitalism as well, especially because of what is now known about the great 
ramifications we face if we do not. One of the best critiques of neoliberalism is David Harvey’s 
A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005), which shows that there are alternatives that are more 
just. Similarly, scholars can criticize neoliberalism from various angles. Yet IBF has not been 
able to make use of such emerging information. Therefore, to distinguish the type of criticism 
used here, the remainder of this chapter aims to avoid such pitfalls whereby one system is 
deconstructed critically only to be replaced with an endorsement of another unworkable or 
unethical paradigm. 
An IBF article by (El-Hawary, et al., 2004) states that the consensus reached within IBF 
thought – which was initiated by IME – is that the ‘Islamic’ higher objectives of IBF can be 
succinctly categorized into a taxonomy consisting of four axioms: risk-sharing (PLS), 
materiality, avoiding exploitation, and not financing prohibited activities.339 Meaning that if it 
can be proven to an oversite committee that these objectives are verifiably not being followed, 
then by its own standards, IBF can be determined as an ethical failure. In actuality, however, 
what is transpiring is far beyond the breach of only these four objectives. Hence, in expanding 
the scope of critical discourse, parts 1 and 2 of this chapter will therefore focus on two different 
levels of criticism: 
 
                                                 
339 El-Hawary, Grais and Iqbal name the four as: A. Risk-sharing: contractual agreements in IBF should reflect a 
system whereby risks and returns are distributed and shared in an equitable manner commensurate to what each 
party has risked and earned, known as ‘profit and loss’ sharing (PLS). This is connoted in contrast to charging 
interest. B. Materiality: all financial transactions should be linked to real and forthright economic activities i.e. real 
goods and services; meaning that something real and tangible is being financed in contrast to speculative products 
(gharar). C. No exploitation: this pertains to all involved parties and is linked to the maqasid of trading ‘by mutual 




(1) The first criticism is aimed at IBF on a micro level; it is a criticism of its 
products and functionality. It focuses on IBF’s ethical violations and how they 
are framed from various angles, and the results of such framing in discourse. 
(2) Whereas the second type of criticism addresses broader issues. On a macro 
scale, it addresses the unethicality of embracing and extending the neoliberal 
value system in spite of an overwhelming amount of continuously emerging 
research that reveals the unethical nature of the capitalist paradigm and 
neoliberalism. Therefore, IBF’s occupation of the domain falsely recognized 
as ‘the authentic Islamic response to capitalism’ deters and inhibits real ethical 
solutions from replacing it. 
 
 
Part 1: A Critique of IBF as a Closed Network Microsystem 
 
6.1.1 Identifying Influence 
 
Long-time IBF scholar Monzer Kahf (2005) contends, “The basic principles of Islamic 
banking are derived from the axioms of justice and harmony” (p. 2). However, the latter IBF 
generations of scholars admit that no such justice has been delivered (Asutay, 2012). 
Furthermore, Kuran’s (1995) early industry criticism rightfully argued that IBF should not be 
viewed as an attempt to “radically shift economic thought” but rather simply a reassertion of 
Islam’s importance “as a source of inspiration” and its ability to be applicable and relevant to 
modern life (pp. 169-170).  
Expanding on this accepted understanding, Wilson and Henry (2004) analyzed wider 
political trends and aspects that played significant roles in the Islamization of public life during 
the 1970’s in which ‘Islamic’ banks were active affiliates. The research focused on Kuwait 
Finance House, and the fact that it was funded by oil money, meaning it was therefore enmeshed 
269 
 
in its politics.340 Saeed (1996) has previously corroborated this while also unveiling that across 
the region, the first IBF institutions were “totally funded by oil wealth” (p. 10). With this 
understanding in mind, it is also not surprising that IBF institutions immediately gravitated 
towards products identical to those offered by Western banks, using religious dressing as a 
veneer.341 One of the strongest arguments against IBF is that its top products charge implicit 
interest, which appears in accounting records as explicit interest all while it markets itself as 
‘interest-free’.  
 
6.1.2 Murabaha: Interest Repackaged as ‘Shariah-Compliant’ 
 
The prohibition of riba means that trading credit for a profit is prohibited, and as a result 
there is a scholarly consensus that interest-based loans, deposits and bonds are also riba. A ruse 
developed in order to circumvent this ruling by creating contracts to synthesize interest rates that 
replaced the cost of funds with profits. Generally, this was done by replacing credit 
intermediation semantics, instead of charging openly for credit, a fictional sale (bay’) was 
introduced into the corporate formality under the pretenses that it was operating on PLS 
principles. El-Gamal (2006) has most aptly titled this obfuscation as ‘Shariah arbitrage’.  
Narrating the development of the murabaha product best encapsulates the subterfuge. Dr. 
Sami Hammoud, an economist who worked as a banker in Jordan for over two decades, is 
                                                 
340 The view taken by Wilson and Henry in a sense fails to take into consideration the wider narrative, which is that 
Saudi Arabia was clearly complying with orders mandated to them by the United States in the arrangement that 
Kissinger and Nixon had set up for them. One of the most vital facts to consider is that all of the Islamic banks were 
founded with oil money. Wilson and Henry’s research focused primarily on how this transpired in Kuwait where it 
gave the impetus for a few individuals to establish the Kuwait Finance House (KFH) in 1977. 
341 Furthermore, the IFIs founded in non-oil exporting countries were all partially funded by oil. Saeed states: “IDB 
[had a] 2 billion 60% stake by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Libya. Dubai Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance House, 
Bahrain Islamic bank, Qatar Islamic bank, the Faisal Islamic banks in Bahrain, Niger and Senegal, The Al-Baraka 
group of Sheikh Saleh Kamel, and Dar al-mal al Islami of the Saudi prince Muhammad al Faisal are all totally 
funded by oil wealth” (p. 10). 
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credited with developing murabah at the Jordan Islamic Bank (JIB) in the late 1970s. Hammoud 
inherited the same conflict IME and IBF had been facing – how to guarantee profits to depositors 
and shareholders unwilling to suffer losses in risk sharing models, and how to make such a 
product Shariah-compliant (Maali & Napier, 2010).342 This, of course, was impossible (Islamic-
finance.com, 2012).343 Hamoud claimed he was able to abstract from Imam al-Shafi’i’s book on 
jurisprudence (Kitab Al Um) what he believed to be an argument substantiating additional 
markup in the price of a good, if its payments were delayed. Imam al-Shafi’i had mentioned that 
if someone was to execute such a transaction broken up into various separate contracts, that his 
intentions could not be judged for doing so. To interpret Al-Shafi’i’s comment as an 
endorsement for this type of transaction was a stretch because this was, of course, the time value 
argument of money, which a minority of classical scholars allowed in writings where they would 
say things like “price may be increased due to deferment” (Al-Masri, 1990).344 Most jurists, 
however, did not give a full endorsement to this opinion, including the majority of Shafi’i jurists.  
However, this is where the crux of the controversy has been in both the Jewish and the 
Christian struggles with pricing credit, which is, how much of a charge is legitimate in 
compensating against default risk? We see for instance that IBF scholars have continued to 
struggle with differentiating between the various costs associated with financing that are all 
presently lumped under the umbrella term ‘interest’. For instance, Al Masri (2004) argues, 
                                                 
342 Maali and Napier studied the ideological influence of sharia-compliant seeking and its resultant effects on the 
accounting and regulations established by the JIB.  
343 Another issue was deciding how to finance long-term infrastructure projects on a PLS model. The amount of 
documentation on the beginning of murabaha is scant. However, a published email dialogue with the permission of 
both writers is posted at Islamic-finance.com in which Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi remarks that Hamoud had 
disclosed to him the impetus behind developing murabaha as a debt plus markup model. Sidiqqi is considered one 
of the pioneers of the IBF industry.  
344 Page 76 discuses a practice called bay’ al-nasi’a or bay’ mu’ajjal which is where the credit price is priced higher 
than the cash price. It is argued that many jurists have allowed this. The concept is also called bay’ al taqsit (Bay' al-
dayn wa-taṭbīqātuhu al-mu'āṣirah). Al-Masri has written about it and the Fiqh Academy (decision 53/2/6, sixth 




“Claiming that all forms of interest are categorically prohibited and that an interest rate 
whatsoever is likewise prohibited, would lead to severing all relations with the literature on 
interest, central banks control authorities, interest rate tables, the scientific criteria for calculating 
interest rates and the control of central banks over such rates” (p. 38).345 IBF scholars adopt all of 
the associated nomenclature and tools of the monetary system, but re-label the transactions with 
terminology that was used in medieval texts because of the legitimacy it garners. But what 
Hammoud’s endorsement of marking up the costs on sales items ultimately did was provide a 
loophole for charging implicit interest from the onset of loans marauding as ‘sales’ (Hammoud, 
1998).346 Furthermore, this alleged ‘discovery’ immediately drew parallels to abiding 
descriptions of riba.  
However, in the manner that Hamoud had constructed the agreement, it entailed a 
combination of three consecutively executed contracts that were each individually Shariah-
compliant, reminiscent of the medieval subterfuge used to circumvent the Christian and Islamic 
usury laws (contractum trinius) (See: Ch. 2). This has been labeled a ‘hybrid contract’ in IBF, a 
product that “most authorities” once called ‘Shariah-compliant’ (Khan, 2010, p. 88). The claim is 
that the ‘rate’ is theoretically not a function of time (Mills & Presley, 1999). Transacted in 
sequence, the three contracts guarantee a risk-free increase to a lender who is transposed as a 
‘seller’. Traditionally, Islam has prevented the legality of such a contract through commentaries 
                                                 
345 Al-Masri’s argument is that profit is unlimited in the Shariah, but if profit were called interest, it would be 
checked by the two contemporary methods: interest pricing which is dictated by monetary and credit policy, and 
secondly, the human differentiation of interest and usury, whatever is deemed ‘exorbitant’. The issue is that scholars 
from Islamic backgrounds have been educated in the tradition of accepting the capitalist assumptions on these 
issues. Sometimes cognitive dissonance leads many of them to reject the possibility of questioning the entire set of 
assumptions that their educational foundations rest upon. Hence, Al-Masri concludes, as many others do, that there 
is a legitimate “interest rate” in Islam (p. 38). 
346 Imam Al-Shafi’i’s Kitab Al Um is distinguished by its hermeneutical approach used in developing principles 
directly from the sources (nusus) and rather than the practice (‘amal) or established consensus. In this manner, Al-
Shafi’i departs with Imam Malik on his approach to the law. Hamoud presented this proposition in his thesis, 
published in 1976. He was later presented with an IDB prize for engineering the product in 1987.    
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on several prophetic traditions on riba. For instance, there is a relevant hadith, which says, 
“Prohibited is two trades in one trade” (Al-Tirmidhi, 1986, p. 1). Additionally there is another 
hadith that says, “Prohibited is two contracts into one contract” (Hanbal, n.d., p. 1). There are 
several other narrations with similar wording that go into even more detail. Hence, the majority 
of scholars have feared for the element of riba in such transactions.347  
Nevertheless, immediately after the inception of murabaha, the product was 
recommended to the Islamic Development Bank and the Dubai Islamic Bank, and shortly 
thereafter to Kuwait Finance House and Jordan Islamic Bank, all newly established. Thus, these 
IBF institutions and others all immediately started using murabaha as the basis of their business, 
thereby ditching the PLS model altogether. By the late 1980’s the murabaha financial product 
represented 70% of all transactions taking place in IBF. Some banks were even more dependent 
on it, using it for 90% of their transactions (Wilson & Henry, 2004).  
Murabaha really became the lynchpin of IBF during the slowdown and normalization 
period. The first Gulf War (1990) and the sinking oil prices of the 1990s periodically halted the 
growth of IBF in that decade. During that period of heightened Western political and economic 
interference, IFI’s lost more than a third of their deposits (Vogel & Hayes, 1998). In order to 
prevent the capital flight that was taking place, OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development) countries shifted their policies towards making their domestic financial 
infrastructures mirror the Western model (Siddiqui, 2005). During that period, IBF was used to 
create a more ‘multipolar’ financial system. Siddiqi argues that this was more of a tactic 
designed to flex what limited power oil-rentier states had left after suffering from the 
                                                 
347 It is not allowed to combine two contracts into one (safaqahtain fi safaqah), which is the basis of all of the IBF 
schemes in practice although they are against the theory they essentially guarantee a return and safeguard the banks 
from any risk. 
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arrangement of recycling petrodollars through the ‘Anglo-American’ banking system (Siddiqi, 
1989). 
In 1999, The U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a letter of 
understanding deeming murabaha to be within the business delineation of banking. This gave the 
go ahead for several American banks to offer home and auto financing using the murabaha 
model as well as the ijara leasing model. Moreover, government sponsored enterprises Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac began buying mortgage notes originated by these contracts. In a letter 
about the murabah product the OCC writes, “Murabaha financing proposals are functionally 
equivalent to, or a logical outgrowth of secured real estate lending and inventory and equipment 
financing, activities that are part of the business of banking” (Currency, 1999).348 Therefore, the 
bulk of profits in IBF are generated by an implied interest rate charge, which is benched to the 
London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), except in IBF it is called an “average markup on 
murabaha” (Kettell, 2011).349 Those trained in the linguistic study of pragmatics would consider 
this context to be deceiving because nothing is intrinsically different about the product except the 
name, which is Arabic, and to some that connotation means ‘Islamic’ and therefore in certain 
minds, ethical. However, in the end, the economic factor called ‘The Law of One Price’ takes 
effect and the prices of IBF products merge with the going interest rates of traditional banks. 
Early on, Sherman (1986) identified this as a full subscription to the capitalist paradigm, arguing 
that the industry operations were ‘inseparable’ from conventional markets and their dynamics.  
                                                 
348 The issue from November 1999, Vol. 12, No. 11 letter no. 867 about the topic of murabaha says the following - 
“Islamic Murabaha financing transactions, whereby a national bank acquires the property on behalf of the customer 
and then resells the property to the customer at a mark up on an installment basis, are permissible for national banks 
as part of the business of banking” (p. 1).  
349 As discussed on page 53, unfortunately, much of the literature written by professors and bankers within the IBF 
apparatus focus on the ‘form’ over the ‘function,’ which means the bulk of the papers published in journals focus on 
details on inching ever closer to “Shariah compliance”. However, a large portion of the material focuses so much on 
form that it ignores the ‘function’. ‘Function’ here means the results that permeate throughout society. Thus, it is 





6.1.3 Legal Stratagems and Ruses 
 
From an ethical perspective, this is all manifestly against higher objectives. Shamsuddin 
Ibn Al Qayyim (d. 1347) wrote extensively reviewing the use of ‘legal stratagems’ designed to 
circumvent Islamic laws (hiyal al-fiqhiyya) (Islahi, 1984).350 Auda (2004) quotes Ibn Al Qayyim 
regarding the medieval practice of circumventing the riba prohibition, “Shariah laws are the cure 
of our sicknesses because of their realities, not their apparent names and outlooks” (p. 21). 
Ayinde (2012) remarks that the gullible Muslim public was “grievously misled into entrusting 
their capital into the hands of these scholars” by products that are essentially ruses used to charge 
interest (p. 37).351 
Hegazy (2007) criticizes the legal stratagem that IBF has used called talfiq 
(amalgamation) which makes the buyer’s promise irrevocable. It in essence safeguards the 
seller’s position and turns the transaction into a guaranteed profit (Hegazy, 2007). All classical 
legal schools of thought condemn these specific types of stratagem. What IBF has done, writes 
Laldin (2009), is to adopt an irrevocable purchase agreement or promise clause in order to 
mitigate and eliminate any potential risk to the bank, which effectively leaves the buyer with a 
100% exposure profile (Laldin, 2009). It is important to note that IBF personnel are aware of 
criticisms calling this product a ruse. In acknowledgement, IBF advocates like Ahmad (1993) 
                                                 
350 Ibn Al Qayyim wrote about Hanafi jurists who were facilitating legal ruses to circumvent the Shariah prohibition 
of usury, which is not a new phenomenon that only IBF has engineered. His writings added to maqasid theory, 
which also supported the idea of the objectives as fundamentals. 
351 The Maliki School of fiqh called it excessive uncertainty (gharar) and deemed it unenforceable in court. Ayinde 
writes, “Murabahah with its components of binding promise is not legally permissible in any of the schools of fiqh. 
According to Hanafite, Shafi'ite, and Hanbalite law, the contract would be enforceable but the purchasing party still 
owned the right to revoke the order and the purchase promise”. To put it another way, the buyer assumes all of the 
risk and the bank guarantees its success. This is anathema to the concept of PLS because the risk has artificially been 
removed for one party, which is the essence of the prohibition of riba. 
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argued in the 1990s that murabaha would soon decline, and that it was only being temporarily 
utilized due to IBF’s nascent status (Ahmad, 1993). Yet decades later, defenders were still 
making the same argument, although cognizant that it was a problem, they alluded to it as the 
‘murabaha syndrome’ (Yousef, 2004).  
 
6.1.4 The Expansion of Pseudo Shariah Compliance 
 
As the murabaha product set the benchmark for financial success in IBF, the industry 
continued to ditch the PLS model and release products mimicking conventional bank products. 
For instance, sukuk – known as ‘Islamic’ bonds – are the largest financial instruments to be 
developed in IBF. According to Standard and Poor’s yearly assessments, sukuk are projected for 
future yearly valuations in the trillions (Nazim & Ibrahim, 2012).352 However, the majority of 
scholars who have taken a deep look at the construction of the language in the sukuk contracts 
have deemed them non-Shariah compliant (Mansoori, 2010). It is widely known that bonds pay 
out low-risk, interest-bearing dividends to investors. Thus, mimicking sovereign bonds, the IBF 
industry has created a version that essentially conveys the same message: returns are solid and 
essentially guaranteed. Assets delineated under the IBF category are approximately $2 trillion 
(.5% of world assets, estimated at $140 trillion) (The Economist, 2014). It has seen a tremendous 
surge since the crisis of 2007-2008 (Standard and Poor's, 2012). Such an influx of liquidity is 
                                                 
352 IBF had generated $132 billion by 2012, and was further projected to generate over $600 billion in demand in 
2015 and beyond.  
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also very attractive to nation-states, which explains why IBF keeps expanding in non-Muslim 
spheres (Nazim & Ibrahim, 2012).353  
 
6.1.5 IBF Shariah Boards  
 
Shariah board members are hired in order to look at, and ultimately approve the ‘Shariah 
compliance’ of IBF products. One of the ideological founders of the industry, Muhammad Taqi 
Usmani, who heads the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Finance Institutions 
(AAOIFI), a Bahrain-based regulatory institution (which is optional to join) that “sets standards 
for the global industry”, has in retrospect admitted that “85% of Sukuk, or Islamic bonds…[are] 
un-Islamic” (Foster, 2009, p. 1). Shariah boards, accounting institutions and regulating agencies 
all exist, but possess neither political nor religious authority, therefore, IFIs are under no 
obligation to adhere to their pronouncements. This is a global phenomenon; essentially anyone 
can open a bank and call it ‘Islamic’.  
On top of this, there are conflicts of interest. Ullah (2012) has described how bank 
managers use political approaches to “struggle for lenient a fatwa” and “try to escape Shariah 
supervision and audit” (p. 167). IBF Shariah boards are comprised of Islamic scholars who have 
financial incentives to continue giving Islamic legitimacy to the banks’ products. The profiting 
stakeholders have major financial incentives to continue such lucrative enterprises, and the 
practitioners and salespeople likewise have the incentives to generate more loans. Rethel (2011) 
mentions that these practitioners take short courses on Islamic principles, which are in reality, 
exercises in futility: 
                                                 
353 Take the UK for instance, which announced that it wanted to become a hub of IBF in 2010, something it has 
consistently reiterated. In addition, countries like Cypress, burdened by debt woes, now look to IBF as an easy way 




These actors act according to the profit-maximizing principle enshrined in 
conventional financial and economic thinking. And again, the question arises of 
how this can be reconciled with the primacy of equity – of the sharing of profit 
and loss – of Islamic financial philosophy and its distributive and social goals. 
Hence, the existing power and knowledge structures in global finance create an 
environment in which Islamic finance serves to reproduce these structures rather 
than to offer an ethical alternative (p. 92). 
 
 
6.1.6 Framing Perceptions: Tarnishing Islam in the Name of Islam 
 
Like every introduction in life, there is only one opportunity to make a first impression, 
and the impression that IBF has made as its claims and ideas go out for circulation to the wider 
global community is that IBF’s principles look great and equitable on paper in axiomatic form, 
but that its practices fall far short of its stated goals. Observers revel in the plausibility of 
increased socioeconomic justice, noting that a PLS economy seems almost utopian (Spangler, 
2013). However, upon delving into statistical data on any number of the leading IBF institutions’ 
financials, it is discovered that they rely on guaranteed implicit interest-based profits, no 
different from other banks (Kamla & Rammal, 2013). One statistic from 1996 showed that under 
20% of transactions were based on PLS at that time. Then another study conducted in 2007 in 
Malaysia revealed that on the assets side, only .5% of transactions were based on PLS. The 
authors conclude, “Our overall results, thus, suggest that Islamic banking…is not very different 
from conventional banking, and the alleged benefits of Islamic banking exist in theory only” 
(Chong & Liu, 2009).354  
                                                 
354 This paper has been cited numerously. On the liability side, it found that in Malaysia 70% of transactions were 
based on mudarabah, a contract that allows silent partners (shareholders) to benefit from the unequal distribution of 
risks, shares and rights. 
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Some writers have turned to analyzing the reasons why PLS was abandoned. A study by 
Dar and Presley (2000) enumerates seven reasons. 1) people are risk averse; 2) property rights in 
Muslim majority countries are not strong and well-defined; 3) interest charging banks have an 
unfair competitive advantage; 4) shareholders in a PLS situation have less equitably distributed 
rights and representation; 5) high risk investments are not optimal for short term investment; 6) 
PLS products have an unfair tax disadvantage; and 7) that IBF has been unable to establish a 
secondary market. Another study conducted by Kamla and Rammal (2013) from a critical 
accounting perspective, an offshoot of critical theory, measures IBF’s lofty axioms and social 
justice disclosures to its actual practices. In it, the researchers lament:  
 
Our reports show that the annual reports and web sites of Islamic banks disclose 
how Sharia implies broader and ethical consequences to their activities. However, 
the disclosures do not indicate that the banks have serious schemes targeting 
poverty elimination or enhancing equitable redistribution of wealth in society. 
Despite operating in Muslim societies that to a great extent are economically 
underdeveloped, the findings of our study do not indicate that Islamic banks have 
mobilized their position for improving the conditions of disadvantaged people. 
The findings of this study have a number of implications for the Islamic banking 
sector. It seems from our analysis that the failure to make social justice the core 
value of their operations has contributed to the failure of Islamic banks to fulfill 
their ideological claims (p. 933). 
 
This thesis first begins with contextualizing the historical reframing of concepts like 
money, credit, banking, interest, and riba so that it becomes explainable how all of these 
quantitative and qualitative criticisms have continued to proliferate, and how they have not been 
able to prompt IBF to ‘move beyond’ this unethical trajectory. However, as the research clearly 
shows, this path has been taken through a long series of choices and negotiations. What is 
interesting then is how IBF continues to sustain and market itself through framing and reframing 
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terminologies. And what is even more interesting, is how in doing so, some discourse accepts its 
statements as factual, whereas an increasing amount of it does not. 
 By definition, interest comprises two types of cost, opportunity cost and credit risk cost. 
In this sense, as discussed in Chapter 2, the ancient term usury here connotes the same 
phenomenon encapsulated today in the usage of the terms interest, compound interest and 
implied interest. The opportunity cost is the ideological component of interest because it is based 
on the assertion that a compounding fee shall be charged simply for the creation of credit itself, 
even though the cost of creating credit money on a ledger today is almost non-existent. Whereas 
the credit-risk cost is the more legitimate component of a fee (the just compensation), which is 
the cost of covering both the transferability of the promise/instrument to any third party as well 
as securing (insuring) it against the potential of default. This requires taking on risk. 
In short, if institutions are only charging credit risk costs for the utilization of credit, then 
the fees are likely to be very insignificant, and the allocation of such credit is likely to be 
motivated by other than profit (ethics). Moreover, such institutions are likely to be equitably 
organized and geared towards servicing local communities and businesses, or in funding interest-
free mortgages (i.e. JAK Bank). Whereas if an institution is charging opportunity costs on top of 
ensuring against credit risks, as typical for-profit banks do, then the fees are likely to be called 
interest, compound interest or implied interest, which imply a certain ideological stance. 
Moreover, for the sake of legal accounting and governmental reporting, the fees are expressed in 
such a manner on bank reports.  
Conventional banks charge explicit interest whereas IFIs charge the exact same amounts, 
and often more, in implicit interest that they have different lexical usages for: profit, fees and 
rent are the semantics most often used in English, whereas in Arabic the terms are matched with 
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medieval contractual terminologies. IFIs utilize several axioms; chief amongst them is the claim 
that they do not charge the interest associated with the cognate riba. Therefore, this is simply an 
issue of framing. Frames are cognitive shortcuts that simplify complex information and 
phenomena for people by providing selective simplification, which thereby provides people with 
a field of vision for a problem (Kaufman, et al., 2003).  Moreover, “Framing involves both the 
construction of interpretive frames and their representation to others. Disputants may use 
framing not only as an aid to interpreting events, but also to promote strategic advantage. 
Framing can be useful for rationalizing self-interest, convincing a broader audience, building 
coalitions, or lending preferentiality to specific outcomes” (p. 1) 
Framing is critical in analyzing obfuscation. Hence, for-profit banks using the label 
‘Islamic’ is similar to corporations with poor ethical records of accomplishment using the label 
‘fair trade’ in marketing their products. Because who owns the label ‘Islamic’? Terror networks 
employ the term, as do numerous marketing agencies advertising to the Muslim world.  
Therefore, in an instance of this, we can look at Traidcraft, a Christian organization that has the 
slogan “fighting poverty through trade”, which it achieves to some extent and documents in its 
yearly Impact & Performance Reports (Traidcraft, 2014). However, by its pure association of 
being under the larger umbrella of ‘fair trade’ that Nestle is now associated with, an obfuscation 
is caused for a large portion of society as interpreters of what such signifiers mean in the likely 
event that they are aware of certain unethical practices associated to Nestle’s track record in poor 
countries (Boyd, 2012).355 
With the rise of research into marketing and psychology there has been ample evidence to 
show that framing is very influential on consumers. Frame-manipulation research in the early 
                                                 
355 It is fairly well known that Nestle was getting mothers in poor countries hooked on using baby formula that they 
could not afford to sterilize. 
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1980s suggested that framing issues in a positive light to subjects generally resulted in less risky 
behavior by those subjects presented with potential value increasing options (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). Whereas framing issues in a negative light and presenting subjects with 
value-decreasing contingencies or dangerous potentialities led decision makers to tend towards 
increased risk-taking. For instance, one study on medicine revealed that 57% of participants were 
likely to take a medicine, if its risks of potentially causing disease were ignored; hence, the 
medicine was marketed in relative terms. Yet only 14% of participants chose the medicine when 
they were shown in absolute terms what the medicine offered (Malenka & al., 1993).  
Understanding the impact of such framing is significant in understanding why 12% of 
Muslims choose to use IBF services even though the costs are higher than conventional banks, 
and the products are not as beneficial in value (as far as costs, liabilities and tax purposes are 
concerned). Likewise, observant Muslims as consumers are susceptible to manipulation of their 
beliefs, which entail a conviction in rewards and punishment in the afterlife based on choices and 
actions taken in the present life. Therefore, framing a product as ‘Islamic’ in absolute terms, that 
implies a potentially negative outcome if the consumer does not choose it, likely leads to the 
same increased risk-taking that is witnessed by other subjects in research studies. However, here, 
the beliefs of Muslims are plausibly giving Muslim consumers added incentives to make what 
are otherwise irrational market choices (Malenka & al., 1993).  
 
6.1.8 Viewing IBF from an Interdisciplinary Angle 
 
From a public relations point of view, it seems that one of the biggest tragedies of IBF is 
that it claims to be Islamic. The discourse used to advertise its products differs amongst 
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institutions, as does the way it has been framed in the media up until now. This will likely 
change as discourse is the driver of ideas, not necessarily facts or data (Van Dijk, 2009). Some 
observers, however, have noticed this phenomenon and have documented it accordingly. 
Maurer's work (2005) is an anthropological documentation and semiotic interpretation of what 
IBF operators are doing in general, which he surmises is simply using “lateral reasoning” in 
order to thrive within a paradigm it vocally criticizes, all while tacitly sustaining it (Maurer, 
2005).356  
So while researchers like Maurer observe that theoretically ‘Economic exchange, in 
Islam, is inseparable from Islamic values’, in practice, Maurer and many others have observed 
and interviewed an entire industry filled with people who have overwhelmingly convinced any 
such inquirer that IBF’s ‘profits’ are not considered by Muslims to be riba. But since they are 
obviously some type of interest, it is concluded that Islam’s trite and facile solution to the 
contemporary enmeshment of interest is to simply proceed with a series of legal stratagems and 
subterfuges (Maurer, 2001). This renders the message of Islam as obsolete, antiquated, and futile 
to an audience concerned with its propensity for contributing to movements in economic justice 
and ethics. Here we can observe the effects of power and the consequences that power 
formations have on institutions, research and discourse very plainly. 
                                                 
356 Maurer’s study was heralded and won the Victor Turner prize in 2005. Professor Maurer receives funding from 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for his Institute for Money, Technology and Financial Inclusion where he is 
a founding director. In regards to his assessment on the ‘lateral reasoning’ used by IBF is that Maurer, an 
anthropologist, is by his own admission a person in search of economic alternatives with the latent potential of 
liberating communities. After a sustained study of IBF, numerous interviews, and gaining qualifications within the 
field, Maurer surmises, "Riba is a hotly debated topic in Islamic banking, and is never simply equated with interest 
or usury, a consensus seems to be emerging around a specific reading of riba, according to which not all interest is 
riba, and not all riba is interest" (p. 9). Furthermore, he states, “In Islamic banking, the Qur’anic term ‘riba’, like the 
Quran itself, is untranslatable” and that different communities can exercise ijtihad (interpretive reasoning) to 
determine and contextualize its meaning for themselves (p. 11). 
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Increasing amounts of researchers are starting to call the bluff of this industry as an 
alleged alternative (Rethel, 2011).357 Nevertheless IBF trudges along seemingly unabated, 
continuing to host numerous annual conferences, trainings and seminars wherein practitioners 
and academicians debate and rehearse the concurrent applications and procedural aspects of their 
industry. However, the argument that IBF is “a project under construction, underpinned by a host 
of definitional, language and doctrinal debates” will not continue to suffice (Pollard & Samers, 
2007, p. 315).  
Getting to the root of problem requires more than simply consulting academics that are 
citing other academics within confined parameters of acceptable discussion, all of whom are 
dependent on perpetuating the belief that the industry is making strides towards better 
functionality. It will increasingly be reported that, “As Islamic finance moves towards the 
mainstream, its ethical principles are increasingly challenged” (Rethel, 2011, p. 82). Because in 
truth, the system continues to integrate with traditional banking and self-justifies its trajectory 
and continued existence, which is preventing the Muslim discourse from switching to ethical 
alternatives.  
 
Part 2: A Macro Critique: An Account of How IBF Enables Plunder 
 
6.2.1 Embracing the Capitalist Paradigm 
 
                                                 
357 Political economist Lena Rethel examines the theoretical possibility of Islamic finance as an intriguing 
alternative to the global order, only to reach the conclusion that, “while Islamic finance challenges Western, more 
specifically Anglo-American dominance of the international financial system, at the same time it serves to 
reproduce, to legitimize and thus to further entrench the knowledge structures that underpin contemporary finance” 
(p. 26). By “challenging” Rethel only means that what is being defied is certainly not the underlying principles and 
amorality of the system, that epistemic authority has already been legitimated and accepted by IBF; but what is 
being negotiated is purely the new beneficiaries of the system, as a fresh Middle-Eastern class of affluence flocks 
towards the establishment of profitable ‘Islamic’ banks.  
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This section addresses how IBF props up a paradigm that is increasingly known for its 
systematic injustices. Since actions are by intentions, and we cannot truly know intentions, we 
can only judge people and systems by their apparent actions. To make just criticisms based on 
any other principles is quite difficult. Thus, in criticizing IBF’s embrace of neoliberal capitalism 
and banking we must analyze the systemic functionalities and externalities of it rather than the 
axioms and principles either system promotes. But what exactly is capitalism? Can a normative 
statement about it be made? A study by Braudell (1983) defines it as a regime centered on a 
sequence of interconnected negations or exclusions which themselves are underpinned by unique 
understandings of labor, property and capital rights that are incorporated into the coercive 
apparatus of the political and legal arrangements of society. Whereas dissidents like the French 
philosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (d. 1865) have called it a regime founded on private 
property in which the people who create capital are robbed of it: meaning, capital, which is 
human labor, and the goods and services human ingenuity and labor provide, is siphoned away 
from the creators of the capital (Guerin, 1970).358 
Proudhon was famous for his expression that ‘all property was theft’. However, Islam has 
always guaranteed the sanctity of property as a God-given right as long as it is not ill gotten. 
Thus, as Toynbee (1948) projected, as Muslims were unable to unite in thought, divergent 
Muslim perspectives and understandings of the capitalist system appeared which all centered on 
different perceptions of governmental authority, property rights, and by default, different 
understandings of banking and bank interest. Subsequently, the system of capitalism spanned 
unhindered to materially define the very meaning of products and fruits of human labor, the 
                                                 
358 What is capitalism? This has been a question asked by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The term originated as a 
pejorative by its opponents during the industrial revolution who witnessed the fields of banking and finance assume 
a complete hegemony over all aspects of social and economic life. Proudhon, a libertarian, mutualist and anarchist, 
is called “the father of anarchism” and he split with Marx on several issues (the refutation The Poverty of Philosophy 
was the initial reason). 
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ideational and imaginative constructs underpinning exchange, and the concomitant institutional 
backing of all systems and related organizations. These attributes were all involuntarily 
transferred to Muslims, entering their consciousness through the nation-state vehicle and its 
institutions. 
 
6.2.2 Unjust Money: Interest, Legal Tender Laws and the Business Cycle 
 
Jackson (1996) defines “tyranny” as, “the tendency to appropriate law or the authority 
that backs it to the end of making false or mistaken claims of legal authority for one’s own ideas 
or of denying individuals rights and ‘freedoms’ to which they as members of the community 
would otherwise understand themselves to be entitled” (p. xxiii). Approaching economics as a 
pure science while it remained mostly ideology, inorganically led to the creation of a sort of 
pseudo-science in support of furthering its aims. Arguing against governmental intervention gave 
a carte blanche for elites to ‘plunder by trade’ in a new and sophisticated banking sphere of 
exchange, and trade took on an entirely new and powerful dimension. The concept of the nation 
state inertly backed this ideology and supported it through legislation. As this expanded into 
classical, and then neoclassical economics, general assumptions were devised in order to 
underpin the paradigm (Weintraub, 2013).359  
                                                 
359 Weintraub enumerates the three assumptions underpinning neoclassical economics: (1) people are rational, and 
their rational preferences can be assigned values; (2) the fundamental goal for every entity (individuals/corporations) 
is purely to maximize; and (3) people act independently when provided with accurate information. An obvious 
problem with neoclassical assumptions is, as Steve Keen has mathematically supported, that they are incongruous 
with knowledge we have attained in the 21st century; theories cannot predict economic outcomes since people are 
not always rational agents – which eliminates the first and third premises of neoclassical ideology. Moreover, not all 
agents are out for pure maximization; fortunately, some altruistic and ethical participants still exist. Findings in 
behavioral economics have challenged all of these false assumptions. Furthermore, the tools that neoclassical 
economists are using to predict crash cycles are innately deficient in their measurement of private debt, rendering 
any altruism or Panglossian views of the economy futile. 
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Since the codification of the prevailing mainstream macroeconomic perspective, there 
have been primarily two control mechanisms in the hands of governing authorities: (1) interest, 
and (2), the business cycle. What these two mechanisms do is first, grow, and then, inflate the 
indebtedness of economic participants whether they are individuals, corporations, or states. 
Interest is charged for the use of money, which is only an abstract accounting concept; this again 
causes ethical problems because only banks are able to transmute the abstract concept of money 
into a manifested representation of it as currency. In a historical context, the (1830) Prudent 
Investor Act bemoans that risk taking is imprudent as part of a long history of risk-averse notions 
in the West.360 Moreover, the well-known Modigliani and Miller theorem of 1958 demonstrated 
that taking on interest bearing debt and leveraging companies against liabilities creates more 
dividends for holders of preferred stock (Modigliani & Miller, 1958).361 It has been taught to 
generations of MBA students that it is therefore statistically beneficial for people and companies 
to borrow money at interest, and to leverage what they do not own, because it generates money 
and leads to more earnings. 
Furthermore, legal tender laws delegate “despotic” power to banks (Ingham, 2004).362 As 
Werner (2005) explains in New Paradigm of Macroeconomics, economic textbooks teach the 
‘boom and bust cycle’ as the ‘business cycle’ and most do not even cover any aspect of banking 
functionalities. Consequently, in response to the economic phenomena created by the interest 
cycle, governments act under the assumption that the only possible course of action is to raise 
interest rates in order to deter borrowing, which is done through shrinking the entire (M4) money 
supply, erasing money from existence and often causing busts. 
                                                 
360 Judge Samuel Putnam, on advising the financial investor on prudence writes in the act that prudence is 
eliminating risk.  
361 Modigliani was awarded the 1985 Nobel Prize in Economics for this contribution among others. 
362 Ingham develops an explanation from the social sciences to present money as a social construct. This means there 
needs to be access, not in ‘equal’ amounts, of course, but there needs to be equity in the way that credit is accessed. 
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Forced ideological acceptance of banking as a concept has permeated wider discourse for 
numerous generations. However, what Rethel and Sinclair (2012) point out is that governments 
privilege the banks with the ability to create as much credit as they can through the manipulation 
of legal tender laws.363 They further argue that whenever public awareness galvanizes a 
consensus towards bringing in the types of government regulations that can eradicate the 
perennial problems of banks, the ‘financial services’ industry finds ways to keep the status quo 
intact. Despite mainstream reservations, the idea that banking as practiced today is an illogicality 
continues to edge into mainstream academic publications. Whereas only a decade ago it was still 
too taboo to enter the mainstream discourse in such a fashion, let alone prevalent enough to pass 
the scrutiny of peer-review.  
 
6.2.3 Misconceptions: Money Manufacturing and the Veiled Monopoly 
 
Banks operate as veiled monopolies on credit. Korten (2011) notes, “When a loan is 
issued, the bank’s accountant enters two numbers in the bank’s accounting records. She records 
the borrower’s promise to repay the loan as an asset, and the money the bank puts into the 
borrower’s account as a liability. With the accountant’s entries the bank created new money from 
nothing in the amount of the loan principal and caused the amount of money in the economy as a 
whole to increase” (p. 2). However, economists and banks (including IFIs) still promote the 
erroneous idea of banks as simple ‘intermediaries’ who take money from savers and try to profit 
                                                 
363 Rethel and Sinclair reiterate that it is indeed a farce to promote the idea that banks are simply intermediaries 
between savers and bowers, a central tenet of mis-education that has been taught in economic textbooks for decades. 
Professor Ronen Palan comments on the book’s appendage that “the financial system is inherently unstable” (p.1). It 
is evident that “Banking is a confidence game”; this is to the detriment to the majority of society and it is estimated 
that the bailouts have cost in surplus of $5 trillion to taxpayers. Their work generally examines banking activity in 
Europe, Asia and America; they focus on how historical circumstances have shaped banks’ attitudes towards risk. 
They advocate a more radical approach to how states need to develop alternative banking systems that are beholden 
to democratic oversight, and not controlled by a private class of shareholders. 
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from prudent and intelligent investments. In actuality, this is a ‘mathematical impossibility’ 
(Keen, 2011). Lord Adair Turner (2011) comments that “the banking system can thus credit and 
create spending power – a reality not well captured by many apparently common sense 
descriptions of the functions which banks perform…in fact they don’t just allocate pre-existing 
savings, collectively they create both credit and the deposit money which appears to finance that 
credit” (p. 1). In another lecture, he calls the way banking is taught in schools “entirely 
mythological” (Turner, 2012).364 Ex-Governor of the Bank of England Sir Mervyn King 
corroborated in a 2012 speech revealing, “When banks extend loans to their customers, they 
create money by crediting their customers’ accounts” (Bank of England, 2012). 
In a real example, Lipsey and Chrystal (2011) showed the UK monetary base to be £2.2 
trillion in 2011 while the actual notes and coins created by the government and put into 
circulation amounted to only £47 billion. Meaning the UK government only had control over an 
astounding 2.1% of the money supply, whereas private banks controlled the rest (Lipsey & 
Chrystal, 2011). It can therefore be stated that, on average, the UK government creates less than 
3% of the UK money supply whereas private banks create 97% of it.365 This statistic regarding 
private money manufacturing is nearly identical in every country. Who then can we assume 
holds ultimate political power? And would such persons and entities not want to preserve such a 
system? It would seem that the state then should be viewed as an extension of the banking sector 
                                                 
364 Turner quotes “The Great Leveraging” by Alan M. Taylor (NBER Working Paper No. 18290 August 2012, 
Revised October 2012). The full quote is “as a description of what modern advanced economy banking systems does 
(sic) this is completely mythological”. This sentiment is slowly becoming mainstream knowledge and indicates that 
the traditional banking system will undergo changes that will render it indistinguishable to the point where the 
contemporary system will seem archaic to future generations. The money supply today has several different terms, 
which attempt to define the scope of the bank created money. In the UK there are two official measures of money. 
The first definition of money (wide monetary base) as M0 has in the past included “notes and coin outside the Bank 
of England + banks‘ operational deposits at the Bank of England” also called “narrow money”. “Narrow money” 
refers to how much cash is in circulation excluding the amount of deposits that are in commercial banks. 
365 This seems unfathomable to many people. Nevertheless, since commercial banks create approximately 97% of 
the money supply, a phenomenal statistic, the M0 money supply is rendered unimportant and it was phased out as a 
measurement in 2006.  
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rather than vice versa.366 With states put into precarious financial positions by the banking sector, 
the prevailing thought held by governmental authorities is that they have no choice but to raise 
money by selling interest-bearing bonds, which place government debt payments on posterity 
(Bank of England, 2013).367  
The salient feature of all credit (M4) money is that it is inherently problematic because of 
the rental price attached to it.368 That price is the interest (Hanson, 1962).369 In addition, the 
money supply is also susceptible to inflation. Inflation occurs when the money supply increases, 
while at the same time, the same level of goods and services circulate. Therefore, the visible 
result is reflected by the rise of prices. When bankers create more money than a level that is 
commensurate with the needs of society for exchanging its goods and services, prices go up, 
salaries shrink and a piece of everyone’s wealth is siphoned by the redeemer of the money 
supply: the banks – including IFIs. Islamic scholars cannot claim they are any longer unaware of 
this aspect. Taqi Usmani, an oft-cited authority in IBF, has expansive citations that display his 
                                                 
366 Therefore, a more accurate measurement is needed, called M4, which is ‘Cash outside banks (i.e. in circulation 
with the public and non-bank firms) + private-sector retail bank and building society deposits + private-sector 
wholesale bank and building society deposits and certificates of deposit’. These terms essentially include all of the 
government printed money as well as all the private banks’ money. 
367 To put these figures in perspective, the entire (2014) output (GDP) of the UK was roughly £1.515 trillion. But the 
national debt (2013) amounted to £1,377.4 billion, or 90.7% of total GDP. It was forecasted to surpass 100% of 
GDP beyond 2015. The amount of interest that UK pays yearly on this money supply created from nothing is around 
£43bn per year, a little over £15,000 for each individual Briton (an average Brit pays £2,000 per year in taxes to pay 
in interest on the debt). The cycle continues because it is argued that the government spends more than its output 
every year, so it claims it must borrow at interest by issuing bonds. However, the bonds (Gilts in the UK) are issued 
on compounding interest rates, so the debt continues to grow. In addition, more money is owed than is actually 
created. And in the event that all of the debts were paid off (theoretically) there would be no money in existence 
because paying off a debt in fractional-reserve banking means extinguishing the money supply. It is an ultimate 
catch 22 in which today’s citizens push the growing debt obligations on posterity. What it means is the money 
supply must always, perpetually and continuously grow or face recession.  
368 Attempting to remedy the debt problem is generally handled in two ways. In the UK, The Conservative Party 
typically supports spending cuts, which end up shrinking the money supply and cause further economic recession. 
On the other hand, The Labour Party emphasizes greater government spending with the intention of generating a 
larger GDP, which then tries to pay off a mathematically impossible escalating debt.  
369 Hanson (1962) elucidates this point “...the price of money, therefore, is the rate of interest. In fact, this is simply a 
further example of the essential difficulty associated with the concept of the value of money; namely, that it has 
different values in terms of different commodities and services, the rate of interest being the value of money for a 
particular purpose - borrowing and lending”. 
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cognizance of this very trenchant articulation of money creation dating back to 1999 (Usmani, 
1999).370 
 
6.2.4 Fundamental Conflict: IBF’s Adoption of the Neoliberal Paradigm  
 
Western styled interest-based banks were established in Muslim majority lands in the 19th 
century (Wilson, 1995). As a result, a one-dimensional view of riba eventually emerged that 
vindicated interest-based banking (Hossein, 2009).371 Neoliberalism has played a major role in 
allowing the persistent exploitation of underdeveloped nations, a problem still subsisting 
(Bourdieu, 1998). Similar studies have revealed that neoliberalism essentially denies the 
existence of social inequality (Navarro, p. 1998).  
Navarro argues that the political right sees social inequality as systematically necessary 
and beneficial, whereas the left tries to mitigate inequality deemed disadvantageous (Navarro, 
2011). Hence, neoliberalism has adopted the extreme right’s view on inequality, meaning the 
concept of inequality is essentially not recognized. Instead, terms like “individual” and “group 
diversity” are employed similar to how terminology is used in postmodern philosophy (Quiggin, 
                                                 
370 In this historic attempt to ban interest, which was later overturned, Uthmani clearly articulated that bank money 
was fraudulently created by banks, not governments, and then lent at interest: “But the net result [of fractional 
reserve lending] is that the modern banks are creating money out of nothing. They are allowed to advance loans in 
the amounts ten times more than their deposits. The coins and notes issued by the government as genuine and debt-
free money have now a very insignificant proportion in the total money in circulation…The spiral of loans built 
upon loans is now the major part of the money supply. Taking the example of UK according to statistics of 1997 the 
total money stock in the country was 680 billion pounds, out of which only 25 billion pounds were issued by the 
government in the form of coins and notes. All the rest, i.e. 655 billion pounds, were created by the banks. It means 
that the original debt-free money remained only 3.6% of the whole money supply while 96.4% is nothing but a 
bubble created by the banks…[and] it means that 96.4% of the aggregate money circulated in the country is nothing 
but numbers created by computers, having no real thing behind them. The position in USA is almost the same as that 
in U.K.” (p. 1). 
371 Hossein adds, “Due to the fact that interest occupies a central position in modern economic life, and has been 
regarded as the life blood of the existing financial institutions, a number of countries have also been inclined to 
interpret it in a manner which is a totally different from the understanding of Muslim scholars throughout the last 
fourteen centuries and is also sharply in conflict with the traditions of the Prophet” (p. 243). Thus, there were several 
measurable steps towards IBF swallowing the entire neoliberal capitalist paradigm. 
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1999, p. 1). In fact, globalization, according to Quiggin “is simply the international manifestation 
of the swing towards neoliberal policies of market-oriented reform that has taken place 
throughout the world since 1970. Increased inequality is the result of the neoliberal reform 
program as a whole. The role of globalisation per se has been overstated” (p. 240). 
 
6.2.5 Ideology and Practice in the Dominant Discourse 
 
According to a popular theory on communication (the two-step flow theory), most people 
form their opinions under the influence of opinion leaders, who in turn are swayed by their 
personal interpretations of the mass media and its wider discourse (Lazarsfeld, et al., 1944).372 
Capitalist ideas permeated through the dissemination of ideas simultaneous with the rise in mass 
media. Neoliberalism later sailed under the name of “The Washington Consensus” because the 
term ‘neoliberal’ eventually became a pejorative, and without needing to functionally change the 
modus operandi, an old ideology was given a new identity.  
As dissidents have oft cited, the actual outcome of the program resulted in more 
restrictive measures on trade, and an emphatic liberalization of capital, the exact inverse of the 
initial goals stated in its foundation (Chomsky, 2013).373 “The Washington Consensus” is a 
functional means toward opening the labor market of underdeveloped nations, which can then be 
                                                 
372 In mass communications, this is a theory that is taught at the undergraduate level. The sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld 
first introduced it in 1948 regarding how the American voter received his or her political information on political 
candidates. It can simply extend to his or her understanding of banking and etcetera. 
373 Furthermore, and in direct correlation, peace and stability remained elusive throughout much of the world. In 
addition, a plethora of research has shown that what these measures actually did was protect the wealthy from any 
need of practicing market discipline because of an elite class’s confidence that governments will always bail out ‘too 
big to fail’ institutions, whereas the working middle class is chided and told to learn real market discipline and fiscal 
responsibility. Before Bretton Woods, 90% of trade was related to trading actual and tangible goods and services, 
real economic output; whereas since then the eradication of economic protectionist laws has allowed a market to 
emerge where roughly 5-10% of the market comprises actual goods and services and the remainder is entirely 
speculative, an entire reversal. 
292 
 
exploited by big multinational companies (Mason, 1997).374 The liberalization of markets 
quintessentially means less trade barriers and tariffs, which facilitates the movement of cheaply 
produced goods across international borders (typically East to West). But without the right visas 
and citizenships, (cheap) laborers are stuck in countries with weak human rights records and low 
salaries. Thus any financial gains the weak countries receive, typically go towards paying off the 
debt and interest imposed on their governments – enforced by a small indigenous elite group 
benefitting from conserving the status-quo.  
On a macro scale, the arrangement is systemically unjust. Yet it has permeated populist 
sentiment and prevailed in every country where Muslims are a majority. This includes Pakistan 
and Iran, which were both unsuccessful in their attempts to enact legislation banning compound 
interest (Khan & Mirakhor, 1990).375 This discussion relates not only to for-profit commercial 
banks, but also to the central banks of sovereign nations, a central component of modern 
statehood. Early on in the development of IBF literature and thought, Muhammad N. Sidiqqi 
(1989) published one of the first papers to consider the role of central banks in Muslim-majority 
countries. Within the concurrent economic framework, he argued that any steps towards change 
had to start with central banks. His perspective was that central banks should serve as lenders of 
last resort, primarily to safeguard depositors’ money (Siddiqi, 1989). However, as political 
factors made structural reforms nearly impossible, capitulation and apathy began to reappear in 
IBF literature. For instance, Shajari and Kamalzadeh (1993) acknowledge, “…omitting the rate 
                                                 
374 The Washington Consensus was a continuation of neoliberal policy, first coined by economist John Williamson 
in 1989, financed by the Institute for International Economics, a U.S. think tank. The general outline is ten economic 
policy points; chief among them is the support for certain interest rates, deregulation, privatization and the 
allowance of foreign investment. All which lead to the repetitive cycle of exploitation. 
375 The Pakistani Federal Shariat Court and the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court made a ruling against 
Islamic Banking in 1991; it happened again in 1999 and it was mandated that PLS conversion or full equity 
participation in banking should be implemented. As expected, the international banking power apparatus put 
tremendous pressure on the country in order to prevent this, which resulted in an overturning of this direction on 
final appeal in 2002. The case was said to be referred to lower courts for “further study”. 
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of interest as the price of money (which is according to the Islamic law, prohibited, and from 
moral point of view, seems unacceptable too) is not possible” (p. 7).376  
  Control over the money supply can greatly benefit society if it is managed property, but 
when its manufacturing is outsourced to for-profit, limited-liability corporations, money and 
value is not safeguarded because the “master” of the money grants himself the prerogative to 
manipulate its “value” (Tomlinson, 1993, p. 79). IBF has not structurally differentiated itself 
from these mechanics. Rethel (2011) concludes, “The result is an incongruity between the 
outcome-oriented ethical-religious legitimacy which should be at the heart of Islamic finance, 
and the financial legitimation which accounting techniques, indices and rating agencies provide. 
And the latter prevails” (p. 92).  
 
6.2.6 The Need for Reassessing Flawed Value Measurements 
 
Combatting the momentum towards more social and environmental destruction requires 
an ethical paradigm shift, as well as the recognition that we are presently using the wrong 
metrics of value measurement to determine economic and environmental reality. GNP or GDP 
(gross national product and gross domestic product, respectively) are not the right metrics to 
detect progress towards sustainability. We currently measure value with GDP, when even the 
originator of the term, Simon Kuznetz, has accepted its flaw in that it does not account for a 
measure of distribution or the exhaustion of natural resources (Kuznets, 1946).377 Korten (2011) 
                                                 
376 The general assumptions that banks should charge a fee for the money they have created from nothing by 
providing their service of double entry bookkeeping is as Kamalzadeh and Shajari say “a great risk”. They say so 
because “banks do not just loan out the money they have received from owners of deposits, but they loan out the 
money which they themselves, while depending on cash reserves, have created” (p. 4). 
377 The approach to economic data is entirely outdated, antiquated and one-dimensional. Kuznets was commissioned 
to quantify some data that would better paint a perspective on the first Great Depression in the United States. The 
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has long argued against the outdated obsession with measuring sustainability, noting that the 
largest GDP grossing countries are the worst polluters. However, there is a pushback from 
emerging states (and markets, like IBF). These entities want the chance to chase ‘growth’ as the 
industrialized states and established industries already have. However, polluting the earth is 
contrary to the Islamic vision of human stewardship. Therefore, despite the profitability of 
something, if it ultimately causes destruction, it is not ethical because one of the maqasid is to 
protect life. In addition, studies show that a high level of GDP neither translates concretely into a 
high level of human development nor a high quality of life (Fanelli, 2007). Consistently we hear 
more about the concept of a ‘Happiness Index’ because there is an increasing awareness that the 
metrics for success, development, achievement and sustainability are inaccurate, and thus, 
measuring true success cannot be done through an oversimplified and one-dimensional operation 
like calculating growth or production. 
Consequently, the growth economy has proven to be destructive. We are left with 
consumerism, poverty, and climate change among other issues stemming back to the system. 
Perpetual growth has failed and de-growth needs to be examined (Bourke, 2004).378 Humans 
face corruption (fasad) on many plateaus. Moreover, there are tipping points of irreversible 
damage being caused to the earth. Therefore, the reconstruction of fundamental principles and 
values is needed in ecological modernization and market environmentalism (Adams & 
Jeanrenaud, 2009). There is a 16-fold increase in energy use in the 20th century resulting in 
sulfur-dioxide emissions being double natural emissions. In addition, the world is polluted with 
nitric oxide, carbon, dioxide and methane emissions that exceed background levels; the release 
                                                                                                                                                             
overreliance on such a limited metric of data is one of the numerous things that needs to be reassessed in economic 
thought. The original discussion puts the context into perspective. 
378 The paper details the history of the concept and the dangers of overlooking it. There is an additional danger that 
the wrong people may co-opt the initiatives as is evidenced by the early participation of the Club of Rome and other 
interest groups of low visibility. 
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of manufactured chemicals has also been steadily increasing (Crutzen, 2002). All of these 
negative externalities are endemic to the capitalist system, and IBF is guilty in this regard 
because in enables and implicitly promotes it. 
 
6.2.7 Conclusion: The Problem is How Banking is Framed 
 
The response to this has been bleak in IBF. But how we frame banking as a ‘for-profit’ 
industry instead of as a ‘for-society’ and ‘for-the-natural-world-industry’, is the main problem. 
Nonetheless, others are trying to rectify the unethical trajectory we have traversed. For instance, 
commissioned by Jordan’s Royal Scientific Board, Odah Al-Jayoussi has been working on an 
alternative paradigm that incorporates an Islamic emphasis on sustainability because “Detailed 
analysis of the ecological, economic and social vital statistics reveals that the current economic 
development model is failing people, nature and the economy” (2012, p. 1). Al-Jayoussi asserts 
that this is due to an epistemological contention between Islam and the West on primarily two 
issues: biology and the economy.379 Biologically, asserts Al-Jayoussi, Muslims believe in 
creation and that humans are dignified. On the other plain, in economics Muslims cannot accept 
that value is determined by an interest rate (Aburawa, 2013).  
                                                 
379 This upsets the natural balance (mizan). The statistical data on how this system has affected the biosphere is 
appalling. See page 21 Table 1.1 in Islam and Sustainable Development, which details the human impact on the 
biosphere. Al-Jayoussi’s proposal is composed of the following principles: “First principle: fitra principle: contain 
entropy and ensure that the flow of resources, through and within the economy, is as nearly non-declining (mizan) as 
is permitted by physical laws. Second principle (mizan): Adopt an appropriate accounting system, fully aligned with 
the planet’s ecological processes and reflecting true, comprehensive biospheric pricing to guide the economy. Third 
principle (ummam): Ensure that the essential diversity of all forms of life in the Biosphere is maintained. Fourth 
principle, which is aligned with the concept of humans being the khalifa of the earth,: maximize degrees of freedom 
and potential self-realization of all humans without any individual or group, adversely affecting others. Fifth 
principle: recognize symbiotic relationships: recognize the seamless, dynamic continuum of wisdom, love, and 
energy that links the outer reaches of the cosmos with our solar system, our planet and its biosphere including all 
humans, with our internal metabolic systems” (p. 21). 
296 
 
In his farewell speech the Prophet Muhammad ملسو هيلع هللا ىلص admonished, “Your persons, properties 
and honor are declared sacred like the sanctity attaching to this day, this month and this spot. Let 
them not be violated” (Arzt, 1990, p. 202). From various perspectives including both the micro 
as well as the macro, it becomes apparent that IBF buttresses a system that is problematic from 
both a legalistic perspective as well as an ethics and maqasid evaluation. It is not simply the 
products that IBF produces, but it is its entire outlook, its institutions, its tools, its mechanisms 
and the means and spheres of influence it has adopted. Banking cannot be ‘Islamized’ if it is to 
retain its quintessential function: manufacturing and then loaning debt at interest.  
The fundamental function of banks as profit centers is the issue. It is not so because 
society does not need a facility to manage its credit. It definitely does. However, it is a societal 
need that can be facilitated by local credit-clearing houses. With banks continuing to possess the 
power over money creation, it is very difficult to transfer that power back to local nonprofit 
institutions that are beholden to the political process. It is through this mechanism that Smith’s 
(2012) proposition of meta-history rings true, that trade can and does manifest throughout human 
history as the opportunity to ‘plunder’. Whereas in the case of modern finance the plundering has 
developed such a sophistication that it is able to operate under the legitimacy of the state and the 









CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Part 1: Summary 
 
The nominal practice of ethical application in legal systems is discernibly open to a range 
of interpretations. Thus, ethics are only enforceable to a very limited extent under the law. A 
metaphysical or philosophical proclivity must to take it from this departure. Moreover, ethics can 
only be ensured to support the most downtrodden in society if there is consistency in the 
application of the law, which necessitates recurrent visitation. In the case of capitalism, laws on 
the books pertaining to moral hazard – most importantly regarding property rights and interest – 
have consistently been influenced by power (Brumbaugh, et al., 2000).380  
In the end, the quest for delineating what is considered ‘just money’ has been made 
evident by asking a series of questions. One was: what is money? As we have seen, it matters not 
what money is represented by, but who defines, and thus, controls it. If it is an IOU, then it 
should serve as a part of the commons and access to it should be equitable. Another question 
was: who should have the right to charge for the creation of money? To that, some argue that it 
should come into being as an act of law, as a state duty. However, liberals of all sorts argue that 
since states have historically abused that power, it should be delegated to private control in an 
ostensibly ‘free market’. However, we can see that this is where more exploitation has occurred. 
Hence, it should be part of the consultative political process. However, in contemporary practice, 
                                                 
380 The greatest example of this is the repeal of the Banking Act of 1933. Known informally as the Glass Steagal 
Act, it prevented banks from being both commercial banks and investment banks. It stopped speculative investments 
with the public’s money. Investment banks could take risks, but not with government securities and the money 
supply people relied on. Starting in the 1960s lobbyists chipped away at the legislation slowly allowing banks to 
engage in unlimited wealth speculation. The statute was officially repealed by the Clinton and Bush administrations 
in 1999 and 2000. The result was a casino-like economy, which led to the housing bubble and global recession. In 
the aftermath U.S. Senators began pushing to renew the act in 2013. With the legal framework in place allowing 
banks to speculate with the public’s money and reap benefits from usury, dystopia has become reality. 
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money creation has been sequestered to the private sector. The result has led to privatization, and 
then to monopolization of money production by individuals in banks who are not accountable to 
the public, nor are they beholden to the political process. As a result, a reoccurring pattern is 
evident. Whenever society loses control over the money power, it loses its full sovereignty. Thus, 
the two elements are inseparable.  
However, as much as liberals, libertarians and statists disagree on who should ideally 
create and control money, they do unite behind one major important factor: the justification for 
charging interest. Therefore, an additional question asked was: is it ethical to charge a 
compounding opportunity cost on money that has almost no opportunity cost? It is oft 
overlooked in discussing exchange parameters that human beings have sought to domineer and 
dominate each other through many avenues, certainly not excluding economic means, throughout 
history. If it is as Hallaq asserts, “Politics is war by other means” then “knowledge–including 
academia–is politics-cum-war by other means” (2014, p. 1). Therefore, the form and presentation 
of knowledge should never change that. Economic discourse is unfortunately not studied in that 
context, in a manner that narrates the perennial fight to control resources, definitions and 
parameters, including the negotiation of concepts like money, its creation and distribution. This 
is how the ideological support for compound interest charges must be framed, if it is to be 
understood from an ethical point of view. Being able to define such truths tacitly occupies the 
most important aspect of the dominance over knowledge, for knowledge is informed by 
dominant discourses. 
We have seen in Chapters 1 and 2 that capitalism is a very value-laden system, with deep 
suppositions about the place of man in the hierarchy of the universe. Thus, according to this 
cosmology, scholars of economics (as a discipline separated from moral policy) opine that 
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charging interest is in itself ‘good’ because it serves a functional purpose, as the price of money. 
This utilitarian approach to knowledge has produced a very reductionist version of science best 
renamed ‘scientism’ (Nasr, 1968).381 Eaton (1985) remarks, “The modern Westerner, persuaded 
that he has a right to ‘think for himself’ and imagining that he exercises this right, is unwilling to 
acknowledge that his every thought has been shaped by cultural and historical influences and that 
his opinions fit, like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, into a pattern which has nothing random about it” 
(p. 28). This is the essence of what a paradigm is, in a Kuhnian sense, an entire way of thinking 
about reality. Capitalism is very much a paradigm, and its framing has entirely changed 
traditional concepts on what is considered right or wrong behavior in marketplaces. 
Accordingly, in Chapter 3, I contrasted the complexities of both the idiosyncratic nature 
of the Western episteme, and an Islam-inspired normative ethics from a viewpoint dissimilar to 
that of the Western normative tradition (Nasr, 1994).382 This provided a normative framework to 
analyze discourse, and the framing of historical events, terms and concepts. In an innovative 
attempt, this maqasid methodology was extended and expanded in Chapter 4 into the theoretical 
realm of exchange. This was done by contextualizing riba and analyzing a few events in the 
early Islamic period as well as identifying that similar values have already been adopted in 
contemporary monetary reform and sustainability spheres, which Muslims have largely 
overlooked and under-supported in their quests to create distinctly ‘Islamic’ economic spheres. 
Islam does not have an economic system per se. Islam is purely a framework for people to use. 
This is why scholastic scholarship never developed a consensus theory on justice, money or 
                                                 
381 In this work, (a book he wrote in the 1960s) Nasr contends that Islamic philosophy provides a better explanation 
for our hierarchy of existence, and that with the lens that understanding provides, all action taken in stewarding the 
earth thereafter will be done with a wisdom that encompasses more than just a materialist understanding of nature.  
382 Nasr elaborates on page 25, “It is for Muslim scholars to study the whole history of Islamic science completely 
and not only the chapters and periods which influenced Western science. It is also for Muslim scholars to present the 
tradition of Islamic science from the point of view of Islam itself and not from the point of view of the scientism, 
rationalism and positivism which have dominated the history of science in the West since the establishment of the 
discipline in the early part of the 20th century in Europe and America”. 
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markets. Thus, in remaining faithful to principles, the chapter highlighted that existing ethical 
paradigms and monetary reform movements already exist, and that they deserve the energies that 
are being misdirected towards IBF. 
Chapter 5 attempted to explain why these ethical avenues are being overlooked and have 
continued to receive little to no support from Muslim polities, which have instead chosen to 
adopt replications of political and economic infrastructures that colonial projects installed and 
left behind. This led to necessitating a historical analysis of how and why Muslims could then 
adopt such visibly obvious and morally contradictory institutions, and how they could be 
brazenly touted as ‘Islamic’. Chapter 5 also covered some of the political decisions and 
trajectories traversed by Muslims in the 20th century. The phenomena was best explained by 
contextualizing a postcolonial understanding of power – or to use a term from Foucault – 
‘Biopower’ and the permeation of different levels of self-policing and falling in line (Foucault & 
Hurley, 1976).  
Several forces were simultaneously at work: postcolonial mindsets (or ‘colonized minds’ 
to use Albert Memmi’s term) were reconstructing the visions of themselves as the ‘not-other’ 
and indiscriminately adopting an episteme from the West with its own idiosyncratic way of 
looking at the universe. Adopting this mindset uprooted the way Shariah had traditionally 
functioned in Islamic societies, as something decentralized. Shariah became something punitive. 
Although historically it was not a punitive system simply focused on punishments, a new Shariah 
understanding emerged, largely centered on incorporating extraneous practices via the 
manipulation of the maslahah concept in order to accommodate the contemporary governing 
paradigm, which simply happened to be capitalism. Tripp (2006) adds that Abduh altered his 
delineation of maslahah to “anything which contributes to the material prosperity and cohesion 
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of the society as a whole” (p. 25). His teacher, Jamal al-din Afghani also promoted a 
functionalist vision that Muslims in every era would “be the main criterion for determining what 
was acceptable” (p. 26). This sentiment also appeared in the writings of anti-imperialists like the 
Lebanese writer Shakib Arslan (d. 1946) and the secularist Young Turks (Keddie, 1969).383 
Critics of the monumental thrust towards embracing capitalism were ostracized, which led to 
further fragmentation among Muslims, and in many cases, provided the fodder necessary for 
creating new political offshoots and movements (Taji-Farouki, 1996).384  
Whereas in the West, neoliberalism dominated, and since the West dominated it was 
eventually foisted on others in a hegemonic manner. The term was first coined by the German 
sociologist Alexander Rustow (d. 1963) as the promotion of a ‘middle-way’ of oscillation 
between classical liberalism and collectivist pluralism. Nevertheless, its nefarious quintessence 
has been made manifest in the examination of its practices, most succinctly critiqued by the likes 
of Harvey, Chomsky and Steiglitz (Rodrik, 2006).385 Besides all indications that the capitalist 
system, and especially neoliberalism, was unworkable in Islamic terms, a class of modernists and 
                                                 
383 Abduh made arguments citing Najm al-Din al-Tufi, as well as Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi (d. 1914). The major 
assumption by all of these thinkers was that God being rational would never prohibit something beneficial and 
would thus allow anything beneficial, which contributed to the functionalist application that was trending in 
philosophy at that time.  
384 As early as the 1950’s for example there was Al-Nabhani (d. 1977) the Palestinian leader who became 
disillusioned with nationalism because it had failed to protect his country’s sovereignty. His vociferous attack of 
capitalism and promotion of a renewed economic vision based on Islamic principles was not widely accepted. This 
led to the development of the Pan-Islamic organization Hizb Ut Tahrir. 
385 The irony and duplicity of it all was that the promotion of strict laissez faire principles in the United States post 
WW II was extolled selectively to the lower social classes and poverty stricken countries that needed to be taught 
the stern lesson of fiscal responsibility, whereas history reveals that every single industrialized Western nation 
developed under governmental protectionism. In other words, governmental protectionism was reserved for the elite 
and wealthy who were the closest to governmental power, hence, neoliberalism has been exposed as a system 
wherein the wealthy class remains protected and the common person is exploited in sundry ways. But neoliberalism 
really became popularized as it was promoted by the American Central Intelligence Agency as an instrument of 
propaganda used to combat any socialist tendencies during the Cold War. It later became widely-known that it was 
purely a program of prohibiting the long-standing cultural and religious practices of regional areas in order to open 
up markets to allowing capitalist penetration by Western multinational corporations looking to maximize profits by 
any means necessary. Examples like Pinochet’s Chile (1973-1990) among other failed experiments gave 
neoliberalism a bad name and its use declined in literature although its techniques and mechanisms were 
wholeheartedly retained by arrangements like the Washington Consensus. In contemporary literature it now means 
more or less the rejection of economic structuralism. 
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reformists emerged in the 20th century to Islamize banking. Islam was broken down to a system 
of theoretical principles detached from its normative traditions and practices. In keeping with the 
Islamic notion of hasn al-dhann (holding a lofty opinion), it seems best to vindicate individual 
actors, but to criticize the collective direction taken. It perhaps may be as Warde claims, that IBF 
is victim to an already established game (Warde, 2000). Others remark that IBF proponents, even 
if in naivety, sincerely believed that what was supposed to take place was an ‘Islamization’ that 
would translate into distributive justice (Pollard & Samers, 2007). On the geopolitical level, 
massive demand for oil only being sold in denominations of the U.S. dollar meant driving 
demand for the currency. This guaranteed U.S. hegemony, but allowed a monopoly to exploit its 
temporal authority as a political tool; “The origins of the policies become public in 1975, when 
Henry Kissinger stated the US was prepared to wage war over oil” (Clarke, 2005, p. 1).386  
Thus, Chapter 6 took into consideration the aforementioned conundrums, political and 
otherwise, in a multi-scale critique of IBF in order that an ethical approach can support ‘moving 
beyond’ it. It examined how IBF dishonestly communicates to potential customers regarding the 
semantics of its products by alleging to adhere to PLS models, which it discarded with decades 
ago in exchange for products that charge implied interest and guarantee profits. It also covered 
how academics are noticing this subterfuge, even as the wider discourse sometimes corroborates 
IBF claims, possibly because of its lucrativeness. It further described several ways IBF operates 
                                                 
386 Clarke (2005) mentions that these policies have enriched U.S. elites, and the elites of U.S. allies at the expense of 
average citizens and their potential prosperities. As a result, the definition of what constitutes ‘money’ under the 
long-standing present arrangement is tantamount to a quantified level of distributive injustice for the majority. 
Moreover, citizen populations are forced to pay for the related inflation, accumulating interest on government bonds, 
deficit spending due to expansionary wars of aggression, and bailouts of private banking firms with nepotistic 
connections to lawmakers. Since the Bretton Woods accord in 1944, the U.S. Dollar has served as the world 
currency, the dominant currency of world trade in the late 20th and early 21st century, still used in roughly 60% of 
transactions, although, that status is diminishing. That status, however, is declining due to various factors of 
mismanagement. Meanwhile China and other nations are making instrumental plans to replace the global currency. 
Part of their rhetoric is to mention that the U.S. Dollar has lost more than 96 percent of its value since the Federal 
Reserve was created in 1913. This, however, is the nature of all fiat money. 
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as a legalistic and ethical breach of the Islamic tradition and how it maintains a macro system of 
injustice. 
 Friedrich List argued in (1841) The National System of Political Economy, that while the 
rich have proclaimed adherence to ‘free trade’ they have all the while been dependent upon state 
bailouts (Turner, 1962).387 Capitalism is then, a system that perennially exploits labor in many 
ways; it is also an unjust system of distribution through unequal pay for equally productive labor. 
The adulation of its principles is antithetical to an ethical envisioning of equitability (qist) and 
distributive or legal justice (‘adl). For what it allows is the transference of the wealth from the 
poor to the wealthy on a systematic scale. For instance, “People in rich countries consume up to 
10 times more natural resources than those in the poorest countries” (Giljum, 2009, p. 3). Where 
are the resources coming from? In earnest, the imbalance is siphoned from the exploited labor of 
those who do equally productive work for a fraction of the pay – and this is called ‘free market’ 
liberal trade. All of these exploitive aspects are better reframed as overlooked tangential aspects 
(abwab) of riba. 
So, returning to the question: is the money created by banks just? Well, the question we 
must ask is since credit is just a promise, should not everyone then have equitable access to it as 
a fundamental right, not in equal amounts, of course, but in amounts commensurate to 
creditworthiness? It should be so. However, the contemporary arrangement does not allow it 
unless one has an approved bank charter from the state in order to start one’s own credit issuing 
institution, which is beyond the financial ability of almost all average citizens (Allen & Rai, 
                                                 
387 Turner further discuss how Britain first spread the ‘gospel’ of free trade to the nations it colonized. Initially 
Britain intentionally tried to destroy American industries in their infancy by selling America manufactured goods 
below cost even though British manufacturers had to take a hit because they thought it worthwhile in order to stifle 
the rise of American manufacturing by manipulating the market and getting it hooked to cheap goods. 
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1996).388 Moreover, the world’s tradable currencies are assigned their values largely by 
individuals speculating from behind computer screens regarding the prosperity and posterity of 
nations. In order to raise funds, countries sell interest-bearing bonds, which perpetually increase 
the debts of sovereign nations in order to pay dividends to private, wealthy bondholders. This 
overview details a system that is far from implementing distributive economic justice. It is all 
allowed because of human interpretations of human created laws, which means that humans also 
possess the agency to ethically identify wrongs and enact legislation to remedy such problems. 
 
Part 2: Theoretical Contributions  
 
Speaking of the pursuit of knowledge, Midgely (1989) writes, “None of us can study 
anything properly unless we do it with our whole being” (p. 51). However, few are able to 
immerse themselves that deeply in thought. On the outside of such capacities, we should consult 
erudition, and despite their differing approaches, what Hamza Yusuf and Tariq Ramadan both 
agree on is that within Islamic thought the political process cannot be separated from ethics. 
This, then, extends as well to politically related business interactions, like banking, money 
creation and distributing claims on resources (Triandis, 1995).389  
Using their dialogue about reforming and reframing issues as a driver to examine 
discourses, this research has intentionally stepped outside of the frames that colleges of business 
use to shape the parameters for economic potentialities, the very departments where Islamic 
                                                 
388 The biggest difficulty in obtaining a bank charter is getting the debt profile approved and securing financing, 
which necessitates on average at least $20 million in capital in addition to an approved debt portfolio. 
389 Like all systems, the Islamic ethos too has certain prescriptions for what can, and cannot be commoditized in the 
market. According to Triandis’s delineation, Muslims in the market should theoretically feel that they belong to the 
collectivist camp rather than feeling pure adherence to the individualist school’s approach to self-maximization. 
This, he argues, should thereby cause the sensory notion that there is a greater responsibility incumbent upon them. 
This approach is paradoxical to the ultra-utilitarian approach. 
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and/or pseudo Islamic banking is negotiated and as an idea. This research has argued that the 
phenomenon that used to be known within several traditions as usury is today accepted in its 
same form under the term interest, and that its acceptance has had an enormous effect on the way 
money is now understood. The term riba shares many of the same characteristics, but is in many 
ways still not a cognate, and Muslim discourse has suffered as it has largely failed to articulate 
riba in a way that can be concretely understood in a contemporary setting, which is why it is so 
easy to circumvent its prohibition. How money is understood seems to emanate from ideology 
interjected into discourse by those benefitting from the societal understanding remaining as such. 
Therefore, upon this discovery, some of the false assumptions that economics has 
embraced have been abandoned herein in an attempt at framings issues in a just manner, which 
has expanded the real and imaginational possibilities. In doing so, this work has presented 
alternative factors for explaining the development, maintenance and discourse surrounding IBF 
as a phenomenon, as an inorganic result of other phenomena, namely ideology and power.  
 
Part 3: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The uniting themes of this research are that the power of money creation can either 
potentially distribute justice, or inequity, and that the mechanism of interest can incite disparities 
that lead to social injustice. Therefore, debt and interest must be recognized for their propensity 
to be used as financial weapons, which if not kept in check, can sanction the concentration of 
power. Hence, in order to safeguard social justice what is needed is supervision, oversight, 
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governance and a range of protectionist policies in order to preserve a just marketplace for all to 
operate within unmolested; this marketplace, then, requires a just exchange mechanism.  
Just-money, or interest-free credit, functioning as a part of the societal commons can 
enrich and enhance society and civic institutions if rights are distributed impartially, most 
important of which are the rights over money creation and legitimate access to credit. Important 
to mention is that the prevailing economic order in any nation categorically boils down to 
whether or not the existent political will advocates for just economic policies. This negotiation of 
the limits of power and rights is perennial, and cannot be taken for granted. It is possibly naïve to 
assume that the political conditions presently exist to implement such a transition. However, 
simply reframing the issue is an act of empowerment, and may therefore be included amongst the 
numerous catalysts for movement towards more ethical possibilities. 
There are different theories about how mass communication circulates; the two-step flow 
theory emerged out of a rejection of the idea that the media simply impregnates certain 
consciousness into people in the manner that a hypodermic needle does a patient. Its contention, 
that information is disseminated from opinion leaders who have formed their opinions based on 
their interpretations of media, can find relevance here, where Muslim scholars are at the 
receiving end of systematic misinformation that is interpreted by ‘scholars’ of economics. Such 
Muslim jurists are reliant on their information gathering systems to deliver to them accurate 
summations of complex issues so that the fatwas they issue can reflect their deep ascertainment 
of complexities. Islamic scholars, however, seem to be at the lowest level of ascertainment under 
the aegis of the capitalist paradigm, which is reflected in their consistent endorsement of 
negligent profit-driven products and policies largely inconsistent with the Islamic ethos.  
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Thus, since scholars have studied economics without understanding the trenchant critique 
of it by centuries of monetary reformers, the roadmap towards greater possibilities has been 
obfuscated. As Professor David Miles, a member of the Monetary Policy of the Bank of England 
concedes, “The way monetary economics and banking is taught in many, maybe most, 
universities is misleading” (Ryan-Collins, 2011, p. 1). As a result, IBF has established a trend of 
recruiting practitioners trained in, and committed to mainstream economic models. Hence, the 
institutions are run by people who are quickly given “short courses” about the abstract principles 
of ‘Islamic’ finance, all of which is objectionable (Pollard & Samers, 2007, p. 322). Thus, 
unfortunately Kuran may be correct in his assertion that “Islamic banking, in its current form, 
will go down in history as a mighty deceit based on an operational principle that is simply 
unfeasible. Islamic banks give and take interest as a matter of course, though under the guise of 
commissions, fees, penalties or profit shares” (Barnes, 2013) 
Recently though, there have been certain fatwas reflecting a growing cognizance of some 
of the issues, which lament the previous generation’s endorsement of fallacious financial 
products that have turned out to be nothing more than more expensive versions of conventional 
products (AMJA, 2014).390 Although this is a positive trend, it is not going far enough. Muslims 
and those adhering to theological and moral codes should understand that monetary reformers 
have been critical of these very injustices for centuries. Therefore, it would behoove all 
                                                 
390 “The AMJA Fiqh Committee Resident Fatwa Committee met in Houston on the 20-22 of Dhul-Qadah 1435 A.H. 
(September 15-17 2014 C.E.) in order to issue a resolution concerning Islamic Home Financing in the United States. 
This meeting took place after an entire conference had previously been held on this topic, in which papers were 
discussed in the presence and with the participation of representatives of most of the relevant companies. This was 
followed up by correspondence between the Resident Fatwa Committee Fiqh Committee and those companies with 
an attempt to clarify and respond to the Shareeah issues that are present in their contracts. Sh. Jamaal Zarabozo also 
participated in this meeting in Houston. After looking into the matter, the Committee Resident Fatwa Committee 
(RFC) decided upon, according to the majority of its members, the following resolution:” The resolution that 
followed was a listing of non-compliant institutions and the specific violations they encroached upon, knowingly. 
However, with all of this said, the fatwa is not of the transcendent type and its conclusions leave much to be desired.  
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likeminded individuals to galvanize support for those who best articulate the problems and 
solutions. If this shift is not made quickly, those associated with IFIs may find themselves on the 
wrong side of history, as an awareness is now considerably present within mainstream 
consciousness, best encapsulated in op-ed titles like Graeber’s (2014) “The truth is out: money is 
just an IOU, and the banks are rolling in it”.391  
Therefore, the entire approach of Muslim scholars needs to change in understanding 
exchange, banking and money – modern fatawa cannot rely on the medieval fatawa discussing 
gold coins or silent partnerships and use the same ‘illah (ratio legis/reason for law). Moreover, 
they can no longer make the circular analysis of analyzing a phenomenon (banking) within the 
framework of the very assumptions that the phenomenon has created (economics). For making 
macro analyses about economic systems an intellectual undertaking (ijtihad) needs to take place 
that makes use of newly available knowledge discovered in behavioral economics, and also in 
several ‘non-economic’ fields, including the field of ‘systems analysis’.  
The problem for an Islamic inquiry into this area is that more traps lie in wait. There is 
quite a lot of research funded by corporate interests that has the potential to subvert ethical 
analyses. Take for example the Santa Fe Institute’s inquiry into complexity economics, which 
applies complexity science towards looking at the economy. A positive aspect of it is that it 
avoids the presumption, now proven false, that the economy is a system in equilibrium. 
However, the metrics, measurements and aspirations (all of which can be done differently by 
using the maqasid) reach conclusions that still present ethical challenges. Another illustration is 
                                                 
391 “The Bank of England's dose of honesty throws the theoretical basis for austerity out the window” because a 
recent Bank of England paper has “let the cat out of the bag” according to Graeber (p.1). He is referring to a paper 
found on the Bank of England’s website titled “Money creation in the modern Economy” by Michael McLeay, 
Amar Radla and Ryland Thomas of the bank’s Monetary Analysis Directorate, Quarterly Bulletin Q1, (2014). The 
rise of this type of analysis is especially articulate in anthropology and behavioural studies related to the economy. 
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the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) developed by Hausman and Hidalgo, which still uses 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a tool of measurement in order to predict future growth 
(Framer, 1999).392 It is a positive development to see people move away from “a strict adherence 
to the holy trinity – rationality, selfishness, and equilibrium” by using recursive economics and 
dynamic systems (Colander, et al., 2004, p. 485). However, even challenging these assumptions 
is still repelled and met with resistance within economics. Complexity economics is now 
considered mainstream, but just not ‘orthodox’.  
Any model or system that is still connected to the idea of outright promoting ‘growth’ is 
part of the problem. Growth is not ‘green’ sustainable. Mora and Sale’s (2011) study that 
projects the need for “27 earths” by 2050 calls us to action; “Recognizing that biodiversity loss is 
intrinsically related to our high demand for ecological resources suggests to us that global 
initiatives need to address our demand for resources more directly if preservation of biodiversity 
is to be achieved” (p. 261). Ethically, the Muslim response to this should be immediate. The first 
action could plausibly be to ‘cease and desist’ all projects that fail to consider a higher purpose. 
There is a hope that some of the right moves are taking place, however, text and talk about 
‘Islamic’ financing can be misdirected towards avenues that only recreate systems that have 
already proven to be exploitative. Included in this genre would be micro-credit operations like 
Bendigo Bank in Australia and Grameen Bank, wherein interest rates being charged to the poor 
reach as high as 20%.  
                                                 
392 This is still more of the extension of the status quo, and not nearly a dynamic enough shift to affect change. It is 
to be expected that research will continue to be governed by the over-arching paradigm. Although the Santa Fe 
Institute has some marvelous research being undertaken, we can see that the people at the helm and the funding 
sources have connections to the banking sector in various ways. For instance, Michael Mauboussin of Credit Swiss 
has chaired the board of trustees, and George Soros has been linked with the institute throughout the decades. 
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Taxing the money supply through compound interest simply leads to the mathematical 
necessity of negative externalities and therefore continuing to support it ideologically should 
now be viewed as archaic, unnecessary and unjust. Leo Tolstoy has commented aptly:  
 
If a theory justifies the false position which a certain part of society is in, then, 
however baseless and even obviously false the theory may be, it will get adopted 
and become the belief of that part of society…However baseless theories of this 
sort may be, however contradictory they may be to everything mankind knows 
and recognizes, however obviously immoral they may be, they are accepted on 
faith, without criticism, and are preached with passionate enthusiasm, sometimes 
for centuries, until the conditions they justify are done away with or the absurdity 
of the theories becomes too obvious (Tolstoy & Maude, 2008, p. 56). 
 
It is highly unlikely that states will be the initiators of change because of the political 
capture expounded in Chapters 5 and 6, a fact that has been lamented by other critical reviews of 
IBF, for instance, in Ayub’s work (2007). In fact, if the nation state has proven anything it is 
Hallaq’s assertion in Impossible State (2012) that the nation state often acts as an inhibitor to 
positive changes in the Muslim world. However, the lack of state support matters not. 
Likeminded ethical people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, should understand that they are not 
without recourse. To the contrary, there are several possible courses of actions (Chomsky, 
1997).393 Because, what seems easier, trying to prohibit banking and interest, or providing people 
with access to interest-free credit?  
 
7.3.1 Final Thought: Changing the Approach to Exchange 
                                                 
393 It should first be prefaced that the idea of taking a perennial money power conglomeration head on should be 
discarded with immediately. It is an exercise in futility. As Chomsky says, there is no point of speaking truth to 




The way economics is taught must change. It must be understood that the self-interest 
postulate does not serve well as an independent discipline and that continuing to immerse young 
minds in an educational curriculum that alleges to explain all economic phenomena through this 
postulate only perpetuates the problem. Instead, economic inquiry needs to be approached by 
trying to fulfill higher objectives. IBF contains too many ethical conflicts with the Islamic 
tradition to be considered a moral avenue for governing economic exchange moving forward. I 
further suggest that the true ethical monetary reform seems to be in developing interest-free 
money, mutual credit, alternative currencies, and microfinance and sustainability projects. This 
path is less glamorous and likely less profitable. IBF needs to redefine itself as ‘ethical and 
sustainable credit facilitating’ or resign to the fact that it is just another contributor to increasing 
environmental hazards and social degradation. If Muslims want certain credit unions to avoid the 
financing of items like pork or alcohol they can exercise their agency through holding majority 
shares in institutions that embody such ethicality. The adjectival use of ‘Islamic’ is redundant if 
the objectives are universal ethical principles. Alternative possibilities are not pie in the sky 
ideals, but are already tangible in burgeoning areas (for instance, Green QE) (Pettifor, 2013). It 
really is as simple as that. 
Approximately 97% the world’s credit is forcibly rented from for-profit banks as an 
interest-based debt. Some have unfortunately lent religious credibility to this general 
arrangement, and are profiting from it. This is clearly unethical; hence, such operations will 
increasingly face criticism as discourse circulates this knowledge. Nevertheless, the capitalist 
trajectory that has shaped how money as an idea is negotiated in discourse may have reached a 
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